Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Department of Transportation (Department) may suspend Leo J. Squire’s license pursuant to Article IV of the Driver’s License Compact (Compact), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1581, Art. IV, based upon an out-of-state conviction that does not require a level of impairment which is substantially similar in nature to that required by Article IV(a)(2). The majority recognizes that Article IV still mandates a greater level of impairment than the New York driving while ability impaired (DWAI) statute, N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1192(1). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly held in Petrovich v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 559 Pa. 614, 741 A.2d 1264 (1999), that the New York DWAI statute is not of a substantially similar nature to Article IV(a)(2).
The majority nevertheless concludes that the Department may suspend Squire’s license under the Compact because of the enactment of Section 1586 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1586. The majority appears to conclude that Section 1586 has amended the Compact in Pennsylvania such that an out-of-state driving under the influence (DUI) statute need require only that the driver’s ability to operate a motor vehicle be impaired to any degree in order to provide a basis for reciprocal suspension *1229for purposes of Article IV of the Compact. I cannot agree that Section 1586 has wrought such a sweeping change.
The relevant language of Section 1586 provides merely that a difference in the degree of impairment between the out-of-state DUI statute and the Pennsylvania DUI statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, may not provide a basis for determining that the out-of-state DUI statute is not substantially similar for purposes of analysis under Article IV of the Compact. Nothing in Section 1586 eliminates the Compact’s requirement that the language of the out-of-state DUI statute be substantially similar in nature to Article IV(a)(2) of the Compact. Thus, among other things, the language of the statute must have an effect substantially similar to a requirement that the driver be impaired to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle. The New York DWAI statute does not require such a degree of impairment, and therefore it cannot provide a basis for reciprocal suspension for purposes of Article IV of the Compact. Petrovich Accordingly, I dissent.