State v. Thomas

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,

dissenting.

I dissent. Contrary to the majority’s reasoning in remanding this case for further proceedings, I believe this record is abundantly clear that petitioner’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel to petitioner’s prejudice.1 Furthermore, as I see it, the only effect of the *194remand ordered by the majority is to make even more obvious how ineffective trial counsel’s performance really was.

The post conviction hearing judge determined that Kinsley had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel to petitioner:

I do conclude ... that under the Strickland v. Washington [466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ] standard Mr. Kinsley was ineffective in his representation of Mr. Thomas during the sentencing phase of this case. Now, it’s true Mr. Kinsley worked hard. It’s true Mr. Kinsley was vigorous in his representation of Mr. Thomas. But the incompetence of counsel standard is not measured by how loud a lawyer yells or frankly by how hard the lawyer works. If a lawyer makes a big mistake, no matter how well-intentioned the lawyer is and no matter how hard the lawyer has worked, that big mistake constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and here Mr. Kinsley made a big mistake in allowing Dr. Spodak to go unsupervised and unchaperoned down to interview Mr. Thomas, who, on the basis of Mr. Kinsley’s advice to him assumed that Dr. Spodak was there to be fair and impartial. Dr. Spodak was a State’s agent, interviewing the defendant to testify as a State’s witness and Mr. Kinsley should not have allowed Dr. Spodak to interview Mr. Thomas without being there himself or taking other appropriate safeguards to protect Mr. Thomas’ interest. Now, the State argues in the alternative, that assuming that Mr. Kinsley made a mistake, that mistake was not material to the sentence that Judge Hormes imposed in this case.
I read the testimony of Dr. Spodak, I have read the statements made by Judge Hormes when he imposed sentence in this case. I am affirmatively persuaded that the mistake Mr. Kinsley made, his error in judgment, did prejudice Mr. Thomas at that sentencing hearing. This isn’t a case where I can’t say one way or the other my mind is in a state of even balance. I am affirmatively *195persuaded that Dr. Spodak’s testimony, based upon his interview with Mr. Thomas, prejudiced Mr. Thomas at the sentencing proceeding.

Thus, it is clear that the court found ineffective assistance in counsel’s allowing Dr. Spodak to interview petitioner alone. It may also be inferred from the court’s reference to “other appropriate safeguards” that counsel’s failure to investigate, or, at least, inquire into the purpose of the evaluation before consenting to it was itself ineffective assistance of counsel as well.2 The court specifically did not find that the ineffective assistance of counsel was trial counsel’s failure to obtain, or present, psychiatric evidence at the sentencing proceeding.3 The court ordered a new sentencing hearing.

In its Application for Leave to Appeal,4 see Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27 § 645-1, as on appeal, the State argues that the decisions made by petitioner’s counsel, to permit petitioner to be evaluated by Dr. Spodak and to permit it to be done outside his presence, were tactical decisions and, consequently, could not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 695 (1984). Concerning counsel’s failure to attend the interview, the State maintains that, in any event, no prejudice flowed from that fact; rather, it arose only from what Dr. Spodak was able to elicit from petitioner during the *196interview.5 Alternatively, the State contends that it was entitled to explore what counsel knew as a result of his consultation with Dr. Beran, a doctor hired by him to conduct a pretrial competency evaluation. The court’s denial to it of that opportunity, the State maintains, requires vacation of its order of a new sentencing hearing. The majority finds merit in this alternative position,6 and orders the case remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Agreeing with the State’s alternative contention, the majority comments:

[i]t is clear that without Kinsley’s testimony concerning his understanding of the results of Dr. Beran’s examination of Thomas prior to trial, the post conviction court could not fairly or accurately determine whether Kinsley’s decisions in connection with the Spodak interview were deficient under the first prong of the Strickland *197test. For example, if Kinsley had been told by Dr. Beran that Thomas suffered from no mental impairment and exhibited the likelihood of future danger to society, then Kinsley’s decision to allow further examination in the hope of obtaining a favorable diagnosis may well have been reasonable.

At first blush, the majority’s observation has a surface— superficial — appeal. Nevertheless, with but minimal thought and analysis, its flaw soon becomes obvious.

Implicit in the majority’s position is that Kinsley was aware of the purpose of the Spodak evaluation, recognized that its results would be the subject of testimony at the sentencing hearing, and, perhaps, understood the significance of the fact that Dr. Spodak would conduct it, i.e. that Dr. Spodak was a State agent. Given the timing of the evaluation, the fact that the State requested it, and, perhaps, the contents of the petition, one could logically assume that at least the first two considerations were obvious. The testimony by Kinsley, however, negates any such assumption. Kinsley testified that he not only did not appreciate the purpose of the evaluation or anticipate that the results of the evaluation would be testified to at the sentencing hearing, but that he thought that Dr. Spodak simply wanted to update the already completed competency examination. And, as we shall see, his testimony revealed, furthermore, that the source of his belief was certain assumptions he made: he believed that Dr. Spodak was a neutral doctor, updating petitioner’s competency evaluation on behalf of Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center, and that Dr. Spodak would not attempt to obtain information for the purpose of benefitting or adversely affecting either the State or the defense.

A determination whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel, far from being a trivial matter, is a matter “of ... fundamental importance to our system of justice.” Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 424, 578 A.2d 734, 737 (1990), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 *198(1984). It is not enough “[t]hat a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685, 104 S.Ct. at 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692, since “the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, n. 14 (1970). Moreover, a capital sentencing proceeding “is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decisions,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-87, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693, citing Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 952-54, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3425-27, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134, 1145-1147 (1983); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), that the role of counsel in both is comparable. Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Furthermore, because the role of counsel is “to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards covering decisions”, id., whether counsel has rendered ineffective assistance must be determined by reference to whether his or her conduct “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced the just result.” Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692.

When evaluating the performance of counsel to determine whether it meets the minimum standard of effectiveness, the inquiry must be whether “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. In other words, counsel’s performance must have fallen “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.

Among the functions counsel is required to perform as part of his or her duty to render effective assistance of counsel is to be an effective advocate for his or her client.

[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct *199on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel’s function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.

Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.

In Strickland, as in the instant case, the duty alleged to have been breached was counsel’s duty to investigate. Addressing that duty, the Supreme Court stated:

Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigation unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.

Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695.

By Petition for Pre-sentence Psychiatric Evaluation, the State obtained a court order for the pre-sentence psychological evaluation of the petitioner by Dr. Michael Spodak. The petition the State filed, as Judge Eldridge pointed out, *200in dissent, see Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294, 344, 483 A.2d 6, 32 (1984), did not state, or even intimate, “that the examination and evaluation by Dr. Spodak would not be done in his capacity as a staff member of Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center and an employee of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene”; it implied,

[o]n the contrary ... that Dr. Spodak would be examining and evaluating Thomas as a member of the hospital staff, as it referred to the prior evaluation “at the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center,” referred to the hospital center’s .findings in the February 1982 report, referred to Dr. Spodak as one who participated in the previous Clifton T. Perkins evaluation, and stated that it is desirable to “supplement” the original evaluation.

Id.

The petition also indicated that the petitioner’s counsel “has no objection to such an evaluation” and, indeed, at the post conviction hearing, Kinsley confirmed that this was so. What counsel did not, and, in fact, could not, explain was why he did not object to the evaluation or, more to the point, why he did not investigate the need for it.

Kinsley testified at the post conviction hearing that he thought that the evaluation the State’s petition sought would be a routine kind of examination, similar to the pretrial competency examination which had been conducted at Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center. Thus, on direct examination, Kinsley responded to a question as to why he allowed Dr. Spodak to examine his client as follows: “So, I have a clear recollection of the whole request was simply a routine psychiatric examination.”. He also testified that he “understood [Spodak] to be a continuing employee of the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital” and that “[Spodak] was simply going to bring whatever he wanted to bring up-to-date.” The same theme was continued during cross-examination. For example, responding to the question why he did not call a psychiatrist to testify at the sentencing phase, Kinsley testified:

*201Because I felt sincerely that Spodak was a State of Maryland employee and he was hired initially to examine Donald Thomas at Clifton T. Perkins. I had no idea at all that Spodak was going to testify. I thought he was simply going to submit a performance-type follow-up psychiatric evaluation for the judge for the purpose of sentencing, not that he was going to come in court and testify. If I knew that, I would have wanted to have seen his written report to the State, and if I saw all of those things that he testified to at the sentencing hearing, God if I saw that, yes, I most certainly would have had a psychiatrist — the very best that money could buy.

In short, petitioner’s trial counsel testified that he acquiesced in the post-trial, presentence examination of his client by Dr. Spodak, a State agent, because he “felt that Spodak was in effect our psychiatrist. He was a State employee.” And because counsel believed the examination would be a mere update of the previously conducted competency examination, he felt no need to be present during the examination. Counsel’s testimony, both on direct and on cross-examination, thus indicates quite clearly that his conclusion concerning the nature of the examination was a product of conjecture or speculation, rather than considered judgment; since he made no inquiry and the State provided precious little useful information, it most certainly was not the result of a reasonable investigation or analysis of the information given him by the State. The record of the post conviction hearing clearly reflects that Kinsley did not ask the State why it desired to have petitioner evaluated or what it sought to learn from the evaluation; he simply inferred, presumably as a result of the petition filed with the court, that it was simply an extension of the competency evaluation.7

*202The choice made by Kinsley to allow Spodak to conduct a presentence examination of petitioner, even if a tactical or strategic choice,8 most assuredly was not one made after a “thorough investigation of the law and facts relevant to plausible options.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Notwithstanding that his client faced the death penalty and the ease with which it could have been done, the record does not reflect that counsel asked even one question regarding the purpose of, or need for, the examination or about the capacity in which Dr. Spodak would conduct it. Strickland recognizes that counsel “has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Assumptions made on the basis of an ambiguous record simply do not constitute “investigations,” especially when a few simple questions would have clarified precisely what the situation was. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693-94; Bowers, 320 Md. at 424, 578 A.2d at 738. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2588, 91 L.Ed.2d 305, 325-26 (1986). And a decision which renders a particular investigation unnecessary is reasonable only to the extent that it is supported by “reasonable professional judgments,” given *203the totality of the circumstances. When a decision is not the product of the exercise of professional judgment, only conjecture, speculation and assumption, it cannot be reasonable. The choices made by Kinsley in this case were not reasonable. His failure to investigate, i.e. to ask questions regarding the requested evaluation, was performance that fell far below any objective standard of reasonableness. So, too, was his decision to allow Dr. Spodak to conduct the examination alone. Again, counsel had no appreciation as to the significance of the examination, who was conducting it, or the use to be made of the results and without that pertinent information, it simply was unreasonable to allow one’s client to be examined alone.9

As an advocate for petitioner, Kinsley could not reasonably have entertained any hope of obtaining a favorable psychiatric report by agreeing to a psychiatric examination without, at the least, knowing its purpose, the role of the person conducting it, and the use to be made of the results. That is particularly true when he may have been aware of adverse information, gleaned from a pretrial examination that may have addressed petitioner’s future dangerousness. Counsel’s knowledge of adverse information does not make it available to the State for use by the State at a sentencing proceeding.10 Moreover, for counsel to have insured the availability of the information to the State by failing to investigate the factual circumstances surrounding the *204State’s request to evaluate his client simply exacerbates the extent to which counsel’s representation was ineffective. It is one thing to have information which may be adverse to the interest of one’s client, but it is quite another to deliver it, on a silver platter, to the advocate for the other side. That would be the precise practical effect of Kinsley’s consent to the psychiatric evaluation, knowing, or, at least, with reason to know, what it would reveal. This is especially the case when the result of counsel’s deficient performance may be, as here, imposition of the death penalty on counsel’s client. Therefore, as I see it, the only effect of the inquiry the majority now mandates is to further demonstrate, exacerbate, if you will, the full extent of the ineffective representation rendered by Kinsley in his handling of this matter.

. The State does not seriously contend, except insofar as the argument regarding counsel’s failure to attend the psychiatric interview is concerned, that counsel’s conduct, if deficient, did not prejudice petitioner. In any event, the trial court’s findings in that regard are quite clear, and, to my mind, amply supported by the record. See Harris v. State, 303 Md. 685, 699-701, 496 A.2d 1074, 1081-82 (1985). Consequently, I focus only on the deficient performance prong of the test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

. Even if the reference to “other appropriate safeguards" may not be construed to relate to counsel’s failure to investigate, the court may nevertheless still be right for the wrong reason. Faulkner v. State, 317 Md. 441, 447, 564 A.2d 785, 788 (1989); Temoney v. State, 290 Md. 251, 261, 429 A.2d 1018, 1023 (1981).

. This point has significance when one considers the alternative position taken by the State, which position has been accepted by the majority of this Court. See note 6 infra.

. Petitioner filed a cross-application for leave to appeal raising numerous issues, the merits of which the majority finds lacking. In view of the position I take with respect to the State’s application, it is unnecessary that I address the cross-application. In any event, as to those issues, I have no real quarrel with the result the majority reaches.

. Interestingly, the majority does not comment directly on the merits of the State's principal arguments. It may be, however, that implicit in the remand order to take additional testimony is a recognition by the majority that neither position has merit.

. I question whether the alternative argument made by the State is properly before us. At the post conviction hearing, there was a colloquy between the court and the State concerning the admissibility of the testimony at issue. During that colloquy, the court suggested that the State did not have any burden of proof with respect to the effective assistance of counsel issue. Responding to that observation, the prosecutor stated clearly, why he raised the issue despite not having the burden to do so:

I don’t shoulder the burden, but the risk by my not asking the question would be if the trial court would find that merely not hiring a psychiatrist before the sentencing phase was the ineffective assistance of counsel. If that is the conclusion that this Court would draw from that, then, of course, I would want to explore in more depth why counsel did not hire a psychiatrist, specifically Dr. Beran. If he had great things to say about Mr. Thomas, then Mr. Kinsley would have used him.

It is clear that the court made no such finding, i.e., that the ineffective assistance of counsel consisted of a failure to hire a psychiatrist for the sentencing phase. Since that was the basis upon which the State sought the testimony, it seems to me to be clear that the issue raised by its alternative argument is not preserved.

. Although the record is unclear on the timing of the objection, the trial transcript is quite clear that counsel objected, vigorously, to the testimony of Dr. Spodak. And the basis for that objection — because counsel "was under the impression that Dr. Spodak would see [petitioner] as a member of the staff of Clifton T. Perkins" — also appears *202clearly in the record. Furthermore, counsel stated, while objecting to Dr. Spodak's testimony, that had he known that Dr. Spodak was a State agent, an expert paid by the State, he would not have permitted access to his client and on that basis, moved to exclude Dr. Spodak's testimony.

. It is questionable that the choice was tactical or strategic. To be strategic, there must be an understanding of the available options and of their relative merit, and/or consequences. The reasonableness or acceptability of any of those options can only be assessed by reference to the totality of the circumstances. Kinsley's testimony reveals that he considered only one "option" and, as to it, not even the consequences of choosing it. See, e.g., People v. Bell, 152 Ill.App.3d 1007, 106 Ill.Dec. 59, 63, 505 N.E.2d 365, 369 (1987) (counsel’s failure to interview potential witnesses to determine whether their testimony would be useful to the defense theory of the case prevented the decision not to call any of them from being a tactical one).

. Trial counsel refrained from accompanying petitioner to the interview with Spodak because he assumed it was a competency update conducted by a neutral professional; had that assumption been true, that decision may well have been appropriate. On the other hand, he should not have relied upon assumption; he should have made inquiry as to the reason for the examination, the role of the person conducting it, etc. Failing to do that, had he attended the examination, he most probably would have discovered the true state of affairs and, thus, been able to salvage the situation.

. Under Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information, even if Kinsley knew that Dr. Beran assessed petitioner as being potentially dangerous in the future, as Dr. Spodak ultimately did, he was neither obligated, nor permitted, to reveal that fact to the court or the State.