Commonwealth v. Balisteri

CAVANAUGH, Judge,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition in the instant appeal. Initially, I note my agreement with the philosophy espoused by the majority, that is to provide restitution to a criminal victim for emotional and psychological damage. I feel constrained, however, to conclude that such a result was not within the contemplation of the Legislature.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h) is penal in nature and thereby is not subject to a broad or liberal interpretation. See Common*159wealth v. Clipper, 303 Pa.Super. 385, 449 A.2d 741 (1982); Commonwealth v. Broughton, 257 Pa.Super. 369, 390 A.2d 1282 (1978); Commonwealth v. Cluck, 252 Pa.Super. 228, 381 A.2d 472 (1977); Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928. The rationale behind the rule of strict construction of a penal statute is not only to give notice to one that their contemplated action is unlawful, but also to supply notice of the penalties which may evolve from their conduct. Commonwealth v. Broughton, supra. The majority’s interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h) would contravene the rationale of the above mentioned rule of construction. Furthermore, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h) was not drafted with the same general terminology as those criminal restitution statutes found in jurisdictions relied upon by the majority, as such we are prevented from exercising our discretion in such a fashion as our colleagues in those jurisdictions.

I would, therefore, conclude that it is for the Legislature to expand this statutory provision. In the interim, the victims in this matter would appear to have an adequate remedy at civil law.