Concurring and Dissenting.
¶ 1 As a result of a July 12, 1993, automobile accident which caused the death of Jayne Craley and seriously injured her son and her mother-in-law, State Farm8 filed the instant declaratory judgment action on September 15, 1997, at No. 97-9019 “for the purpose of determining a question in actual controversy between the parties as set forth below” (paragraph 4 of declaratory judgment action complaint).
¶ 2 State Farm alleged at paragraph 18 of its complaint, that “Jayne A. Craley and Russell Craley purchased non-stacking uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages and executed valid waivers of ‘stacking’ coverages.” At paragraph 19, State Farm alleged:
Under the applicable State Farm Fire and Casualty Company policies of insurance, and in particular endorsement 6997AG applicable to both policies, defendants are precluded from “stacking” the uninsured motorist coverage under the second household policy providing uninsured motorist coverage.
¶ 3 The docket reflects that on October 29, 1997, due to the absence of any factual disputes, the parties submitted a stipulation “that [the] action may be decided by *791declaratory judgment.” The docket further reflects that on March 20, 1998, a certificate of readiness for trial was filed, “Jury and Non-Jury Trial waived”, and that, thereafter, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts, as well as briefs and proposed conclusions of law. The trial court filed a decision on December 22, 1998, which provided that “Randall P. Craley in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Jayne Ann Craley and as parent and natural guardian of Keith P. Craley and Gloria M. Craley are entitled to recover the following uninsured motorist benefits from State Farm Fire and Casualty Company — $90,000.00.” This ruling, pursuant to well-settled law of our Supreme Court, was a final, appealable order. State Farm9, rather than requesting reconsideration and entry of an order vacating the order of December 22, 1998, pending action by the court on its motion for reconsideration, filed post-trial motions on January 4, 1999. The appellees filed post-trial motions on January 12, 1999. Due to the passage of 30 days, the order of December 22, 1998, became final on January 21, 1999. See: General Accident Co. of America v. Allen, 547 Pa. 693, 706-707, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (1997). Fifteen months thereafter, by order dated April 26, 2000, the post-trial motions filed by State Farm were denied and the appellees’ post-trial motions were granted, as a result of which the verdict was amended from $90,000 to $30,0000. State Farm, on May 25, 2000, filed a praecipe to enter judgment and a notice of appeal to this Court.
¶ 4 As the learned author of the majority opinion and my distinguished colleagues of the majority have opined, our Supreme Court in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wickett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (2000), in clear and certain terms faulted attempts by this Court “to ignore the plain and unambiguous language of a statute” and held that:
Section 7532 simply states that an order in a declaratory judgment action that either -affirmatively or negatively declares the rights and duties of the parties constitutes a final order. As the above discussion explains, that is exactly what the trial court’s September 9, 1996, orders did. Therefore, the trial court’s orders constituted final orders pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2), and the trial court was without jurisdiction to reconsider them more than thirty days after their entry. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Wickett, supra at 604, 763 A.2d at 818. Nor was the decision of the Supreme Court in Wickett an expression of a new interpretation of Section 7532 of the Judicial Code. See e.g.: General Accident Insurance Company of America v. Allen, supra; Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gisler, 764 A.2d 1111, 1113 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, - Pa. —, 782 A.2d 548, 2001 Pa. LEXIS, 1564 (Pa. July 24, 2001); Redevelopment Authority of Cambria County v. International Insurance Co., 454 Pa.Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581, 586 (1996)(en banc), appeal denied, 548 Pa. 649, 695 A.2d 787 (1997); Warner v. Continental/CNA Insurance Companies, 455 Pa.Super. 295, 688 A.2d 177, 179 (1996), appeal denied, 548 Pa. 660, 698 A.2d 68 (1997).
¶ 5 The usual procedure in declaratory judgments, where, as here, the facts are not in dispute, is for the parties to file cross motions for summary judgment and for the appeal to be taken directly from *792the order granting summary judgment. See, e.g.: Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380 (Pa.Super.2000); Standish v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., 698 A.2d 599 (Pa.Super.1997); Pempkowski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 451 Pa.Super. 61, 678 A.2d 398 (1996), affirmed, 548 Pa. 23, 693 A.2d 201 (1997); Bowers by Brown v. Estate of Feathers, 448 Pa.Super. 263, 671 A.2d 695 (1995), appeal denied, 550 Pa. 696, 705 A.2d 1303 (1997); Equibank v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 426 Pa.Super. 354, 626 A.2d 1243 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 605, 641 A.2d 306 (1994); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 441 Pa.Super. 446, 657 A.2d 1252 (1995), reversed, 549 Pa. 518, 701 A.2d 1330 (1997); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Broughton, 423 Pa.Super. 519, 621 A.2d 654 (1993) (en banc).
¶ 6 Nevertheless, a motion for summary judgment is not the sole means by which to resolve a declaratory judgment action. The parties in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Martin, 442 Pa.Super. 442, 660 A.2d 66 (1995), just as have the parties in the instant case, stipulated to the facts which were then submitted to the court for declaratory judgment. The appeal was properly taken by State Farm directly from “the order entering declaratory judgment in favor of appellees ...." Id. at 68.
¶ 7 Had that procedure10 been followed in the instant case, this Court would have had jurisdiction to vacate the December 22, 1998, order, since the jurisdiction of this Court extends only to appeals filed within thirty days of the entry of a final order.
¶ 8 A study of declaratory judgment appeals over the past decade reveals a number of decisions, but no certain authority. See: Widener University, Inc. v. Estate of Boettner, 726 A.2d 1059, 1061 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 678, 749 A.2d 472 (2000) (in declaratory judgment action appeal followed the denial of defendant’s exceptions to the decree). Bangor Area Education Association v. Angle, 720 A.2d 198 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998), affirmed per curiam, 561 Pa. 305, 750 A.2d 282 (2000) (in declaratory judgment action, appeal filed following denial of exceptions to order captioned “decree nisi”); State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Levine, 389 Pa.Super. 1, 566 A.2d 318 (1989) (appeal taken following denial of post-trial motion filed after verdict in jury trial held in declaratory judgment action brought to determine if insurer had duty to defend); Acceptance Insurance Co. v. Seybert, 757 A.2d 380, 381 (Pa.Super.2000) (appeal filed after denial of “Exceptions to Adjudication”, filed to order granting summary judgment in favor of insurer in declaratory judgment action); Kmonk-Sullivan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 746 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal granted, 565 Pa. 647, 771 A.2d 1285 (2001) (appeal filed following denial of post-trial motion to adjudication and decree nisi entered on stipulated facts in declaratory judgment action); United Services Automobile Association v. Shears, 692 A.2d 161, 162 (Pa.Super.1997) (order entered in declaratory judgment action “that USSA had a duty to provide coverage under its policy co-extension with Pennsylvania Law, and that the breach of USAA’s duty *793to provide this coverage was a tort” was deemed “interlocutory” and “not appeal-able”).
¶ 9 The declaratory judgment action underlying Baughman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 441 Pa.Super. 83, 656 A.2d 931 (1995), was commenced by State Farm and conducted as a bench trial, following the denial of State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court entered “[an] order and supporting opinion, declaring that the insured’s UIM policy limits under the applicable State Farm policy are $100,000. Notice of the order was mailed on May 9, 1994. On May 16th, State Farm filed a motion for post-trial relief. On June 2nd, before the resolution of State Farm’s post-trial motions, State Farm filed a notice of appeal.” The filing of the notice of appeal within 30 days of the declaratory judgment was, of course, the correct procedure as explained by our Supreme Court in Allen, supra, and Wick-ett, supra — and was, as well, the prudent course, if counsel was uncertain as to the appealability of the order of May 9, 1994. See: Comments to Pa.R.A.P. 1701. This Court, however, quashed the appeal,
Specifically, based on the testimony, Judge Reed found that the Insured did not authorize her husband to reduce her UIM coverage when the husband reduced his UIM coverage. Judge Reed also found that the Insured did not ratify or assent to a reduction in her UIM coverage at any later date. Based on these findings, Judge Reed concluded that, pursuant to section 1734 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, the Insured had $100,000 in UIM coverage under the State Farm policy. Because of the foregoing, we find that Judge Reed rendered a verdict or decision, not a final judgment. Accordingly, State Farm was correct in filing post-trial motions therefrom. Miller, supra, 424 Pa.Super. 48, 621 A.2d 1033.
Since we find that Judge Reed rendered a decision after trial, and because State Farm properly filed its post-trial motions within ten days of receiving notice of the decision, we quash the instant appeal so that the trial court may have the first opportunity to correct any errors that it may have made in its adjudication.
Baughman, supra, 656 A.2d at 933 (citations omitted).
¶ 10 Nor is Baughman a fleeting deviation, for, as earlier recounted, our Court appears to have overlooked the finality of an order of declaratory judgment in cases where the order of declaratory disposition was entered in response to a motion for summary judgment, as well as where the order of declaratory disposition was entered in response to the submission of stipulated facts. That the effort by the bar to secure declarations of the law could produce such uncertainty is uniquely anomalous, as well as discomforting.
¶ 11 As I see it, therefore, the operative factors are:
The General Assembly and our Supreme Court have mandated that orders declaring rights and duties in declaratory judgment actions are immediately ap-pealable.
The majority quite correctly complies with that mandate.
That compliance by this Court with the mandate of the Supreme Court inflicts adverse consequences upon appellees and their counsel.
Appellee and their counsel suffer such adverse consequences because they were beguiled by certain of the decisions of this Court.
*794¶ 12 Such unfairness cries for correction and such adjustment as may be available under the law. I am of the mind that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has afforded just such an avenue for adjustment in its decision in Commonwealth v. Fry, — Pa. -, 778 A.2d 623 (2001), where the court reversed and remanded to this Court an appeal which had been quashed by this Court as untimely. The Court there relied upon Union Electric Corp. v. Board of Property Assessment, 560 Pa. 481, 746 A.2d 581 (2000), for the proposition that a nunc pro tunc appeal should be granted when the failure to comply with the timeliness requirement was caused by a misstatement by an administrative body of the deadline for filing an appeal. Commonwealth v. Fry, supra. Surely, that rationale is no less applicable to the confusion caused by judicial uncertainty.
¶ 13 Thus, although I firmly join in the decision of my colleagues that the appeal of State Farm was untimely, I believe that the authority of this Court to allow an appeal nunc pro tunc is now an inherent prerogative of this Court, and that we would wisely and justly here exercise that authority.
¶ 14 MUSMANNO, J. joins the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by McEWEN, President Judge Emeritus, and also files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co., filed a declaratory judgment action at No. 97-8741 which was treated as a companion case but not formally consolidated with the declaratory judgment action filed by State Farm.
. Prudential also filed post-trial motions on January 4, 1999, to the order entered at No. 97-8741 on December 22, 1998.
. Had State Farm petitioned for reconsideration and obtained an order, prior to January 21, 1999, vacating the order of December 22, 1998, the trial court would have also had jurisdiction to enter the further order which declared that the appellees were entitled to $30,000 in uninsured motorist benefits.