OPINION
PER CURIAM.This case came before the Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided. The appellant in this case, the State of Rhode Island, seeks review of the trial justice’s ruling dismissing nine counts of an indictment against the defendant, Timothy Mullen, charging him with the abominable and detestable crime against nature pursuant to G.L.1956 § 11-10-1. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and hearing the oral arguments of counsel, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the issues raised by this appeal should be summarily decided at this time.
The defendant was charged, inter aha, with nine counts of abominable and detestable crimes against nature pursuant to § 11-10-1. The indictment alleged that defendant committed sexual acts upon the victim between February 22, 1992, and February 22, 1995, when the victim was between the ages of fourteen and seventeen. However, the state, upon a request for a bill of particulars, stated that the alleged acts took place between April 10, 1994, and February 22, 1995, when the victim was over sixteen years of age.
While this indictment was pending, the Legislature repealed certain provisions of § 11-10-1. The statute as amended reads as follows:
*785“SECTION 1. Section 11-10-1 of the General Laws in Chapter 11-10 entitled Crime Against Nature’ is hereby amended to read as follows:
11-10-1. Abominable and detestable crime against nature.— Every person who shall be convicted of the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or with any beast, shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years nor less than seven (7) years.” P.L.1998, ch. 24, § 1.
A justice of the Superior Court dismissed nine counts charging abominable and detestable crimes against nature on the ground that the Legislature repealed that portion of the statute prohibiting such conduct with mankind. The motion justice reasoned that the thrust of the repeal was to decriminalize sodomy between persons who had attained the age of consent (sixteen years) and “the manifest intent of the General Assembly was to end prosecutions, convictions, and perhaps even sentencing, * * * of persons who engage in no other criminal conduct than that of sodomy.”
On appeal the state argues that the Legislature intended to decriminalize sodomy between consenting adults and did not intend to decriminalize sodomy among those who cannot or did not consent. The state further asserts that the victim’s ability to consent, even after the age of sixteen, was compromised in this case because of the age difference between defendant and the victim,1 as well as the victim’s troubled background. Specifically the state argues it would not contravene the intent of the Legislature to apply the general savings statute and prosecute defendant for alleged violations of § 11-10-1.
The parties agree that “[a]t common law the general rule was that in the absence of an effective saving clause, the repeal of a penal statute operated to bar prosecution for prior violations of the statute.” State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1053-54 (R.I.1988) (citing State v. Souza, 456 A.2d 775 (R.I.1983); State v. Fraser, 82 R.I. 261, 264, 107 A.2d 295, 296 (1954)). “The rule was founded on the theory that the Legislature by its repeal determined that the conduct in question should no longer be prosecuted as a crime.” Babbitt, 457 A.2d at 1054 (citing United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 54 S.Ct. 434, 78 L.Ed. 763 (1934); Ex parte Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex.Crim.App.1978)).
Rhode Island’s general savings statute, G.L.1956 § 43-3-23, provides that “[n]o suit, prosecution, or indictment pending at the time of the repeal of any statute for any offense committed * * * shall in any case be affected by the repeal, but the suit, prosecution, or indictment may be proceeded with, and the act shall be deemed to be in force for the purpose of prosecuting the act to final judgment and execution or sentence, as the case may be.” “[I]t was the legislative intent that [§ 43-3-23] was to have the effect of saving criminal proceedings pending at the time of the repeal of any penal statute unless such construction would be clearly repugnant to the express provisions of the repealing statute.” State v. Lewis, 91 R.I. 110, 115, 161 A.2d 209, 212 (1960).
In Babbitt this Court held that the effect of a simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a common-law rape statute into one for sexual assault did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to prosecute the defendant for a violation of the repealed statute. 457 A.2d at 1054. Applying the simultaneous-repeal-and-reenactment exception to the common-law abatement doctrine, this Court stated that “the effect of the change in the law as it relates to the crime of rape was merely amendatory in nature; there was never a time when the elements of the offense were not considered criminal.” Id. There the crime of *786common-law rape was embodied in the new sexual-assault statute.
The defendant in Babbitt was also charged with violating G.L.1956 § 11-34-5, which made unlawful the “transport[ing of] * * * another for the purpose of prostitution * * *. [T]he Legislature amended § 11-34-5 by adding the requirement that the proscribed conduct be conducted for pecuniary gain.’ ” Babbitt, 457 A.2d at 1055. This Court concluded that because the defendant did not act in the interests of pecuniary gain, the acts of the defendant were not made criminal under the amended statute and a “contrary ruling would be inconsistent with the legislative intent.” Id.
In the case at bar we are of the opinion that the trial justice was correct in determining that it was the manifest intention of the Legislature to decriminalize the act of sodomy between consenting adults. Having repealed that portion of § 11-10-1 that proscribed sodomy “with mankind,” the Legislature clearly intended that such activity be regulated by the criminal statute on sexual assault. G.L.1956 chapter 37 of title 11. The definitional provisions of that statute explicitly include those acts that formerly composed the “crime against nature” provision, § 11-37-1(8), so that those acts are punishable when they are carried out in such a way as to violate the statute. The sexual-assault statute further provides that the age of consent is sixteen, § 11-37-6, and this age of consent is applicable to sodomy as well as to other forms of sexual behavior. Consequently for purposes of this statute a person who has attained the age of sixteen years may be considered a consenting adult. In applying the savings statute, § 43-3-23, one must also consider § 43-3-2, which reads as follows:
“Application of rules of construction. In the construction of statutes the provisions of this chapter shall be observed, unless the observance of them would lead to a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the general assembly, or be repugnant to some other part of the statute.” (Emphasis added.)
We are of the opinion that the trial justice was correct in determining that the preservation of these charges would have been inconsistent with the manifest intention of the General Assembly to decriminalize sodomy between consenting adults and that it would be repugnant to the statute as amended.
The dissent suggests that the effect of the Court’s ruling in this case will be to revive the common-law rule extinguishing all pending prosecutions upon repeal of a criminal statute. Nothing could be further from the intent of this opinion.
We believe that when the Legislature repeals or amends a portion of a criminal statute, the effect of such repeal or amendment upon pending prosecutions should be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the provisions of § 43-3-2 in the light of the intent of the Legislature in enacting the repeal or amendment. In the case at bar we are of the opinion that it is inconsistent with the intent of the Legislature to prosecute acts that are no longer criminal offenses. It is fundamentally unfair to prosecute an individual for prior conduct that would now not constitute a violation of law. A major purpose of a criminal statute is to deter conduct deemed unacceptable and either malum in se or at least malum prohibi-tum by the Legislature.
When by virtue of amendment or repeal such conduct is no longer prohibited, prosecution can have no deterrent effect. The sole purpose of prosecution in such a situation is pure punishment for its own sake. We believe that such nondeterrent punitive action would be inconsistent with and repugnant to the express provisions of the repealing statute.2
*787For the reasons stated, the state’s appeal is denied. The judgment of the Superior Court in dismissing counts 4 through 12 of the indictment is hereby affirmed. The papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court.
. The defendant was twenty-four years old in 1992 when the alleged acts began. He was twenty-eight years old on February 22, 1995, the latest date upon which he was charged with a violation of G.L.1956 § 11-10-1.
. The dissent suggests that their position is not based on punishment for the sake of punishment but on common sense for the sake of common sense. We would only observe that *787common sense may be one of the most rare and precious of human attributes. Its existence or nonexistence in a particular context depends to a great extent upon the perception of the beholder. In this case the majority’s perception obviously differs from that of the dissent.