Concurring.
Most respectfully, I agree "with the conclusion reached by the majority, and join in the judgment, but write separately to make two points.
First, the majority says that “[although the trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint on grounds that [] Parks failed to allege she reported Alpharma’s misconduct externally, we shall affirm on a different basis.” Maj. Op. 65, 25 A.3d at 203 n. 4. In doing so, the majority leaves in a state of doubt *88the law regarding whether a whistleblower action requires external reporting. We resolved this issue in favor of internal reporting in Lark v. Montgomery Hospice, Inc., 414 Md. 215, 994 A.2d 968 (2010), in which we held that a nurse who alleged she was terminated after reporting to her supervisor the failures of her employer to observe health standards, stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge.
Although Lark involved the Health Care Worker Whistle-blower Protection Act, which contained specific provisions about notice to the employer that are not applicable here, the Court rejected the employer’s argument that Lark was required to report the wrongful actions to external authorities on broad grounds applicable to many types of employers. Writing for the Court, Judge Joseph Murphy explained its rationale by adopting commentary from a treatise on wrongful discharge:
Although it would clearly seem to be in employers’ interest to encourage employees to report violations internally before (or instead of) making reports to governmental authorities, a number of courts that have addressed the issue have held that the public policy tort doctrine does not protect a whistleblower from retaliation unless he or she has gone outside the company with reports of wrongdoing.
The majority (and better) view, however, is that internal protests are enough, and that the viability of a public policy tort claim by a discharged whistleblower does not depend on whether or not the violations or illegal activities were reported to outside authorities.
Id. at 232, 994 A.2d at 978 (quoting Paul H. Tobias, Litigating Wrongful Discharge Claims § 5.13 (1987 & Supp.2009-10)).
The Lark Court then quoted with approval from a Connecticut case applying Massachusetts law:
... A rule that would permit the employer to fire a whistleblower with impunity before the employee contacted the authorities would encourage employers promptly to discharge employees who bring complaints to their attention, and would give employees with com*89plaints an incentive to bypass management and go directly to the authorities. This would deprive management of the opportunity to correct oversights straightaway, solve the problem by disciplining errant employees, or clear up a misunderstanding on the part of a whistleblower. The likely result of a contrary rule would be needless public investigations of matters best addressed internally in the first instance. Employers benefit from a system in which the employee reports suspected violations to the employer first; the employee should not, in any event, be penalized for bestowing that benefit on the employer.
Lark, 414 Md. at 236, 994 A.2d at 980-81 (quoting Sullivan v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 802 F.Supp. 716, 724-25 (D.Conn.1992) (emphasis in original)). In concluding, Judge Murphy said:
Moreover, if an employer (1) corrects the activity that created a substantial danger, and (2) terminates the employment of the “meddlesome” employee who reported the problem that has been corrected, it would make no sense to impose an external report requirement that would accomplish nothing other than a drain upon the scarce resources of the appropriate board.
Id. at 242, 994 A.2d at 984. Based on our decision in Lark, and on the many persuasive authorities cited in that case, see id. at 231-243, 994 A.2d at 977-84, I would expressly reject the ruling of the trial court in this case that Parks loses because she did not make a report outside of the company.
My second concern is sparked by the majority’s reliance on a Fourth Circuit case, Szaller v. The Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148 (4th Cir.2002), a decision I think is poorly reasoned. Although the passage from Szaller quoted by the majority is perhaps, innocuous, other strong language in Szaller is, in my view, decidedly wide of the mark. I fear repercussions from the stamp of approval given the case by the majority:
Szaller argues that the Red Cross violated a clear mandate of public policy by discharging him for reporting allegedly improper blood handling procedures to a Red Cross hotline. *90We disagree. Szaller cannot point to a single mandate of Maryland public policy that his termination contravened. He relies solely on FDA regulations and a consent decree between the FDA and the Red Cross to support his wrongful discharge claim. Maryland courts, however, have given no indication that federal regulations or consent decrees constitute Maryland public policy. And absent any suggestion that Maryland would recognize a claim for wrongful discharge in the circumstances presented by Szaller’s termination, we cannot conclude otherwise and extend state law through judicial conjecture.
Szaller simply cannot rely on federal regulations as a mandate of Maryland public policy. Although federal law can preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause, this in no way implies that federal law automatically defines state policy, or that federal agencies can determine its parameters. Perhaps the regulations and consent decree provisions Szaller points to in his proposed second amended complaint would constitute clear mandates of federal policy. But federal policy is enforced by the means Congress specifies, not through state-law wrongful discharge actions.
Szaller, 293 F.3d at 151 (emphasis added).
The Fourth Circuit continued its tirade against reliance on federal regulations in wrongful discharge cases:
In an attempt to address the overwhelming burden his position would place on Maryland employers, Szaller contended at oral argument that only federal regulations dealing with situations of “extreme importance” should be included in the state’s public policy. Szaller further argued that the FDA regulations at issue here, addressing the proper collection of blood, are of such importance. Yet Szaller was unable to give any meaningful guidance about which regulations would qualify as Maryland public policy and which ones would not, or how a court would even begin to determine which ones were “important” enough to support a wrongful discharge action. Szaller urges that we simply use “good judgment” to draw the line between various regulations, or write a narrow decision for this case *91only. But all federal regulations address areas of public concern, and a litigant could argue that all federal policies protect cogent and compelling interests. If the Maryland courts or legislature wish to define which federal regulations also qualify as clear mandates of state public policy, they are free to do so. But federal courts cannot draw the line for Maryland.
Szaller at 152. The Fourth Circuit surely underestimates our skill in separating the wheat from the chaff. It is by no means beyond the ken of this Court to assess the relative importance of one Federal regulation over another in terms of wrongful discharge law.
I would reject all of the above language from Szaller out of hand, and make clear that when addressing wrongful discharge cases in Maryland, or when Federal courts apply Maryland law, clear violation of a public policy set forth in a federal regulation may be sufficient to pass the Adler test. Even without a full-blown study of the Code of Federal Regulations, I am confident that federal agencies, which Congress relies on to issue rules pursuant to statutes governing major policy matters, have issued regulations sufficiently important to our safety, health and welfare that they constitute a clear mandate of public policy.
Indeed, Parks’s claim that Alpharma violated the FDA labeling requirements comes closer to a legitimate claim than Adler’s did. One of the reasons we rejected Adler’s claim was that “Adler’s complaint does not assert that the falsification of corporate records was done with an intent to defraud either stockholders or the public at large by enhancing or depressing the market value of the Corporation’s shares or other obligations.” Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 44, 432 A.2d 464, 471 (1981). In contrast, Parks complained about a practice that could potentially impact public health. Ultimately, however, Parks’s claim does not quite make the grade because the meaning of the term “clinically significant hazard,” which is the measure of what triggers a warning requirement under 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i), simply is not sufficiently clear to meet the Adler standard. The term is variable and *92subject to many different interpretations. In Adler and its progeny, Maryland has adopted a more conservative view of what is actionable, not wishing to involve the courts in borderline claims where the violation of public policy is not so clear.
For the aforementioned reasons, I join in the majority’s judgment only.