dissenting: Because the majority opinion allows par*673ties to jump into and back out of litigation, depending on their satisfaction with the outcome, and because the majority opinion undermines the finality of judgments, I respectfully dissent.
The facts are straightforward. Lester Dean is the sole owner and manager of Glacier Development Co. Glacier purchased certain property in Kansas City, Kansas, in 1995 and 1996. In 2001, the Kansas Department of Transportation (KDOT) began making preparations for reconstruction of 1-35, which included a large portion of the Glacier property. In 2003, KDOT filed an eminent domain petition in Wyandotte County, and the date of the taking was August 13, 2003. Court-appointed appraisers awarded Glacier $2.19 million for the fair market value of the property. Glacier filed an application to withdraw the full amount of the appraisers’ award, which the district court granted, and checks were issued to Glacier, attorneys, and others. On August 29, 2003, KDOT appealed the appraisers’ award to district court. On May 26, 2004, Reid F. Holbrook and Jarod G. Goff, counsel for Dean, filed an entry of appearance “on behalf of Defendants, Glacier Development Company, L.L.C. and Lester M. Dean, Jr.” Subsequent filings by both parties identified Dean as a defendant. The June 9, 2005, pretrial order identified Dean as one of the landowners and was approved by counsel as “attorneys for landowners.”
A jury ultimately determined that the fair market value of the property immediately prior to the taking was $800,000. On July 15, 2005, the district court filed a journal entry of judgment memorializing the jury verdict and naming Glacier and Dean jointly as defendants. On July 20, 2005, Glacier and Dean filed a notice of appeal from that June 23, 2005, judgment and docketed the appeal on August 10, 2005.
The July 20, 2005, notice of appeal was captioned “DEBRA L. MILLER, in her capacity as the Secretary of Transportation for the State of Kansas, Plaintiff, vs. GLACIER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.L.C., and LESTER M. DEAN, JR., Defendants” and read in its entirety:
“Notice is hereby given that the defendants Glacier Development Company, L.L.C. and Lester M. Dean, Jr. appeal from the judgment announced by the *674Court on June 23, 2005, and all previous rulings and orders on all issues relating to and decided therein, to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kansas.”
The docketing statement was similarly captioned “DEBRA L. MILLER, in her capacity as the Secretary of Transportation for the State of Kansas, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs.. GLACIER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.L.C. and LESTER M. DEAN, JR., Defendants/Appellants.” The statement of facts asserted in relevant part: “Prior to the date of taking, Glacier Development Company, LLC and Lester M. Dean, Jr. (landowners’) were owners of two tracts of real property located along 1-35 in Wyandotte County, Kansas . . . .” The statement was submitted under the names of Reid F. Holbrook, Judd L. Herbster, and Joy D. Hays, “attorneys for defendants/appellants.” This court affirmed the judgment in an opinion filed July 13, 2007. Miller v. Glacier Development Co., 284 Kan. 476, 161 P.3d 730 (2007).
On October 24, 2005, after the appeal was docketed and while the appeal was still pending, Glacier and Dean filed a motion in the district court for a nunc pro tunc order or for relief from judgment. The motion asserted that Dean did not own the subject property in his personal capacity, that he was not named as a party defendant, and that he was not served with process in his personal capacity. His motion requested that his name be removed from the judgment.
In an order filed December 5, 2005, the district court denied the motion, finding that the inclusion of Dean as a party defendant was not a clerical error or simple oversight under K.S.A. 60-260(a). Having determined that the asserted error was substantive and not clerical, the court held it did not have jurisdiction to alter the judgment because the appeal had already been docketed with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts. Dean did not perfect an appeal from this order. He also failed to raise the issue of the propriety of a judgment against him in the direct appeal docketed on August 10,2005.
Shortly afterwards, Dean filed a motion in Jackson County, Missouri, asking that court to set aside and/or stay enforcement of a foreign judgment, repeating his assertion that he was not a party to the Kansas eminent domain proceeding. The district court ruled *675against him, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Miller v. Dean, 289 S.W.3d 620 (Mo. App. 2009). On June 5, 2008, Dean filed a motion for relief from judgment in Wyandotte County District Court, again asserting that he was not properly a parly defendant in the eminent domain appeal. The district court denied the motion, finding that under the doctrine of res judicata the December 5, 2005, order barred further consideration of the issue. Dean thereupon filed a timely notice of appeal, which brings the present appeal to this court.
The majority concludes that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the eminent domain appeal to enter a judgment against Dean personally for the return of funds under K.S.A. 26-511 because he did not personally receive the proceeds of the original appraisers’ award. This is not a question of subject matter jurisdiction.
The majority cites to Miller v. Bartle, 283 Kan. 108, 150 P.3d 1282 (2007), a case raising constitutional issues and challenging attorney fees in an eminent domain appeal, which appropriately found that an eminent domain action is a special statutory proceeding that does not provide a forum to litigate noncompensation issues, such as the necessity and extent of the taking. 283 Kan. at 114. The majority quotes from Bartle that “[t]he plain language of K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 26-508 limits the district court’s jurisdiction in appeals from eminent domain proceedings to the issue of compensation — that is, to a determination of the fair market value of the property in question, as defined in K.S.A. 25-513(e).” 283 Kan. at 115.
In the present case, however, the district court clearly had the “authority to hear and decide” the eminent domain appeal, which was a determination of the fair market value of the property in question. See K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 26-508(a):
“If the plaintiff, or any defendant, is dissatisfied with the award of the appraisers, such party, within 30 days after the filing of the appraisers’ report, may appeal from the award by filing a written notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court. The appeal shall be deemed perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal. In the event any parties shall perfect an appeal, copies of such notice of appeal shall be mailed to all parties affected by such appeal, within three (3) days *676after the date of the perfection thereof. An appeal by the plaintiff or any defendant shall bring the issue of damages to all interests in the tract before die court for trial de novo. The appeal shall be docketed as a new civil action, the docket fee of a new court action shall be collected and the appeal shall be tried as any other civil action. The only issue to be determined therein shall be the compensation required by K.S.A. 26-513, and amendments thereto.”
The appeal is treated as a new civil action, and the voluntary appearance of a party in that new civil action precludes the party from later arguing that the court lacked the authority to impose judgment against that party. Although the statute requires proper service, this is a requirement of personal jurisdiction, which may be waived and which is not subject to collateral attack for an indefinite period of time.
The inclusion of Dean in the judgment did not materialize out of the blue. Dean was the sole owner of Glacier; Dean held himself out as the owner of the property in question; Dean testified at length about the value of the property, which he referred to as belonging to him; and Dean’s counsel filed an entry of appearance on behalf of Dean, adding his name to the caption of the pleadings. Dean continued to appear as a party in pleadings filed by his counsel and in rulings by the courts. Most importantly, Dean was a proper party defendant in the district court appeal.
In Dotson v. State Highway Commission, 198 Kan. 671, 426 P.2d 138 (1967), we considered a situation similar to this one. We held that, although one of the landowners first entered his appearance in an appeal in district court from a condemnation action and was not named as a party in the original condemnation proceedings, he was bound by the judgment because he executed and filed a written entry of appearance, was represented by counsel during trial, and was named as a landowner in the evidence and instructions as well as in the jury’s verdict.
“When the name of a person who claims an interest in the land condemned is first revealed after an appeal from the appraisers’ award has been docketed, and it is agreed such person was one of the owners, he thereby becomes an interested and necessary party to the appeal action.” 198 Kan. 671, Syl. ¶ 4.
The Dotson court held that filing of a written entry of appearance by counsel was equivalent to service of process under K.S.A. 60-*677203, and the appellant had thereby submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 198 Kan. at 676. In affirming the judgment, this court astutely noted that the contention that the appellant was not a party to the appeal action was “a mere afterthought because of the jury’s verdict being substantially less than the [appraisers’] award.” 198 Kan. at 677.
Dotson should govern and dispose of this appeal.
The majority also notes that in order to make Dean personally hable for the return of the money received by Glacier, the district court would have had to find some extraordinary reason to hold Dean personally responsible for tire LLC debt. No such extraordinary undertaking is required here. Dean not only failed to raise a defense of corporate capacity, he affirmatively placed himself into the litigation and he personally challenged the amount of the award on appeal. By invoking the jurisdiction of both the district court and this court, he voluntarily stripped himself of the corporate veil that might otherwise have protected him. It is not the responsibility of opposing counsel or of this court to drape him in a cloak that he cast aside three judgments ago. See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross, 98 Ohio St. 3d 77, 97, 781 N.E.2d 121 (2002) (parties, through their counsel, are responsible for shaping issues they select for resolution at trial; trial court and opposing counsel cannot reasonably be expected to anticipate existence of argument not raised to court, and opposing party should not bear loss caused by poor litigation by counsel for responsible party).
Furthermore, when a party fails to take an appeal from an appealable order, that order becomes the law of the case. State v. Finical, 254 Kan. 529, 532, 867 P.2d 322 (1994). Dean raised the issue of personal service and error in the entry of appearance in his original motion for relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b). Any arguments that he makes now he could have made at that time. He failed to appeal the December 5, 2005, judgment denying his motion for relief from judgment. He also failed to raise the issue of his personal liability in his direct appeal.
When a second trial or appeal is pursued in a case, the first decision is the settled law of the case on all questions addressed in the first appeal, and the courts will not reconsider such questions. *678State v. Morton, 283 Kan. 464, 472, 153 P.3d 532 (2007). The law of the case doctrine promotes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process by protecting against the agitation of settled issues. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S. Ct. 2166, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1988).
If—as the majority concludes—prior, unappealed orders are not considered binding, one may contemplate unlimited future litigation in any number of cases in which losing parties argue that adverse judgments are void and that void judgments may be attacked at any time and by collateral means.
K.S.A. 26-517 requires that a district court shall, upon motion by any party involved in a disputed division of an appraisers’ award or disputed amount of the final judgment, determine the final distribution of the award or amount of judgment. I would find that the district court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction over Dean and that its judgments constitute the law of the case, and pursuant to such a finding, I would remand the case to the district court for a determination of the final distribution of the award or amount of judgment consistent with this opinion.
Hebert, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion. Davis, C.J., dissents.