dissenting.
In its attempt to resolve this difficult custody dispute between a child’s maternal grandparents and its natural father, the Court adopts too rigid a rule of law. It mandates that on the death of a parent (in this case the child’s mother) custody of the affected child must immediately revert to the surviving biological parent (the father) absent sufficient proof of unfitness to justify termination of the parental rights of the father. Ante at 244, 748 A.2d at 563. The Court elaborates by stating that the termination of parental rights standard is satisfied only by proof of “unfitness, abandonment, gross misconduct or ‘exceptional circumstances.’” Ante at 245, 748 A.2d at 563. The Court defines “exceptional circumstances” to include the probability of “serious psychological harm to the child,” ante at 246-47, 748 A.2d at 564, characterized by circumstances in which a sustained and enduring relationship between the child and the third party creates a status of psychological parenthood. Sorentino v. Family & Children’s Soc. of Elizabeth, 72 N.J. 127, 131-32, 367 A.2d 1168 (1976), appeal after remand, 74 N.J. 313, 378 A.2d 18 (1977). The Court notes that the “Sorentino-type” case illustrates the only recognized application of the exceptional circumstances standard in our caselaw, ante at 248, 748 A.2d at 565, but implies that other proofs might satisfy the “parental termination or exceptional circumstances standard” provided that such proofs demonstrate “serious physical or psychological harm or a substantial likelihood of such harm.” Ante at 248, 748 A.2d at 565. Because the Court’s limited description of *265the non -Sorentino “exceptional circumstances” standard uses the phrase “parental termination or exceptional circumstances standard” and requires proof of “serious physical or psychological harm,” the clear implication of the Court’s holding is that trial courts in similar cases must find evidence of harm analogous to that required to terminate parental rights in order to satisfy the Court’s non -Sorentino test. As this Court held in New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604, 512 A.2d 438 (1986), “[in termination cases] [t]he primary focus of the court should be upon harm for which there is ‘unambiguous and universal social condemnation.’ Developments in the Law— The Constitution and the Family, 93 Haro. L.Rev. 1156, 1319 (1980). Paramount examples of such condemnation are evident in the context of physical and sexual abuse.” Although the Court purports to establish an “exceptional circumstances” basis for overriding the presumption favoring custody in the natural parent, it declines to “define the full scope of the exception,” stating that the scope of the exception must await “case by case development.” Ante at 248, 748 A.2d at 565. In the meantime, the Court infuses the exceptional circumstances standard with a meaning almost synonymous with the level of harm required to support termination of parental rights.
The Court’s standard is too inflexible. In eases like this one, in which the custody dispute is triggered by the death of a natural parent, the underlying tragedy is profound and, as Justice O ’Hern observes, the Court’s holding creates “a rule of law that will only add to the child’s suffering in many circumstances.” Ante at 259, 748 A.2d at 571. Instead of a rigid rule of law, the Court should adopt a rule that permits trial courts to exercise sufficient discretion, as reflected by the Family Part’s decision below, to avoid unnecessary detriment to an already distraught child. The Court’s standard, however, would treat as insufficient evidence that a transfer of custody would cause actual detriment to the child if that evidence did not demonstrate “serious harm,” a *266prerequisite to the termination of the father’s parental rights. The Court’s high standard of proof, analogous to the proof required to justify termination of parental rights, is so restrictive that its relevance in assisting courts to resolve difficult custody issues is sharply circumscribed, as is illustrated by the record before us.
In March 1998 the Family Part, after an extensive hearing, determined that physical custody of Chantel Ivonne Watkins-Murphy, born August 15,1996, whose mother Megan Murphy, age seventeen, died twelve days after her birth, should remain with Beverly and Kevin Nelson, the maternal grandparents with whom Chantel had resided since birth. The father, Lawrence E. Watkins, Jr., nineteen years old when Chantel was born, was awarded visitation from Friday to Sunday evenings.
The Family Part’s disposition indicated that although Larry had a warm and loving family that was available to assist him in caring for Chantel, the court was concerned about Larry’s maturity. The court noted that Larry, at age twenty, had only recently graduated from high school and attempted during trial to obscure his educational background. The court expressed concerns about his limited job experiences, noting that he recently had held four different jobs for no longer than a few months each. The court expressed concern about the testimony of Larry’s parents indicating their intent to sell their home and retire to North Carolina, in the context of Larry’s testimony that if they relocated he would buy another home and remain in New Jersey. The court also noted that Larry’s limited child support of twenty-five dollars weekly, his unwillingness to pick-up Chantel for his weekly visitation or to visit her at the Nelson house, and his failure to notice or participate with the Nelsons in treating Chantel’s hypotonia condition (overly flexible joints) and slow development, were in contrast with the Nelson’s recognition of Chantel’s problem and early intervention to rectify it.
In short, ample evidence in the record existed to support a determination by the Family Part that an immediate transfer of *267custody to Larry could result in actual detriment to Chantel because that evidence caused the court to have serious doubt about Larry’s competence, in the event his parents were unavailable, to provide the special level of care that Chantel required. Although the Family Part applied a different standard, I agree with Justice O’Hern’s observation that “[t]he standard for governing the custody of a child whose custodial parent has died should depend on the degree of harm that a child will suffer if removed from the home surroundings and family that has until then nurtured the child.” Ante at 261, 748 A.2d at 572.
In my view, under that standard, ample evidence in the record would have supported the Family Part’s award of physical custody to the Nelsons. The Court’s decision to now award immediate custody to Larry within seven days, ante at 257, 748 A.2d at 570, without any knowledge of intervening events over the past two years, does not address responsibly or comprehensively the difficult issues posed by this appeal. Nor does the Court’s opinion acknowledge that under its own characterization of the exceptional circumstances standard, the Nelsons may now be able to establish a psychological parenthood status that would trigger a best interest standard for determining custody. A remand to the Family Part to make findings concerning the relevant facts and circumstances that should today control an award of custody would be a more balanced and appropriate resolution of this appeal, and would avoid prematurely uprooting the child before custody is finally resolved.
I
On August 27, 1996 seventeen-year-old Megan Murphy (“Megan”) was killed in a tragic automobile accident. Her twelve-day-old daughter, Chantel Ivonne Watkins-Murphy (“Chantel”), survived the accident. Lawrence Watkins, Jr. (“Larry”), Chantel’s father, was nineteen when Megan was killed. Larry and Megan had been dating for less than a year and had no plans to marry or live together at the time of the accident. At the time of Megan’s *268untimely death, Megan and Chantel were living with Megan’s mother, Beverly Nelson, and her stepfather, Kevin Nelson (the “Nelsons”). The Nelsons had begun making plans to care for Megan and Chantel in their home when they learned that Megan was pregnant eight months earlier. Mrs. Nelson had postponed her continuing education to stay home and care for Chantel while Megan completed high school.
On September 4, 1996 the Nelsons filed a complaint for temporary guardianship of Chantel and for a determination of the paternity status of Larry. At an October 3, 1996 hearing the Chancery Division, Probate Part granted temporary guardianship to the Nelsons, primarily because Larry’s paternity was in doubt. The Probate Part noted that “[i]t is not in the best interests of this child to be treated like a yo-yo” and allowed the Nelsons to retain temporary custody of Chantel. The Probate Part informed Larry that if he established paternity and showed that he had adequate “resources to take care of [Chantel],” then he would have the “first obligation and right to take care of [her].” Because the Chancery Division, Family Part was the proper forum for determining custody, the Probate Part made no determination concerning whether Larry should be granted custody of Chantel. The Probate Part suggested that Larry file an application for a determination of paternity and a complaint for permanent custody with the Family Case Management Office if Larry chose to seek permanent custody of Chantel. In an October 8, 1996 letter, however, the Probate Part acknowledged that there was no basis for requiring Larry to prove his paternity because Larry already had executed a Certificate of Parentage in accordance with N.J.S.A. 9:17-41. The Probate Part reiterated in that letter its decision to award the Nelsons temporary guardianship pending the Family Part’s custody determination.
One week later, Larry filed an answer to the Nelsons’ complaint seeking guardianship and filed a counterclaim seeking permanent custody of his daughter. A temporary custody hearing Was held in April 1997. Through counsel, Larry objected to negotiating a *269possible compromise through mediation. Therefore, the matter was transferred from the Probate Part to the Family Part. In May 1997, the Family Part judge ordered both parties to “attend Hunterdon County custody/visitation mediation program in order to address the issue of custody.” Larry did not attend the mediation orientation and did not complete a questionnaire provided by the Family Case Management Office. In August 1997, the court found Larry in violation of litigant’s rights for failing to attend court-ordered custody mediation and ordered both parties’ counsel to provide the Family Part with briefs addressing the issue of custody under the present circumstances. The court also ordered a plenary hearing to be scheduled to address the custody issue.
The plenary trial to determine which party would be granted permanent custody of Chantel was held over four days in December 1997 and January 1998. Lawrence Watkins, Sr., Larry’s father, testified that he picked up Chantel almost every weekend for her visits with the Watkins family and that Chantel’s visits with the Watkins’ lasted from Saturday morning until Sunday evening or afternoon. Mr. Watkins said that Larry did not pick up Chantel for her weekend visits with the Watkins because “there was some conflict” between Larry and Mrs. Nelson. He said that Chantel was “very close” to her father. Mr. Watkins testified that Larry contributed twenty-five dollars per week to the Nelsons in support of Chantel. Larry’s sister and mother both testified that Larry expressed a strong desire to have permanent custody of Chantel.
Larry also testified in support of his claim for permanent custody of Chantel. Larry described his current employment with the Alternative Design company, where he was participating in a management training program. He had started the program two weeks prior to trial and was to be paid $250 to $300 a week until the program was completed. Larry testified that after the management training program was completed, he would earn $30,000 a year. Prior to working for Alternative Design, Larry had worked *270for two months in the warehouse of a computer company as an inventory clerk. Prior to that, Larry worked for about two months in a temporary position unloading trucks for Lord and Taylor. Larry’s other work experience was at Lechter’s department store during high school. In order to care for Chantel while he was working, Larry planned to drop off Chantel at his cousin’s home because his cousin had experience baby-sitting for children in the neighborhood. Larry’s cousin operated her own daycare service and lived two houses away from the Watkins on the same block.
Larry stated that he was agitated by disagreements between himself and Mrs. Nelson concerning the possession of some of Megan’s personal items, and relating to the religious differences between the Nelsons, who are Roman Catholics, and Larry, who is a non-practicing Jehovah’s Witness. Larry wanted the Nelsons to maintain a relationship with Chantel as grandparents and felt that “they do have to be a part of her life,” but he did not believe that Chantel should be exposed to the Nelsons’ religious beliefs and holiday celebrations.
Larry acknowledged that he did not notice that Chantel had special developmental needs. Larry did not participate in the bimonthly sessions of the early intervention program designed to address her hypotonia condition and slow development. Larry’s mother and aunt attended the initial evaluation session of the early intervention program, but because the sessions were held during the middle of the day no member of the Watkins family participated in the early intervention program at Hunterdon Medical Center.
Larry testified that he had spoken to his parents about their plans to retire and move to North Carolina. When asked what he would do if his parents were to move to North Carolina, Larry described his plans:
Q. And what would you do if they were to go to North Carolina?
A. I would stay up here. My career’s up here.
Q. Would you remain in the home that you grew up in?
*271A. No. I’d probably get my own.
Q. In your present earning situation, would you be able to afford to do that?
A. Yes, I would.
Q. Would you be staying in Cranford?
A. If not the surrounding area. I would try and stay dose to family.
Larry was living with his parents at the time of trial and had never lived on his own away from his family.
Mrs. Nelson testified in support of her claim for permanent custody of Chantel. Mrs. Nelson described her continued studies at Rutgers University where she was working towards a Masters degree in social work. Mrs. Nelson planned to enroll Chantel in on-site daycare at Rutgers while she attended class or to leave Chantel with a neighborhood friend that Chantel was “very familiar with.”
Mrs. Nelson described how she had become certified as a foster parent and, although the Nelsons were no longer foster parents, she testified that the Nelsons previously had been “named outstanding new foster parents in the State.” Mrs. Nelson stressed the importance of a child knowing his or her ethnic background and presented an exhibit that showed the breadth of Chantel’s extended family. Mrs. Nelson wanted Chantel to identify with Megan’s Hispanic and Caucasian heritage in addition to Larry’s African-American background. Mrs. Nelson believed that Chan-tel should be raised with knowledge of the Nelsons’ Catholic faith, but that Chantel should be exposed to Larry’s religious beliefs as well. The Nelsons and their three children all attend religious services regularly.
Mrs. Nelson testified about her experience with Chantel’s developmental problems. The Nelsons enrolled Chantel in an early intervention program at Hunterdon Medical Center when they noticed that Chantel did not have the normal muscle tone found in a baby and had difficulty holding her head up, rolling over, and sitting up. Mrs. Nelson testified that those “floppy” characteristics were most likely inherited from Megan, who had struggled with her own learning disabilities during school. A physical *272therapist and a speech/language pathologist determined that Chantel had delays in her expressive speech, cognitive abilities and motor skills. The initial assessment diagnosed Chantel with hypotonia, a condition in which weakened nerve connections lead to overly flexible joints in the body.
A bi-monthly physical therapy session was set up for Chantel to assist her in dealing with that condition. Doctors who performed a neurodevelopmental evaluation of Chantel suggested “that Chan-tel continue in the early intervention program if they can continue to see her” because her biologic relatives’ history “with substance abuse, attention problems and learning difficulties may put Chan-tel at risk for some of these conditions as she grows.” Mrs. Nelson testified that she had recently completed a two-weekend seminar offered by the New Jersey Council on Disabilities to better prepare her to address learning or physical disabilities that might arise in Chantel’s future. Mrs. Nelson also testified that she recently enrolled Chantel in a “mom and tots” exercise class to help stimulate her joints and reduce the effects of her hypotonic condition.
Mrs. Nelson testified that Larry’s mother indicated that the Watkins family wanted custody of Chantel at Megan’s funeral. Mrs. Nelson was concerned about giving Chantel to Larry because she believed that Larry had a history of instability and was very immature. Mrs. Nelson also said that she had doubts about whether Larry was the biological father based on Chantel’s skin tone and that those doubts affected her decision to keep Chantel after the accident. Mrs. Nelson also was concerned with Larry’s “past history of depression” and that, during a conversation she had with Larry, Larry had mentioned that he felt suicidal on three occasions. Larry did not recall telling Mrs. Nelson that he was suicidal.
Despite those concerns, Mrs. Nelson testified at trial that it was in Chantel’s best interest to be folly integrated into both families and that, as Chantel got older, she should spend more time with Larry. Mrs. Nelson testified that she considered herself to be a *273psychological parent and gave an example of how she was dealing with Chantel’s infancy:
I guess already what we’ve done has been the early intervention, and being very aware. I have integrated — one of Chantel’s problems was cognitive delay. So, what I’ve done with her at this point is, rather than just the normal verbal reinforcement, I’ll repeat things more. Every time I pick her up, I’ll repeat “up” several times. She didn’t always seem to catch on right away on things. She needs to be shown things more than average for the connection, at least from what I’ve seen. So, what I’m doing now is personally tailoring what I think she needs for added reinforcement. What will happen as she get — she gets older, it will depend on school. If there is any learning disability — there’s no way to know yet. But, again as in the one report, it was pointed out that subtle learning disabilities are very likely to be overlooked in a school system. So, part of it’s — it’s self-education, knowing what to look for and be very willing to advocate for her.
Mrs. Nelson also testified that she felt Chantel would adjust to longer visits, two to three night stays, with the Watkins family in the near future, but that she thought a child psychologist should determine if extended visits were appropriate for Chantel.
Dr. Robert Clyman, a clinical psychologist, testified regarding whether the Nelsons would be suitable custodial parents for Chantel. Dr. Clyman evaluated only the Nelsons. Dr. Clyman observed the Nelson family interact with Chantel and interviewed each member of the Nelson family, Chantel’s early intervention physical therapist, the bereavement counselor who worked with the Nelsons, and other collateral sources in reaching his conclusion that the Nelsons would be suitable custodial parents. Dr. Clyman also testified that Chantel appeared to be integrated into the Nelson family. Dr. Clyman stated that he believed that the Nelsons, as former foster parents, would reach out to the Watkins family “after things are normalized,” but that there was currently “very little communication” between the Nelsons and the Watkins.
Mr. Nelson was the final witness at trial. Although Mr. Nelson’s job periodically required him to travel for extended periods of time, Mr. Nelson stated that he spent significant time with his three daughters. Mr. Nelson said that he was concerned about Larry’s ambition and his future plans. Mr. Nelson believed that Larry was unemployed at the time that Dr. Clyman interviewed him. Mr. Nelson also testified that he believed that Larry’s *274mother was the force behind Larry’s effort to obtain custody of Chantel.
On March 11,1998 the trial court awarded custody of Chantel to the Nelsons. The trial court was “impressed” with both sets of grandparents and quoted from the report prepared by Dr. Clyman that concluded “that the Nelsons would be highly suitable parents for Chantel.” The trial court recognized that
the parent-child relationship is ordinarily not disturbed unless there is a clear showing of the parents’ gross misconduct or unfitness. The courts have tended not to interfere with or deny the natural parent custody to his or her child.
The trial court noted the presumption in favor of the natural parent’s superior right to custody, but recognized that that rule should not be followed in all situations. The trial court characterized the Nelsons as psychological parents and concluded that “Beverly and Kevin Nelson stand in the shoes of their deceased daughter Megan and are in parity with Lawrence Watkins Jr., thus the best interest standard should apply.”
The trial court determined that awarding custody to the Nelsons was in the best interest of Chantel. The court noted that the Nelsons had noticed Chantel’s hypotonia and had taken immediate steps to treat her condition. The court further noted that the Nelsons’ family environment was stable in comparison to Larry, a twenty-year old with limited work experience who lived with his parents. The court was concerned with the support that Larry could provide Chantel and characterized his relationship with Chantel as “one of play, and not much other responsibility.” The court found it was “significant” that Larry’s parents were contemplating retiring in North Carolina and “that they may not be available in the future to assist their son.” The court questioned Larry’s maturity level and did not believe that Larry could care for Chantel on his own.
The court found that the Nelsons would make Chantel aware of her “biracial and mixed religious background” because they had experience dealing with those issues with one of their adopted daughters. The court noted the lack of communication between *275Larry and the Nelsons and was concerned with the possibility that Larry and his family “would discourage contact with the Nelsons and thereby deprive Chantel access to half of her heritage.” Therefore, the court concluded that Chantel’s “physical and mental welfare will be better protected in the Nelson household.” The , court ordered the current weekend visitation schedule, which had been expanded to include Friday evenings, to remain in effect and awarded legal and residential custody to the Nelsons.
Larry filed a Notice of Appeal in April 1998. In July 1998 the Nelsons filed a Notice of Motion to set Larry’s child support, fix a visitation schedule, and require Larry to submit to genetic testing to determine whether he is the biological father. Larry filed a certification on July 10,1998 in response to the Nelsons’ Notice of Motion, stating that he was presently unemployed because his temporary job had ended, but that he was “looking for a new job and expeet[ed] to have a new job in about two weeks.” Larry also opposed any change in the visitation schedule unless it provided him additional time with Chantel. Larry expressed resentment at the Nelsons’ continued attempt to require him to be genetically tested to determine if he was the biological father of Chantel. The Family Part denied the Nelsons’ motion.
The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Part’s disposition because the trial court “applied] the correct legal principles to fact findings that are clearly supported by substantial credible evidence.” Watkins v. Nelson, 321 N.J.Super. 482, 484, 729 A.2d 484 (1999). The Appellate Division deferred to the trial court’s conclusions “that the Nelsons are Chantel’s psychological parents, and ... that as between [Larry] and the Nelsons, Chantel’s best interest requires that custody remain with the Nelsons.” Id. at 485, 729 A.2d 484. The Appellate Division quoted extensively from the trial court’s letter opinion and cited the “ample precedent for granting custody to a psychological parent where that is in the best interest of the child.” Id. at 493, 729 A.2d 484. The Appellate Division noted that
*276“[u]nfitness” is not the issue here. No one suggests that Watkins is an unfit parent. Rather the trial judge concluded that the evidence showed that it was in Chantel’s best interest to remain in the primary care and custody of the Nelsons, while maintaining a strong relationship with Watkins and his family.
[Id at 495-96, 729 A.2d 484.]
The Appellate Division affirmed “[t]he trial judge’s conclusion that it is in Chantel’s best interest to remain in the custody of the Nelsons” based on substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 496, 729 A.2d 484. Responding to their dissenting colleague, the majority declined to
apply a bright-line rule, essentially holding that a biological father who is not unfit, and who has maintained a relationship with his child, must be granted sole custody in preference to any other person, including the child’s grandparents, who themselves have had the custody and care of the child virtually since birth by reason of the death of her mother. Such an absolute parental preference rule effectively forecloses custody to any other party, even one who has functioned in every way as a parent, unless the biological parent is sufficiently unfit that termination of that parent’s parental relationship would be warranted. To adopt such a rule would be a mistake.
[/A at 499-500, 729 A.2d 484.]
The Appellate Division concluded that the dissent failed to recognize “the significant precedent in New Jersey’s common law for the proposition that the best interest of the child, and not parental unfitness, is the appropriate scale on which to balance the custodial claims of a biological parent against the claim of one ... who has functioned in every way as a parent.” Id. at 500, 729 A.2d 484. The dissent argued that “[t]he correct legal standard in this dispute is parental unfitness,” id. at 501, 729 A.2d 484, and that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that the Nelsons were psychological parents and therefore “in parity with [the] plaintiff so that the best interest standard applies.” Id. at 504, 729 A.2d 484 (Braithwaite, J., dissenting).
II
A.
The law controlling custody determinations has developed as societies moved away from patriarchy and toward more egalitarian views of children, women, and family. A brief review of that *277history and those developments will shed light on the emergence of contemporary law controlling child custody determinations.
The idea that children were the property of their parents was present during ancient times. “Aristotle believed the child was a parent’s possession because it came physically from the parent, like a tooth or a lock of hair. In Aristotle’s cosmology, it was the male seed, more divine than the base matter contributed by the female, that gave the child its life.” Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?’’: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 995, 1043 (1992)(citing Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, Ch. XII, 1161b (J.A.K. Thomson trans.1986) (footnote omitted)). Aristotle reasoned that
[t]here cannot be injustice in an unqualified sense towards that which is one’s own; and a chattel, or a child until it is of a certain age and has attained independence, is as it were a part of oneself; and nobody chooses to injure himself (hence there can be no injustice toward oneself); and so neither can there be any conduct towards them that is politically just or unjust.
[Aristotle, supra, Book V, Ch. VI, 1134b, (quoted in Woodhouse, supra, at 1044).]
Our Court of Errors and Appeals summarized the ancients’ treatment of children in Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 519-20,128 A. 254 (1925), as follows:
Greece, Egypt, Persia and the ancient civilizations generally, according to the historian Tytler, considered the child as a charge of the state, which, after early infancy, took the child into its control and educated him throughout youth, in the manners, customs, traditions and laws of the state, emphasizing in the curriculum loyalty to the state, as the first consideration from the child. Thus, says Aristotle in his “Politics,” “it is an axiom that the best laws, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state, will be of no avail, unless the young are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution.”
The early Roman law, on the other hand, conceded to the father absolute dominion over the child, including .the power of death, as a corrective. This arbitrary and unlimited power was afterwards modified by the state in the interest of the humanities, so that, in the days of the later emperors, a father was banished from the empire for having killed his son. 1 Blackstone Com. 451.
The English maintained a system of absolute parental control “subject to the power of the king, as parens patriae, to control the infantile status in the interest of the child, as well as in the interest of the state.” Lippincott, supra, 97 N.J. Eq. at 520, 128 A. 254 (citing 1 Blackstone Com. 451).
*278The shift away from the conception of children as property was recognized by the New York Court for the Correction of Errors in Mercein v. People, 25 Wend. 64, 105-06 (1840), in which the Chancellors wrote:
Upon a review of all the authorities binding upon the courts of this state, I have come to the undoubting conclusion, that the right of the father to the custody of his child is not absolute, and that such custody is referrable to its interest and welfare, and is to be selected by the court in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, irrespective of the claims of either parent. This conclusion I believe is warranted by the law of this state, as well as by the law of nature. A sense of parental duty ought ever to withhold a parent from pressing his or her claims to the custody of a child, whenever the true interests of such child forbid it; and whenever this parental obligation fails to influence the conduct of the parent, it is fortunate that the enlightened principles of our law authorize our courts to interpose in behalf of the child.
See also Lippincott, supra, 97 N.J. Eq. at 521, 128 A. 254 (citing Mercein as early ease that illustrates state’s right to intervene on behalf of children).
In Richards v. Collins, 45 N.J. Eq. 283, 288, 17 A. 831 (1889), the Court of Errors and Appeals awarded the custody of a girl who was “of an age and capacity to form a sensible choice” to the aunt and uncle who had raised the girl. In what amounts to a nineteenth-century recognition of psychological parenthood, the Court reasoned as follows:
Doubtless it is the strict legal right of parents and those standing in loco parentis to have the custody of infant children as against strangers. This right -will control the judgment of the court, unless circumstances of weight and importance connected with the welfare of the child, exist to overbear such strict legal right.
The court will not regard the parental right as controlling, when to do so would imperil the personal safety, morals, health or happiness of the child. In determining this delicate and often difficult judgment, the couii looks at the character, condition, habits and other surroundings of claimants.
In resolving the general question of what will best subserve the interest and happiness of the child, its own wish and choice may be consulted and given weight, if it be of an age and capacity to form a rational judgment____
The wishes of children of sufficient capacity to form them are given especial consideration, where the parents have for a length of time voluntarily allowed then-children to live in the family of others, and thus form home associations and ties of affection for those having their care and nurture, and when it would mar the happiness of the children to sever such ties.
*279The relation of parent and child is regarded as not fully characterized by the relative duties of service and support. Nature’s provision of mutual affection commonly exists as the incentive to parental and filial duty and the bond of family union. It is the instinct of childhood to attach itself and cling to those who perform towards it the parental office, and they become endeared to it by ministering to its dependence.
[Id. at 286-87,17 A 831 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).]
The Richards Court held that in a controversy over the custody of a ehild, the child’s “welfare will be the paramount consideration in controlling the discretion of the court. The strict right of the parent mil be passed by, if a judgment in observance of such right would substitute a worse for a better custodian.” Id. at 287-88, 17 A. 831 (emphasis added).
At the dawning of the twentieth century, child welfare became a recognized social science and
the concept of parental obligations as an outgrowth of divinely conferred paternal ownership and control of children had given way to that of parental trusteeship in the child’s “best interests.” This transformation reflected changing ideas about the relation of the individual to the state in a democratic republic, where individual liberty was the value most highly prized.
[M]arried women had gained a separate legal identity, and children, formerly private economic assets of parents, increasingly were viewed as individuals and proper subjects of public concern. Public policy, now drawn into molding and monitoring family relations, had joined forces with republican individualism to make obsolete the view of the child as paternal property subject to paternal whim.
[Woodhouse, supra, at 1038-39 (footnotes omitted).]
In Lippincott, supra, 97 N.J. Eq. at 518, 128 A. 254, the Court of Errors and Appeals considered the claims of maternal and paternal grandparents to the custody of a girl, their granddaughter, whose parents had died. The Court’s summary of the law implicated both the best-interests standard and the limitations on the rights of the natural parent:
Manifestly, the touchstone of our jurisprudence in matters dealing with the custody and control of infants, is the welfare and happiness of the infant, and not the filial affections naturally arising from parental or family relationship.
Thus, it has been quite generally held that even the natural right of the father to the custody of his child cannot be treated as an absolute property right, but rather as a trust reposed in the father by the state, as parens patriae for the welfare of the infant.
[Id. at 519, 128 A. 254 (citations omitted).]
*280Consistent with Richards, supra, 45 N.J. Eq. at 287, 17 A. 831, and Lippincott, supra, 97 N.J. Eq. at 518, 128 A. 254, later New Jersey courts that ruled on custody and visitation issues emphasized the welfare of the child as the primary, albeit not dispositive, consideration. Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 430, 332 A.2d 199 (1975)(“In matters involving custody and visitation the ultimate concern of our courts is always for the welfare of the infant. This is the controlling element.”); Lavigne v. Family & Children’s Soc. of Elizabeth, 11 N.J. 473, 479, 95 A.2d 6 (1953)(reversing judgment returning child to natural parents who had surrendered child to agency for adoption and stating: “It has long been the settled law in the court of last resort in this State that in dealing with the custody and upbringing of an infant the welfare of the child is the controlling consideration.”); Brown v. Parsons, 136 N.J. Eq. 493, 503, 42 A.2d 852 (E. & A.1945)(affirming award of custody to maternal grandmother despite claims of natural father and stating: “In a controversy over a child’s possession, its welfare will be the paramount consideration in controlling the discretion of the court. The strict right of the parent will be passed by, if a judgment in observance of such right would substitute a worse for a better custodian.”); In re A.B.M., 132 N.J. Eq. 434, 441, 28 A.2d 518 (E. & A.1942) (reversing on grounds of abandonment award of custody to natural mother and noting: “Our law is clear on the subject. It is not the parental right but the interest of the child which is controlling.”); In re Mrs. M., 74 N.J.Super. 178, 183, 181 A.2d 14 (App.Div.1962) (ordering return of child to natural mother although she had entrusted child to caretakers and observing: “It is a principle of long standing that in dealing with the custody and upbringing of an infant the welfare of the child is the controlling consideration. Even parental rights must yield to this principle.” (citations omitted)); In re Flasch, 51 N.J.Super. 1, 18, 143 A.2d 208 (App.Div.1958) (preserving custody in children’s stepmother, rejecting custody claim by parents of natural mother and stating: “Particularly in a case of this nature, is it true that general principles of law do not decide concrete eases, as has been so aptly *281said. Each matter must be decided on its own merits with the best interests and welfare of the children as the paramount consideration. To this principle, even parental rights must yield.”).
Although the welfare of the child has dominated custody determinations since the late nineteenth century, most custody decisions have maintained a consistent but qualified emphasis on the rights of parents. In In re Mrs. M., supra, 74 N.J.Super, at 183-84, 181 A.2d 14, the Appellate Division summarized the law controlling custody determinations as follows:
Although the safety, happiness, and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child is the prime determinant in custodial arrangements, common law courts have been sensitive to the “right” of a parent to the custody of his or her child. This right, which recognizes the natural bond of blood and affection between parent and child, is unlike a property right. It has been described as akin to a trust reposed in the parent by the State, as parens patriae, for the welfare of the infant. Lippineott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 519, 128 A. 254, (E. & A.1925).
See also Baum v. Komberg, 139 N.J. Eq. 265, 268-69, 50 A.2d 844 (E. & A.1947) (awarding custody of ten-year old boy to natural father rather than to uncle who had eared for child for six years and stating: • “The rule of law is clear and has been enunciated many times: the welfare of the child is of paramount importance but the right of the parents is also to be considered. The difficulty, if any, in cases of this kind is its application.”); S.M. v. S.J., 143 N.J.Super. 379, 385, 363 A.2d 353 (Ch.Div.1976) (granting custody to step-father in preference to claim of natural mother and noting that “‘[e]ourts have traditionally been reluctant to deny a parent custody of his or her child.’ They should remain so. But, when the best interests of the child will be clearly served by custody in someone other than the parent, a finding of abandonment by the parent, or parental unfitness, is not a prerequisite to a custody order.” (citation omitted)); Ex parte R.L., 137 N.J. Eq. 271, 44 A.2d 396 (Ch.1945) (awarding custody to child’s aunt in preference to claim of natural mother and stating: “[T]he natural and legal rights of the parent must, of course, be contemplated, but the subject of paramount consideration undoubtedly is the welfare of the child.”); Pope v. Brown, 3 N.J. Misc. 572, 572-73, *282128 A. 851 (Ch.1925) (awarding custody of one-year old child to father in preference to maternal grandparents and noting: “[T]he father has prima facie the legal right to the custody of his child, and, ordinarily, is entitled to have that right enforced by decree of this court in [custody] proceedings---- [That right] will not be enforced where such enforcement would ‘imperil the personal safety, morals, health or happiness of the child.’ ’’(citations omitted)).
Consistent with a seventy-year-long string of judicial decisions in this state that focus on the best interests of children, see Richards, supra, 45 N.J. Eq. at 287, 17 A. 831, the Appellate Division in Hoy v. Willis, 165 N.J.Super. 265, 272, 398 A.2d 109 (1978), stated that
[c]ourts have traditionally been reluctant to deny a parent custody of his or her child. In re Mrs. M., 74 N.J.Super. 178[, 181 A.2d 14] (App.Div.1962). However, when the best interests of the child will clearly be served by a custody award to a third party, a finding of either parental unfitness or abandonment is not a prerequisite to the entry of an order doing so. S.M. v. S.J., 143 N.J.Super. 379[, 363 A. 2d 353] (Ch.Div.1976).
Two Appellate Division decisions have characterized the natural parent’s preferred right of custody in stronger terms, and have raised the burden of proof for third parties who challenge the custodial claim of a natural parent. In In re D.T., 200 N.J.Super. 171, 176, 491 A.2d 7 (1985), the Appellate Division stated that
[s]ince the right of parents to the custody of then- minor children is both a natural and legal right, the law should not disturb the parent/child relationship except for the strongest reasons and only upon a clear showing of a parent’s gross misconduct or unfitness or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.
Similarly, in Zack v. Fiebert, 235 N.J.Super. 424, 432, 563 A.2d 58 (1989), the Appellate Division noted that
[u]nder ordinary circumstances, a custody action by a third party against a natural parent is more like a termination action than a custody action between biological parents. Although visitation may be preserved, such an award destroys any pretense of a normal parent-child relationship and eliminates nearly all of the natural incidents of parenthood including the everyday care and nurturing which are part and parcel of the bond between a parent and child. Thus, normally, when a third party seeks custody as against a natural parent, the standard should be the termination standard of unfitness. See E.T. v. L.P., supra, 185 N.J.Super. at 81[, *283447 A.2d 572]. The application of this standard is footed in the presumption in favor of the natural parent’s superior right to custody. See Matter of D.T., supra, 200 N.J.Super. at 175-76, 491 A.2d 7.
The suggestion in Zack, and the majority’s holding in this appeal, that unfitness sufficient to justify termination of parental rights is the primary standard for supporting an award of custody to a third party rather than a natural parent unduly limits the discretion of trial courts in custody cases. In New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services v. A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 604-11, 512 A.2d 438, we developed a four-part test for termination proceedings that required proof that the parental relationship would seriously impair the child’s health and development and that delay in placing the child elsewhere would add to the harm, noting that examples of such condemnation “are evident in the context of physical and sexual abuse.” Id. at 604, 512 A.2d 438 (citation omitted). In a custody dispute between a third party custodian and a natural parent seeking custody, proof that the natural parent already has inflicted such severe harm rarely will exist, and so high a threshold of proof is thus unnecessary and inappropriate.
Although D.T. and Zack generally raised the standard for denying natural parents custody and for granting custody to third-parties, the Appellate Division noted in Zack that if a
third party is able to show that he or she stands in the shoes of a parent to the child and thus in parity with the natural parent, he or she should be accorded the status of a natural parent in determining the standard to be applied to the quest for custody. In such circumstances, the best interests test should apply.
[Zack, supra 235 N.J.Super. at 432, 563 A.2d 58 (citing In re Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 445, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988)).]
The tension between the welfare of the children, parents’ rights, and judicial reluctance to find in favor of third parties over fit natural parents has been reconciled by one commentator:
Although the two approaches are distinct in theory and not always compatible, in most cases they will lead to the same conclusion and are different ways of emphasizing the same goal. It has been suggested that most courts which apply the “best interest” test in a custody conflict between parents and grandparent[s] seem merely to disguise the application of the parental right doctrine by using as a device the presumption that custody by the parents will be in the best interest of the child. Thus, while, ordinarily, the natural right of the parents will prevail in a contest between them and the grandparents where both parties are equally fit to *284care for the child and the parents are not chargeable with laches or forfeiture as having left the child with the other party, in a particular case the forces of environment may be so strong as to compel the court in the best interests of the child, to deny the natural right of the parents even where otherwise they are perfectly fit persons to have custody of the child.
[D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Award of Custody of Child Where Contest is Between Child’s Parents and Grandparents, 31 A.L.R.3d 1187, 1191 (1970)(foot-notes omitted).]
See also Zack, supra, 235 N.J.Super. at 430 n. 2, 563 A.2d 58 (“It has been suggested that these two theories [parental rights and best interests] are not in actual conflict, because the ‘best interests of the child’ doctrine presumes that custody by the natural parent will be in the child’s best interests.”).
In addition to considering the natural parent preference and the best interests of a child, this Court further developed the law controlling custody determinations when we recognized in Sorenti-no I, supra, 72 N.J. at 131-32, 367 A.2d 1168, that the rights of parents to custody of a child may be limited by the child’s relationships with other adults. We noted that “[t]he court cannot evade its responsibility, as parens patriae of all minor children, to preserve them from harm. The possibility of serious psychological harm to the child in this case transcends all other considerations.” Id. at 132, 367 A.2d 1168 (citations omitted). In Sorenti-no I we required plaintiffs seeking to remove a child from the only home known to the child to carry “the burden of proving by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the potentiality for serious psychological harm accompanying or resulting from such a move will not become a reality.” Id. at 133, 367 A.2d 1168.
We further discussed the doctrine of psychological parenthood in Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 221-23, 377 A.2d 628 (1977), a case in which we returned a child to his natural parent in the absence of a showing of psychological parenthood. We noted that “[i]t has been recognized that the psychological aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the development of the child and its mental and emotional health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.” Id. at 222, 377 A.2d 628 (citing J. Goldstein, et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973)). In Sees we *285were “entirely satisfied that there is no statutory or legal basis upon which to deny or resist [the] plaintiffs claim qua parent to the full custody of her child.” Id. at 221, 377 A.2d 628. Despite that disposition, we noted that “[i]t is possible ... for facts to arise in a given setting which might obtrude upon what is otherwise a clear legal picture in favor of a natural parent, and move the court to exercise its equitable powers pursuant to its parens patriae jurisdiction with respect to the custody of the child.” Ibid. See also Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J.Super. 387, 398-99, 633 A.2d 1009 (App.Div.l993)(applying best interests test because maternal grandparents were primary caretakers of child and functioned as her psychological parents); Hoy, supra, 165 N.J.Super. at 277, 398 A. 2d 109 (granting custody of child to third party because “there was a probability of severe and long-term psychological damage should a transfer of custody [to the natural parent] occur”); Zack, supra, 235 N.J.Super. at 432-33, 563 A.2d 58 (holding that best interests standard applies when third party seeking custody of child over natural parent is able to show that he or she is psychological parent).
B.
The third-party versus natural-parent custody jurisprudence of other states, like New Jersey’s, ultimately focuses on doing what is in a child’s best interest. It is generally presumed that to be with a natural parent is in a child’s best interest. The various states give the presumption different weights. Although all states will grant custody to a third party if a natural party is shown to be unfit, in some states that is the sole means of overcoming a natural parent presumption. Ex parte Mathews, 428 So. 2d 58, 59 (Ala.1983)(holding that natural parent preference may only be overcome by finding “that the parent seeking custody is guilty of such misconduct or neglect to a degree which renders that parent an unfit and improper person to be entrusted with the care and upbringing of the child in question”); McKee v. Flynt, 630 So.2d 44, 47 (Miss.1993)(holding that natural parent preference may be *286overcome only by “clear showing that the parent has (1) abandoned the child, or (2) the conduct of the parent is so immoral [as] to be detrimental to the child, or (3) the parent is unfit mentally or otherwise to have the custody of his or her child.”).
Other states allow the presumption in favor of a natural parent to be rebutted on a showing of exceptional circumstances. See Merritt v. Way, 58 N.Y.2d 850, 460 N.Y.S.2d 20, 446 N.E.2d 776, 777 (1983)(“In a custody contest between parent and nonparent, the question of best interests is not reached absent a showing of surrender, abandonment, unfitness, persistent neglect or other extraordinary circumstance.”); Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo.1998) (stating that rebuttable presumption in favor of natural parent “may be overcome by evidence that a parent is unfit, unable or unwilling to take charge of the child”); In re E.J.H., 546 N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D.1996) (“In custody disputes between a natural parent and a third party, exceptional circumstances may require, in the child’s best interest to prevent serious harm or detriment to the child, that the child be placed in the custody of a third party rather than with the natural parent.”); Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1986)(natural parent preference may rebutted by showing of unfitness or of “special facts and circumstances ... constituting an extraordinary reason for taking a child from its ... parents”).
Focusing on the effects a custody determination will have on a child while maintaining the natural parent preference, a few states incorporate both the rights of parents and the needs of children into their analyses permitting custody to be awarded to the third party on a showing that granting custody to the natural parent is likely to result in actual detriment to the child. In C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375, 380 (Alaska 1998), the Supreme Court of Alaska noted that the natural parent preference is overcome if granting custody to a parent is clearly detrimental to a child. That approach is different from a best-interests approach in that it requires nonparents “not merely to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [they] can better serve a child’s interests, but to *287prove by ‘clear evidence’ that a parent is unfit or that his or her custody is clearly detrimental.” Ibid. Alaska uses that approach “despite an inevitable sacrifice of children’s interests in cases where a nonparent can better serve those interests, but a parent’s custody is not ‘clearly detrimental.’ ” Ibid.
Washington likewise follows a standard that requires that “the non-parent establish either that the parent is unfit or that ‘circumstances are such that the child’s growth and development would be detrimentally affected by placement with an otherwise fit parent.’ ” In re Custody of Stell, 56 Wash.App. 356, 783 P.2d 615, 620 (1989) (quoting In re Marriage of Allen, 28 WaskApp. 637, 626 P.2d 16, 22 (1981)). In Allen, a stepmother was granted custody of a deaf child over the child’s natural father. The Allen court found that granting custody to the child’s father would be a detriment to the child because his father possessed minimal sign language skills whereas his stepmother and step-siblings knew sign language, and the child’s educational and developmental progress were the result of the stepmother’s efforts. Id. at 22-23. Citing J. Goldstein, A. Freud, and A. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child, the Allen court sought a “middle ground” between the most common custody standards:
[T]o give custody to a nonparent there must be more than the “best interests of the child” involved, but less than a showing of unfitness. In extraordinary circumstances, where placing the child with an otherwise fit parent would be detrimental to the child, the parent’s right to custody is outweighed by the state’s interest in the child’s welfare. There must be a showing of actual detriment to the child, something greater than the comparative and balancing analyses of the “best interests of the child” test. Precisely what might outweigh parental rights must be determined on a case-by-case basis. But unfitness of the parent need not be shown.
[Allen, supra, 626 P.2d at 23 (emphasis added).]
Finally, some states permit the best interests of a child alone to overcome a presumption in favor of a natural parent, recognizing that the denial of an award of custody is not equivalent to a termination of parental rights. Accordingly, those states do not require proof of exceptional circumstances or that a parent is unfit, but focus instead on what is best for the child. In Charles v. *288Stehlik, 560 Pa. 334, 744 A.2d 1255 (2000), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently summarized its approach to custody determinations. That court noted that between a natural parent and a third party the natural parent preference will be overcome only if convincing reasons appear that the child’s best interest will be served by an award to the third party. Id. 744 A.2d at 1257. The Stehlik court stressed that the biological parent’s prima facie right to custody
is not to be construed as precluding a custody award to a non-parent, absent a demonstration of the parent’s dereliction. We again emphasize that the standard seeks only to stress the importance of parenthood as a factor in determining the best interests of the child. However, other factors which have significant impact on the well being of the child can justify a finding in favor of the non-parent, even though the parent has not been shoum to have been unfit.
[T]he cardinal concern in all custody cases is the best interest and permanent welfare of the child. In staying true to that maxim, we have decreed that there will be instances where it is proper to award custody to the third party even where there has been no showing that the biological parent is unfit While this Commonwealth places great importance on biological ties, it does not do so to the extent that the biological parent’s right to custody will trump the best interests of the child. In all custody matters, our primary concern is, and must continue to be, the well-being of the most fragüe human participant — that of the minor chüd. [Id. at 1258 (quoting Albright v. Commonwealth, ex rel Fetters, 491 Pa. 320, 421 A.2d 157, 161 (1980) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added)).]
See also Abrams v. Connolly, 781 P.2d 651, 657 (Colo.l989)(“The long-standing principle of Colorado law is that the best interests of the child are the overriding considerations in matters of child custody. Although there is a presumption that a natural parent has a first and prior right to custody of his or her child, the presumption may be rebutted by evidence establishing that the welfare of the child would be promoted by awarding custody to a nonparent.” (citation omitted)); Tailor v. Becker, 708 A.2d 626, 628 (Del.l998)(upholding statute that requires best interests analysis in custody disputes between custodial stepparent and natural parent); Henrikson v. Gable, 162 Mich.App. 248, 412 N.W.2d 702, 704 (1987)(“[A] showing that a parent is unfit is not required to overcome this presumption____ [I]n order to overcome the natu*289ral parent presumption, the trial judge was required to find that ... defendant clearly and convincingly established that the best interests of the children required maintaining custody with defendant.”); Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 124 N.H. 138, 467 A.2d 249 (1983) ( holding that there is no need to find natural parent unfit, balancing rights of natural parents and holding that “the paramount and controlling consideration is the overall welfare of the children involved”).
The majority’s survey of the custody jurisprudence of other states reveals that different standards are applied throughout the country in determining to whom custody should be granted in a dispute between a third party and a natural parent. The Court correctly concludes that the majority of states appear to require proof of either unfitness or other exceptional circumstances before custody will be awarded to a third party rather than a natural parent, but the content of the exceptional circumstances standard varies from state to state and application of the standard appears to be significantly influenced by the specific facts.
Ill
I dissent from the majority opinion because its requirement that third parties seeking custody of children satisfy a standard that is essentially equivalent to the termination-of-parental-rights -standard is a return to unnecessary formalism discarded by our jurisprudence over a century ago. The majority’s standard is inflexible and will lead to harsh results. I favor, and the state’s children would benefit from, a child-centered approach that considers whether placing a child with a natural parent instead of a third party would cause actual detriment to the child.
As early as 1889, this Court’s predecessors discarded notions of children as property when it declared that New Jersey courts “will not regard the parental right as controlling, when to do so would imperil the personal safety, morals, health, or happiness of the child.” Richards, supra, 45 N.J. Eq. at 287, 17 A. 831. By requiring that third parties satisfy the heightened standard of *290proof of unfitness applicable to termination of parental rights proceedings, a standard applied to natural parents who never again will see their children, the Court rejects longstanding deci-sional law that recognizes the importance of subordinating parental rights to avoid detriment to a child.
The record before the Family Part clearly was adequate to sustain that court’s custody determination under the standard that I favor: absent proof of a psychological parent relationship, the non-parent must establish “either that the parent is unfit or that ‘circumstances are such that the child’s growth and development would be detrimentally affected by placement with an otherwise fit parent.’ ” Stell, supra, 788 P.2d at 620 (quoting Allen, supra, 626 P.2d at 22).
The testimony before the Family Part demonstrated that, as the court observed, Larry has “a caring close knit family.” The court noted that it was “impressed with the plaintiffs parents,” commenting on testimony by Mr. Watkins Sr. about the characteristics of a good father and the thoughtful testimony of Mrs. Watkins on the issue of a child’s religious training.
The court was not favorably impressed by Larry’s testimony in several respects. The court was critical of Larry’s “attempt to obscure his educational background,” referring to his reluctance to explain why he was delayed in obtaining a high school diploma. The court noted with disapproval that Larry relies on his father to provide transportation for Chantel’s visits, observing that Larry never visits Chantel at the Nelson’s home, that his involvement with her “is one of play and not much other responsibility,” and that his contribution of $25.00 per week “raises responsibility questions with this level of support.”
Although the court acknowledged that the Watkins family environment was “responsible” and “stable,” it emphasized that “custody is being sought by [Larry] and not his family.” The court expressed significant concern about the possibility that if Larry’s parents relocated to another state, Larry would not be capable of caring for Chantel: •
*291An issue that arose during the course of the testimony was that shortly his mother and father will be moving to North Carolina upon retirement. Lawrence E. Watkins Jr. does not give me the same sense of responsibility and security as his parents do. He has had limited job experience, has worked at four jobs for no longer than a couple of months each. His maturity is questionable, he would not be able to care for Chantel on his own.
(At oral argument the Court was informed that Larry’s parents no longer plan to leave New Jersey, but that information was not in the record before the Family Part.)
In contrast, the Family Part was favorably impressed with both Beverly and Kevin Nelson and their parenting skills. The court emphasized the significance of the Nelsons’ early recognition of Chantéis developmental problems and their initiative in enrolling her in an intervention program at Hunterdon Medical Center. The court also noted with approval “the Nelson family’s reinforcement of [Chantel’s] learning processes.”
The court also emphasized the findings of Dr. Clyman who evaluated Chantéis interaction with the Nelsons, observing that Dr. Clyman “found Chantel to be fully integrated into the Nelson family, that is, not only with Beverly and Kevin, but with Jessica, Emily and Dorothy as well.” The court referred to Dr. Clyman’s observation that Chantel “was happily adjusted, well behaved and easily reacted with her siblings.”
The Family Part, relying on Zack v. Fiebert, supra, 235 N.J.Super. 424, 563 A.2d 58 and Hoy v. Willis, supra, 165 N.J.Super. 265, 398 A.2d 109, concluded that the Nelsons functioned as psychological parents to Chantel and therefore “stand in the shoes of their deceased daughter Megan and are in parity with Lawrence E. Watkins Jr., thus the best interest standard should apply.” Based on that standard, the court concluded that “Chantel’s physical and mental welfare will be better preserved in the Nelson household. They have already demonstrated an ability to discover problems and immediately deal with them.”
Because Chantel was only sixteen months old at the commencement of the plenary hearing, and no expert testimony was offered on the issue of whether a psychological parenting relationship *292existed between the Nelsons and Chantel, see Sorentino I, supra, 72 N.J. at 133, 367 A.2d 1168, the Family Part’s conclusion that a psychological parenting relationship existed is unpersuasive. Accordingly, its use of a best interests standard in making the custody award to the Nelsons undoubtedly was inappropriate. Nevertheless, that court’s findings and conclusions clearly would have supported the same custody determination under the more stringent standard that I propose, based on the evidence that Chantel’s growth and development would have been “detrimentally affected” by placement with Larry. The Family Part clearly expressed its view that Larry had not demonstrated that, without assistance from his parents, he was capable of assuming full responsibility for the care and supervision of Chantel. Accordingly, the evidence and the court’s findings supported the Family Part’s custody award, notwithstanding that it applied an inappropriate standard.
More than two years have elapsed since the custody hearing. Chantel is now more than three and one-half years old and has resided with the Nelsons since birth. This Court is uninformed about the events that have occurred since the custody hearing with respect to the Nelsons, Larry and Chantel. Under those circumstances, a reversal of the custody award made in March 1998, combined with an immediate unsupervised transfer of custody to Larry, is manifestly inappropriate. That disposition poses a significant and unnecessary risk to Chantel’s interests.
In my view, the appropriate result is to remand this matter for a new custody determination by the Family Part. On remand the Nelsons would be free to offer proof through expert testimony that they presently have established a psychological parenting relationship with Chantel. If the court so finds, a best interest standard can be applied in making the award of physical custody and visitation. Absent such a finding, the court should award custody to Larry unless it determines that he is unfit or that the award of custody to him would be likely to cause actual detriment to Chantel’s growth and development.
*293Justice O’HERN joins in this opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices GARIBALDI, COLEMAN, LONG and VERNIERO — 5.
For remandment — Justices O’HERN and STEIN — 2.