concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the court. However, in my opinion, the error requiring reversal includes not only the trial court’s decision to return the jury’s note without determining its contents, but also its failure to respond adequately to the jury’s earlier inquiry as to what to do if they determined that Foster did not make reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages. The original mitigation instruction had failed to inform the jury what effect a factual finding of a failure to mitigate should have on their verdict. In response to the note, the court simply instructed the jury only that it should “determine the [e]ffect, if any, your findings have on the plaintiffs claim for damages.” This response did not go nearly far enough, particularly given the inadequacy of the court’s earlier instruction. Rather, the re-instruction left the jury without guidance on a principle of law essential to their decision. Foster’s counsel requested as a response to the jury’s note “that the failure to minimize or mitigate damages does not preclude recovery, but only precludes those damages as might have been avoided by reasonable efforts of the plaintiff.” This statement comports with the well-settled law on this *799issue,1 and, if given as an instruction, it would have cleared the jury’s confusion. “Where a jury has demonstrated confusion, ... the trial judge may not allow that confusion to continue, but must make an appropriate and effective response.” Whitaker v. United States, 617 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C.1992) (citing Murchison v. United States, 486 A.2d 77, 83 (D.C.1984)) (other citations omitted). Here, the jury made clear its difficulties, and the trial court did not ‘“clear them away with concrete accuracy.’ ” Id. (quoting Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946)). The jury was left to determine the effect of a failure to mitigate on their verdict without guidance on the controlling legal principles. Their subsequent note, which went unanswered, demonstrates further their confusion. For these reasons, I agree that reversal is required.
. See Gamble v. Smith, 386 A.2d 692, 695 n. 8 (D.C.1978); Hill v. Liner, 336 A.2d 533, 535 (D.C.1975) (citing W.B. Moses & Sons v. Lockwood, 54 App. D.C. 115, 120, 295 F. 936, 941 (1924)); Brandon v. Capital Transit Co., 71 A.2d 621, 622-23 (D.C.1950); see generally Edward M. Crough, Inc. v. Department of General Servs. of the District of Columbia, 572 A.2d 457, 466-67 (D.C. 1990).