dissenting:
The majority holds that the lower court committed an error of law by failing to follow statements contained in an opinion expressing the views of only two members of our Supreme Court. I dissent.
On a previous appeal of this negligence action, our Supreme Court reversed the order awarding judgment n.o.v. in favor of the defendant township and remanded for disposition of the township’s motion for new trial. The Court filed three opinions. Mr. Justice LARSEN’s opinion, joined by only one other Justice, was published as the lead opinion in the case. In that opinion, Justice LARSEN reviewed the record and determined that it contained sufficient evidence of the township’s negligence in failing to provide protective measures for pedestrians on one of its roads. He concluded that the lower court had erred in disregarding certain expert testimony in the record when it ruled on the township’s motion for judgment n.o.v. because such a motion must be considered in light of all the evidence of record. Having reached this conclusion, Justice LARSEN stated further that it was nonetheless proper for the trial court to admit into evidence the expert testimony of a traffic engineer regarding the safety of a township road.
*426Mr. Justice POMEROY, joined by two other Justices, filed a brief concurring opinion. He stated that he “agree[d] that the learned trial court erred in granting Ridley Township’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, and thus also agree[d] that the judgment [had to] be vacated.” Drew v. Laber, 477 Pa. 297, 303, 383 A.2d 937, 944 (1978). In reaching this conclusion, however, Justice POMEROY relied upon the reasoning set forth in Flickinger Estate v. Ritsky, 452 Pa. 69, 305 A.2d 40 (1973) (proximate causation where negligence of intervening third parties is at issue). Mr. Justice ROBERTS, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented on the ground that the township owed no duty to the plaintiff and, consequently, could not have been negligent.
Our Supreme Court has stated that an opinion of only two Justices of that Court “has no binding precedential value.” Commonwealth v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 260, 248 A.2d 32, 35 (1968). See also Mt. Lebanon v. County Board of Elections, 470 Pa. 317, 368 A.2d 648 (1977) (plurality opinion regarded as “non-decisional”); Commonwealth v. Davenport, 462 Pa. 543, 549 n.3, 342 A.2d 67, 75, n.3 (1975) (case not representing view of majority of Court is non-decisional). In the previous appeal of the instant case, only one other Justice joined Justice LARSEN’s opinion. The concurring and dissenting opinions were silent on the issue of the admissibility of the expert testimony. President Judge CERCONE concludes, however, that the silence of the concurring Justices implied agreement with Justice LARSEN’s statements regarding the admissibility of the expert testimony now in question. I disagree. The language of the concurring opinion unambiguously indicates agreement only with Justice LARSEN’s conclusion that judgment n.o.v. was improperly granted. A finding that the expert testimony was properly admitted was not a necessary step in reaching that conclusion because the lower court was not permitted to exclude testimony properly or improperly admitted at trial in ruling on the motion for judgment n.o.v. Because the concurring Justices expressly adopted only the result of Justice LARSEN’s opinion, and because the conclusion that the expert testimo*427ny had been properly admitted was not necessary to that result, I believe that only two Justices have expressed their view on the evidentiary issue. Consequently, I believe that on remand the lower court was not bound to adhere to Justice LARSEN’s statements regarding the admissibility of the expert testimony.
Moreover, I believe that the lower court properly resolved the evidentiary issue in ruling on the township’s motion for new trial. It is well — settled that
[pjhenomena and situations which are matters of common knowledge, may not be made the subject for expert testimony. In Burton v. Horn & Hardart, 371 Pa. 60, [88 A.2d 873], [our Supreme] Court said: “Expert testimony is inadmissible when the matter can be described to the jury and the condition evaluated by them without the assistance of one claiming to possess special knowledge upon the subject.”
Collins v. Zediker, 421 Pa. 52, 53-54, 218 A.2d 776, 777 (1966).
At trial, the lower court admitted into evidence the opinion of a traffic and transportation engineer that the road in question was not properly maintained. The engineer testified that because it was so narrow, the road should, at a minimum, have had signs warning motorists that pedestrians walked on the roadway. In ruling on the township’s motion for new trial, the lower court concluded that it had improperly admitted this testimony into evidence. I agree. The appropriate width of highways and the necessity of warning signs are matters within the knowledge and understanding of laypersons. These are not issues of such complexity as to require expert testimony in order for the jury to reach an informed decision. Additionally, admission of this evidence was not harmless because the testimony of the traffic engineer that the road was improperly maintained “could well have unduly influenced the jury in behalf of the side which called him, regardless of inherent merit involved.” Collins v. Zediker, supra, 421 Pa. at 55, 218 A.2d at 778. Therefore, I would hold that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the township a new trial, *428Gilligan v. Shaw, 441 Pa. 305, 307-08, 272 A.2d 462, 463-64 (1971), and, accordingly, would affirm the order of the court below.