dissenting:
Today, my colleagues in the majority vacate a sentence of 94 months’ incarceration, a significant departure from the 188-to-235 month Guidelines range applicable to defendant, a career offender who, at age 28, in this case pleaded guilty to his third felony drug crime. The majority and concurring opinions suggest that the challenged sentence is unduly harsh in light of mitigating circumstances, specifically, defendant’s efforts to reform and cooperate in the years between arrest and sentence. They do not, however, hold that the sentence falls outside the range of choices available to the district court so as to render the term of incarceration substantively unreasonable, see Majority Op., ante at [83] (leaving question of substantive reasonableness unresolved), a conclusion that I think would be difficult to reach under our precedent, see United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc) (holding that district court’s substantive determination will be set aside only in “exceptional cases” where sentence imposed “ ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions’ ” (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007))); see also United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir.2006) (recognizing that in “overwhelming majority of cases,” Guidelines sentence will fall within “broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances”). Instead, the majority vacates and remands for resentencing based on possible procedural error, which it locates in “ambiguity” as to the district court’s understanding of the scope of its discretion to depart from the Career Offender Guideline, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, specifically, that part of the Guideline dictating a Criminal History Category of VI. See Majority Op., ante at [80-81, 82]. I must respectfully dissent. Not only do I not share the majority’s concern about the district court’s understanding of its sentencing discretion, I disagree with its decision to order resentencing without afford*87ing the district court an opportunity to clarify the purported ambiguity. I begin with this second point.
1. Ambiguity Warrants Clarification Not Vacatur and Resentencing
Even assuming arguendo that the majority properly identifies ambiguity in the sentencing record, I think the proper action would be to remand for clarification, not to vacate and order resentencing. Whether before or after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), this court has applied a “strong presumption” that district courts understand the scope of their discretion to impose sentences that depart or vary from the Guidelines. United States v. Brown, 98 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1996); see, e.g., United States v. Legros, 529 F.3d 470, 477-78 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. Sero, 520 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir.2008). We will deem this presumption “overcome only in the rare situation where the record provides a reviewing court with clear evidence of a substantial risk that the judge misapprehended the scope of his departure authority.” United States v. Sero, 520 F.3d at 192 (emphasis removed). This is not such a case.
The majority does not purport to identify clear evidence of a substantial risk that the district court misapprehended the scope of its sentencing discretion. Rather it locates ambiguity on this point in the district court’s “repeated emphasis on Preacel/s status as a Category VI career offender.” See Majority Op., ante at [80]. Such ambiguity might warrant a remand for clarification of the district court’s understanding of its sentencing discretion. See United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 669 (2d Cir.2008) (remanding “without vacating the sentences imposed” for clarification as to whether error infected the sentence).1 To rely on ambiguity alone to order vacatur and resentencing is, to my mind, to eviscerate the “clear evidence” rule.
This is not to suggest that ambiguity may never warrant resentencing. In United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163 (2d Cir.2008), we ordered resentencing after identifying ambiguity as to the district court’s understanding of the scope of its post-Booker sentencing discretion, but that case arose in the unusual context of legal uncertainty on that issue in the interim between Booker and the clarifying decisions in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). See United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d at 181 (recognizing degree to which our own decisions had contributed to confusion). This case presents no comparable unusual circumstances.2
*88Thus, to the extent the court here orders vacatur and re sentencing before affording the district court an opportunity to clarify its understanding of the scope of its discretion, I dissent for that reason alone.
2. The Identified Ambiguity
I further dissent because I do not think the record reveals ambiguity as to the district court’s understanding of the scope of its sentencing discretion. As the sentencing transcript cited by the majority reveals, the district court frequently — and correctly — stated that the Sentencing Guidelines put Preacely in Category VI because he qualified as a career offender. See Majority Op., ante at [80] (quoting Sentencing Tr. at 11-12). The majority expresses concern that such “repeated emphasis on Preacely’s status as a Category VI career offender” signals that the sentencing judge may not have “understood that he could make a so-called 'horizontal departure’ from the Career Offender Guideline and adopt a lower criminal history category.” Id. at [80]. It questions whether the district court understood “that the Career Offender Guideline was not mandatory.” Id. at [81]. I do not share these concerns.
The district court manifested an understanding of its complete discretion to sentence outside the Guidelines when it stated “I’m empowered to go to nothing,” ie., to impose even a non-incarceratory sentence. Sentencing Tr. at 12. The majority construes this statement to show “only that the judge understood his authority to depart from the statutory minimum pursuant to the government’s 5K1.1 motion.” Majority Op., ante at [81]. In support, it notes that the judgment of conviction references only § 5K1.1 as the basis for departure. See id. I am not convinced. Well before Booker, it was understood that a government motion for departure pursuant to § 5K1.1 and, in the case of a mandatory minimum, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), restored full sentencing discretion to the district court, freeing it from both the Sentencing Guidelines and any statutory minimum. In a case where such a motion is made, it thus makes sense for a district court to reference one or both of these sections in the judgment as the basis for imposing a non-Guidelines sentence, without citing other grounds that may also have afforded a measure of departure discretion.
More to the point of this dissent, however, only a few sentences after referencing its discretion to impose a non-incarceratory sentence, the district court conclusively demonstrated awareness that it was not bound to adhere to the Career Offender Guideline by stating that it had “cut the guideline range from a Category VI.” Sentencing Tr. at 12. I am hard pressed to locate any ambiguity in the district court’s understanding of the scope of its sentencing discretion when the court thus states that it has granted a departure from the Criminal History Category dictated by the Career Offender Guideline and knows that its departure discretion is so complete that it could impose even a non-incarceratory sentence.3
Viewed in this context, district court statements cited by the majority, such as *89“I may not ignore his prior record. I may not ignore the guidelines,” Majority Op., ante at [81] (quoting Sentencing Tr. at 13); and “I am dealing with a Category VI career offender, regardless of all of what you said,” id. at [82] (quoting Sentencing Tr. at 12), are not reasonably construed— to my mind — to suggest that the district court misapprehended the scope of its departure discretion. As the majority itself acknowledges, “district courts are not ... free to ignore the Career Offender Guideline,” id. at [79], a conclusion that derives from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A). Indeed, precisely because the Guidelines are a § 3553(a) factor, district courts not only “begin their [sentencing] analysis with the Guidelines,” they appropriately “remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 50 n. 6, 128 S.Ct. 586. Thus, I think the cited references to Category VI are reasonably understood simply as the district court’s explanation, by reference to a § 3553(a) factor, for why it chose not to afford Preacely the greater sentencing departure that he requested, ie., a sentence of time served (equivalent to approximately two years’ imprisonment) with a period of supervised release that included six months’ confinement in a halfway house. Where, as here, a district court acknowledges its discretion to impose even a nonincarceratory sentence, a reviewing court will generally not identify substantive, much less procedural, error in the district court decision to accord more weight to a particular Guideline than a defendant urges. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (holding that appellate court does not review weight assigned § 3553(a) factor except to determine if factor “can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of the circumstances”); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 59-60, 128 S.Ct. 586 (“On abuse-of-discretion review, the Court of Appeals should have given due deference to the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the sentence.”).
It appears that the majority, nevertheless, identifies ambiguity as to the district court’s understanding of its departure discretion from the court’s failure to indicate what departure it was making from the Career Offender Criminal History Category of VI before proceeding to give defendant consideration for cooperation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Whatever the merits of such a sequential approach to Guidelines departures, I do not think it is a procedural prerequisite to a reasonable sentence. Gall v. United States instructs that district courts should ordinarily “begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range,” 552 U.S. at 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, but it does not require district courts to address Guidelines departures in any particular order, or even separately, much less to recalculate the Guidelines after each departure.4 Indeed, *90after Booker, district courts are liberated from one of the more unfortunate aspects of Guidelines sentencing: the bazaar-like atmosphere of parties bargaining over the temporal value to assign discrete aggravating and mitigating factors, a process in which it is sometimes possible to lose sight of the larger question of what sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to address the statutory factors critical to just federal sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
To the extent Judge Lynch expresses concern that the district court may not have satisfied its § 3553(a) obligations based on “apparent failure to consider ... evidence” of Preacely’s reform, Concurring Op., ante at [86], I respectfully disagree. As the particulars of Preacely’s reform were highlighted by defense counsel in thoughtful and detailed written and oral presentations, I do not think we have any basis for thinking that the district court inadvertently overlooked such evidence. See United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.2007) (“[W]e do not insist that the district court address every argument the defendant has made.”); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 30 (“[W]e will not conclude that a district judge shirked her obligation to consider the § 3553(a) factors simply because she did not discuss each one individually or did not expressly parse or address every argument relating to those factors that the defendant advanced.”). Nor is there any reason to think that the district court, which specifically stated that it had considered all § 3553(a) factors, “thought about this sentence a lot,” Sentencing Tr. at 15, and “cut the guideline range from a Category VI,” id. at 12, deliberately ignored the reformation evidence that provided the strongest support for such a cut. In fact, the district court’s consideration of Preacely’s evidence of reform is demonstrated by its very first statement after the parties’ sentencing presentations, when it ob*91served, “Well, there is no question that he has done a lot to improve his situation.” Id. at 11; see generally United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that “no specific verbal formulations should be prescribed to demonstrate the adequate discharge of the duty to ‘consider’ matters relevant to sentencing”). This reinforces my view that the record does not indicate the district court’s failure to consider reformation evidence or possible misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion, but only its assignment of less weight to mitigating evidence than the defendant, and possibly my colleagues in the majority, might wish. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. at 59-60, 128 S.Ct. 586; United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189; accord United States v. Mazza-Alaluf, 621 F.3d 205, 214 (2d Cir.2010) (“Because the district court has a particular advantage in assessing the evidence and the defendant, we accord it considerable deference in assigning weight to relevant sentencing factors.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 583, 178 L.Ed.2d 425 (2010).
In this respect, it is worth noting that a departure from Criminal History Category VI to Category V would have yielded a sentencing range of 168 to 210 months, well above the 94-month sentence imposed.5 The majority elides this point by hypothesizing that if the district court had properly understood its discretion to depart from the Career Offender Guideline, it might have used a Criminal History Category of V, an offense level of 23, and a resulting Guidelines range of 84 to 105 months — Preacely’s Guidelines range without the career offender enhancement — as the starting point for awarding § 5K1.1 consideration. See Majority Op., ante at [82], The hypothesis raises several concerns in my mind.
First, it implies that the district court may have misapprehended its authority to depart from the Career Offender Guideline with respect to offense level as well as criminal history. The possibility of such a procedural error confronts a significant hurdle: the district court undoubtedly departed from the career offender offense level of 31 because, even at Criminal History Category I, offense level 31 provides for a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months, which is higher than the 94-month sentence Preacely received. Thus, I can only assume that, here too, the majority questions the district court’s awareness that it could depart from the career offender offense level before it afforded Preacely § 5K1.1 consideration for cooperation. I have already explained why I do not think the district court was required to consider departures in a particular order, especially where, as in this case, the district court acknowledged departure authority broad enough to permit it to impose a non-incarceratory sentence.
But I identify a further concern with the majority’s hypothesis: it too quickly assumes that a departure from the Career Offender Guideline would necessarily have *92reduced both Preacely’s criminal history and offense level to their original calculations. That is not apparent to me. Some grounds for departure — such as reformation — might support consideration along the criminal history axis without necessarily supporting a reduction in the enhanced offense level. Other factors — such as cooperation — might support departure from the offense level without necessarily supporting a departure from the enhanced criminal history. On the record before us, I identify no basis to think that, had the district court only understood the full scope of its sentencing discretion, it might well have reduced Preacely’s offense level to 23 even before assessing his cooperation. Indeed, the majority does not incorporate this hypothesis into its conclusion. It directs the district court on remand to consider only whether Category VI over-represents defendant’s criminal history and risk of recidivism, without any direction to reconsider Preacely’s career offender offense level before affording § 5K1.1 consideration. See Majority Op., ante at [82].6
Like my colleagues, I recognize that Preacely received a severe sentence despite his significant cooperation and efforts at reformation. I also recognize that other judges might have accorded these factors greater weight in mitigating the seriousness of Preacely’s crime and his risk of recidivism. What I do not recognize is any basis in the record for thinking that the balance struck by the district court is infected by procedural error, specifically, by possible misapprehension as to the court’s authority to depart from the Career Offender Guideline. Thus, while I see no reason to remand even for clarification, I specifically dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate and to order resentencing.
. United States v. Sanchez explained that if clarification revealed that the sentence was not infected by a misunderstanding of sentencing authority, "the district court should not disturb the sentence imposed, and ... need take no further action.” 517 F.3d at 669. On the other hand, if the clarification revealed infection, the district court "should vacate the sentence and ... resentence the defendant.” Id.-, accord United States v. Keller, 539 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.2008).
. Although other cases pre-dating Sanchez ordered resentencing where there was record ambiguity as to a court's understanding of its sentencing discretion, see United States v. Thorpe, 191 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Ekhator, 17 F.3d 53, 55-56 (2d Cir.1994), these cases did not consider the burden of resentencing, which requires not only a defendant's presence but consideration of an expanded record through the date of resentence, see generally United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d at 669; United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 229 (2d Cir.2005). As Sanchez recognized, there is no reason to impose these burdens until clarification reveals that actual *88error informed the sentence. See 517 F.3d at 669.
. United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, cited by Preacely and relied on by the majority, is plainly distinguishable. There, the district court not only did not signal that it was departing from the history category mandated by the Career Offender Guideline, it stated that it was bound by the statute defining career offenders to impose sentences higher than it might otherwise have done. See id. at 657-58.
. To the extent U.S.S.G. § IB 1.1, in establishing an order for application of Guidelines provisions, instructs sentencing courts to determine a defendant’s criminal history as specified in Parts A and B of Chapter Four, see id. § 1B1.1(a)(6), before referring to the departure grounds identified in § IB 1.1(b), a question arises as to whether a § 4A1.3 departure based on an inadequate criminal history category is part of a § IB 1.1 (a)(6) determination, so as necessarily to precede a § 5K1.1 departure for cooperation. Compare United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir.2010) (holding departures to be applied at § IB 1.1(b) (previously numbered § lBl.l(i)) stage), United States v. Darton, 595 F.3d 1191, 1195-97 (10th Cir.2010) (same), and United States v. Tolliver, 570 F.3d 1062, 1065-66 (8th Cir.2009) (same), with United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183, 193-95 (4th Cir.2010) (holding criminal history departure applied at § IB 1.1 (a)(6) (previously num*90bered § lBl.l(f)) stage under pre-2003 Guidelines).
Although our court has not addressed the issue in a published decision, but see United States v. Jones, 369 Fed.Appx. 171, 172 (2d Cir.2010) (holding that § 4A1.3 departure does not change Guidelines range but, rather, "imposes a sentence outside the calculated range” (emphasis in original)), I am inclined to answer that question in the negative, particularly in this case where sentence was imposed after a 2003 amendment that clarified that a § 4A1.3 departure is the "assignment of a criminal history category other than the otherwise applicable criminal history category,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.l (E) (emphasis added). This language identifies § 4A1.3 not as part of the process for determining a defendant's criminal history category but, like § 5K1.1, as one of the "policy statement[s]” for departures "that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence” after calculation of a defendant's applicable Guidelines range. U.S.S.G. § lBl.l(b); see United States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that 2003 amendment appears to mean that henceforth departures apply at § lBl.l(b) stage); United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d at 193-95 (same).
In any event, a reading of § IB 1.1 (a)(6) to include § 4A1.3 departures would not necessarily favor Preacely. Section 1B1.1(a)(6) contains two sentences, the first of which instructs courts to "[djetermine the defendant’s criminal history category as specified in Part A of Chapter Four,” and the second of which instructs courts to "[d]etermine from Part B of Chapter Four any other applicable adjustments.” The employment of two sentences, the latter of which references “other” adjustments, might suggest sequential application, in which case a district court would apply a § 4A1.3 departure before applying a § 4B1.1 career offender enhancement. The law is to the contrary, see United States v. Mishoe, 241 F.3d 214, 219 (2d Cir.2001) (recognizing ability to apply § 4A1.3 departure after § 4B1.1 enhancement), a conclusion consistent with viewing § 4A1.3 simply as one of the many departure grounds available for court consideration — in no particular order — at the final step of the Sentencing Guidelines process, see U.S.S.G. § lBl.l(b).
. My colleagues do not suggest that Criminal History Category V overstates Preacely’s record. Four convictions contributed to that category before application of the career offender enhancement: a 1995 conviction for disorderly conduct; a 1995 conviction for selling drugs, occurring only seven days after Preacely's release on the disorderly conduct charge; a 1999 conviction for misdemeanor assault; and a 2000 conviction for another drug sale. Even without consideration of two juvenile drug dispositions, these convictions placed Preacely in Criminal History Category IV. The two facts that put him in the high end of Category V were his commission of the federal drug crime within two years of release on the 2000 conviction and while on parole. While I do not discount the significant evidence of Preacely’s rehabilitation, neither can I minimize the risk of recidivism raised by this record, nor fault the district court for according it significant weight.
. There is, in fact, some reason to question whether Preacely’s offense level was properly calculated at 23 before application of the Career Offender Guideline. That level is based on Preacely’s trafficking in a total of 21 grams of crack cocaine, the amount recovered in two seizures. The record, however, strongly suggests that Preacely's related conduct involved a higher drug quantity. See Concurring Op., ante at [83] (cautioning that it would be "naive” to think "that what Preacely was caught doing was the full extent of his misbehavior”). Not only was he indicted for dealing in 50 grams or more of crack, he admitted in the course of his pre-sentence interview that he routinely dealt crack when not employed, including in the five months preceding the first seizure of drugs in this case. In short, if Preacely's Guidelines had been calculated by reference to the totality of the drugs he dealt, as seems appropriate under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, his offense level might well have been at least two, and possibly four, levels higher than 23. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. To be sure, this is still below the level 31 mandated by the Career Offender Guideline. But it makes me question how easily one can decide on the record before us the degree to which that Guideline inflated Preacely’s offense level.
I further note that the record on appeal provides little information about the conduct involved in Preacely’s crimes of conviction, his possible past gang membership, or how he came to have information about the serious crimes on which he provided cooperation. I will assume that the government, in moving for § 5K1.1 consideration, has provided the district court with a full and candid account of defendant's criminal conduct both in and beyond the crimes of conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(b)(5).