concurring.
I entirely agree with the reasoning and conclusion that the specific requirements *805of Super. Ct.Crim. R. 118 control over the. general “treat as conceded” provision of Super. Ct.Crim. R. 47 — 1(c), just as our case law has held that Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56 controls over Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12 — 1(e). I would stop there in deciding this appeal and not venture to develop any “general principle” applicable to all criminal and civil motions to which Crim. R. 47-I(c) and its civil counterparts apply. Such motions can run the gamut from routine to disposi-tive. It seems to me premature to suggest that a conscientious and overworked trial judge must in all unopposed motions matters determine whether the movant has made a prima facie case for whatever may be sought. Indeed, if this be so, it is hard to see what the “treat as conceded” provision was intended to effectively accomplish.1
. I might add in passing that even if Davis had reached the age of twenty-one, she would have violated the provision applicable to all individuals banning possession on a public street of an alcoholic beverage in an open container. That offense at the time of Davis’s