(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I.
Introduction
Seven decades ago, Mr. Justice Holmes reminded us that:
“Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called *663great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend.” [Dissenting Opinion in Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-401, 24 S.Ct. 436, 468, 48 L.Ed. 679 (1904)] (Emphasis added.)
The current financial hardships, the plight and in fact the possible survival of many of Pennsylvania’s nonpublic schools make the instant matter both a “great” and a “hard” case. Certainly, there is a tugging appeal to one’s humanitarian feelings and interest over the difficulties which will confront nonpublic schools if these appropriations are constitutionally precluded,1 and one is mindful that, unfortunately, the financial crisis is perhaps most crucial to the Roman Catholic parochial schools which have contributed so much in educating so many at such relatively low costs.8 I am not unaware of the grave concern that more public funds would have to be spent if nonpublic schools were closed thereby transferring the educational burden almost totally to the public arena; however, for me the constitutional test is not one of fiscal load, since the argument on fiscal grounds embraces the type of interest which in the words of Justice Holmes could appeal to the feelings and distort the constitutional judgment.2 3
*664But today, just as when the First Amendment was written almost two centuries ago, we must be vigilant to not let the “immediate interest’’ at hand cause the federal courts to bend or deviate from the well-settled principles of law embraced within the boundaries of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. It is now too late in the day to move backwards the hands of our forefathers’ constitutional clock.
Thus, I concur with the majority of the Court today only insofar as they uphold the provisions of Act 195 pertaining to the loaning of secular textbooks to the nonpublic school pupils. Furthermore, I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that those portions of Act 195 which authorize the loaning of projection equipment and recording equipment must be invalidated, but I respectfully dissent from the Court’s conclusion that equipment of that nature can be severed from the overall instructional equipment loan program and otherwise approved. Reiterating my position, I believe only the loaning of secular textbooks can be constitutionally permitted under the First Amendment, and the remaining aid programs, including the auxiliary services program of Act 194, the instructional materials program of Act 195, and the instructional equipment program of Act 195 must be stricken down in toto and be held unconstitutional.
In many respects, this case vividly illustrates and typifies the unswerving persistence and perseverance of state legislatures throughout the nation in continually seeking to alleviate the increasing financial plight and monetary strain of nonpublic secondary and elementary schools. Each successive legislative scheme, heeding the sage admonitions reflected in the growing number of Supreme Court pronouncements, becomes inevitably more sophisticated and refined as it endeavours to approach as close as feasible to the “verge” 4 of the constitutional precipice and yet not overstep the boundaries of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Recognizing that “we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law,” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (Burger, Ch.J.), it is my judgment that, adhering to the constitutional standards and guidelines announced heretofore, the only component of Acts 194 and 195 which substantially complies- with the First Amendment strictures is the loaning of secular textbooks to nonpublic school pupils.
The majority of the Court has today adopted a position that in my view exalts form over substance, ignoring and obscuring a fundamental reality that the subsidizing and sponsorship of secular education in nonpublic secondary and elementary schools ineluctably will eventuate in spawning the fostering and promotion of religion violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The constitutional guarantees traditionally subsumed under and secured by the Establishment Clause have today unquestionably been seriously if *665not irreparably eroded and eviscerated. As a likely aftermath of the Court’s affixing its imprimatur to this legislation, one can forecast dire portents for Church-State relations. Most assuredly, this action will not go unnoticed in other states whose steadfast hopes of being able to financially assist nonpublic schools have still not been dashed and who remain undaunted and confident that they ultimately will prevail.
I recognize that my most able and distinguished colleagues speak with equal sincerity and conviction for the views which they have espoused in the majority opinion. Yet, with all due respect and esteem I feel that I would be utterly remiss (from my perspective of the constitution) if I did not register my firmest protest against what I regard as a perilous departure from the teachings of the First Amendment. The instant decision is not merely a latent, minute crack in the constitutional bulwark; instead it smashes the constitutional floodgates. It sanctions the potential inundation of ominous policies which could leave the constitution a mere shell of what the Founding Fathers envisioned and it creates dangers which the founders so fervently and zealously sought to avoid.4a
The First Amendment as it assures freedom of religion and prohibits governmental establishment of religion, comes almost directly and primarily from the authorship of James Madison and his prior efforts in writing A Bill For Establishing Religious Freedom as finally enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia on January 19, 1786. In pointed language that provision noted:
“Well aware that Almighty God hath created the mind free; * * * that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical;
“We, the General Assembly, do enact, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, retrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief.” (Emphasis added)
We have clearly turned the constitutional clock backwards here. Madison, as author of the First Amendment, was concerned that not even a “three pence” contribution be exacted from any citizen in the aid or establishment of a religion. (See third paragraph of Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments). Here the majority sanctions almost seventy million dollars exacted from taxpayers in one state. Tragically, there is no suggestion that the end to this escalating magnitude is ever in sight if sophisticated nomenclature and adroit bookkeeping mechanisms are used.
II.
Relevant Financial and Religious Characteristics of Acts 19b and 195
Before focusing on the constitutional questions the financial dimensions of this legislation should be highlighted, particularly noting and emphasizing the sectarian and denominational affiliations of most of the recipients of these governmental subsidies. In administering Acts 194 and 195 the Commonwealth has adopted the position that it will not inquire about the religious characteristics *666of the nonpublic schools requesting monies provided in accordance with this legislation. The only criterion apparently imposed in determining eligibility is that the nonpublic school complies with and fulfills the Commonwealth’s compulsory school attendance requirements. Thus even if a nonpublic school maintains religious restrictions on pupil admissions, that school would not be precluded from participating in the programs challenged here. Along the same lines, Robert J. Czekoski, Coordinator of Nonpublic School Services and the chief administrator of Acts 194 and 195, testified at the final hearing on plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction that it was of no relevance in implementing the programs and thus the Commonwealth would not inquire whether any school compelled attendance for instruction in theology and religious doctrine or required participation in religious worship. Nor would the Commonwealth question if the nonpublic school was an integral part of the religious mission of the sponsoring church, has as a substantial or dominant purpose the inculcation of religious values, imposes religious restrictions on faculty appointments, or attaches religious restrictions on what the faculty might teach. (See generally N.T. of September 10, 1973 at 8-18 particularly 13-17.)
In answers to interrogatories propounded by the plaintiffs it was ascertained that of the 1,320 nonpublic schools in the Commonwealth which comply with the compulsory attendance laws, at least 986 or roughly 75 per cent were Roman Catholic Diocesan schools. To further clarify those statistics, the aggregate number of individuals attending nonpublic schools was 453,699, but 400,932 or approximately 88 per cent represented pupils attending Roman Catholic Diocesan schools. The record does not provide a more specific religious delineation for the remaining nonpublic schools.5
For the 1972-1973 school year the Commonwealth budgeted $14,280,000.00 for the implementation of Act 194 and $16,660,000.00 for Act 195. The respective figures appropriated for the 1973-1974 school term are $17,880,000.00 and $17,560,000.00. Under Act 195, during the 1972-1973 school year $4,670,000.00 of the sum budgeted for that year had been expended for the acquisition of textbooks for loan to nonpublic school children.
At least two observations can be readily gleaned from the foregoing statistics: First, the sums allocated by the Commonwealth for the implementation of Acts 194 and 195 can by no means be regarded as insubstantial or insignificant. Secondly, nonpublic schools having a recognized and dominant sectarian character are the primary and principal beneficiaries of the legislative enactments. The presence of the latter feature has notably contributed to several courts ruling that statutes of this nature were essentially class legislation . and thus constitutionally suspect under the First Amendment. See, e. g., Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 93 S.Ct. 2982, 2986, 37 L.Ed.2d 939 (1973); Public Funds for Public Schools of N. J. v. Marburger, 358 F.Supp. 29, 33-36 (D.N.J.1973); Wolman v. Essex, 342 F.Supp. 399, 412 (S.D.Ohio 1972), aff’d, 409 U.S. 808, 93 S.Ct. 61, 34 L.Ed.2d 69 (1972) ; Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F.Supp. 744, 753-755 (S.D.Ohio 1972), aff’d sub nom., Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901, 93 S.Ct. 3062, 37 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1973) .
*667III.
Act 195 and the Secular Textbook Loan Program
The providing of secular textbooks to nonpublic school children under Act 195, 24 P.S. § 9-972, is the one section of these two acts which might best withstand a First Amendment attack and pass constitutional muster. One of my reservations about this program, and generally for that matter a fatal reservation regarding the other three programs, pertains to the wording of the statute itself as it is particularly embodied and expressed in its legislative findings and declaration of legislative policy. The legislative drafting accentuates the special class appearance which permeates the entire statutory framework.
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) and Board of Education of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968) are the two authorities enunciating the relevant criteria most apposite here.6 In Everson the Court found it to be constitutionally permissible for the state to offer free access to public transportation to and from school for all school children, including those in attendance at nonpublic schools. The Allen ruling extended Everson to immunize the loaning of secular textbooks to all children throughout the state for designated grades, encompassing both nonpublic and public school children. For each statute there was no question that the general benefits provided thereunder would inure to all the children in the state, thus avoiding any inference that a certain class had been singled out to receive state aid.
The Everson statute specifically stated:
“Whenever in any district there are children living remote from any schoolhouse, the board of education of the district may make rules and contracts for the transportation of such children to and from school, including the transportation of school children to and from school other than a public school, except such school as is operated for profit in whole or in part.
“When any school district provides any transportation for public school children to and from school, transportation from any point in such established school route to any other point in such established school route shall be supplied to school children residing in such school district in going to and from school other than a public school, except such school as is operated for profit in whole or in part.” 330 U.S. at 3, 67 S.Ct. at 505 n.1.
The text of the Allen statute substantially tracked the wording of Everson:
“In the several cities and school districts of the state, boards of education, trustees of such body or officers as perform the function of such boards shall have the power and duty to purchase and to loan upon individual request, to all children residing in such district who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a public or private school which complies with the compulsory education law, textbooks. Textbooks loaned to children enrolled in grades seven to twelve of said private schools shall be textbooks which are' designated for use in any public, elementary or secondary schools of the state or are approved by any boards of education, trustees or other school authorities. Such textbooks are to be loaned free to such children subject to such rules and regulations as are or may be prescribed by the board of regents and such boards of education, trustees or other school authorities.” 392 U.S. at 239, 88 S.Ct. at 1924 n.3.
*668Juxtaposing Act 195, 24 P.S. § 9-972(a), under attack here to the Ever-son and Allen statutes, one can contrast the legislative drafting technique employed :
“9-972. Loan of textbooks, instructional materials and equipment, nonpublic school children.
“(a) Legislative Findings: Declaration of Policy.
The welfare of the Commonwealth requires that the present and future generations of school age children be assured ample opportunity to develop to the fullest their intellectual capacities. To further this objective, the Commonwealth provides, through tax funds of the Commonwealth, textbooks and instrumental materials free of charge to children attending public schools within the Commonwealth. Approximately one-quarter of all children in the Commonwealth, in compliance with the compulsory attendance provisions of this act, attend nonpublic schools. Although their parents are taxpayers of the Commonwealth, these children do not receive textbooks or instructional materials from the Commonwealth. It is the intent of the General Assembly by this enactment to assure such a distribution of such educational aids that every school child in the Commonwealth will equitably share in the benefits thereof.”
Though the intent of the legislature in each instance was obviously and undoubtedly identical, that is, to extend some basic secular services to all children irrespective of the school attended, the Pennsylvania statute is more susceptible to a constitutional challenge than its predecessors. See also Marburger, supra, 358 F.Supp. at 35-36 and other cases cited on page 666 supra.
A more troublesome aspect of this program is the potential for excessive entanglement of Church and State. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) articulated the three-prong test courts should follow in analyzing the multifarious, legislative schemes adopted.
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 1926, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ Walz, supra, at 674, 90 S.Ct. at 1414.”
The plaintiffs concede that the Acts 194 and 195 evince a secular legislative purpose. Passing over for the moment the second requirement that the statute not be such that its primary or principal effect either advances or inhibits religion, I will consider the third criterion commanding that there be no excessive entanglement of the government and religion.
The Court’s decision to consolidate the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed.R. Civ.P. 65(a)(2) necessitates that any analysis should not be restricted solely to facial unconstitutionality but additionally should examine whether the application, implementation, or construction of the statute is constitutionally repugnant.
In the case at bar the Commonwealth has promulgated “Guidelines for the Administration of Acts 194 and 195,” and therefore I can scrutinize the. regulations in conjunction with the statutes. Allen preceded Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970) and thus the entanglement requirement introduced in Walz was not directly raised or considered in Allen. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 613-614, 91 S.Ct. at 2111-2112, held constitutionally infirm a Pennsylvania statute on the ground of excessive entanglement without reaching whether the scheme was equally violative under the “effect” test. On the other hand, the Court struck down the Pennsylvania and New York statutes on the primary effect bar in Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 93 S.Ct. at 2982 n. 8, 37 L.Ed.2d 939; Committee for Public *669Ed. & Religious Lib. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2969, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973), and Levitt v. Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Lib., 413 U.S. 472, 93 S.Ct. 2814, 2818-2820, 37 L.Ed.2d 736 (1973).
Unlike the regulations upheld by the Court in Allen, the administrative regulations of the Commonwealth are much more intrusive, cumbersome and detailed, bringing the Commonwealth into frequent association with the nonpublic schools. Though the Court there did not invalidate the administrative procedure utilized by the state notwithstanding the intermediate intervention of the nonpublic schools, the operation in the instant case extends beyond the practice permitted then. The legislative approach in Allen was found not to be constitutionally flawed even though the individual pupil requests for secular books were filed initially with the nonpublic school and the nonpublie school would prepare summaries forwarding those to the Board of Education. 392 U.S. at 244, 88 S.Ct. at 1926-1927 n. 6. Storing the textbooks on the premises of the nonpublic schools was similarly constitutionally tolerated.
Section 4 of the Commonwealth’s Guidelines explicates the operative procedures the nonpublic schools and their pupils should follow to receive the books made available through Act 195. Sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 4.7, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, and 4.13 of the Guidelines, set forth below, point out some of the entanglement features of the Act.
Sections 4.3 and 4.6 provide:
“4.3 Each nonpublic school shall submit on or before October 15 for the initial year and on or before March 1 thereafter a loan request for the desired textbooks to the Department of Education. The requests will be of standard format and will be distributed by the Department of Education prior to October 1 of the initial year and on or before February 15 of each year thereafter, to each nonpublic school or the appropriate chief administrator. The request shall not exceed 80 per cent of the total allocation.” 7
“4.6 Textbooks requested will be shipped directly to the appropriate nonpublic school.”
Exhibit D-9,8 printed in the footnote, is the form prepared by the Department of Education which students should complete for the books. Evidently the De*670partment of Education sends the forms directly to the nonpublic schools, the schools in turn forward them to the parents who fill them out and return them not to the Secretary of Education, thus contrary to what the forms connote, but rather to the school from which they received the forms.9
Therefore, as in Allen, and as stated in Section 4.3 of the Commonwealth’s Guidelines, the nonpublic school totals the number of individual requests and transmits this figure to the Department of Education. According to Section 4.6, the books are then transported not to the children but to the nonpublic schools which distribute them to the children.10 Thus, to a limited degree this resembles the procedure which was approved in Allen on a record, I might add, which was far more exiguous than that presented to this Court.
The Allen procedure however has been further distended in the instant case. Section 4.4 of the Guidelines provides:
“Five per cent should be allowed in the purchase request for transportation allowances.”
Section 4.7 states:
“The Department of Education is responsible for fiscal control, fund accounting and maintaining records for the acquisition of the textbooks.”
While Section 4.7 suggests that the accounting operations would be centralized, entailing minimal contact with the nonpublic schools and thus not necessifating the “comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance” condemned in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114, other sections of the Guidelines negate any contention that the Commonwealth’s administrative intrusion would only be slight, infrequent or occasional.
Section 4.9 admonishes:
“Each nonpublic school shall be responsible for any expenditures in excess of its allocations.”
A reading of Sections 4.10 and 4.11 re-emphasizes the legislative drafting shortcomings. Section 4.10 states in relevant part:
“Textbooks loaned to the nonpublic schools: (a) shall be maintained on an inventory by the nonpublic school.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 4.11 provides:
“It is presumed that textbooks on loan to nonpublic schools after a period of time will be lost, missing, obsolete or worn out. This information should be communicated to the Department of Education. After a period of six years, textbooks shall be declared unserviceable and the disposal of such shall be at the discretion of the Secretary of Education.” (Emphasis added.)
Viewing the regulations as in pari materia and integral components of Act 195, serious questions are raised in my mind as to whether the books are in fact loaned directly to the children as in Al*671len or really if this portion of the Act is merely nothing more than an elaborately contrived subterfuge designed to principally aid nonpublic schools which are fundamentally and preponderantly church-related.11
A final example of potentially hazardous entanglement of Church and State is Section 4.13 of the Guidelines:
“The nonpublic school or the agency which it is a member shall be responsible for maintaining on file certificates of requests from parents of children for all textbook materials loaned to them under this act. The file must be open to inspection for the appropriate authority. A letter certifying the certificates on file shall accompany all loan requests.”
Upon considering (1) the special class nature of the legislation, (2) the excessive administrative entanglement features of the Act, and (3) the potential that the Act serves as a boon to nonpublic schools because of the primary aid which could be diverted for sectarian functions unless there was strict compliance by the nonpublic school administrators, I am not completely free from doubt as to the constitutionality of even this provision which allocates secular books by the Commonwealth to children enrolled in nonpublic schools. Certainly, defendants have not patently established the constitutionality of this provision. Yet, despite my almost agonizing doubts on this extremely close question, I resolve the issue of constitutionality in favor of the provision of the statute which loans secular books to students at nonpublic schools. But in making this resolution I must note that by the barest scintilla possible the book provision avoids intrusion into the zone of unconstitutionality.
IV.
Act 194 and the Auxiliary Services Program
Turning to Act 194, the authority mandating the provision of auxiliary services for nonpublic school children, the Court is confronted with a novel and intriguing legislative scheme enabling nonpublic schools to receive some secular services from the Commonwealth. While I reluctantly concur with the majority as respects the loaning of secular textbooks, I am unable to arrive at the same conclusion for the auxiliary services, the instructional equipment or the instructional materials. The approbation of this approach can produce far-reaching, sweeping, and monumental consequences for Church-State relations, for at bottom the seminal question presented is whether a state can achieve in an indirect, circumlocutious fashion what it is constitutionally barred from doing directly. Phrased differently, can the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via Intermediate Units, which are duly authorized state agencies, circumvent the First Amendment restraints which historically have been engrained and implanted in the constitutional matrix of this country? I earnestly do not believe so.
First, the program of auxiliary services is plagued by the same legislative *672drafting defect alluded to in the previous discussion of the loaning of secular textbooks. In essence the special class of sectarian schools has been isolated for receipt of state supportive services.
Secondly, the plaintiffs’ position in regard to the auxiliary services should be stated here :
“We [the plaintiffs] do not challenge the right of parochial school children to obtain the auxiliary services provided by the statutes or the constitutional authority of the Commonwealth to provide those services to them. We challenge only the power to supply the services on church-owned and church-controlled premises as part of the program of parochial school education under church sponsorship. We recognize that requiring the children to come to publicly controlled neutral premises to receive publicly administered services may be less convenient than the form of administration authorized by the statutes. But, this is no less true with respect to any of the numerous forms of aid that the Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional.” Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief at 2.
In contrast to Act 195 and the loaning of textbooks, (1) these auxiliary services are being provided on the premises of the nonpublic schools and (2) teachers, unlike textbooks, are not fungible, the former not being inanimate objects totally devoid of emotions, feelings or opinions. Nor can it be gainsaid that the Intermediate Unit is any less an organ of the Commonwealth, and thus it is subject to the same constitutional proscriptions incumbent on the state.
The Commonwealth’s plan calls for the Intermediate Unit to hire these teachers rather than the nonpublic schools, and the teachers are of course accountable to the Intermediate Unit for their professional conduct and the conscientious performance of their duties. But these precautionary measures still cannot permit one to inescapably avoid the conclusion that some assurance must be made that when these teachers are thrust into a religious environment, their secular functions do not become inextricably entwined with the sectarian character of the school.
In Earley v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) the Court repudiated Rhode Island’s attempt to supplement the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic schools. The Court rejected the argument that teachers would not mix religion with the secular subjects which they were charged with teaching:
“We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and the First Amendment. We simply recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral. Doctrines and faiths are not inculcated or advanced by neutrals. With the best of intentions such a teacher would find it hard to make a total separation between secular teaching and religious doctrine. * * * Further difficulties are inherent in the combination of religious discipline and the possibility of disagreement between teacher and religious authorities over the meaning of the statutory restrictions.
“We do not assume, however, that parochial school teachers will be unsuccessful in their attempts to segregate their religious beliefs from their secular educational responsibilities. But the potential for impermissible fostering of religion is present. The Rhode Island Legislature has not, and could not, provide state aid on the basis of a mere assumption that secular teachings under religious discipline can avoid conflicts. The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion. . . .
*673*x> * *x* * *
“A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed. * * * Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and church.” 403 U.S. at 618-619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114. (Emphasis added.)
No more or less is expected and demanded of the Commonwealth in the instant case. While the Commonwealth’s procedure is probably more restricted and less disturbing than that present in DiCenso, supra, some state surveillance must be maintained and that intrusion in my view would require excessive embroilment of Church and State violative of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Moreover, I do not believe that the Commonwealth’s complacent reliance upon the professional integrity of the teachers alone adequately provides the requisite assurance of compliance with the First Amendment. The Supreme Court in DiCenso clearly refuted any contention that the state can, absent repeated prophylacic contacts with the institutions, ensure that state-subsidized teachers in nonpublie schools comport with constitutional limitations and standards.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth’s history of assigning nurses to nonpublic schools pursuant to 24 P.S. § 14-1402 does not save Act 194.12 Without passing upon the validity of that practice, suffice it to say that while a speech therapist’s tasks arguably could be con*674sidered as providing health care, I do not view them as synonymous with or comparable to the duties of nurses or doctors, or dentists. And certainly no respectable argument can be advanced for according guidance counselors this favorable inference. Finally, the drafting of 24 P.S. §§ 14-1401 and 14-1402 more clearly exemplifies statutes whose benefits provided thereunder are uniformly applicable to a general class.13
V.
Act 195 and the Instructional Materials Program
The validity vel non of the instructional materials provision of Act 195 is in many ways undistinguishable from the secular book provision. Nonetheless, for reasons which hereinafter follow, I find this program is constitutionally infirm under the First Amendment.
The invalidation of the instructional materials provision revolves more around primary effect than entanglement, although any administrative objections hereinafter noted for instructional equipment in Section VI, infra, are equally applicable to the instructional materials.
Section 1.12 of the Guidelines defines the kinds of materials available:
“Instructional Materials shall mean books, periodicals, documents, pam*675phlets, photographs, reproductions, pictorial or graphic works, musical scores, maps, charts, globes, sound recordings, including but not limited to those on discs and tapes, processed slides, transparencies, films, filmstrips, kinescopes and video tapes, or any other printed and published materials of a similar nature made by any method now developed or hereafter to be developed. The term includes such other secular, neutral, nonideological materials as are of benefit to the instruction of nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter provided for public school children of the Commonwealth.”
Section 3.16 of the Guidelines notes in part:
“Inventory of Instructional Equipment and Materials
“a. Instructional materials loaned to the nonpublic schools shall be maintained on an inventory by both the nonpublie and the appropriate intermediate unit.
“b. It is presumed that instructional materials on loan to nonpublic schools after a period of time will be lost, missing, obsolete or worn out. These items should be so noted on an annual inventory.”
Moreover, Sections 3.17(a) and 3.13(b) of the Guidelines, more fully described in Section VI, infra, must be complied with by the nonpublic schools.
A cardinal distinction between approving the loaning of secular books and the banning of instructional materials would be that ostensibly books are given directly to the children and derivatively the benefits are extended to their parents without any primary effect of aiding or inhibiting religion. Secondly, the costs of secular books are relatively nominal in contrast to the financial magnitude of the program here.
The crux of the case for me is whether you can by sophisticated accounting methods fund only secular programs in nonpublic schools, recognizing that a substantial monetary benefit is realized by the sectarian organization, without primarily aiding or advancing religion. For me the answer is unequivocally, emphatically and resoundingly NO. The primary effect gloss of such funding was first broached by Circuit Judge Coffin in DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F.Supp. 112, 119-120 (D.R.I.1970), reiterated by Circuit Judge Anderson in Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F.Supp. 421, 424-434 (D.Conn.1970), aff’d, 403 U.S. 955, 91 S.Ct. 2292, 29 L.Ed.2d 865 (1971), and the ramifications articulated by Judge Gurfein in Committee for Public Education and Relig. Lib. v. Nyquist, 350 F.Supp. 655, 665-667 (S.D.N.Y.1972).
Judge Anderson’s incisive and most lucid comments in Johnson, supra, 319 F.Supp. at 424-434, should not go unheeded. After an exhaustive legal analysis, he concluded:
“Reason demands some outer limit to the defendants’ contention that public funds and controls which are not literally earmarked to pay for or regulate religious instruction or observances can never be said to sponsor or otherwise establish an institution which is built around them. Abstract discussion of secular functions must not obscure the realities of how institutions such as schools operate. At one pole, it is clear that payment of aid directly to a religiously-affiliated educational institution does not automatically establish religion just because the sectarian activities of a school may be enhanced by anything which makes it more convenient for children to attend it. See Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. at 671, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697. But at the other extreme, a law which converts a school’s entire task of providing secular instruction from a purely private to a predominately state responsibility, while permitting religious instruction to continue unaltered, would constitute sponsorship of the school — the physical and administrative facility through which religion is taught — even if all public funds were formally designated to be spent *676for functions other than teaching religion. The test for this sort of institutional sponsorship, which is a variety of ‘excessive government entanglement with religion’ analogous to ‘releasing’ public school students for private religious instruction in their schools, is ‘inescapably one of degree.’ See Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. at 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697. If a law authorizes a religious group to participate in a contractual education program which requires the state to assume sponsorship of its entire non-religious scholastic'curriculum, then the institution receiving funds and being regulated must be tested by standards of religious neutrality similar to those required of a public school.” Id. at 433-434.
The use of Intermediate Units as conduits does not save this program or remove- any constitutional defects. The benefits are as substantial for the nonpublic schools whether the money is paid to them directly or the materials are paid for by someone else. The Commonwealth’s procedure mitigates the entanglement defect, but it does not avoid the primary effect shortcoming. Constitutional vulnerability is predicated on a disjunctive reading of the standards rather than requiring the conjunctive presence of all three criteria.
Thus, either on primary effect or entanglement grounds, this program should not be salvaged.
VI.
Act 195 and the Instructional Equipment Program
Providing instructional equipment under Act 195 to nonpublic schools similarly must not be upheld. Loaning of secular instructional equipment to nonpublic schools will require the same “comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance” stricken down in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619, 91 S.Ct. at 2114. The majority, recognizing that at least for some equipment there will be a potential for constitutional abuse, considers severance an adequate remedy for rectifying this. One of my disagreements with the Court is the inadequate weight accorded the primary effect consequences of this legislation. A second area of difference is the intrusive entanglement of the nonpublic schools with the Commonwealth which the majority here minimizes and discounts.
Rather than “purchasing” the “secular educational services” from nonpublic schools as in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 609, 91 S.Ct. at 2109, the Commonwealth authorizes the Intermediate Unit to acquire this equipment and then loan it directly to the nonpublic schools. This procedure mitigates the previous approach of the Commonwealth by avoiding the provision of direct state financial aid via cash grants to the sectarian schools. Id. at 621, 91 S.Ct. at 2115.
Section 1.13 of the Guidelines defines the wide variety of equipment available under the Act:
“Instructional Equipment shall mean instructional equipment, other than fixtures annexed to and forming part of the real estate, which is suitable for and to be used by children and/or teachers. The term includes but is not limited to projection equipment, recording equipment, laboratory equipment and any other educational secular, neutral, nonideological equipment as may be of benefit to the instruction of nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter provided for public school children of the Commonwealth.”
While projection equipment and recording equipment per se may be religiously neutral, this equipment can be misused and the carefully drawn statute of the legislature can be circumvented. A projector can be utilized to show religious films as easily as can the recording equipment be used to play records or tapes in a particular denominational vein.
*677Section 3.16 of the Guidelines provides in relevant parts:
“Inventory of Instructional Equipment and Materials
•S ■2v
“c. Instructional equipment loaned to nonpublic schools shall be maintained on an inventory by both nonpublie schools and the appropriate intermediate unit. After a period of 10 years these items shall be declared unservicable and the disposal of such shall be at the discretion of the Secretary of Education.
“d. Each nonpublic school shall submit to the local intermediate unit an inventory of all instructional materials and equipment on loan on or before June 1 of each fiscal year. Each intermediate unit should submit to the Secretary of Education a composite inventory of all instructional materials and equipment on loan, on or before June 30 of each fiscal year.”
Sectional 3.17 further states:
“Payment
“a. The intermediate unit will receive the allocations for the nonpublic school children and render the necessary accounting procedures and reports.”
Read in conjunction with 3.17(a) should be Section 3.13(b):
“Each nonpublic school shall be responsible to insure that requests for expenditures shall not exceed allocations. In the event that this occurs it is understood that each nonpublic school shall be responsible for any expenditure in excess of its allocation.”
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 621, 91 S.Ct. at 2115, the power of the Commonwealth to conduct a post-audit of the sectarian school’s financial records was singled out as being indicative of the entangling relationship between Church and State which should be eschewed. Moreover, the Court was wary of regulations which might be promulgated in order to implement any of the programs. Thus, the potential for entanglement as much as the actual practices in existence, alarmed the Court and was an important, if not overriding, concern in reaching its judgment.
Wholly apart from the vitiating administrative facets of Act 195 hereinbefore mentioned, the majority appears to minimize as being constitutionally insignificant the fact that the instructional equipment and instructional materials are given to the schools rather than the children as is the case for the textbooks. Nothing in the Act compels the schools to maintain any minimum level of expenditures as an offset for receipt of these items. In effect, the Court is saying that whenever a state provides purely secular equipment for a religious school, there can be no primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion irrespective of the extent of the economic assistance to the institution. This is a conclusion which I am unable to fully accept. The majority reads the First Amendment restrictions in an exceedingly narrow fashion. Thus this neat categorization and compartmentalization purportedly enable the Commonwealth to pay for only secular equipment which in the past was entirely paid for by the nonpublic schools, now freeing the schools’ monies for sectarian uses. To me, this is a clear sponsorship of religion by the Commonwealth without exacting any correlative promises that these benefits are administered in a constitutionally nondiscriminatory fashion.
The class nature of this legislation with its primary effect overtones as well as the ongoing administrative entanglement aspects of the Act leads me to the same conclusion that this program should not be sustained in any part.
VII.
Political Divisiveness, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause
Defendants have also attempted to analogize these programs to those ap*678proved in Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, supra; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971), and Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973). Any reliance upon those authorities is misplaced, as the factual underpinnings of those cases are clearly distinguishable.
We do not have as in Walz, 397 U.S. at 678, 90 S.Ct. at 1416, the tradition and experiences of two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation for churches. Nor as in Tilton and Hunt does this case involve (1) a “one-time, single-purpose construction grant,” Tilton, supra, 403 U.S. at 688, 91 S.Ct. at 2100; (2) to a college whose students are less impressionable and where presumably less emphasis is placed on religious indoctrination;14 and (3) where the nature of the program entails limited government surveillance in order to fully comport with the First Amendment guarantees.
Moreover, the potential for political divisiveness and dissension adumbrated by Chief Justice Burger in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403. U.S. at 623-625, 91 S.Ct. at 2116-2117, is equally controlling here and extremely compelling:
“The potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice is aggravated in these two statutory programs by the need for continuing annual appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and populations grow.”
* * * «- * *
“We have already noted that modern governmental programs have self-perpetuating and self-expanding propensities. These internal pressures are only enhanced when the schemes involve institutions whose legitimate needs are growing and whose interests have substantial political support. Nor can we fail to see that in constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought to approach ‘the verge,’ have become the platform for yet further steps. A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it can be a ‘downhill thrust’ easily set in motion but difficult to retard or stop. Development by momentum is not invariably bad; indeed, it is the way the common law has grown, but it is a force to be reckoned with. The dangers are increased by the difficulty of perceiving in advance exactly where the ‘verge’ of the precipice lies. As well as constituting an independent evil against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect, involvement or entanglement between government and religion serves as a warning signal.”15
Other arguments urged by the proponents of these programs must similarly be rejected as unfounded and unsound. In Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Lib. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. at 2973, Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, almost summarily dismissed any contention predicated on the Free Exercise Clause of a right to state aid.
“It is true, of course, that this Court has long recognized and maintained the right to choose nonpublic over public education. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). It is also true that a state law interfering with *679a parent’s right to have his child educated in a sectarian school would run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. But this Court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses, e. g., Everson v. Board of Education, supra; Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, and that it may often not be possible to promote the former without offending the latter. As a result of this tension, our cases require the State to maintain an attitude of ‘neutrality,’ neither ‘advancing’ nor ‘inhibiting’ religion. In its attempt to enhance the opportunities of the poor to choose between public and nonpublic education, the State has taken a step which can only be regarded as one ‘advancing’ religion. However great our sympathy, Everson v. Board of Education, supra, 330 U.S. at 18, 67 S.Ct. at 513 (Jackson, J., dissenting), for the burdens experienced by those who must pay public school taxes at the same time that they support other schools because of the constraints of ‘conscience and discipline,’ ibid., and notwithstanding the ‘high social importance’ of the State’s purposes, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), neither may justify an eroding of the limitations of the Establishment Clause now firmly emplanted.” (Footnote omitted).
Accord, Johnson v. Sanders, supra, 319 F.Supp. at 435; Wolman v. Essex, supra, 342 F.Supp. at 418-419; Kosydar v. Wolman, supra, 353 F.Supp. at 764.
Another argument of the defendants premised on the Equal Protection Clause can additionally be given short shrift. Chief Justice Burger, while concededly addressing a different constitutional question, spoke of the interplay between the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 2809, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973), where the Court barred nonpublic schools engaged in racial discrimination from receiving free textbooks from the state, the Chief Justice reasoned:
“Appellees fail to recognize the limited scope of Pierce when they urge that the rights of parents to send their children to private schools under that holding is at stake in this case. The suggestion is made that the rights of parents under Pierce would be undermined were the lending of free textbooks denied to those who attend private schools — in other words, that school children who attend private schools might be deprived of the equal protection of the laws were they invidiously classified under the state textbook loan program simply because their parents had exercised the constitutionally protected choice to send the children to private schools.
“We do not see the issue in appellees’ terms. In Pierce, the Court affirmed the right of private schools to exist and to operate; it said nothing of any supposed right of private or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse, on an equal basis or otherwise. It has never been held that if private schools are not given some share of public funds allocated for education that such schools are isolated into a classification violative of the Equal Protection Clause. It is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal protection, receive state aid.
“The appellees intimate that the State must provide assistance to private schools equivalent to that it provides to public schools without regard to whether the private schools discriminate on racial grounds. Clearly, the State need not. Even as to church-sponsored schools, whose policies are nondiscriminatory, any absolute right to equal aid was negated, at least by implication, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). The Religion *680Clauses of the First Amendment strictly confine state aid to sectarian education. Even assuming, therefore, that the Equal Protection Clauses might require state aid to be granted to private nonsectarian schools in some circumstances — health care or textbooks, for example — a State could rationally conclude as a matter of legislative policy that constitutional neutrality as to sectarian schools might best be achieved by withholding all state assistance. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). In the same way, a State’s special interest in elevating the quality of education in both public and private schools does not mean that the State must grant aid to private schools without regard to constitutionally mandated standards forbidding state-supported discrimination. That the Constitution may compel toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such discrimination.” (Emphasis added.)
In Sloan v. Lemon, supra, 413 U.S. 825, 93 S.Ct. at 2987-2988, Mr. Justice Powell also refused to allow parents of children attending nonsectarian nonpublic schools in Pennsylvania to receive the tuition reimbursements. The severability clause was insufficient justification to exclude nonsectarian schools from the ban since it could not be presumed such legislation would have been enacted by the Commonwealth were it only to encompass such a small class of beneficiaries.
VIII.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs in my view are entitled to a preliminary injunction barring the expenditure of funds under Acts 194 and 195, except for the secular textbooks which I would permit. Because of this approach, I find it unnecessary to decide whether there is any free exercise violation to plaintiffs in that there was compulsory taxation for the support of religion or religious schools.
Tragically, some persons, before the ink here is hardly dry, will claim that the dissent is anti-religious or fails to appreciate the importance of religion and religious education in our society. Such distortions would be far from the truth. Each of my children, as a matter of parental choice, has attended nonpublic schools which have a religious focus and are sponsored by a religious body. But it was a private choice; the taxpayers under the constitution are not permitted to pay the price for my religious preferences.
. While tjie instant record does not contain as original documents much economic data on the precise impact of the termination of the economic assistance in issue to students attending nonpublic schools, counsel for intervenor, Springfield, has included a copy of the brief filed by Henry E. Crouter in Crouter v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 93 S.Ct. 2982, 37 L.Ed.2d 939 (1973). In that latter brief, President Nixon is quoted as having said:
“ . . . In the past two years, close to a thousand nonpublic elementary and secondary schools closed and most of their displaced students enrolled in local public schools.
“If most or all private schools were to close or turn public, the added burden on public funds by the end of the 1970’s would exceed $4 billion per year in operations, with an estimated $5 billion more needed for facilities.” Report to the Congress of March 3, 1970 on Education Reform. Crouter brief at 59.
Theodore R. Sizer, Dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, has said:
“How to finance this necessary and responsible increased cost? In my judgment the average independent school would not be able to increase its income the requisite amount and still hold tuition down low enough to provide for a varied student body. The only recourse is public funds . . . .” Crouter brief at 56.
. The Report of the Archdiocesan Advisory Committee on the Financial Crisis of Catholic Schools in Philadelphia and Surrounding Counties (Abridged Edition 1972) notes that in fiscal 1970 elementary schools in the Archdiocese of Philadelphia incurred debts of $193,000, while high schools spent $804,000 more than available revenues.
“A. . . . The combined school operation deficit for 1970 was, therefore, $997 thousand. Thus, the total deficit for 1970 incurred by the three operations— parish churches, elementary schools and diocesan high schools — was $2.2 million. During fiscal 1971, the deficit in parish operations alone jumped to $5.1 million, a four-fold increase over 1970. Although complete school financial data is not yet available for 1971, there is every probability that the total deficit will increase, due mainly to the elimination of state aid.
“B. Deficits will continue and will grow during the next several years. Projections covering the school years 1972-73 (fiscal ’73) to 1974-75 (fiscal ’75) indicate that by 1975 the cumulative deficit in the schools will reach $55.4 million. That projection represents the deficit resulting from a concatenation of most probable conditions. The deficit could be as high as $84.1 million, or a low of $43.1 million.” Id. at 9.
. See as an example Legislative Finding 4 of the Pennsylvania Act under attack in Crouter v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 93 S.Ct. 2982, 37 L.Ed.2d 939 (1973) :
“(4) Should parents of children now enrolled in nonpublic schools be forced by economic circumstances to transfer any substantial number of their children to public schools, an enormous added finan*664cial, educational and administrative burden would be placed upon the public schools and upon the taxpayers of the State. Without allowance for inflationary increase, the annual operating cost of educating in public schools the five hundred thousand students now enrolled in Pennsylvania nonpublic schools would be an additional four hundred million dollars ($400,000,000). Necessarily added capital costs to construct new facilities or acquire existing facilities would be in excess of one billion dollars ($1,000,000,000). Any substantial portion of these operating and capital costs would be an intolerable public burden and present standards of public education would be seriously jeopardized. Therefore, parents who maintain students in-nonpublic schools provide a vital service to the Commonwealth.”
. The “verge” language was first penned by Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 67 S.Ct. 504, 512, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947).
. For a history of the First Amendment and its constraints, see Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 28-63, 67 S.Ct. 504, 517-535, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), and the references cited therein; Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, II Writings of James Madison 183-191 (Hunt ed. 1901) ; Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212-232, 68 S.Ct. 461, 466-475, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Note, Sectarian Books, the Supreme Court and the Establishment Clause, 79 Yale L.J. 111, 131-139 (1969) ; Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1680 (1969) ; Pfeifer, Church, State, and Freedom (rev. ed. 1967). For general historical references see Emerson, Haber & Dorsen, Political and Civil Rights in the United States, Vol. 1 at 741-744 (1967).
. Significantly, one should bear in mind that the predominant concentration of Catholic schools which will receive aid under these Acts does not fully account for or document the degree of participation or involvement of other sectarian, e. g., Lutheran, Jewish, Presbyterian, or Episcopalian schools. Thus if the entire statistical universe of all sectarian schools in the Commonwealth were included, it necessarily would reflect a higher percentage of the nonpublic schools being religiously identified or integrally connected with sectarian organizations. Cf. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 93 S.Ct. 2982, 2985-2986, 37 L.Ed.2d 939 (1973) and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 610, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2110, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), where the Court found that more than 96 per cent of the nonpublic schools in the Commonwealth were church-related.
. Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370, 50 S.Ct. 335, 74 L.Ed. 913 (1930), was not decided on First Amendment grounds, but rather was bottomed on a finding that neither Section 4 of Article IV of the United States Constitution, guaranteeing to every state a republican form of government, nor the Fourteenth Amendment forbidding an unconstitutional taking of property for private use, had been violated when free books were provided by the state to all school children.
. Section 4.3 of the Guidelines was revised by the Secretary of Education in March 1973, and now reads :
“Each nonpublic school shall submit on or before May 15 for the 1973-74 school year and on or before March 1 thereafter a loan request for the desired ‘textbooks’ to the Department of Education. The requests will be of standard format and will be distributed by the Department of Education prior to April 15 for 1973-74 school year and on or before February 15 of each year thereafter, to each nonpublie school or the appropriate chief administrator. The request shall not exceed 80 per cent of the total allocation.”
. Exhibit D-9 provides:
“TO: SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
CERTIFICATE OF INDIVIDUAL REQUEST FOR LOAN OF TEXTBOOKS
“I hereby request the loan of textbooks and instructional materials in accordance with Pennsylvania Act of 195-1972 for my child (ren) attending
(School) (City) (Zip)
“Date: _ (Signed) _
(Parent or Guardian)
“N.B. This law is applicable to Pennsylvania residents attending schools in Pennsylvania only.”
. Exhibit D-17 is the text of a letter mailed by one sectarian school principal to parents of children enrolled in that nonpublic school. There is nothing in the record to discredit the second paragraph of the letter and as a matter of practice this probably would be the manner in which the book transfer process operates.
“Dear Parent:
“Pennsylvania law, Act 195, November 1972, provides for the loan of some textbooks and instructional materials to students of nonpublic schools. We are, therefore, happy to be able to extend to you a credit of $9.70 per student toward the purchase of textbooks ; the instructional materials will be made available in the classroom. This credit will be deducted from the student’s book bill in September.
“Please sign the enclosed card and return to the school as soon as possible. Your prompt cooperation in this matter will be appreciated. (Emphasis added.)
Very truly yours,”
. It is not clear from Allen whether, once the figure indicating the number of books needed had been computed and conveyed to the Board of Education, the books were sent directly to the children or to the school. The fact that the books could be kept on the premises suggests that the books were shipped to the schools.
. In Allen, the Court additionally observed that parents of nonpublic school children had presumably been required to purchase textbooks. According to the Commonwealth’s proposed pretrial order, nonpublic school children prior to Act 195 similarly had to purchase their own textbooks. The record in this case however does not disclose whether separate book fees were charged by the school to which the parents under Act 195 could now expect a pro-rata deduction or if parents paid a fixed tuition for their children at nonpublic schools and this tuition encompassed any and all school expenses attendant to enrolling in that school. There is nothing in the Act 195 compelling the nonpublic schools to credit the parent’s account and not use the money formerly allocated for secular books for other purposes. Cf. Nyquist, supra, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. at 2969. “In the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and non-ideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is invalid.” See also 413 U.S. 756, 93 S.Ct. at 2970-2971.
. 24 P.S. § 14-1402 provides:
Health services
“(a) Each child of school age shall be given, (1) a vision test anually by a school nurse, medical technician or teacher, (2) a hearing test employing an audiometer at least once every year in the elementary grades and once every two years in secondary grades by a school nurse or medical technician, (3) a measurement of height and weight at least once annually by a school nurse or teacher, and (4) a chest X-ray by a medical technician when the child is in high school.
“(a.l) Every child of school age shall be provided with school nurse services.
“(b) For each child of school age, a comprehensive health record shall be maintained by the school district or joint school board, which shall include the results of the tests, measurements and regularly scheduled examinations and special examinations herein specified.
“(c) Medical questionnaires, suitable for diagnostic purposes, furnished by the Secretary of Health and completed by the child or by the child’s parent or guardian, at such times as the Secretary of Health may direct, shall become a part of the child’s health record.
“(d) All teachers shall report to the school nurse or school physician any unusual behavior, changes in physical appearance, changes in attendance habits and changes in scholastic achievement, which may indicate impairment of a child’s health. The nurse or school physician or school dentist may, upon referral by the teacher or on his own initiative, advise a child’s parent or guardian of the apparent need for a special medical or dental examination. If a parent or guardian fails to report the results to the nurse or school physician, the nurse or school physician shall arrange a special medical examination for the child.
“(e) The school physicians of each district or joint board shall make a medical examination and a comprehensive appraisal of the health of every child of school age, (1) upon original entry into school in the Commonwealth, (2) while in sixth grade, (3) while in eleventh grade, and (4) prior to the issuance of a farm or domestic service permit unless the child has been given a scheduled or special medical examination within the preceding four months. The health record of the child shall be made available to the school physician at the time of the regularly scheduled health appraisals.
“(f) The Secretary of Health, upon petition of the school board or joint school board or on his own initiative with the concurrence of the school board or joint school board, may modify for individual school districts the school health services program specified in this section. The program as modified shall conform to approved medical or dental practices and shall permit valid statistical appraisals of the various components of the program.”
. 24 P.S. § 14-1401 reads:
Definitions
“As used in this article—
“(1) ‘Children of school age’ or ‘child of school age’ means every child attending or who should attend an elementary grade or high school, either public or private, within the Commonwealth and children who are attending a kindergarten which is an integral part of a local school district.
“(2) ‘Teachers’ means professional employes, temporary professional employes and substitutes and instructors in public or private schools within the Commonwealth.
“(3) ‘Other employes’ means janitors, bus drivers, cooks and other cafeteria help and all others employed at schools.
“(4) ‘School physician’ means a physician legally qualified to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathy or osteopathic surgery in the Commonwealth, who has been appointed or approved by the Secretary of Health.
“(5) ‘School dentist’ means doctor of dental surgery or dental medicine legally qualified to practice dentistry in the Commonwealth, who has been appointed or approved by the Secretary of Health.
“(6) ‘Family physician’ means either a doctor of medicine legally qualified to practice medicine and surgery in the Commonwealth, or an osteopath or osteopathic surgeon legally qualified to practice osteopathy or osteopathic surgery in the Commonwealth, who has been designated by the parent or guardian as the personal physician of the child.
“(7) ‘Family dentist’ means a doctor of dental surgery or dental medicine legally qualified to practice dentistry ■ in the Commonwealth, who has been designated by the parent or guardian as the personal dentist of the child.
“(8) ‘School nurse’ means a licensed registered nurse who is assigned to a school district or joint school board, or a licensed registered nurse properly certificated by the Superintendent of Public Instruction as a school nurse who is employed by a school district or joint school board as a school nurse. The employment of any nurse employed by a school district or joint school board as a school nurse prior to the effective date of this act shall not be affected by a contract for school health services that may be entered into by any school district or joint school board under the provisions of this act.
“(9) ‘Dental hygienist’ means a dental hygienist licensed by the State Dental Council and Examining Board, who is assigned to a school district or joint school board or a dental hygienist licensed by the State Dental Council and Examining Board and certificated as a school dental hygienist by the Superintendent of Public Instruction, who is employed by a school district or joint school board as a dental hygienist. The employment of any dental hygienist employed by a school district or joint school board as a dental hygienist prior to the effective date of this act shall not be affected by a contract for school health services that may be entered into by any school district or joint school board under the provisions of this act.
“(10) ‘Medical technician’ means a person skilled in the operation of X-ray or other diagnostic equipment having such training and experience as required by the Secretary of Health.
“(11) ‘Sanitarian’ means a person having such training and experience as required by the Secretary of Health and qualified to conduct sanitary inspections of school buildings and grounds in connection with water supply, sewage and refuse disposal, food service, heating, lighting, ventilation and safety.”
. The Commonwealth conceded, after examination by the Court during argument on the propriety of the preliminary injunction, that at least the 986 Roman Catholic Diocesan Schools in the Commonwealth eligible under Acts 194 and 195 have a religious purpose. See N. T. of September 13, 1973 at 161.
. See also concurring comments of Mr. Justice Harlan in Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. at 699, 90 S.Ct. at 1427:
“Subsidies, unlike exemptions, must be passed on periodically and thus invite more political controversy than exemptions. Moreover, subsidies or direct aid, as a general rule, are granted on the basis of enumerated and more complicated qualifications and frequently involve the state in administration to a higher degree, though to be sure, this is not necessarily the case.”