concurring.
X join in the opinion of the Court, and add this supplementary statement merely to make it clear that a trial court may, in a proper case and in a proper manner, indicate to the jury his view that the evidence does not suggest that the killing was committed in the heat of passion or in response to adequate legal provocation. In doing so, however, the court must make it clear that voluntary manslaughter is nevertheless a permissible verdict. See Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 468 Pa. 308, 317-320, 362 A.2d 217, 224-225, and cases there cited.* As we there stated,
“While informing the jury that in his opinion no facts existed to support a verdict of voluntary manslaugh*226ter, the trial court fully informed the jury of its ability to return such a verdict; specifically told them that onlyotheir recollection of the facts controlled; and stated that they were the sole finders of facts. Such a circumscribed statement cannot be said to have impermissibly infringed upon the jury’s function. See American Bar Association Standards Relating to Trial by Jury, § 4.7 (Approved Draft, 1968).”
As the opinion of the Court states, the trial judge in the case at bar nowhere told the jury that a voluntary manslaughter verdict was within its power to return. Indeed, he implied the contrary. This was error which requires that this appellant be granted a new trial.
NIX, J., joins in this concurring opinion.Mr. Justice ROBERTS filed a dissenting opinion on another ground, in which he was joined by Justices NIX and MANDERINO. Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) EAGEN concurred in the result.