Revenue Cabinet v. Hubbard

LAMBERT, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

Respectfully, I dissent.

The majority opinion offers an excessively technical interpretation of the statute that renders it at odds with the stat*721ute’s more commonsense meaning and purpose. The statute is very broad and should not be given such a narrow construction.

To determine the meaning of “crippled,” the majority quotes a two-part dictionary definition of the verb “to cripple.” Yet the majority then relies only upon the first part of the definition and fails to even acknowledge the second part-, which is as follows: “[T]o deprive of capability for service, efficiency, or wholeness.” According to this definition, one without teeth or with defective teeth would be crippled, as such a person would be deprived of the ability to eat and digest food effectively and efficiently, and might also be unable to speak coherently. This, if we are to rely on dictionary definitions, the whole definition should be applied rather than just a portion of it.

Dictionary definitions aside, the tenor and purpose of the statute leaves no doubt in my mind that it applies to dental pros-thetics. The statute refers to items individually designed for a particular person that “substitute for the bodily structure.” There can be no doubt that false teeth, bridges, braces, and crowns fall into this category. Moreover, there is no reason in logic to exclude such prosthetic devices. I can think of no rational basis to allow the tax exemption for artificial limbs, artificial eyes, hearing aids, and other items in the statute and deny the exemption for prosthetic dental devices. While a distinction might be made for artificial limbs necessary for ambulation, artificial eyes serve only a cosmetic purpose, and while hearing aids are undoubtedly important, I doubt whether they would be universally regarded as more important than artificial dental devices.

It is not the role of this Court to analyze the wisdom of legislation that creates tax exemptions, yet when the legislature has spoken, this Court should not impose artificial limitations on the Act. Rather, we should give effect to it in a reasonable and common sense manner.