*778OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
DALLY, Judge.The majority of the panel hearing this appeal on original submission ordered reversal of the judgment. We have now considered the State’s Motion for Rehearing and conclude the majority of the panel incorrectly ordered reversal of the judgment on the ground it considered, but in considering other grounds of error the judgment must still be reversed.
The decision of the majority of the panel is based on a finding that “. . . appellant’s confession affirmatively showed that he did not participate in the theft of the ring ...” and that the State is “... bound by this exculpatory portion of the confession.” The panel’s majority opinion says:
“According to appellant’s confession his first knowledge of the theft of the ring came when his wife showed him the ring, after they left Buvinghausen’s residence. By this time the theft of the ring from the residence was complete.”
The appellant’s confession in part states:
“After we left Pecan Street, we were driving down the street and my wife showed me a gold ladies’ ring with 11 diamonds in it. She asked me to find out how much it was worth. I asked her where she got it but she didn’t say and I didn’t ask. I drove to the Longhorn Pawn Shop and we both went in and a guy waited on us, and offered thirty dollars for it. I pawned the ring and got the money and left.”
When the State offers in evidence a defendant’s statement a portion of which is exculpatory, the State is bound by the exculpatory portion of the statement unless it is refuted by other evidence. Palafox v. State, 608 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1979);1 Glover v. State, 566 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Pope v. State, 505 S.W.2d 556 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). However, the inference of untruth may be drawn by the jury from all of the evidence including any inconsistencies in the statement itself or from any inconsistencies between the exculpatory portions of the statement and other evidence. Nichols v. State, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 432, 10 S.W.2d 109 (1928); Pope v. State, supra; Gragg v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 386, 214 S.W.2d 292 (1948).
The panel failed to consider an important sentence in the appellant’s statement which is in conflict with the portion of the statement found by the panel’s majority to be exculpatory. That sentence which appears in the statement before the part quoted in the majority opinion, reads: “This statement that I am giving is about a theft that I was involved in along with my wife Gemey.” This sentence in the statement and other evidence admitted, which will be summarized, if believed by the jury, is amply sufficient to disprove that portion of the statement construed as exculpatory.
The appellant told a fellow employee that he was in need of money. The appellant obtained for his seventeen year old wife a job cleaning a fellow employee’s house. On the first day she worked the appellant went to get his wife at noon; he entered the house before they left. The appellant immediately went to the pawn shop; the manager of the pawn shop testified the appellant was alone. When he pledged the ring the appellant made a written statement that he was the absolute owner of the ring and that it was free and clear of any encumbrance or claim whatsoever. The ring had a retail value of $750; the appellant pawned it for $30. The appellant did not go to work until the second day after the ring was stolen. The complainant asked about the ring, and the appellant denied knowing anything about it. An hour later the appellant left work and returned with a ring which he gave to the complainant stating this was the complainant’s ring; however, it was not the complainant’s ring. Although some of this evidence concerns what happened after the ring was taken from the place where it was hidden in the house, it is circumstantial evidence bearing on the appellant’s knowledge and participa*779tion in the taking of the ring. This evidence, under the long established law already cited, is sufficient to disprove that portion of the confession found to be exculpatory.
The jury was instructed without objection that it could find the appellant guilty of theft either acting alone or with another. The appellant’s possession of and his assertion of ownership in the ring he pawned which had been recently stolen were in the circumstances of this case sufficient to support the jury’s verdict finding the appellant guilty of the offense of theft. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973); Prodan v. State, 574 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Mulchahey v. State, 574 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Rodriguez v. State, 549 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Sirabella v. State, 492 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Tyler v. State, 478 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Stubblefield v. State, 372 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Cr.App.1963).
We will now consider the ground of error in which the appellant argues that his connection with the theft was not disclosed by direct evidence, and that the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury under the law on circumstantial evidence. This ground of error was properly preserved for review in the trial court.
It was alleged that “on or about November 15, 1977, [Wilbur Austin Maxwell, III] did then and there unlawfully appropriate property namely, one ring, owned by Allen Buvinghauser, hereafter styled the complainant, of the value of over two hundred dollars and under ten thousand dollars, with the intent to deprive the complainant of the property, and without the effective consent of the complainant.”
V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.03, provides:
“(a) A person commits an offense if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.
“(b) Appropriation of property is unlawful if:
“(1) it is without the owner’s consent, or
“(2) the property is stolen and the actor appropriates the property knowing it was stolen by another.”
The indictment is under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.03(a), (b)(1), since it does not allege that the appellant obtained the ring from another knowing it was stolen, V.T. C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.03(a), (b)(2).
Although the appellant and the State argue in their briefs before us as to the theory of theft under which the appellant was indicted and tried, it appears that there is no direct evidence to support either theory. To convict under either theory discussed by the parties, there must be direct evidence showing (1) that the appellant knew that the ring was stolen when he pawned it, V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.-03(a), (b)(2), or (2) that appellant took the ring, V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 31.03(a), (b)(1).
If the theory of the theft is that the appellant obtained possession of the ring after it was stolen and disposed of it knowing it had been stolen, there is no direct evidence that he knew it was stolen. Thus, the trial court would have a duty to give a charge on circumstantial evidence, even though there are strong circumstances to show he knew it was stolen. Richardson v. State, 600 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).2
If the theory is that appellant took the ring there is likewise only circumstantial evidence, unless the written statement made by appellant to police officers and introduced into evidence was sufficient admission to relieve the court from its duty to submit a charge in circumstantial evidence. This is true even in a case in which defendant is charged as a party.
The statement made by appellant reads: “This statement that I am giving is about a theft that I was involved in along with my wife Gemey.” Also contained in *780appellant’s written statement is the following: “I pawned the ring and got the money and left.” Neither of these statements is an unequivocal admission of the taking of the ring or of appellant’s knowledge that the ring was stolen at the time he pawned the ring. This Court has held that proof of an admission of the accused will not relieve the trial court of its duty to charge on circumstantial evidence in a theft case unless the statement is an unequivocal admission of the taking of the property by the defendant from the person in possession. Thornton v. State, 136 Tex.Cr.R. 560, 127 S.W.2d 197 (1939). In the alternative theory the court will not be relieved of the duty to charge on circumstantial evidence in a theft case unless the statement is an unequivocal admission of the defendant’s knowledge at the time of the unlawful disposition that the property was stolen.
In this case there is proof that appellant pawned the ring after it was taken from the rightful owner. However, there is no direct evidence that appellant either took the ring or knew that it was stolen when he pawned it. There are circumstances from which appellant’s theft of property may be inferred. However, when only by a process of inference can it be determined that there is a confession or admission of such taking, the trial court should have charged on circumstantial evidence.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
ROBERTS, CLINTON and W. C. DAVIS, JJ., concur in the result. ODOM and McCORMICK, JJ., dissenting.. See Dissent for writer’s view.
. See the dissenting opinion for the writer’s view on giving a charge on circumstantial evidence.