dissenting.
I dissent from point of error one and on that issue, I would reverse.
In point of error one, Kathleen Finstad argues that the trial court erred when it refused to make these additional findings and conclusions regarding valuation. She argues on appeal that she can receive no meaningful review of the facts based on the trial court’s global findings and conclusions. I agree.
Kathleen went to trial on an amended petition for divorce in which she pled grounds of cruelty and asked that Harold reimburse her community estate for various assets that he transferred to his children by another marriage. Upon trial, evidence was received to support her various allegations. After trial, the court merely divided the property, and filed the findings of fact as set out on page two of the majority’s opinion. The first three of those findings relate to issues that were not contested in the divorce (the parties met the residency requirements of the Fami*379ly Code; living together was insupportable; no children were born of the marriage). Only three of the findings have any relevance to the contested issues:
4. Petitioner [the husband] brought separate property into the marriage which, while he was unable to trace it into existing assets, was used by the parties during the marriage.
5. Gambling was part of the life style [sic] of the parties both before their marriage and thereafter.
6. The earnings of the Respondent from her employment as a nurse were converted to cash and the use of that cash by the Respondent was not satisfactorily explained.
Kathleen requested 21 additional findings of fact and eight additional conclusions of law, all of which the trial court declined to make. Kathleen’s proposed findings seven through 15, 17, 18, 24, and 25 requested that the court recognize specific transfers by Harold Finstad to his children by an earlier marriage. Proposed finding number 16 was that Kathleen invested her separate property in the parties’ residence. Proposed finding number 19 was that Harold’s earning capacity was four times that of Kathleen. Proposed findings 20 through 23 related to the temporary orders, and proposed findings 26 and 27 addressed Harold’s cruel treatment of her.
The majority overrules point of error one on the ground that the additional findings were merely evidentiary, not ultimate and controlling issues. Citing Finch v. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ), the majority holds that the ultimate and controlling issue is whether the trial court divided the property in “a just and right manner.” Citing Finch and Wallace v. Wallace, 623 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ dism’d w.o.j.), the Court noted that we have “repeatedly” held the value of specific property is not an ultimate issue. I agree we have. I disagree that we should continue.1
I recognize we held in Finch that it is not necessary for the trial court to make specific findings in a divorce on the characterization and value of the property. Finch, 825 S.W.2d at 221. Even though I was a member of that panel, I now believe that decision was wrong. In a case like this, with complicated complaints regarding the separate and community assets and claims of reimbursement, it is not possible to show error without specific findings. The trial court’s scant findings are of no assistance to our review.
In a divorce such as this, before the trial court makes its decision on how to divide the community estate, the trial court must make at least three underlying decisions: (1) what is the character of the property (separate or community); (2) whether the community estate is entitled to reimbursement from either spouse; and (3) what is the value of the community property. The trial court makes those decisions based on three different of standards.
The decision on the character of the property is a constitutional issue. Tex. Const, art. 16, § 15; Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1977) (the character of property “is fixed by the Texas Constitution, and not by what is ‘just and right’ ”); Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex.1982) (the distinction between separate and community property is constitutionally-mandated). The characterization of the property is based on the evidence introduced at trial. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 173 (Tex.1975) (trial court may not ignore the jury’s decision on the status of property); In re Marriage of Moore, 890 S.W.2d 821, 834 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1994, no writ); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 770 S.W.2d 924, 928 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1989, no writ) (court may not ignore jury’s characterization of property).
The decision on reimbursement is a legal issue. See Heggen v. Pemelton, 836 S.W.2d *380145, 148 (Tex.1992) (reimbursement is a “vested economic right”).2 The amount to be reimbursed is based on the evidence introduced at trial.
The decision on the value of the property is a factual issue based on the evidence received at trial. Grossnickle v. Grossnickle, 865 S.W.2d 211, 212 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ) (party has right to jury trial on value of property; court cannot ignore findings); Archambault v. Archambault, 763 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1988, no writ) (court may not treat jury’s valuation as advisory); see Moore, 890 S.W.2d at 838 (jury’s decision on valuation is binding).
Thus, the trial court must begin with a decision that is constitutional (character of the property), then reaches a decision that is legal (reimbursement), then factual decisions about value, before it makes its final decision on the division itself, which is discretionary. The last decision, the only one that is discretionary, rests on layers of decisions that are constitutional and legal decisions which cannot be undone by the trial court based simply on its “discretion.”
Under the majority’s opinion, all levels of %ie trial court’s decision all collapsed into one decision — whether the entire division is “just and right.” Without information about the trial court’s underlying assumptions about the character of the property, reimbursement to the community, and value of the property, we have no way to decide if the trial court’s ultimate division is “just and right.” 3
Our opinions on this issue are in direct conflict with the opinion of our sister court, a court with which we share jurisdiction over 14 counties. In Joseph v. Joseph, 731 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ), the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed and remanded because the trial court refused to file findings and assign values for three pieces of property whose value was disputed at trial.
In Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex.1989), the Texas Supreme Court stated that the trial court’s duty to file findings and conclusions is mandatory. The trial court’s failure to respond when the requesting party has properly made all requests is presumed harmful unless the record before the appellate court affirmatively shows that the complaining party has suffered no injury. Id.
In Sheldon Pollack Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete of Texas, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied), the Dallas Court of Appeals stated that the test for determining whether a complaining party has suffered harm due to the court’s failure to file findings is:
Whether the circumstances of the particular case would require an appellant to have to guess the reason or reasons that the trial judge has ruled against it. In factually complicated situations in which there are two or more possible grounds for recovery or defense, an undue burden would be placed upon an appellant.
Id.; see also Fraser v. Goldberg, 552 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). On appeal, neither the appellant nor the appellate court should have to guess the trial court’s reasons for its division of property. Joseph, 731 S.W.2d at 598; Fraser, 552 S.W.2d at 594.
Here, Kathleen’s pleadings requested a disproportionate share of the community property based on a number of grounds, including fault, disparity of earning power, future employability, and claims for reimbursement based on Harold’s dissipation of community funds. The trial court’s findings completely ignored these grounds for recov*381ery. The trial court’s two conclusions were bafflingly vague:
1. The equitable claims for reimbursement of both parties were taken into account and considered.
2. The property division was based on the evidence and such permissible factors as the evidence raised and is fair and equitable to both parties.
Essentially, the trial court’s “conclusion” is that the division it made was “just and right.” The majority assumes the trial court made a division that was “just and right” without examining any assignment of the value and characterization of the property.
The lack of findings force Kathleen and this Court to guess the reasons the trial court divided the property the way it did. Kathleen clearly suffered harm in the presentation of her ease on appeal. See Joseph, 731 S.W.2d at 598 (appellant was harmed by failure of trial court to make findings that specified the appraisal method used to divide property).
The trial court has wide discretion to take the factors mentioned into account in dividing the property. However, the trial court’s discretion is not limitless. Without meaningful findings or conclusions, it is impossible for us to determine that the trial court acted within that discretion.
. Our opinion in Magill v. Magill, 816 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied), demonstrates the weakness in the Finch and Wallace holding. In Magill, we chastised the appellant for not having findings on value:
Without recorded property values and factual findings, we presume that the trial court property considered the entire circumstances of the parties and correctly exercised its discretion in dividing their property.
Magill, 816 S.W.2d at 534.
. I recognize that in an earlier opinion the Supreme Court called reimbursement an "equitable” remedy. Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex.1988). Because our community property law did not develop from the common law, I believe Heggen's characterization of reimbursement as a "vested right" is correct and Penick is wrong.
. This holding, which was first stated in Wallace and repeated in Finch, was aptly criticized in a continuing legal education article by Wm. Dudley, "Preservation of Error and Appellate Practice,” Advanced Family Law Course NN-25 (State Bar of Texas, 8-15-94). In that article, Mr. Dudley wrote: "It is difficult to see just how a court of appeals can determine the fairness of the division without a finding as to value.”