Dissenting.
As the North Carolina offense for which Appellant is being penalized does not reflect conduct which is substantially similar to conduct that is punishable in Pennsylvania, I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority insofar as it finds that Pennsylvania’s DUI offense of driving with a .10% BAC, level is substantially similar to Article IV of the Compact, which proscribes being “incapable of safely driving.” The majority then determines, however, that North Carolina’s per se offense of a .08% BAC level is conclusive evidence of “appreciable impairment”, which, in turn, is substantially similar to Article IV’s “incapable of safely driving.” Based on this reasoning, the majority concludes that Appellant can be reciprocally punished in Pennsylvania.
Yet Appellant was not convicted on the basis of any evidence that he was driving in an unsafe manner. Appellant’s North Carolina conviction was based upon a .08% BACTevel. This is a per se offense that results in a conviction without any *98inquiry as to whether the driver was in fact incapable of safely driving. In contrast, in Pennsylvania, a driver will not be sanctioned for a .08% BAC level alone. See Kline v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 725 A.2d 860 (Pa.Cmwlth.) (refusing to suspend Pennsylvania driver’s license due to Virginia conviction based on .08% BAC level; noting that a person driving with a BAC level of .08% will suffer no consequences in Pennsylvania if he is still capable of being a safe driver), alloc. denied, 560 Pa. 712, 743 A.2d 924 (1999).
Moreover, in my view, the twenty percent difference between the North Carolina and Pennsylvania per se offenses is significant, and renders the respective legal limits substantially dissimilar. The majority authorizes PennDOT to sanction a Pennsylvania driver for out-of-state conduct which falls well below the threshold of conduct that the General Assembly has deemed to be punishable in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, I dissent.
Chief Justice FLAHERTY and Justice ZAPPALA join.