dissenting:
I would affirm. It may be surprising that an interpretation by the division majority, of the Postal Reorganization Act (see 39 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1982)), defeats the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to hear a dispute between a subcontractor and a surety for payment of work fully performed by the subcontractor in the construction of a city post office in the District of Columbia. It may likewise be surprising (if not particularly relevant) that this interpretation (under the circumstances here) may defeat payment altogether of some $32,265.60 in-disputedly due the subcontractor for such work fully performed.1 It, however, is both surprising and relevant that the majority’s interpretation is incompatible with the plain language, and the purpose, of the Reorganization Act.
The specific issue is whether Congress intended (as the surety argues) that the federal construction act (the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-270e (1982)) apply in its entirety to contracts entered into by the United States Postal Service. The Superior Court denied the motion of the surety to dismiss this action brought by the subcontractor on the ground “that the provisions of the Miller Act [40 U.S.C. §§ 270a et seq.'] are not applicable herein pursuant to the *680provisions of the Postal Reorganization Act [39 U.S.C. § 410 (b)(4)(B)].” A motion by the surety to strike the motion to dismiss (and for summary judgment) was denied under the law of the case doctrine and the plaintiff awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $250 for having had to defend against a motion previously decided.
The Postal Reorganization Act, whereby Congress created an independent organization in the executive branch, provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided ... no Federal law dealing with public or Federal contracts ... shall apply to the Postal Service.
(b) The following provisions shall apply to the Postal Service * * * [certain] provisions of title 40: [including] * * * sections 270 a-e (known as the Miller Act, relating to performance bonds)_
39 U.S.C. § 410 (1982) (emphasis added).
Thus, in setting forth the federal contracting provisions which would apply to this independent establishment, the Congress used a broad exclusive approach followed by a narrow inclusive one. This is recognized by the majority: “[The] Act in many respects sets the Postal Service free from the constraints of federal law generally applicable to federal governmental components, including the bulk of laws dealing with ‘public or Federal contracts, property, [and] works.’” Ante at 678. Certainly the Congress could not have been unaware of the substantive provisions of the statute which it selected for inclusion; it could not have been unaware that the Miller Act requires both performance and payment bonds for federal public projects. See United States v. Brown, 422 A.2d 1281, 1284 (D.C.1980) (presumption of Congressional awareness of existing statutes). Yet it specifically provided that the provisions of the Miller Act relating to performance bonds should apply to the newly recognized postal service. In my view, this specific reference to performance, coupled with the absence of any reference to payment gives credence to appellee’s position that Congress did not intend that the provisions of the Miller Act requiring payment bonds be applicable to the postal service establishment. Id. (there is a presumption that change in legislative language intended to produce legislative result). I am not persuaded by the majority’s reasoning that the “parenthetical” reference is merely a cryptic way of describing the Miller Act or its reliance on descriptions of other titles. This exercise violates a cardinal principle of statutory construction: where the language of the provision is clear on its face we do not look behind it. “[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act if framed, and if that is plain ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917). Moreover, this language is not entitled to closer scrutiny because it fails to embody legislative intent or yields an absurd or unjust result. See Auger v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review, 477 A.2d 196, 211-12 (D.C.1984).
If the legislative history of the Reorganization Act tells us anything, it is to emphasize Congressional intent to limit the application of federal law to the postal service, particularly with respect to contracts. For example, the report of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee states: “The Board of Governors [of the Postal Service] shall have broad authority and shall not, except as specified, be subject to Federal laws dealing with contracts ... which in most instances apply to Government agencies.” S.Rep. No. 91-912, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970) (emphasis added). See also H.R.Rep. No. 91-1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3649, 3675 (operation of federal law to postal service generally excluded). Moreover, there are sound practical reasons why the Congress may not have chosen to require that payment bonds, enforceable (under the federal scheme) only in the federal district courts, be a requirement for contracting with the reorganized postal service. It is the United States government which receives the protection of performance bonds. . It would follow that the United States would litigate the issue of performance in the United States courts. On the other hand, the payment bonds required by the Miller Act pro*681vide recourse for private parties — the subcontractor or supplier who would be left without a remedy (because of sovereign immunity) when a general contractor becomes insolvent. See Active Fire Sprinkler Corp. v. United States Postal Service, 811 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.1987). Now Congress has seen fit to waive the immunity of the postal service. As the majority points out (in note 5) the Reorganization Act specifically provides that the Postal Service may “sue and be sued” (39 U.S.C. § 401), thus constituting a waiver of sovereign immunity that allows the enforcement of significant rights against the Postal Service not available as against the United States as such. See Franchise Tax Board v. United States Postal Service, 467 U.S. 512, 104 S.Ct. 2549, 81 L.Ed.2d 446 (1984) (Postal Service subject to state order to withhold delinquent taxes from employee’s wages). It would follow logically from these changes that the subcontractor performing services for postal authorities would no longer run the risk of being left without a remedy in the absence of a payment bond. Sovereign immunity out of the picture, there would be no necessity that the action be litigated in the federal court. The position which the majority takes today leaves a subcontractor without this option. In my view, the Superior Court properly refused to dismiss this action.
. The surety has argued that since this action was not filed in the federal court within the one-year period required by the Miller Act, the subcontractor’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations.