We granted defendant Lorenzo Flint’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal an order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in order to consider the propriety of the habeas court’s conclusion that, under OCGA § 9-14-48 (e),1 the State had proven that it was prejudiced in its ability to respond to petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus due to petitioner’s delay in filing it. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Flint was indicted for one felony count and one misdemeanor count of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, and on June 29,1988, he pled guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to five years with four years to be served in prison and one year to be served on probation for the felony count and twelve months to serve on the misdemeanor count. In 1993, Flint was convicted of federal drug *40trafficking offenses, and the 1988 state drug convictions were used in enhancement of his sentence.
Nearly twenty years after his state convictions, in 2007, Flint filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of Fulton County, and on January 17, 2008, the superior court entered an order denying habeas corpus relief based, inter alia, on procedural default. Flint sought an appeal from this Court, and in March 2008, this Court granted a certificate of probable cause to appeal, and by order remanded the case with direction that the habeas court hold a hearing, which was to be transcribed, and consider whether the petition was procedurally barred and subject to dismissal under OCGA § 9-14-48 (e).
Following remand, the habeas court2 held a hearing on June 16, 2009, at which Flint testified telephonically. The court then entered an order dismissing the petition under OCGA § 9-14-48 (e), based on findings that Flint had delayed twenty years in filing his petition, that the State was prejudiced in its ability to respond, and that Flint had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that his petition was based upon grounds of which he had no actual knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have had knowledge, prior to the occurrence of circumstances prejudicial to the State.
Thus, the analysis of the propriety of the habeas court’s action necessarily focuses on the provisions of OCGA § 9-14-48 (e), which
authorizes the discretionary dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a non-capital case under certain circumstances. Specifically, the government must show that the habeas petitioner’s delay in filing the petition has prejudiced its ability to respond. Moreover, dismissal under this provision is unavailable if the habeas petitioner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she did not know of the grounds for the petition, and could not have known of them through the exercise of reasonable diligence, prior to the events that prejudiced the government.
Wiley v. Miles, 282 Ga. 573, 577 (3) (652 SE2d 562) (2007).
The inquiry is two-fold, and the threshold question is the existence of prejudice to the State in attempting to respond to the habeas petition. As to the issue of assessing prejudice, Flint urges that this Court should be guided by interpretations of former Rule 9 (a)3 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States *41District Courts4 because of its similar wording to OCGA § 9-14-48 (e); thus, he argues, inter alia, that the State’s burden should be heavy in seeking a dismissal, that application of the statutory provision permitting dismissal should be limited, that the State should have the burden of making a particularized showing of prejudice, and that the passage of time alone should not be sufficient to constitute prejudice.
First, it should be noted that while Rule 9 (a) provided the standard for permitting dismissal of a habeas corpus petition in circumstances in which the State has been prejudiced by the delay in filing, it is no longer extant; there is now a one-year statute of limitation as provided in 28 USC § 2244 (d) (1), as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. As this Court has plainly outlined, an assessment of prejudice must involve an examination of the claims made by the petitioner in seeking habeas corpus relief and the capability of the State to respond given the passage of time in lodging such claims. Wiley v. Miles, supra at 577 (3).
Flint’s petition for writ of habeas corpus alleged eight grounds for relief: (1) the guilty plea and judgment of conviction are void because they bear what is only alleged to be Flint’s signature and that signature is in the space designated for the signature of the attorney rather than that of the defendant; (2) Flint was denied counsel and compelled to incriminate himself during a meeting with the assistant district attorney, resulting in prejudice to his trial defense and ultimately causing him to enter his guilty plea; (3) counsel involved in Flint’s plea, namely attorney Hester, had a conflict of interest resulting from, inter alia, a prior attorney-client relationship, which affected Flint’s preliminary hearing and proposed trial strategies, and resulted in his guilty plea; (4) Flint’s plea was not voluntarily or intelligently made because, inter alia, he was not advised of the Boykin5 rights either prior to or during the plea and he was coerced by attorney Hester into entering the plea before a visiting judge because Hester told him “to plead guilty right now, or return back before the assigned judge who will find you guilty and who will impose a much harsher sentence than that of the visiting judge”; (5) attorney Hester affirmatively misadvised Flint of the *42consequences of his plea and sentence; (6) the sentence entered on the felony drug charge was illegal (for an unspecified reason) at the time it was imposed; (7) Flint’s counsel failed to appeal his conviction and sentence despite Flint’s request to do so; and (8) Flint suffered the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not raise grounds one through seven, including the failure to investigate and present Flint’s alleged trial defense, and Hester was ineffective in advising Flint to enter a guilty plea so soon after Flint’s arrest and without exploring possible defenses.
Thus, each and every ground raised by Flint directly involves or potentially implicates actions by the plea court, Flint’s defense attorney Hester, and the assistant district attorney involved in the case. The State presented to the habeas court uncontroverted affidavit evidence that defense counsel Hester had died, in fact less than a month after Flint filed his petition, and that the assistant district attorney involved in the pleas could not provide specifics about Flint’s case and was able to make statements about only general practices and procedures in criminal cases, which could not address, much less resolve, Flint’s complaints. Both the judge and the court reporter involved in the pleas were octogenarians and no longer available or able to provide any relevant information. Any existing notes regarding the pleas were in “pen writing,” a process no longer used, and in a “very personal” shorthand which could not be deciphered, and one from which no court reporter would certify a record; there was no official paper record whatsoever and no back-up tape recording of the proceedings. Thus, the State presented a scenario of far more than the mere passage of time affecting its ability to respond to Flint’s petition; rather the delay brought into sharp focus the ravages of time on the ability to reconstruct the circumstances of Flint’s pleas of guilt to the drug charges. As the habeas court accurately observed during the hearing in the matter, the lapse in time resulted in a situation in which it could make no substantive determinations regarding the claims in Flint’s petition.
As to the question of whether Flint proved by a preponderance of the evidence that, prior to the events prejudicing the State’s response, he did not know of the grounds for his habeas petition, and could not have known of them through the exercise of reasonable diligence, it must be resolved adversely to Flint. Indeed, the record belies any assertions of lack of timely actual or constructive knowledge by Flint. The gravamen of Flint’s complaints on habeas is that he was misled, in some form or fashion, regarding the pleas and their punitive consequences. But, the record contains signed “declarations” expressly “under the penalty of perjury” by Flint and his mother regarding their knowledge, prior to and at the time of the pleas, of circumstances allegedly giving rise to his habeas claims, *43including Flint’s immediate dissatisfaction with his received punishment. Indeed, as the State maintains, the record supports an alternate conclusion that Flint’s delay in asserting his challenge on habeas was because his guilty pleas to the state drug charges had no collateral consequences until such time as they were to be used for the enhancement of his federal sentencing.
Given Flint’s extreme delay in filing his habeas petition resulting in the total prejudice to the government in its ability to respond, and Flint’s failure to meet his burden of proving a legally valid excuse for not filing the petition sooner, the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Flint’s habeas petition pursuant to OCGA § 9-14-48 (e). Wiley v. Miles, supra at 578 (4).
Judgment affirmed.
Ml the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., and Thompson, J., who dissent.OCGA § 9-14-48 (e) provides:
A petition, other than one challenging a conviction for which a death sentence has been imposed or challenging a sentence of death, may be dismissed if there is a particularized showing that the respondent has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that it is based on grounds of which he or she could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the respondent occurred. This subsection shall apply only to convictions had before July 1, 2004.
A different judge presided over this habeas proceeding.
This rule provides:
A petition may he dismissed if it appears that the state of which the respondent is *41an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
Rule 9 (a) was interpreted as a codification of the equitable doctrine of laches as applied to habeas corpus petitions. Walters v. Scott, 21 F3d 683 (C.A.5, Tex. 1994).
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969).