In 2006, Karl Hall pled guilty to aggravated battery, two counts of burglary and two counts of forgery in the first degree. He was sentenced to serve 15 years in confinement and 15 years on probation. In 2008, Hall filed a habeas corpus petition, claiming that the indictment was faulty, that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, that the amount of restitution and costs was altered after he signed the final disposition, and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress evidence and in leading him to believe that his entire sentence would be probated. An evidentiary hearing was held, and more than two months later, the habeas court entered an order granting the habeas petition on the ground that Hall was denied effective assistance of counsel because “counsel’s pretrial *281investigation of [the] case was seriously lacking . . . [and] deprived [Hall] of a true adversarial process.” The habeas court expressly declined to rule on any other ground. The Warden appeals.
“A (habeas) petition . . . shall . . . clearly set forth the respects in which the petitioner’s rights were violated.” OCGA § 9-14-44. “All grounds for relief claimed by a (habeas) petitioner . . . shall be raised ... in his original or amended petition.” OCGA § 9-14-51.
Murrell v. Young, 285 Ga. 182, 183 (2) (674 SE2d 890) (2009). Here, trial counsel’s purportedly deficient investigation was not raised as a ground for relief either in the petition or at the habeas hearing. Although Hall claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition, that claim was not based on an allegation that the investigation was inadequate, but dealt only with the aforementioned grounds that a motion to suppress should have been filed and that counsel misled Hall as to the sentence.
At the habeas hearing, the only reference to the investigation came when counsel briefly testified, in response to a question by the State’s attorney, that he received and reviewed all the State’s evidence pursuant to reciprocal discovery, that he spoke with the district attorney about the case, and that he discussed the case with Hall on several occasions. Hall, however, did not further question counsel about the investigation or argue that it was deficient. Thus, contrary to the dissent’s claim that “a thorough record was made as to what trial counsel did and did not do [to prepare] for appellee’s case,” it is apparent that neither the Warden nor Hall made any such thorough record about the pretrial investigation. Of course, the reason no such record or argument was made regarding the adequacy of the investigation is because it was not set forth as a ground for relief in the habeas petition.
“Although we do not doubt the authority of a habeas court to consider ... matters sua sponte, we believe the parties must be given an opportunity to address them in a meaningful way.” King v. Hawkins, 265 Ga. 93, 94 (454 SE2d 135) (1995). Because the adequacy of counsel’s pretrial investigation was not raised in the petition or at the hearing, and instead appeared in the case for the first time in the habeas court’s final order, the Warden is correct in asserting that he was denied the opportunity to address the matter in a meaningful way. Compare Walker v. Penn, 271 Ga. 609, 610, fn. 3 (523 SE2d 325) (1999) (warden did not complain that he was denied an opportunity to respond to habeas court’s sua sponte consideration of matter not raised by petitioner). Since “the issue was not properly raised as required under OCGA §§ 9-14-44 and *2829-14-51, . . . the habeas court accordingly erred by granting relief on this issue.” Murrell v. Young, supra at 183-184 (2). We therefore reverse the improper grant of habeas relief and remand the case to the habeas court for consideration of Hall’s unresolved claims.
Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.
All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, C. J., and Benham, J., who dissent.