DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge COHN JUBELIRER.I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Board erred in denying administrative relief and so must recalculate Santiago’s maximum'term expiration date based on the time served on his Maryland sentence. Therefore, I dissent.
Although the majority holds that Pennsylvania was not required to give full faith and credit to the Maryland sentencing order, it still concludes that the Board was required to carry out the Maryland sentencing order. Additionally, in reversing the Board, the majority holds that “Pennsylvania was a stranger to the Maryland court order and had no duty or right to enforce it because that duty was solely vested in Maryland officials charged with that responsibility. All that the Board had the power to enforce was time imposed on a Pennsylvania sentencing order, not time imposed by another jurisdiction.” Santiago v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 937 A.2d 610, No. 85 C.D. 2007, op. at 615 (Pa.Cmwlth.Dec.3, 2007). However, in so holding, the majority does not recognize that the Board was merely following the mandates of what is commonly referred to as the Parole Act1 in addressing the administrative review, which it is charged with doing. Specifically, Section 21.1a(a) of the Parole Act, 61 P.S. § 331.21a(a), mandates that sentences for crimes committed on parole must be served consecutively with time remaining on original sentences and that backtime2 must be served after the service of a new sentence outside the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections.3 Based on *617this statutory mandate, the Board did not have the authority to credit Santiago’s backtime with time spent incarcerated for a Maryland offense because Santiago was required to serve the Maryland sentence prior to being reentered to commence serving the state parole violation backtime.
The mechanics of the legislative scheme behind Section 21.1a(a) of the Parole Act demonstrates the General Assembly’s intention to create a deterrent for those on parole not to commit any additional crimes by specifying that, if they do, their punishment will be in addition to their backtime. A parolee must serve backtime when he has violated his parole. This furthers the public policy of the parole system which is “the protection of the public’s safety and the adequate supervision of the offender....” Miller v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 837 A.2d 618, 622 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (citing Section 1 of the Parole Act, 61 P.S. § 331.1.) If the punishment for the new crimes committed while on parole could be served concurrently with the unexpired term of the original sentence, there would be no additional punishment for the additional crimes, thus eliminating this deterrent. Moreover, if the majority were correct that a foreign jurisdiction could negate this Commonwealth’s parole and sentencing scheme, it would run contrary to the General Assembly’s intent behind enacting the Parole Act by giving parolees a “get out of jail free card.”
I do not disagree with the majority that Maryland may give credit to Santiago for time served on his Maryland sentence, regardless of whether such time was served in Maryland or in Pennsylvania. However, what Maryland cannot do is rewrite the laws of this Commonwealth to allow sentences for crimes committed on parole, regardless of the location, to run concurrently with Pennsylvania backtime that is served in Pennsylvania. That type of sentencing is clearly prohibited by the Parole Act.
I share the majority’s concern that “[t]he Board’s position that it cannot give credit ... increases the cost of confinement to Pennsylvania taxpayers because Pennsylvania now has to pay for incarceration for a Maryland sentence.” Santiago v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 937 A.2d 610, No. 85 C.D.2007, op. at 615 (Pa.Cmwlth.Dec. 3, 2007). However, that is a concern which arises from the statutory scheme enacted by the General Assembly and, therefore, is not within this Court’s authority to remedy. When creating the statutory authority that controls this case, the General Assembly presumably balanced those competing policies of deterrence and cost. It is, therefore, the General Assembly, and not this Court, that *618must alter the balance of those competing policies and amend the statute, if they are to change.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s decision denying Santiago administrative relief.
President Judge LEADBETTER and Judge LEAVITT join in this dissenting opinion.
. Act of August 6, 1941, P.L. 861, as amended, 61 P.S. §§ 331.1 — 331.34a.
. "Backtime” is a penalty imposed by the Board for a violation of parole. Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa.Cmwlth. 38, 483 A.2d 1044, 1047 (1984). By definition, "backtime” is that part of an existing judicially imposed sentence that a parole violator is required to serve as a result of violating the terms and conditions of parole prior to being eligible to again apply for parole. Id. at 1047-48.
. Section 21.1a(a) provides:
(a) Convicted Violators. Any parolee under the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Board of Parole released from any penal institution of the Commonwealth who, during the period of parole or while delinquent on parole, commits any crime punishable by imprisonment, from which he is convicted or found guilty by a judge or jury or to which he pleads guilty or nolo contendere at any time thereafter in a court of record, may, at the discretion of the board, be recommitted as a parole violator. If his re-commitment is so ordered, he shall be reentered to serve the remainder of the term which said parolee would have been com*617pelled to serve had he not been paroled, and he shall be given no credit for the time at liberty on parole.... The period of time for which the parole violator is required to serve shall be computed from and begin on the date that he is taken into custody to be returned to the institution as a parole violator.
If a new sentence is imposed upon such parolee, the service of the balance of said term originally imposed shall precede the commencement of the new term imposed in the following cases:
(1) If a person is paroled from any State penal or correctional institution under the
control and supervision of the Department of Justice and the new sentence imposed upon him is to be served in any such State penal or correctional institution.
(2) If a person is paroled from a county penal or correctional institution and the new sentence imposed upon him is to be served in the same county penal or correctional institution.
In all other cases, the service of the new term for the latter crime shall precede commencement of the balance of the term originally imposed.
61 P.S. § 331.21a(a).