concurring in part, dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the majority’s ultimate holding — that the claims of neither plaintiff survive the municipality’s motions to dismiss — I write separately to highlight a significant problem I see with its analysis as to the issue of standing. Specifically, I am concerned with the majority’s assertion that plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue their constitutional claims because their complaint did not allege “that the subject zoning ordinance amendments will be or have been enforced against property owned by plaintiffs[.]” I think that a requirement that the ordinance be enforced before a property owner may challenge it could allow a municipality to evade statutorily-mandated procedural safeguards by waiting to enforce an ordinance until two months after its adoption, thereby immunizing itself pursuant to the statute of limitations.
Our case law with respect to North Carolina General Statutes, section 160A-364.1 is fairly clear. When a plaintiff challenges the validity of a zoning ordinance, which a municipality enacted pursuant to its legislative function,4 he has two months within which to initiate an action for declaratory judgment. In Pinehurst Area Realty, Inc. v. Village of Pinehurst, we noted that our courts have construed this statute strictly. 100 N.C. App. 77, 80, 394 S.E.2d 251, 253 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 92, 402 S.E.2d 417, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1251, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1055 (1991). In that case, we also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that section 160A-364.1 did not provide the relevant statute of limitations for constitutional claims:
Plaintiff characterizes this action as “a cause of action for deprivation of constitutional rights” and states that the United States *65Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985), has directed that such actions “be subject to the relevant state’s personal injury statute of limitations” which in North Carolina is three years. The Wilson court was addressing federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 when it chose to apply the personal injury statute of limitations. We do not find Wilson controlling.
Id. After recounting the “important public policy considerations” such as “a strong need for finality with respect to zoning matters],]” we explained that
North Carolina courts have not held that violations of federal constitutional claims in zoning actions extend the usual [two-month5] statute of limitations. In Sherrill v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 81 N.C. App. 369, 344 S.E.2d 357, disc. rev. denied, 318 N.C. 417, 349 S.E.2d 600 (1986), this Court held that plaintiff’s claims for federal due process violations were barred by the nine-month statute of limitations. It is noteworthy that Sherrill was decided after Wilson, supra.
Id. at 80-81, 394 S.E.2d at 253. The Pinehurst Court then held that the “plaintiff’s challenge to the 1985 zoning law based on alleged state and federal constitutional violations is barred by the [two]-month statute of limitations.” Id. at 81, 394 S.E.2d at 253-54.
In Capital Outdoor Advertising v. City of Raleigh, our Supreme Court noted that this Court and the Fourth Circuit had dealt differently with which statute of limitations applied to facial constitutional challenges to zoning ordinances. 337 N.C. 150, 162, 446 S.E.2d 289, 297 (1994). Although that case did not require our Supreme Court to decide between the three-year time limit upheld by the Fourth Circuit and the nine-month- — now two-month — limitation supported by the Pinehurst Court, it nonetheless suggested its agreement with the shorter time frame. Id. (“While our [two-month] statute of limitations contained in N.C.G.S. § 1-54.1 and N.C.G.S. § 160A-314.1 appears to treat the issue far more specifically than N.C.G.S. § 1-52(5) and while our North Carolina Court of Appeals decisions appear the better reasoned decisions on the issue, we need not resolve the matter in this case . . . .”). Accordingly, our case law appears to be well-settled that a plaintiff must raise facial *66constitutional challenges to an ordinance within the two-month statute of limitations or else such claim is barred.
Our case law also is well-established as to standing. Our Supreme Court has held that one’s status as a taxpayer or as a citizen of a certain municipality does not confer standing to challenge a zoning ordinance. See Fox v. Board of Comm’rs, 244 N.C. 497, 500, 94 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1956) (“[I]t was not alleged or shown that any plaintiff owns realty constituting farm land either subject to or exempt from the provisions of the ordinance. Indeed, it is not alleged or shown that any plaintiff owns any property of any kind presently restricted by the ordinance. Plaintiffs cannot present an abstract question and obtain an adjudication in the nature of an advisory opinion.”). Rather, “[a] party has standing to challenge a zoning ordinance in an action for declaratory judgment only when it ‘has a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter affected by the zoning ordinance and ... is directly and adversely affected thereby.’ ” Village Creek Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Town of Edenton, 135 N.C. App. 482, 485, 520 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1999) (quoting Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 620, 227 S.E.2d 576, 583 (1976)).
In Grace Baptist Church v. City of Oxford, cited by the majority, our Supreme Court held that a plaintiff’s failure to allege specific facts within its complaint to establish standing was rectified by the municipality’s request for an injunction in its responsive pleading. 320 N.C. 439, 444, 358 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1987). Based upon that threatened enforcement, the plaintiff was “in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of enforcement[.]” Id. The majority in the case sub judice takes that application of facts a step further by requiring enforcement, or threatened enforcement, in order for a plaintiff to assert a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance. Notably, however, the Grace Baptist Court analyzed the plaintiff’s standing in that case only with respect to its as-applied constitutional claim. Id. When analyzing whether an ordinance had been selectively enforced against the plaintiff as compared with others in the municipality, a threshold question of enforcement clearly is necessary. I emphasize, though, that immediately prior to that determination, the Grace Baptist Court had reviewed the merits of the plaintiff’s facial challenge to the ordinance without addressing issues of standing. Id. at 442-43, 358 S.E.2d at 374-75. Accordingly, I do not think that Grace Baptist supports the majority’s assertion that plaintiffs do not have standing to pursue their constitutional claims because their com*67plaint did not allege “that the subject zoning ordinance amendments will be or have been enforced against property owned by plaintiffs[.]”
I think that the majority errs by considering the standing requirements for facial constitutional challenges in the same light as those required for as-applied constitutional claims. Requiring enforcement or threat of enforcement in order to mount an as-applied challenge to an ordinance or to challenge the quasi-judicial decision of a zoning board with respect to a requested variance ensures that only those citizens truly affected by a municipality’s actions have standing to bring their claims. In contrast, a facial challenge to an ordinance’s validity or, as the majority discusses, challenges to the procedures ensured by statute or local ordinance should not depend upon threat ened enforcement. Facial challenges, therefore, are more similar to what the majority labels “statutory challenges” than to as-applied constitutional challenges.
Thrash Ltd. P’ship v. County of Buncombe (Thrash II), as cited by the majority, addressed this specific issue when it distinguished a case relied upon by the municipality:
We find Andrews to be distinguishable. The plaintiff’s challenge to the zoning ordinance in Andrews was based on arbitrariness, equal protection, or constitutionality as applied to the plaintiff’s land. As the case necessarily involved a specific consideration of plaintiff’s land, the plaintiff was required to show that she had an immediate risk of sustaining an injury in order to have standing. In the instant case, plaintiff is challenging the procedural enactment of the Multi-Family Dwelling Ordinance. Thus, plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action is not an “as-applied” challenge, but rather is an attack on the validity of the zoning ordinance.
195 N.C. App. 727, 730-31, 673 S.E.2d 689, 692 (2009). The Thrash II Court further noted “that to require a plaintiff to demonstrate a direct injury in order to challenge a zoning regulation would allow counties to make zoning decisions without complying with the statutory requirements . . . .” Id. at 731, 673 S.E.2d at 692.
In Messer v. Town of Chapel Hill, this Court held that a plaintiff cannot challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance unless he first has requested a variance. 125 N.C. App. 57, 64-65, 479 S.E.2d 221, 225, vacated as moot, 346 N.C. 259, 485 S.E.2d 269 (1997). In a prescient dissent, Judge Greene acknowledged the potentially problematic interaction between our statute of limitations and a requirement of *68enforcement for standing purposes. Id. at 65, 479 S.E.2d at 226 (Greene, J., dissenting). At the.time he authored this dissent, the statute of limitations was nine months, id. (Greene, J., dissenting); Judge Greene’s concerns may prove more relevant given the truncated two-month statute of limitations. According to Judge Greene,
I do not agree that the complaint must be dismissed on the grounds that the claims are premature or “not ripe” for consideration. The plaintiffs challenge the ordinance on the grounds that it is an arbitrary and capricious act by the government and is therefore unconstitutional. In other words, the plaintiffs contend that any application of the ordinance is unconstitutional because their property rights were violated the very moment the government enacted the ordinance, without regard to how it may be applied. This constitutes a “facial challenge” as opposed to an “as applied challenge,” see Eide v. Sarasota County, 908 F.2d 716, 724 n.14 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1179, 111 S. Ct. 1073 (1991), and as such there is no requirement that the plaintiff, prior to filing the complaint, first seek a variance from the zoning requirement. See id.; Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 11, 99 L. Ed. 2d 1, 14, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988) (addressing facial challenge). Furthermore, because any action challenging the validity of the ordinance must be filed within nine months of its enactment, N.C.G.S. § 160A-364.1 (1994), requiring the plaintiffs to seek a final ruling on a variance request prior to filing this action would seriously jeopardize the right to file the action, as it is likely that a final decision would not be entered within nine months of the enactment of the ordinance. I would reverse the order of the trial court and remand.
Id. at 65, 479 S.E.2d at 225-26 (Greene, J., dissenting).
This precise problem presented itself in a pair of our unpublished cases. In Nags Head Constr. & Dev., Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, we held that the plaintiff had not established standing to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance.
In its complaint, plaintiff does not claim or allege that it would be subject to the challenged ordinance or is about to suffer any direct injury. Rather, plaintiff merely alleges that it has a legal interest in certain parcels of property located within the Town’s jurisdiction. This general interest, common to all members of the public, is insufficient to establish standing. [Wilkes v. North Carolina State Board of Alcoholic Control, 44 N.C. App. 495, *69496-97, 261 S.E.2d 205, 206-07 (1980)]. Furthermore, plaintiff does not claim or allege that it sought or was denied a permit or variance under the challenged ordinance.
2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 832, at *6 (unpublished). When the case came before us again, we held that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs claim, leaving plaintiff with no method of redress.
The zoning ordinance at issue in this appeal was adopted on 20 August 2003. Pursuant to G.S. § 160A-364.1, plaintiff had until two months thereafter to file a suit challenging the ordinance. Although plaintiff filed a complaint on 20 October 2003, that complaint was dismissed for lack of standing and this Court subsequently affirmed the dismissal. See Nags Head Constr. & Dev., Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, — N.C. App. —, — S.E.2d —, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 832 (2005) (unpublished) (trial court properly dismissed the complaint as plaintiff failed to show an existing case or controversy with the Town and that plaintiff would suffer direct injury because a permit was neither sought or denied).
Plaintiff next filed the subject complaint challenging the zoning ordinance on 4 February 2004, more than five months after the expiration of the two month limitations period. On these facts, the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff had not sustained his burden of showing that the action was instituted within the prescribed period. Thus, the order granting defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion was proper.
Nags Head Constr. & Dev., Inc. v. Town of Nags Head, 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 971, at *4-5 (unpublished).
Here, I agree with the majority that the two-month statute of limitations bars plaintiff Bird’s claims. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-364.1 (2005). As cited by the majority, “this Court has previously held that even where an amendment is adopted inconsistent with the notice requirements of Chapter 160A, an action which attacks the validity of the amendment commenced more than [two] months from the adoption of the amendment is barred.” Thompson v. Town of Warsaw, 120 N.C. App. 471, 473, 462 S.E.2d 691, 692 (1995) (citing Pinehurst Area Realty, 100 N.C. App. at 80, 394 S.E.2d at 253). Therefore, because plaintiff Bird did not bring her claims within the requisite two-month time frame, her complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as properly held by the trial court.
*70However, plaintiff Templeton’s claims are not barred by the statute of limitations, because he brought his original suit within the allotted two-month period and voluntarily dismissed those claims pursuant to Rule 41 of our Rules of Civil Procedure. He then re-filed within the one-year time frame provided by that Rule. Thus, I must look at whether plaintiff Templeton has standing to pursue his claim. In accordance with Thrash II, plaintiff Templeton has not alleged specific facts that support his standing to challenge the ordinance. However, I emphasize that an allegation as to the slope value of his property and as to the distance between his property and a major traffic corridor would satisfy the requirements of standing with respect to both “statutory challenges” and a facial constitutional challenge. He need not allege that enforcement of the ordinance is imminent except as to his as-applied constitutional challenges. I also note that the majority’s reasoning appears to be inconsistent with respect to its standing analysis. If plaintiff Bird’s allegation that “the Town subjected the trust property to the onerous regulations of the Viewshed Ordinance and Map” necessitates the inference that such property “must be located within 100 feet of a major traffic corridor or a portion of the trust property can be seen from a major traffic corridor[,]” as asserted by the majority, then the allegations that plaintiff Bird’s and plaintiff Templeton’s properties are “directly and adversely affected” by the zoning ordinances would require the same inference. If we take the allegations as true, then both allegations are sufficient to establish standing. If we require specific factual allegations that support a finding of standing, as the Thrash II Court appeared to require, then neither party meets that threshold. As I would hold that all of plaintiff Bird’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, I do not address whether she established standing as to either of the ordinances.
. The statute of limitations set forth in North Carolina General Statutes, section 160A-364.1 applies to a challenge to an ordinance’s validity, which goes to a municipality’s legislative authority to adopt, amend, and repeal zoning ordinances. See David W. Owens, Land Use Law in North Carolina 270-72 (2006); see also Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 618, 227 S.E.2d 576, 582 (1976) (“The General Assembly has delegated to ‘the legislative body’ of cities and incorporated towns the power to adopt zoning regulations and from time to time, to amend or repeal such regulations.”) (citations omitted). In contrast, when a municipality makes a quasi-judicial decision, such as denying a variance from a zoning ordinance, the applicable statute of limitations is thirty days from the date of the decision. See Owens, supra, at 271-72; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-388(e2) (2009).
. North Carolina General Statutes, section 160A-364.1 originally provided a nine-month statute of limitations for challenges to zoning ordinances. However, effective 1 October 1996, the General Assembly amended the statute to two months, the time limit applicable to the case subjudice. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 746 §§ 7, 8.