concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join in Part I of the opinion of the Court and in the mandate dismissing this appeal. I respectfully dissent, however, from the considered dicta in Part II where the Court, in my view, misconstrues Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 645A(a)(4). The construction that the automatic stay is unwaivable lacks support in the statutory language, is contrary to the ordinary rules of statutory construction, and does violence to the legislative history.
After Thanos had been found guilty of murdering sixteen-year-old Billy Winebrenner and fourteen-year-old Melody Pistorio, but before the death sentences for those murders were imposed, Thanos wrote the following letter, dated April 21, 1992, to Governor William Donald Schaefer:
“You said on the news tonight that something’s wrong with this appeal process in these death penalty cases. I won’t speak for others, but in my case I agree with you.
“My question is what are you going to do about it? I’ve got 3 attorneys who insist on filing motions and appeals for me after I’ve adamantly told them not to.
“I’ve written to their superiors and told them to withdraw all appeals and not file anymore. They’ve totally ignored *529my letters. Duplicity runs deep in how my case is being handled. Great amounts of tax payers monies are being squandered.
“There is no question as to my guilt. I gave a lengthy video confession and I’m not sorry for anything — in fact I don’t want to die, I’d rather seek revenge by killing the youthful, or elderly.
“So what are you going to do to stop these public defenders from squandering the public’s money when I don’t want them filing frivolous motions and appeals that I’ve neither wanted or requested.
“This is your chance to prove you’re not a coward and all talk — I’ll not appeal and as soon as the Court of Appeals reviews my case as is mandatory, you sign that death warrant.”
After his convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 576, 625 A.2d 932 (1993), Thanos, by letters to the trial judge and to public defenders, and in his testimony at the hearing below, adhered to the decision expressed in his letter to Governor Schaefer.
The majority today opines that the General Assembly intended that the 240 day automatic stay under § 645A must run its full course, even under the circumstances here, because the General Assembly intended to build into the capital sentencing process a guaranteed, minimum, 240 day delay in executing any death sentence. That reading of the statute is, in my opinion, plainly wrong.
The 240 day automatic stay under ¶ 4 complements the time limit set forth in ¶ 3 on the exercise by a circuit court of jurisdiction over an initial proceeding under the Post Conviction Act in a capital sentence case. A circuit court has no jurisdiction “unless the petition for the initial proceeding is filed within 240 days after the date of’ certain events marking the end of direct review. § 645A(a)(3)(i). During that period execution of the death warrant is stayed to enable counsel and the person sentenced to death to prepare a petition seeking post conviction review. If a person under sentence of death *530has determined not to seek post conviction review and has waived the benefit of the 240 day stay, the purpose of the automatic stay has been satisfied. The majority’s construction divorces ¶ 4 from ¶ 3, and divorces ¶ 4 from its purpose, thereby violating the rule that a statute is to be construed in accordance with its purpose. See Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 535 A.2d 471 (1988).
The general rule is that rights or benefits conferred on an accused by constitutions, statutes, and rules of court may be waived. “[T]here are few, if any[,] instances where a criminal defendant is prohibited from surrendering his rights, be they constitutional or otherwise.... ” State v. Magwood, 290 Md. 615, 619 n. 2, 432 A.2d 446, 448 n. 2 (1981) (citation omitted). In recent years three cases have reached this Court in which persons convicted of crimes have contended that they enjoyed the kind of “super right,” i.e., unwaivable right, that the majority concludes is the nature of the 240 day automatic stay. In each case the contention was rejected.
The Court of Special Appeals in McKay v. State, 32 Md. App. 451, 362 A.2d 666 (1976), held that such a “super right” was created by Art. 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, a holding that this Court promptly reversed. State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 375 A.2d 228 (1977). Article 21 provides in relevant part “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be found guilty.” McKay challenged the majority verdict by which he had been found guilty, while the State argued that McKay had waived the unanimity requirement. After tracing the history of the unanimity requirement through English and American legal history, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Art. 21 “does not bestow a right but imposes a mandate.” 32 Md. App. at 462, 362 A.2d at 674 (footnote omitted). That court concluded that “unanimity is an imperative requirement of a legal verdict in a Maryland criminal prosecution before a jury, and not a right of the accused which he may waive.... ” Id.
*531This Court stated the issue in McKay to be “whether unanimity, under the Maryland Constitution, is an imperative requirement that cannot be waived.” 280 Md. at 566, 375 A.2d at 232. We pointed out that, by 1776, waivers of trial by jury and of a twelve member jury were permitted. Id. at 568, 375 A.2d at 233. Judge Levine, writing for a unanimous Court, then said:
“The contemporary era furnishes even less support for the ‘imperative requirement’ interpretation, particularly in light of the fact that other provisions in the Declaration of Rights protecting defendants in criminal cases, however fundamental they have been regarded by our society, are subject to waiver. Article 22, which declares that ‘no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case,’ may, ‘like all other privileges,’ be waived. Allen v. State, 183 Md. 603, 612, 39 A.2d 820 (1944). No less a right than trial by jury itself, as we have emphasized at length, could be waived well before independence. State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 14-19, 273 A.2d 156 (1971). The poll of the jury, the very procedure by which unanimity is confirmed, is an ‘absolute right’ of ‘constitutional dimension,’ Ross v. State, 24 Md.App. 246, 253, 330 A.2d 507 (1975) , rev’d on other grounds, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976) , which can be waived by the simple failure to exercise it. Similarly, a mere failure to object to the admission of illegally seized evidence amounts to a waiver of that valuable right. Jenkins v. State, 232 Md. 529, 532-33, 194 A.2d 618 (1963); Porter v. State, 230 Md. 535, 536-37, 187 A.2d 870 (1963). Finally, the defendant can also waive the right to counsel, State v. Blizzard, 278 Md. 556, 575, 366 A.2d 1026 (1976); State v. Fowler, 259 Md. 95, 103-04, 267 A.2d 228 (1970); the right to confront the witnesses against him, State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 79-81, 288 A.2d 163 (1972); and the right to a speedy trial, Bonner v. Director, 237 Md. 445, 447, 206 A.2d 708 (1965). See also Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 6-16, 367 A.2d 1 (1976).”
280 Md. at 569-70, 375 A.2d at 234-35. This Court, in McKay, concluded:
*532“If, therefore, all these fundamental rights can be waived by the accused, there is no rationale for an interpretation denying him waiver of unanimity, which, like all the rights just enumerated, is generally regarded as existing primarily for his benefit.”
Id. at 570, 375 A.2d at 235.
It is noteworthy that the benefit, to be waivable, need only be “primarily” for the defendant. Surely the unanimity requirement contains an element of benefit to society as a whole, by increasing the reliability of the finding that the accused is, in fact, the criminal agent, but that societal benefit does not block waiver by the person benefited. Similarly, any societal benefit that one under sentence of death have the opportunity to prepare to demonstrate that the conviction and sentence are open to collateral attack does not prevent waiver by the primary beneficiary of the provision for post conviction review.
In 1981, this Court decided Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632, by a four to three vote. Logan had voluntarily surrendered himself to the police after learning that a warrant of arrest, charging theft, was outstanding against him. Id. at 463-64, 425 A.2d at 634. Logan voluntarily signed a form, by the terms of which he waived his right to be taken promptly before a judicial officer. Id. at 475-76, 425 A.2d at 640-41. That right was then conferred by Maryland District Rule (M.D.R.) 723a, now Maryland Rule 4 — 212(f). One of the issues was whether M.D.R. 723 conferred rights on Logan which were his to waive, or whether the rule imposed nonwaivable duties upon police and judicial officers. Id. at 465, 425 A.2d at 635.
Earlier, Johnson v. State, 282 Md. 314, 322, 384 A.2d 709, 714 (1978), had stated that M.D.R. 723a was designed to bolster several fundamental constitutional guarantees, including the right to be informed of the accusation, freedom from unauthorized seizure of the person, the right to counsel or to have counsel appointed, and freedom from coercive investigatory methods. This Court said in Logan that it was “clear that each of the rights, constitutional or otherwise, contem*533plated by the rule to be made known to the accused at his initial appearance can itself be waived.” 289 Md. at 469, 425 A.2d at 637. We said that “[i]t would be a strange holding indeed were we to conclude that though the defendant can knowingly waive a constitutional right, he cannot knowingly waive a court rule (absent specific language rendering such a purported waiver ineffective) adopted to bolster and implement that constitutional right.” Id. at 470, 425 A.2d at 637.
We then addressed the contention that “the requirement of M.D.R. 723a imposes an independent obligation on the arresting officers, and that such a duty imposed by law upon another is not the defendant’s to waive.” Id. (footnote omitted). Rejecting that contention, we said:
“It is now well-settled by almost universal authority that when waiver is permitted, the potential beneficiary of the right surrenders both the privilege he possesses by virtue of it, as well as the ability to claim the advantage flowing from the failure to perform any corresponding obligation imposed on the State by that right. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 279 Md. 1, 7, 367 A.2d 1, 6 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935, 97 S.Ct. 2177, 53 L.Ed.2d 225 (1977) (duty to bring defendant to trial imposed on State by defendant’s right to speedy trial; right waivable); State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 270, 347 A.2d 219, 227 (1975) (right to counsel imposes duty on State to provide effective representation; right waivable); State v. McKay, supra (right to unanimous criminal jury verdict does not impose imperative requirement on the State to provide the same; right subject to waiver). The existence of that obligation seldom destroys the ability of the defendant to willingly forego what exists primarily for his benefit.”
Id. at 470-71, 425 A.2d at 637-38.
The dissenting judges in Logan accepted the analysis “that the obligation of the police, under subsection a of the rule, to take an arrestee before a judicial officer ‘without unnecessary delay,’ has the effect of conferring upon the arrested defendant a right to prompt presentment.” Id. at 491, 425 A.2d at *534648 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The dissenting judges in Logan likewise accepted the proposition that the right to a prompt initial hearing was subject to a knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. The disagreement with the majority had to do with whether the particular waiver executed by Logan was effective. See id. at 491-99, 425 A.2d at 648-52 (Eldridge, J., dissenting).
In the case now before us there is no disagreement concerning Thanos’s competence to discharge counsel and to forego collateral review. Yet, contrary to Logan, the majority today concludes that the obligation on the State to defer execution exists independently of whether Thanos has waived his correlative right to collateral review.
The third “super right” case is Cubbage v. State, 304 Md. 237, 498 A.2d 632 (1985). There, the accused, as part of a plea bargain, had waived appeal, but, after sentencing, nevertheless appealed. Id. at 238-39, 498 A.2d at 639. Cubbage submitted that any waiver of the right of appeal is contrary to public policy and ineffective. Id. at 240, 498 A.2d at 634. After determining that Cubbage voluntarily had waived his right to appeal, we held that the appeal going to the merits of the judgment of conviction should be dismissed. Id. at 250, 498 A.2d at 639. Citing, inter alia, Logan and McKay, we observed that Cubbagé’s argument dealt “simply with another specific application of the general concept that nearly every right, constitutional or statutory, may be waived.” Id. at 241, 498 A.2d at 634.
Against the background of these cases, one would expect a bill intended by the General Assembly to create just such a “super right” to do so in clear and unambiguous terms. This is particularly true when one considers that the General Assembly has already created a nonwaivable direct review of death sentences under Art. 27, § 414 which necessarily encompasses an appellate review of the guilty verdict. The direct review mandated by § 414 can be accomplished by review of the record without the participation of the person under sentence of death. In contrast, the automatic stay under *535§ 645A(a)(4) is tied to the initial petition for post conviction review, which almost always requires the cooperation of the prisoner. Nothing in the language of § 645A(a) suggests that the General Assembly intended that, in addition to the automatic direct review, the stay should run its full course even when the prisoner has waived post conviction review.
For the textual support for its conclusion, the majority relies on the introductory language of § 645A(a)(4), “[njotwithstanding any other provision of law.” The quoted language makes the 240 day stay arise automatically. The function of the quoted language is to override other provisions of law concerning stays of execution of a death warrant. The quoted language should not be extended to include, and to repeal, the law of waiver.
Under the Maryland Rules of Procedure and absent the “[njotwithstanding” introduction, an application to a circuit court to stay execution of a death sentence would be by motion in writing, setting forth the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. Md. Rule 4-252(c) and (d). A copy would be served on the State. Md. Rule 1 — 321(a). The State would have fifteen days within which to respond. Md. Rule 4-252(e). The circuit court would have to sign an order and that order would have to be filed with the clerk and entered on the docket. Further, the circuit court would not be stripped, under all circumstances, of any discretion whatsoever in acting on the merits of the request, and the circuit court certainly would have discretion as to the length of the stay. Depending on how that discretion might have been exercised in any given case, one or more applications, additional to the original stay request, might be made within the first 240 days following exhaustion of direct review in a capital sentence case. The “notwithstanding” language creates the stay without the need for pursuing these procedural steps.
Under the majority’s construction, the “[njotwithstanding” language of ¶ 4 sweeps far beyond an override of the procedural steps necessary to obtain a stay. Under the majority’s view, the general law of waiver cannot be applied, even if *536there is an express waiver by a competent beneficiary of the stay. That is so extraordinary a conclusion that an intent to create that result should not be attributed to the General Assembly, unless clearly expressed in the statute.
Prohibiting waiver of the stay created by § 645A(a)(4) where post conviction review has been waived simply creates delay for no purpose. That result collides with the insuperable hurdle of the legislative history. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of § 645A(a) were enacted by Chapter 499 of the Acts of Í991. The aim of that legislation is to reduce unnecessary delay in the carrying out of death sentences. Chapter 499 was Senate Bill 497, introduced by the Chairman of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee.
Senate Bill 497 was concerned with the number of different judicial proceedings potentially available to a condemned murderer after direct review of the conviction and death sentence had been exhausted. These begin with a petition for post conviction review filed in a Maryland circuit court. There may be an appeal, allowable in the discretion of this Court, from the post conviction court’s judgment, and there may be a further, discretionary review by the United States Supreme Court of post conviction issues. A flow chart contained in the legislative file on Senate Bill 497 pointed out that the convicted murderer may twice petition for proceedings under the Maryland Post Conviction Act. Assuming no court reverses or remands in whole or in part as a result of proceedings under the Maryland Post Conviction Act, the condemned murderer may then petition the United States District Court for the District of Maryland for habeas corpus relief. If that relief is denied, the condemned murderer may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. From that court’s determination, if adverse, the condemned murderer may seek discretionary review by the United States Supreme Court. The same flow chart also stated that there is no limit on the number of times a prisoner may petition for federal habeas corpus relief. If no court engaged in federal habeas corpus review reverses or remands in whole or in part, then the condemned murderer may petition a Maryland circuit *537court alleging that the petitioner, in the interim, has become incompetent and may not be executed. The flow chart advised that a determination adverse to the petitioner in that proceeding would be subject to discretionary review by this Court. This Court’s determination, according to the flow chart, could be the basis for again invoking federal habeas corpus review.
Senate Bill 497 also had its genesis, as reflected by the legislative file, in an unsigned legal memorandum or workpaper, headed, “Suggestions for Reducing Delay in Capital Litigation.” That memorandum made twelve specific suggestions that were within the control of state law. Suggestion No. 7 addressed post conviction review in state courts and reads:
“7. Adopt 180 day filing deadline for post-conviction petition in capital cases.
“Explanation: Even one day of delay in a capital case is a victory for the defense. Delay is a strategy. Without a deadline on the filing of a post-conviction petition, however, the only way to see a death sentence challenged on post-conviction is to go through the charade of obtaining a warrant of execution (as if anyone is going to be executed without even one post-conviction). Under the current system, no one even starts looking for an attorney for the condemned prisoner until the Supreme Court denies cert.— a minimum of 4 months after the Court of Appeals’ affirmance. And then, once an attorney is found, that attorney wants at least 6 months to prepare the post-conviction decision. The trade off here is time for a more formalized system of obtaining representation in capital post-conviction cases.
“Suggested legislation:
“See amendment post conviction statute, attached.”
The attachment to the memorandum proposed amending the post conviction statute to provide, inter alia, an additional ¶ 3 to § 645A(a) reading as follows:
“(3) In a case in which the death penalty has been imposed, the circuit court may not exercise jurisdiction over *538a proceeding under this subtitle unless the initial petition is filed:
(i) Within 180 days of an order denying any petition for writ of certiorari or a decision affirming the death sentence; or
(ii) Within 90 days of the expiration of the time for seeking review by the Supreme Court if no review is sought.”
These materials were furnished to the Department of Legislative Services where a bill was drafted. The “request form” of the Department of Legislative Services, used to cover transmittal of the draft through an internal review process, describes the substance of the legislation as “expediting capital cases.” Senate Bill 497, as introduced, contained ¶ 3 in the form identical to that proposed in conjunction with the legal workpaper.
The bill was referred to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee where five amendments were placed on the bill and, as so amended, the bill was favorably reported. The third of these amendments changed ¶ 3 substantially to the form in which it was enacted, and added ¶ 4 in exactly the form in which it was enacted.
The bill was presented to the full Senate accompanied by a floor report from the committee in which amendment No. 3 was described as follows:
“This amendment adds language that establishes the 240 day time period within which an initial post conviction petition must be filed in a death penalty case. It also adds language that requires that a warrant of execution be stayed during this time period.”
Under the heading, “BACKGROUND,” the floor report also advised in relevant part:
“There is currently no statute of limitations for the filing of a post-conviction petition. Nor is there currently a specific time period within which a court must hold a hearing on a post conviction petition. The purpose of this bill is to *539establish a type of statute of limitations for the first petition in a death penalty case....
“This bill is intended to prohibit unnecessary delay in the filing of post conviction petitions in death penalty cases and in the scheduling of hearings in such cases. According to testimony, the State must currently resort to a warrant of execution if the State wants to motivate a defendant who has been sentenced to death to file a post conviction petition. This bill will require the initial post conviction petition in a death penalty case to be filed within the specified period regardless of whether the State has obtained a warrant of execution.”
(Emphasis added). The bill passed the Senate by a vote of forty yeas to one nay, with six senators not voting.
In the House of Delegates, Senate Bill 497 was referred to the Judiciary Committee, to whose chairman the Office of the Public Defender wrote in support of the bill. That letter described the bill as “excellent legislation” and the product of “much work” by the Chairman of Judicial Proceedings, the Attorney General, and the Office of the Public Defender.
The interrelation between ¶¶ 3 and 4 of § 645A(a) is made clear by the public defender’s explanation:
“This Bill mandates time frames for the filing of an initial death penalty post conviction petition and the Circuit Court hearing on that petition. Further the Bill requires a stay of execution pending the filing of the petition. Extensions of time frames are allowed for good cause shown.
“This Bill does more than satisfy concerns regarding delays in death penalty litigation. Under present law a prosecutor may seek an execution date immediately upon the Supreme Court’s final action on direct appeal. If the prosecutor so pushes for a quick execution date, the Public Defender must quickly appoint counsel to prepare a hasty post conviction petition with the hopes of subsequent amendment and possibly a reassignment of counsel. This practice is wasteful and may jeopardize a clear presentation of the defendant’s claims.
*540“The reasonable time frames and stay provisions in this Bill would standardize practice, give the State a reasonable expectation of the date of filing, and allow the defense ample time to prepare thorough post conviction pleadings. The good cause language provides a fail safe.”
(Emphasis added). The bill passed the House 120 to 3, and the Senate concurred in the House amendments forty-six to nothing.
I believe that the members of the General Assembly who voted so overwhelmingly to eliminate unnecessary delay in capital cases will be shocked at an interpretation declaring that they voted to delay for the sake of delay, when post conviction review has been waived. This Court, construing statutes establishing punishments for crimes in order to determine the unit of prosecution, has said that “in addition to considering the specific words of the statute, we may consider the general history and prevailing mood of the legislative body with respect to the type of criminal conduct involved.” Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 327, 558 A.2d 715, 721 (1989). In Randall Book Corp. we rejected applying a rule of lenity in prosecutions for knowingly displaying obscene materials for advertising purposes. Id. at 327-28, 558 A.2d at 721-22. Similarly, in Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 188, 567 A.2d 126, 129 (1989), we rejected a construction based on the rule of lenity in determining the unit of prosecution for possession of controlled dangerous substances where the defendant simultaneously possessed two different controlled dangerous substances. We expressed our belief that “the prevailing mood of the Maryland General Assembly with respect to illegal drug activity” is “ ‘to turn the screw of the criminal machinery — detection, prosecution and punishment — tighter and tighter.’ ” Id. at 189, 567 A.2d at 129. My reading of the legislative history of Senate Bill 497 reveals no intent to treat murderers under death sentence more leniently than purveyors of drugs or pornography.
The majority nevertheless concludes that a nonwaivable stay, as contrasted with an irrevocable waiver of the stay or with some kind of waiver revocable at the option of the *541prisoner, is the only construction of § 645A(a)(4) that does not produce an absurd result. I agree with the majority that the General Assembly never intended for the prisoner to be able to renounce a waiver, after a court has determined competence to discharge counsel and to waive further review. The majority bases its rejection of irrevocable waiver, however, on “the specter of a defendant being dragged into the gas chamber during the 240-day stay granted by the legislature, protesting that he had changed his mind but being told by the State that he must not go back on his word....” 332 Md. 511, 526, 632 A.2d 768, 775 (1993).
Given that the current public policy of this State, as manifested in its law, recognizes the death penalty, the majority’s rejection of the irrevocable waiver alternative is unfocused. While perhaps appropriate to a general social policy debate on the death penalty, vel non, the majority’s specter adds nothing to the analysis of why the stay must be unwaivable. A similar specter could be envisioned in which a condemned murderer seeks to revoke a waiver of the right to remain silent and, at the last moment, to withdraw a confession. Waiver certainly would apply in the latter instance, and there is nothing peculiar about the 240 day stay that alters the waiver result if conventional jurisprudence, uniformly applied, is the controlling standard for adjudication.
Further, a construction of § 645A(a)(4) that makes the waiver irrevocable does not, as the majority implies, immediately terminate all possible further review. The prisoner simply moves to the next step depicted on the flow chart. Federal habeas corpus review remains available with respect to federal constitutional issues that the prisoner had raised before the State’s highest court, even if no state post conviction proceeding has been brought. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 103 L.Ed.2d 380, 386 (1989); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 517 n. 18, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1056 n. 18, 31 L.Ed.2d 394, 407 n. 18 (1972). In addition, applications for executive clemency remain available, particularly for cases presenting meritorious grounds based on newly discovered evidence.
*542Were the irrevocable waiver construction advanced in this dissenting opinion to be applied in the case at hand, Thanos, however, would have an additional procedural option if he were to change his mind. If, prior to his scheduled execution but within the 240 day period, Thanos were to petition for post conviction review, the issue of whether his particular waiver was effective in the first instance would be presented. Thanos could submit that his waiver was not knowing, in view of the erroneous advice given to him by the circuit court and confirmed by the affidavit of the Commissioner of Correction, that Thanos’s waiver was revocable at his option.
MURPHY, C.J., and KARWACKI, J., have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this concurring and dissenting opinion.