The issue presented in this case is whether a parent has a duty, enforceable in equity, to support an adult child who becomes disabled after the age of majority.
On December 10, 1980, Emma Sininger, appellee, filed a Bill of Complaint for Child Support against Donald Sining*606er, appellant, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The parties had been divorced a vinculo matrimonii on February 19, 1969. Pursuant to the divorce, appellant paid child support for each of their three children until they reached the age of majority—age twenty one.1 By court order, payments were ended in August of 1980, all children having reached the requisite age.
By the complaint filed herein, Mrs. Sininger sought support for their daughter Janette, who although age twenty-three at the time, suffered from severe mental illness and was incapable of supporting and caring for herself. At hearings before a domestic relations master testimony focused on when Janette’s disability occurred. Appellant contended that Janette was not disabled by her illness until she became an emancipated adult. Both parties agree that after reaching age twenty one, Janette left the family home and held her own apartment and a job. Further, it is uncontested that Janette presently is disabled and requires medical attention. Appellee maintained, however, that Janette’s mental illness, hence her disability, began in childhood and that she never was able to care for herself properly. The evidence focused on this question because in ruling on appellant’s Motion for Decision of a Question of Law, the master had held that for support to be awarded, appellee had to prove that Janette’s mental or physical disability existed before she reached the age of majority.
After hearing the evidence, the master found that Janette was not disabled at the time she attained the age of majority, and he denied support. Appellee excepted to the master’s legal and factual conclusions. The circuit court accepted the master’s factual finding concerning the time that the disability occurred, but granted appellee’s exception to the master’s legal conclusion that the duty to sup*607port an adult child existed only when the disability preceded emancipation. The court concluded that Janette was currently disabled and that Maryland law imposed an obligation on her parents to contribute to her support. The case was remanded to the master to determine Janette’s needs and the relative abilities of her parents to pay. Based on all the testimony, the master recommended child support of $300.00 per month commencing and accounting from January 1, 1982. Both parties excepted to the master’s recommendations. The circuit court overruled the exceptions and adopted the master’s recommendations.
Mr. Sininger appealed to the Court of Special Appeals and Mrs. Sininger cross-appealed contending that the sum awarded and the retroactive date set were clearly erroneous. Prior to consideration by the intermediate appellate court, we issued certiorari on our own motion to consider this issue of public importance.
Appellant first contends that the equity court lacked jurisdiction to order child support because jurisdiction terminated once the children attained the age of majority. Appellant’s contention focuses on the lack of continuing jurisdiction. The complaint, however, although based in equity, is not for modification of the original support order. The complaint here relies on the court’s general equity jurisdiction and not on its continuing jurisdiction in the original domestic relations case. Appellant essentially concedes that section 3-602(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.),2 grants the *608circuit court jurisdiction over a child; and that if the term “child” has been statutorily enlarged it may include more than persons under the age of majority. In the instant case the issue before us is whether an incapacitated adult child is to be treated on equal footing with a minor child. Because we will hold that the parent has a duty to support an incapacitated adult child and because such an adult child is to be treated on equal footing with a minor child, the parents duty is properly enforceable under section 3-602(a), Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud.Proc. Article.
Appellant contends, and the dissent agrees, that the duty to support a disabled child into adulthood continues because the disability prevents the child from ever becoming emancipated. The reasoning is that because the child is incapable of emancipation, he remains a minor and the obligation continues until the condition changes. Appellant concedes that the parental duty to support exists in the situation where the incapacitation is continuing from the child’s minority, but contends that the duty extends no further. Appellant contends that once a child becomes an emancipated adult the obligation of parental support cannot be resumed. We shall refer to this view as the emancipation rationale. Appellant supports these contentions by characterizing Smith v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962), the pivotal case on point, as a case limited to its facts, which involve a child incapacitated during his minority. Essentially, the appellant would draw a distinction in the parents’ support obligation based upon the time that the child’s disability arose. We do not agree.
In Borchert v. Borchert, 185 Md. 586, 45 A.2d 463 (1946), this Court first addressed the issue of a parent’s duty to support an adult incompetent child. The Court pointed out that no common law obligation to support adult incompetent children existed, id. at 590, 45 A.2d at 465, but noted a *609tendency in other jurisdictions to expand the common law and to recognize a duty, id. at 592, 45 A.2d at 465. The Court, however, chose not to follow the trend in the absence of statutory authority in this state to enforce such a duty. Id. at 594-95, 45 A.2d at 466-67. The Court stated:
“However desirable it may be for some power to exist by which a father may be compelled to support his son, ... the Legislature has not seen fit to make the failure to do so a criminal offense although it has so designated such failure in other domestic situations heretofore mentioned. The omission by the legislative branch of the government of such a statute is an indication that the failure to support an incapacitated child is placed by it on a different footing from the failure to support a minor child. We cannot now without further legislative action hold that the divorce statute attempted to be invoked in this case is enlarged to include other than minor children.”
Id. The Court was content to hold that a parental duty did exist for purposes of the law of the case based upon the concession of the appellant. Id. at 592, 45 A.2d at 46. In view of the Court’s holding that such a duty was ultimately unenforceable, it was not essential to determine whether the duty was recognized in Maryland.
The General Assembly promptly responded to the legislative omission noted by the Court in Borchert, and in 1947 enacted what is now codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 97. The statute provides:
Ҥ 97. Failure of parent to support destitute adult child.
Any person who has an adult child destitute of means and unable to support himself by reason of mental or physical infirmity, who is possessed of or able to earn means sufficient to provide such child with necessary shelter, food, care and clothing and who neglects or refuses so to do, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.”
*610The Court again faced the issue in Smith v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962). In Smith, a chancellor’s order for the divorced father to pay support for his physically incapacitated adult child, who lacked other means of support, was upheld. Id. at 360, 176 A.2d at 865. The Court reviewed the Borchert decision and then held:
“It is significant, we think, that at the first opportunity after the Borchert decision further legislative action was in fact taken. At its 1947 session the Legislature enacted an act now codified as § 97 of Art. 27, Code (1957), making it a criminal offense for a parent, possessing the means, to fail to provide for a destitute adult child where mental or physical infirmity makes it impossible for the child to care for itself. The passage of this act is a clear indication of legislative intent to place failure to support an incapacitated child on equal footing with failure to support a minor child.”
Id. (emphasis added).
In Smith, the Court did not draw a distinction based on emancipation. The Court held that the legislative enactment made it clear that the duty to support an adult incapacitated child was on equal footing with the duty to support a minor child. 227 Md. at 360, 176 A.2d at 865. The holding in Smith is based on Article 27, section 97, of the Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.). This statute contains no suggestion that a distinction should be based on emancipation. We agree with the holding in Smith that the legislative intent in this enactment was clear.
Although the facts of Smith involved a child incapacitated during his minority,3 it is significant that the Court *611did not include such facts in the recitation of facts, rationale, or holding of its opinion. The fact that the child was incapacitated during his minority is crucial to the emancipation rationale. The absence of this crucial fact persuades us that the Court did not intend the interpretation that the appellant and dissenting opinion would attribute to the Court’s opinion. It is apparent that the Court in Smith was aware of the emancipation rationale and declined to base its holding on such reasoning. Further, in Borchert, supra, the Court noted that an emancipation rationale was used in some cases in other jurisdictions, 185 Md. at 592, 45 A.2d at 465, yet the Court apparently resisted adopting this rationale for Maryland. Thus, where the Court twice was faced with the perfect situation to adopt the rationale it declined to do so. We are not persuaded that an emancipation rationale can be properly attributed to the Smith case. We instead rely on the plain language of Article 27, section 97, and the holding of Smith v. Smith, and hold that a parent who has the means to do so, has a duty to support an incapacitated adult child whose disability commenced after she attained the age of majority.
This conclusion is reinforced by comparison with the statutes dealing with the converse of the issue at hand, i.e., the duty of a child to support the child’s parents. Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1983 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, §§ 104-110, comprising the subtitle, “Destitute Parents,” treat this duty. The subtitle was first enacted by Chapter 637 of the Acts of 1916 and was amended into substantially its present form by Chapter 675 of the Acts of 1939. To facilitate the reader’s comparison of the present “Destitute Parents” subtitle with §§ 97-103, comprising the subtitle, “Destitute Children,” we have set forth the two subtitles in parallel in *612an appendix to this opinion where wé have supplied italics to the words “parent” and “child.” This comparison makes immediately apparent that the General Assembly essentially tracked the then existing “Destitute Parents” subtitle when it responded to Borchert with the “Destitute Children” subtitle enacted by Chapter 113 of the Acts of 1947. Sections 97-103 dealing with destitute adult children are obviously the converse of §§ 104-110 dealing with destitute parents.
The foregoing is significant in its relevance to interpretation of the phrase “[a]ny person who has an adult child,” which introduces § 97. That phrase’s companion in present § 104 is the phrase, “[a]ny person having a parent or parents.” It is clear from the comparison of § 97 with § 104 and from the way in which the words “parent” and “child” are employed in both subtitles as a whole that the use of the verb “to have” with “person” as its subject and either “an adult child” or “a parent or parents” as its objects describes the relationship of parent and child. The “person who has an adult child,” referred to in § 97, is a person who stands in the relation of parent to the “adult child.” The person who has a “parent or parents” in § 104 stands in the relation of child to the parent or parents. Thus, § 97’s use of the term, “person,” is not limited to one who has the “care, custody and possession” of the adult child as those terms are used in § 96 and as suggested by the dissent.4 Indeed, when Chapter 113 of the Acts of 1947 brought § 97 into the Maryland Code the Act was described *613by its title as one “relating to the support of destitute adult children by their parents.”
One significant difference between the statutes relating to the support by financially able parents of destitute and disabled adult children, at the time of their enactment in 1947, and the then subtitle relating to the support of destitute and disabled parents by their financially able children is that the introductory section of the latter was limited to “[a]ny adult person ... having a parent or parents____” (Emphasis added.) See Md.Code (1939), Art. 27, § 98. By Chapter 36 of the Acts of 1952 the limitation, “adult,” was deleted from that section which is presently § 104. The deletion expanded § 104 to impose the duty to support destitute parents on their minor children in addition to their adult children, when, in either instance, the children were financially capable of doing so. This 1952 expansion by the General Assembly of the statute dealing with support of the preceding generation by the succeeding generation strongly indicates that the 1947 parallel statute dealing with support by the preceding generation of incapacitated adults of the succeeding generation should not be forced into a restricted construction. The plain meaning of “adult child ... unable to support himself by reason of mental or physical infirmity” includes Janette. Section 97 is not limited exclusively to the child who has chronologically reached the age of majority, who suffers from a disability incurred during minority and extending uninterruptedly beyond the age of majority, and who thereby has not, as a technical legal matter, been emancipated.
There are statutes other than those in Art. 27 which impose on a parent the duty to support a child, and our interpretation of the scope of §§ 97-103 may be tested against them in an effort to discern a consistent policy, if any. Currently such statutes include those dealing with the expense of patients in state hospitals, with paternity, and with marital property. At the time present Art. 27, § 97 was enacted the hospital reimbursement statutes seem to have been construed to include incapacitated, but previously *614emancipated, adult children within the parents’ support duty. The later enacted paternity and marital property statutes reflect the same policy.
In 1947 obligations to reimburse for the care of inmates in state psychiatric hospitals and in chronic disease hospitals were imposed by Md.Code (1989, 1947 Cum.Supp.), Art. 59, title, “Lunatics and Insane,” subtitle, “Lunatic or Insane Paupers.” In that subtitle § 4 placed liability on “a father or mother, or both for a son or daughter ____” With respect to chronic disease hospitals, Md.Code (1947 Supp.), Art. 43, “Health,” § 528 provided that “there shall be collected from the patient or his family as much of the actual cost of maintenance as is reasonably possible ....” Chapter 509 of the Acts of 1949 expanded on this theme by providing for investigation of the financial condition of “persons legally chargeable” with the patient’s support. See Md.Code (1951), Art. 43, § 562(a). These provisions for reimbursement of psychiatric and chronic disease hospital costs were construed to apply to the parents of adult children. This is demonstrated by the amendments to both statutes effected by Chapter 164 of the Acts of 1964 which limited the parental obligation to make reimbursement toward the cost of care rendered to a son or daughter to cases where the children were under twenty-one years of age. In the title to Chapter 164 the General Assembly stated its purpose to be “to remove the liability of parents for payment toward the cost of care of their adult children____”
These provisions are today Md.Code (1982), §§ 16-101(f)(2) and 16-102(a) of the Health General Article which incorporate the present age of majority. While the policy was changed in 1964 with respect to health care reimbursement, no comparable change was or has since been made to the dependent adult children subtitle of Art. 27.
Disputed paternity and the obligation to support illegitimate children were litigated in 1947 under former Art. 12, title, “Bastardy and Fornication,” of Md.Code (1939, 1947 Cum.Supp.). A civil procedure for determining paternity and enforcing support was substituted by Chapter 722 of *615the Acts of 1963. See Md.Code (1957, 1981 Repl.Vol., 1983 Cum.Supp.), Art. 16, §§ 66A to 66P. Section 66H(a)(l) provides that the equity court may order the declared father to pay a certain sum for the support and maintenance of the child
“until the child reaches the age of 18 years, dies, marries or becomes self-supporting, whichever event first occurs. However, if the child, having reached 18 years of age, is destitute of means and unable to support himself by reason of mental or physical infirmity, the court may require payments to be made or continued during the continuance of the mental or physical infirmity.”
We do not believe that this language necessarily applies only when the incapacity occurred prior to reaching eighteen years of age. First, the expression “having reached 18 years of age” is applicable to a nineteen year old as well as an eighteen year old. Had the legislature intended to implement an emancipation rationale, they could have simply and clearly stated instead: “upon reaching 18 years of age____” Further, in our view this provision is not limited only to a continuing incapacitation situation because the legislature did not limit the power of the court to continuing existing payments, but rather, provided that the court could require “payments to be made or continued.” (Emphasis added.)
The most recent expression by the General Assembly in a somewhat analogous area is under the Marital Property Act, Md.Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), §§ 3-6A-01 to 3-6A-08 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That statute employs the term “minor child” in defining a “family home” which is the subject of special provisions in § 3-6A-06. Under the Marital Property Act a “ ‘[mjinor child’ includes a child 18 years of age or older who, because of mental or physical disability, is dependent upon a parent.” § 3-6A-01(d). Once again, the General Assembly has not indicated any intention to restrict this definition to a child who is unemancipated because of continuing disability.
*616In sum, most of the analogous statutes are consistent with our interpretation of the “Destitute Children” subtitle of Art. 27. In any event, these statutes fail to reflect any definite and consistent policy which is contrary to our interpretation and which might otherwise justify placing a very restrictive construction on the plain language of Art. 27, § 97.
We also note that the Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers, Inc., Estate Planning for Families with Handicapped Dependents 332-333 (1983) advises practitioners that transfers by a parent to a child generally are not taxable as gifts so long as they are in satisfaction of a legal obligation to support the child. Then, citing Smith v. Smith, supra, 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 and Art. 27, § 97 it is stated that “[i]n Maryland, the parents of an adult disabled child do have an obligation of support,” without limiting the statement to the adult child who is unemancipated because of continuing disability.
Finally, in consideration of the dissent in the instant case we are presented with an extreme and emotional hypothetical to support appellant’s view. But this Court decides actual cases, not hypotheticals. We could easily imagine a hypothetical that would have absurd results under an emancipation rationale approach. For instance, a man’s two daughters, one age 17, the other age 18, are injured and paralyzed in the same car accident. The younger daughter can rely on her father’s support indefinitely, yet the eighteen year old daughter has no right to support. We reject the inequitable results that could follow from the appellant’s approach. We prefer to await an actual case and decide it, and distinguish it if appropriate, at that time.
In the instant case we are concerned with the plight of Janette Sininger. We believe that the vast majority of married parents would care and support a mentally disabled twenty-three year old daughter. Indeed, in this case Janette’s mother has taken Janette into her care to care for her; it would be no different if the Siningers remained *617married. The rights of a child should not be made to suffer from her parents’ divorce. Washburn, Post-Majority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 Temp.L.Q. 319, 345 (1971). Under the appellant’s approach, Janette would so suffer.
Janette’s case illustrates the difficulty of the emancipation rationale in cases of mental, rather than physical disability. Unlike physical injuries, mental disabilities often develop over time. The evidence in the instant case traced the roots of Janette’s mental disability into her childhood. Yet, her mental difficulties, though present all along, did not become disabling, according to the master’s finding, until after she passed the age of majority. Although she has suffered all along, her father is freed from any obligation to support her because the master found that her sufferings did not disable her until after her twenty-first birthday. Under the emancipation rationale we can imagine two twenty-three year olds, both incapacitated, one incapacitated for five years (after majority), the other for six years (before majority). The result is that one is entitled to support and the other is not. The arbitrary age chosen for the age of majority should not override the clear policy expressed in plain language by the legislature in Art. 27, § 97. We cannot accept the inconsistency and inequity that would follow from applying an emancipation rationale as urged by appellant.
Therefore, we hold that the instant case is within the ambit of Smith v. Smith, 227 Md. 355, 176 A.2d 862 (1962);5 *618the parental duty to support an adult incapacitated child existed in this case regardless of the child’s emancipation. The duty is enforceable under the general equity jurisdiction of the circuit court under § 3-602(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Md.Code (1974, 1980 Repl.Vol., 1983 Cum.Supp.).
In view of our holding we need not address appellee’s contention that the circuit court was clearly erroneous in finding that the child was not disabled until after she reached the age of majority. The distinction between when the onset of illness occurs and when the illness becomes disabling is irrelevant under our holding.
Appellee also contended on her cross-appeal that the sum awarded, and the retroactive date set, by the circuit court were clearly erroneous. Upon reviewing the considerations and decisions made by the domestic relations master, and accepted by the circuit court, we cannot say that the findings were clearly erroneous.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. TWO-THIRDS OF THE COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT/CROSS APPELLEE; ONE-THIRD OF THE COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT.
APPENDIX
Destitute Children
§ 97. Failure of parent to support destitute adult child.
Any person who has an- adult child destitute of means and unable to support himself by reason of mental or physical infirmity, who is possessed of or able to earn means sufficient to provide such child with necessary shelter, food, care and clothing and who neglects or refuses so to do, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
Destitute Parents
§ 104. Failure of children to sup- • port destitute parents.
Any person having a parent or parents within this State, such parent or parents being destitute of means of subsistence and unable either by reason of old age, infirmity or illness to support himself or herself, who is possessed of or able to earn means sufficient to provide such parent or parents with necessary shelter, food, care and clothing, and neglects or refuses so to do, shall, upon conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction in any court of the State having original jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $500.00 or imprisonment in the Maryland House of Correction for not more than one year, or both, in the discretion of the court.
*619§ 98. Oath by child; procedure against parent.
(a) Whenever any child destitute of means of subsistence and unable either by reason of mental or physical infirmity to support himself shall, in writing under oath filed with a State’s Attorney (the term State’s Attorney as used in this subtitle includes deputy State’s Attorney or assistant State’s Attorney acting under authority given by the State’s Attorney) accuse his parent of being possessed of or able to earn means sufficient to provide him with necessary shelter, food, care and clothing and has failed to do so, the State’s Attorney may require witnesses other than the parent accused to appear before him for such examination of witnesses as may be deemed in the public interest. After such examination or inquiry the State’s Attorney may file an information in the circuit court of the county against the accused parent charging him with the offense of nonsupport.
(b) Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent the State’s Attorney, if he sees fit, from submitting any such nonsupport case to the grand jury, as in other criminal cases, for such action as it may deem proper, instead of proceeding by way of information.
§ 99. Inquiry by State’s Attorney; disobedience to subpoena, etc.
The State’s Attorney may, for the purpose of facilitating the handling of such cases, issue subpoenas and summonses requiring the personal attendance of any person, firm, corporation or association, other than the accused parent, to give testimony in connection with such examination or inquiry, or requiring the production of any and all documentary matter in connection with such examination or inquiry. The State’s Attorney may also administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses and receive evidence. In the
§ 105. Oath by parent; procedure against child.
(a) Whenever any parent destitute of means of subsistence and unable either by reason of old age, infirmity or illness to support himself or herself shall in writing under oath filed with a State’s Attorney (the term State’s Attorney as used in this subtitle includes deputy State’s Attorney or assistant State’s Attorney acting under authority given by the State’s Attorney) accuse his or her adult child of being possessed of or able to earn means sufficient to provide such parent with necessary shelter, food, care and clothing and has failed to do so, the State’s Attorney may require witnesses other than the child accused to appear before him for such examination of witnesses as may be deemed in the public interest. After such examination or inquiry the State’s Attorney may file an information in the circuit court of the county against the accused child charging him with the offense of nonsupport.
(b) Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent the State’s Attorney, if he sees fit, from submitting any such nonsupport case to the grand jury, as in other criminal cases, for such action as it may deem proper, instead of proceeding by way of information.
§ 106. Inquiry by State’s Attorney; disobedience to subpoena, etc.
The State’s Attorney may, for the purpose of facilitating the handling of such cases, issue subpoenas and summonses requiring the personal attendance of any person, firm, corporation or association, other than the accused child, to give testimony in connection with such examination or inquiry, or requiring the production of any and all documentary matter in connection with such examination or inquiry. The State’s Attorney may also administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses and receive evidence. In case of *620case of disobedience to a subpoena or summons, or the contumacy of a witness appearing before him, the State’s Attorney may invoke the aid of the circuit court of the county; and the court may thereupon issue an order requiring the person, firm, corporation or association, to obey the subpoena or summons and to give testimony and to produce any and all documentary matter deemed necessary by said court for such investigation or inquiry. In case any person, firm, corporation or association refuse to obey such an order of the court after the same has been served on the witness, such person, firm, corporation or association shall be deemed in contempt of court and shall be punished therefor, subject to the right to appeal as now provided or hereafter regulated.
§ 100. Notice to parent accused by information.
The parent accused or about to be accused of nonsupport by an information filed by a State’s attorney shall be notified by the State’s attorney in writing of: (1) the time and place of hearing in the examination or inquiry, (2) the right of such parent to appear at such hearings and to produce such evidence or information touching upon said investigation as he may desire, and (3) the right of such parent to testify in his own behalf before the State’s attorney, provided he notifies the State’s attorney of his desire to do so and signs a written waiver to the effect that any testimony which he may give may be used against him in the event that he is tried on any information or indictment that may be brought against him.
§ 101. Payments for support; bond.
Whenever a parent accused of nonsupport, after proceedings before a State’s attorney, shall consent thereto in writing, or whenever upon failure to give such consent such parent shall be found guilty, the court shall issue an order directing such parent: disobedience to a subpoena or summons, or the contumacy of a witness appearing before him, the State’s Attorney may invoke the aid of the circuit court of the county; and the court may thereupon issue an order requiring the person, firm, corporation or association, to obey the subpoena or summons and to give testimony and to produce any and all documentary matter deemed necessary by said court for such investigation or inquiry. In case any person, firm, corporation or association refuse to obey such an order of the court after the same has been served on the witness, such person, firm, corporation or association shall be deemed in contempt of court and shall be punished therefor, subject to the right to appeal as now provided or hereafter regulated.
§ 107. Notice to child accused by information.
The child accused or about to be accused of nonsupport by an information filed by a State’s attorney shall be notified by the State’s attorney in writing of: (1) the time and place of hearing in the examination or inquiry, (2) the right of such child to appear at such hearings and to produce such evidence or information touching upon said investigation as he may desire, and (3) the right of such child to testify in his own behalf before the State’s attorney, provided he notifies the State’s attorney of his desire to do so and signs a written waiver to the effect that any testimony which he may give may be used against him in the event that he is tried on any information or indictment that may be brought against him.
§ 108. Payments for support; bond.
Whenever a child accused of nonsupport, after proceedings before a State’s attorney, shall • consent thereto in writing, or whenever upon failure to give such consent such child shall be found guilty, the court shall issue an order directing such child:
*621(1) To pay for the maintenance and support of said child, or to pay an equal sum to the county or to the City of Baltimore, as the case may be, if said child be a public charge, during the life of said child or until the child is possessed of other means of adequate support. The sum to be paid may be agreed upon, if consent proceedings be had, or in the absence of agreement, such sum as the court may fix, with due regard to the circumstances of the accused parent, and
(2) To give bond to the State of Maryland in such penalty as the court may fix, with good and sufficient securities, conditioned on making the payments required by the court’s order, or any amendments thereof. Failure to give such bond shall be punished by commitment in the jail until said bond be given, but not exceeding one year.
§ 102. Release of parent on probation; recognizance.
Instead of imposing the punishment for failure to give bond, the court may, in its discretion and'with due regard to the financial ability of the accused parent, release such parent from custody on probation for the period during which the accused shall be required to make payments, upon his entering into a recognizance in such sum as the court shall direct, with or without securities. The condition of the recognizance shall be such that if the accused parent shall make his personal appearance at the court whenever ordered to do so within the period during which he shall be required to make such payments, and shall further comply with the terms of the order, or of any subsequent modification thereof, then the recognizance shall be void, otherwise of full force and effect. If the court be satisfied by information and due proof under oath that the accused has violated the terms of such order, it may forthwith proceed to impose sentence under the original conviction of failure to give
(1) To pay for the maintenance and support of said parent, or to pay an equal sum to the county or to the City of Baltimore, as the case may be, if said parent be a public charge, during the life of said parent or until the parent is possessed of other means of adequate support. The sum to be paid may be agreed upon, if consent proceedings be had, or in the absence of agreement, such sum as the court may fix, with due regard to the circumstances of the accused child, and
(2) To give bond to the State of Maryland in such penalty as the court may fix, with good and sufficient securities, conditioned on making the payments required by the court’s order, or any amendments thereof. Failure to give such bond shall be punished by commitment in the jail or the house of correction until said bond be given, but not exceeding one year.
§ 109. Release of child on probation; recognizance.
Instead of imposing the punishment for failure to give bond, the court may, in its discretion and with due regard to the financial ability of the accused child, release such child from custody on probation for the period during which the accused shall be required to make payments, upon his or her entering into a recognizance in such sum as the court shall direct, with or without securities. The condition of the recognizance shall be such that if the accused child shall make his personal appearance at the court whenever ordered to do so within the period during which he shall be required to make such payments, and shall further comply with the terms of the order, or of any subsequent modification thereof, then the recognizance shall be void, otherwise of full force and effect. If the court be satisfied by information and due proof under oath that the accused has violated the terms of such order, it may forthwith proceed to impose sentence under the original conviction of failure to give *622bond. In the case of forfeiture of a recognizance and enforcement thereof by execution, the sum recovered may, in the discretion of the court, be paid, in whole or in part, to the child or to the county or to the City of Baltimore, as the case may be, if the child'be a public charge.
§ 103. Release from order, bond, etc.
Upon the death of the child or the parent, or upon the child securing other adequate means of support, or upon the parent becoming unable to earn or losing possession of means sufficient to provide support for the child, the parent and his sureties shall be released from the terms of any court order rendered and of any bond or recognizance given. bond. In the case of forfeiture of a recognizance and enforcement thereof by execution, the sum recovered may, in the discretion of the court, be paid, in whole or in part, to the parent or to the county or to the City of Baltimore, as the case may be, if the parent be a public charge.
§ 110. Release from order, bond, etc.
Upon the death of the parent or the child, or upon the parent securing other adequate means of support, or upon the child becoming unable to earn or losing possession of means sufficient to provide support for the parent, the child and his sureties shall be released from the terms of any court order rendered and of any bond or recognizance given.
. See Maryland Code (1957, 1981 Repl.Vol.), Article 1, § 24. Legislative change of age of majority is to be construed prospectively only (from July 1, 1973). Monticello v. Monticello, 271 Md. 168, 315 A.2d 520, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880, 95 S.Ct. 145, 42 L.Ed.2d 121 (1974) (applied to child support agreement).
. The section provides:
"§ 3-602. Custody, guardianship, maintenance, and support of child.
(a) Jurisdiction of courts of equity.—A court of equity has jurisdiction over the custody, guardianship, legitimation, maintenance, visitation and support of a child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the court may:
(3) Decide who shall be charged with the support and maintenance of a child, pendente lite or permanently;
*608Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), Cts. & Jud.Proc. Article, § 3-602(a).
. The Court's opinion in Smith indicates only that the child in question was an adult, and was incapacitated, but the opinion does not indicate expressly when his incapacitation occurred. In his brief, appellant confuses the incapacitated son with another son, nineteen years old, who was involved in a separate issue. We can infer from the opinion that the case did involve a child incapacitated during his minority because the court did not address the issue presented here today. The briefs in the Smith case confirm this inference. The adult *611son was afflicted with epilepsy at age six and had additional psychological problems. Appendix to Appellant’s Brief at E. 9, Smith, supra. Also, we note that the appellee in Smith argued the theory that the obligation to support continues because an incapacitated child is incapable of becoming emancipated. Brief of Appellee at 11-13, Smith, supra.
. Art. 27, § 96 provides:
"Desertion or abandonment of child.
Any person having the care, custody or possession of any child under eighteen years of age, who shall desert or abandon such child with the intent that it shall become a public charge, or without making provision for its proper support and maintenance for a period of at least three years with some responsible person or institution duly authorized to take and care for infants, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor .... ”
Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.).
. We are aware of the decisions of other jurisdictions upon which appellant relies; however, the cases are not persuasive. In Pocialik v. Federal Cement Tile Co., 121 Ind.App. 11, 97 N.E.2d 360 (1951), the intermediate appellate court pointed out that there was no statute or decision of the state’s supreme court imposing an obligation on the parent. Thus, it is unlike the law of Maryland. We also note that the Indiana court cited our decision in Borchert, supra, which suggests that we should not be persuaded by Pocialik, 97 N.E.2d at 363. Appellant also relies upon Kruvant v. Kruvant, 100 N.J.Super. 107, 241 A.2d 259 (1968). We note the New Jersey intermediate appellate court also relied upon Borchert, supra, which in view of Smith v. Smith, supra, limits its applicability here.