dissenting.
In matters of statutory construction it is the duty of courts to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislative Branch. Beckham v. Board of Education, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575 (1994). In determining legislative intent it is proper to consider “the evil the law was intended to remedy. In determining whether a conflict exists between sections of a statute, a practical'result must be found.” Beach v. Commonwealth, Ky., 927 S.W.2d 826, 828 (1996). We are commanded by KRS 446.080(1) as follows:
All statutes of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the legislature, and the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall not apply to the statutes of this state.
In 1994 the General Assembly amended KRS 304.99-060 and provided criminal penalties for “[t]he owner or operator of any vehicle who fails to have in full force and effect the security required by Subtitle 39 of this chapter....” The amended version of the penalty statute is entirely consistent with KRS 304.39-010(1) which declares as a statutory purpose “To require owners, registrants and operators of motor vehicles in the Commonwealth to procure insurance_” There could be no rational reason for the General Assembly to have so amended KRS 304.99-*705060 adding operators of motor vehicles to the penalty provision, but an intent to impose criminal penalties upon operators as well as owners of uninsured motor vehicles. The failure of the General Assembly to have corrected KRS 304.89-080(5) to achieve consistency with its other amendment can only be explained by inadvertence.
If there was any doubt as to legislative intent or fair notice under the statute, I would join the majority. However, my review of the relevant statutes and our decision in Commonwealth v. Foley, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 947 (1990), leads me to the conclusion that legislative intent is clear and that fair notice has been given. Moreover, it is not unduly onerous to require one who drives a non-owned vehicle to ascertain from the owner whether there is in effect a policy of liability insurance. If such a person fails to correctly ascertain the insured status of the vehicle, he should not escape responsibility for his failure to have become so informed.
Mandatory liability insurance is a matter of fundamental public policy in Kentucky. It addresses “the evil” of financially irresponsible persons operating motor vehicles on the public highways. Beach v. Commonwealth, supra. Crenshaw v. Weinberg, Ky., 805 S.W.2d 129 (1991); Fann v. McGuffey, Ky., 534 S.W.2d 770 (1975). This Court has frequently refused to enforce policy provisions which invalidated required coverage. Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., Ky., 623 S.W.2d 865 (1981); Beacon Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., Ky., 795 S.W.2d 62 (1990). We should zealously enforce this recognized public policy and impose criminal sanctions upon persons who operate uninsured motor vehicles as provided in KRS 304.99-060.
WINTERSHEIMER, J„ joins this dissenting opinion.