This appeal is from a judgment and sentence of the circuit court which sentenced Nichols to a total of ten years as a result of his guilty plea to eleven counts of burglary.
The principal issue is whether it was reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to recuse himself from the sentencing hearing. Other issues raised are whether there was a procedural defect in the judgment of sentence; whether it was reversible error for the trial judge not to impose concurrent sentences; whether evidence derived from the failed plea bargain should have been excluded and whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
Nichols, while in jail in Ohio, volunteered information regarding a series of unsolved burglaries in Boyd and Greenup Counties, Kentucky. Nichols reached a plea agreement with the prosecution in all cases and the prosecutor recommended a sentence of five years on each of the eleven counts to run concurrently. Nichols appeared in Greenup Circuit Court on January 25,1989, and pled guilty to eleven counts of burglary in the second degree in violation of K.R.S. 511.030. He waived formal sentencing and requested to be sentenced immediately. The trial judge indicated that he was inclined to follow the recommendation of the prosecution.
However, before rendering sentence, the judge inquired of the prosecutor if the victims of the burglaries had been consulted in regard to the recommendation, and the prosecutor responded that he did not know. Upon learning that at least one of the victims had not been informed of the proceedings, the trial judge withdrew sentence and set the matter for trial. He advised the prosecution to contact the victims. Three of the eleven victims did not agree with the prosecutor’s recommendation. The Greenup County Jailer was one of the victims dissatisfied. These three cases were then sent to a jury only for the purpose of recommending sentence and not for any fact finding of guilt. The jury recommended five year concurrent sentences on the three offenses and indicated that the sentences were to run concurrently with the other eight charges. At final sentencing on May 24,1989, the trial judge ordered that the three counts run concurrently with each other but further ordered that those terms be served consecutively to the others for a total of ten years in prison. Nichols appealed the ten year sentence, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. This appeal followed.
Nichols argues that the trial judge should have recused himself because the sentence was motivated by the desire to please the local jailer. He maintains that there was clear bias on the part of the sentencing judge. He claimed that when the judge learned that one of the victims was the jailer, he allowed this person to object to the sentence. When the trial judge did render sentence, the final sentence was double the initial prosecution’s recommendation and contrary to the recommendation of the jury.
Nichols asserts that K.R.S. 26A.015(2)(a), (e) and SCR 4.300, Canon 3 C, provide that a judge is to disqualify himself in any proceeding where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party and that a judge should disqualify himself in any pro*265ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
The record indicates that the trial judge directed the prosecution to contact all the victims of the burglaries and not just the jailer. Our examination of the record agrees with the view of the Court of Appeals. The expression of the concern by the trial judge that the victims of the crimes be informed of the prosecution recommendation does not provide a basis for reversible error based on bias, prejudice or personal knowledge as contemplated by an automatic or statutory recusal in K.R.S. 26A.015(2)(a). Nichols could have sought disqualification of the sentencing judge pursuant to K.R.S. 26A.020(1) but did not. This statute provides a separate and distinct opportunity to a party who does not believe he or she will receive a fair and impartial trial. It allows a complaining party to file an affidavit with the circuit clerk who certifies the facts to the Chief Justice who then reviews the facts and determines whether to designate a special judge. When a party or counsel seeks to disqualify or recuse a judge from proceeding further in any matter, a motion can be filed with the judge under K.R.S. 26A.015 or an affidavit pursuant to K.R.S. 26A.020. It would also appear that an aggrieved party can do either or both.
Clearly the record does indicate that the trial judge was concerned about the views of the victims, including the County Jailer. The trial judge said, “Well, I certainly don’t want Mr. Salmons to be mad at the judge. If he, the jailer, thinks he ought to have more ... I’m not going to give him more. I’m going to give him a fair trial.”
K.R.S. 421.500 provides that victims of crimes have a right to make an impact statement for consideration by the court at the time of the defendant’s sentencing. The county jailer, who is a victim of crime, has as much right as anyone to make such an impact statement regardless of his official position. The language of the trial judge does not provide a basis for personal bias. The comments of the trial judge were a proper expression of the requirement for notification to all crime victims of their right to express an opinion on a sentencing proceeding. The statement, “I don’t want him mad at me,” should not be unduly expanded in such a context.
The mere fact that the jury recommended this sentence on three offenses which it heard and expressed a desire that all the sentences should be run concurrently is not controlling. A jury recommendation regarding whether sentences shall be served concurrently or consecutively pursuant to K.R.S. 532.055(2) is not mandatory or binding on a trial judge. Dotson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 930 (1987).
The contention that the proceedings on January 25, 1989 amounted to a formal sentencing is without merit. There was no final order entered as a result of that hearing. The judgment on a plea and sentencing by a jury and final sentencing order was signed June 15, 1989 and entered June 20, 1989. It was from this document that the notice of appeal was filed on June 21.
His third argument is that the trial judge was required to impose the concurrent sentence recommended by the jury. Nichols claims that he relied to his detriment on assurances of the trial judge that it would impose whatever the jury recommended. A careful examination of the record does not indicate that any such promise was ever made by the trial judge. Under any circumstances, the trial judge was not required to follow the jury’s recommendation regarding sentences. Cf Dotson, supra.
The authorities presented by Nichols are unconvincing. Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 360 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Reyes, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 62 (1969) are factually distinguishable. A review of the record does not indicate that the trial judge misled the defendant in any way, and that the trial judge was not a party to the plea agreement because the prosecution arranged the bargain in this case.
A fair and careful reading of the comments by the trial judge in this case does not indicate that he committed himself to be bound in any way by the recommenda*266tion of the jury. There is no possibility that this case could be interpreted that the judge made a promise that he would be required to fulfill similar to Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 760 S.W.2d 84 (1988).
Nichols next maintains that evidence should have been suppressed because the movant did not receive the sentence he bargained for. A careful review of the entire record shows that Nichols assumed the risk of his own multi-sentence imprisonment. The prosecution never wavered in its recommendation to the trial judge which was all that Nichols could possibly negotiate. The prosecution could not bind the trial judge in any way. There is no merit to this argument.
The final issue raised by Nichols is that the sentence was an improper unconstitutional abuse of discretion by the trial judge. This argument also has no merit. The trial judge has discretion to determine whether multiple sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively. K.R.S. 532.-110(1). The basis for the argument by Nichols is that the sentencing statutes for felonies made no provision for the consideration of a statement by the victim. However, K.R.S. 421.500 and 421.520 authorize such a victim impact statement.
The Commonwealth throughout its appellate brief argues that counsel for Nichols has failed to observe CR 76.-12(4)(c)(iv) in regard to the required statement about preservation of error. We must admonish appellate counsel to comply with all the rules of this Court regarding the presentation of appellate briefs and in particular with the requirements of the rule to state whether the question has been properly preserved for appellate review. However it should be noted that in regard to the argument regarding recusal, it is not required to preserve the error as noted in Commonwealth v. Carter, Ky., 701 S.W.2d 409 (1985). Also see Small v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 617 S.W.2d 61 (1981) in this regard.
It is the holding of this Court that the circuit judge was not required to sua sponte recuse himself pursuant to K.R.S. 26A.015. There was no reversible error in the imposition of sentence in this case.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
LAMBERT, REYNOLDS, SPAIN and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. COMBS, J., dissents by separate opinion in which STEPHENS, C.J., and LEIBSON, J., join.