OPINION
PER CURIAM.This case involves the liability of a police officer, and the City by which he is employed, where injury or death arises out of a police pursuit of a suspected law violator.
Carlis Ray Kennedy sustained fatal injuries when the pickup truck he was driving was struck by an automobile driven by Richard L. Thomas, who was at the time being pursued by a police cruiser driven by Officer Clyde Henderson. Suit was brought by the next of kin of Mr. Kennedy against Richard Thomas, Officer Henderson, and the City of Spring City, Tennessee, the employer of Mr. Henderson.
After a non jury trial, the trial judge awarded plaintiffs a judgment against all defendants in the amount of $100,000.00. This judgment was affirmed on appeal of the City of Spring City and Officer Henderson.
The tragedy occurred at approximately 9:00 p.m., on April 16, 1986, on U.S. Highway 27 in Rhea County near the Spring City city limits. Earlier that day, Thomas had stolen an automobile in Georgia, and he and a fourteen year old female companion were driving north to an unknown destination. When they reached Rhea County, near Dayton, Tennessee, a deputy sheriff attempted to stop the Thomas automobile for speeding. Thomas refused to stop and wrecked the automobile he was driving in the chase that followed. Thomas and his companion fled on foot. Shortly thereafter, they were seen stealing a second automobile. The theft was reported immediately. Officer Henderson, the only police officer on patrol duty in Spring City, was alerted by radio dispatches of the theft, the description of the automobile and its occupants, the license number of the stolen automobile, and the fact that the stolen automobile was last seen moving north-wardly on U.S. Highway 27 toward Spring City.
Officer Henderson parked his police cruiser perpendicular to the highway so that he could view passing automobiles. He observed an automobile of the general description of the stolen automobile pass and stop behind an automobile at a traffic signal in Spring City. Officer Henderson pulled onto the highway with one automobile between him and the suspected stolen *165automobile. Thomas drove to the next traffic light and stopped. The automobile behind Thomas moved into the left turn lane, placing the police cruiser directly behind Thomas. Officer Henderson verified the automobile license number as being that of the stolen automobile, notified the dispatcher of this fact and of his intention to stop Thomas. When the traffic signal turned green, Officer Henderson turned on the blue lights on the police cruiser as a signal to Thomas to pull over. Thomas sped up, passed a pickup truck by using the center turn lane and proceeded to run a red light at the next intersection. Officer Henderson then turned on his siren, and set out in pursuit of Thomas. He notified his dispatcher of the pursuit and requested the dispatcher to notify the adjacent county for assistance; however, the nearest officer to assist in Roane County was twenty-five miles away. Officer Henderson pursued the Thomas automobile “less than a mile,” when the Thomas automobile entered a “slight curve”, crossed the center line of the highway and hit the Kennedy pickup truck head-on. U.S. Highway 27 was straight from the point where Thomas ran the red light until the point of impact. The vehicles passed no traffic either way from the time the pursuit began until the collision between the Thomas and Kennedy vehicles.
. Officer Henderson did not know the speed he was driving in the chase. He testified that before the collision he had “started dropping back”, explaining that “[w]ell, he wasn’t stopping_there was not any point in staying on his bumper if he wasn’t going to stop.”
Mr. Thomas testified that his automobile reached a speed of eighty-five miles per hour at one point in the chase. He also testified that he wrecked because the steering on the stolen automobile “wasn’t too good,” he was not an experienced driver, and just “couldn’t steer it.” The record shows that the steering and brakes on the stolen automobile were in good condition.
Dr. George Kirkham, an associate professor in the School of Criminology at Florida State University, testified that “a solo officer should never attempt the apprehension of a felony suspect in a vehicle situation, without obtaining additional assistance from other law enforcement personnel and without, where possible, planning the location, the time of the particular stop to be made.” He reasoned that the fleeing felon would be more likely to flee where he knew that only one officer was in pursuit than he would if he was confronting more than one officer. He also testified that there was “no exigent circumstance that would warrant a deviation or departure from this well established procedure.”
Trooper Fred T. Ewton, who investigated the accident, testified he would want assistance from another officer in making a felony stop, and would not have initiated emergency equipment without such assistance. He did admit, however, that he had made solo felony arrests.
Both lower courts found that Officer Henderson was negligent in commencing pursuit, pointing out that there was no apparent danger to the public through the operation of the fleeing automobile prior to Officer Henderson’s attempting to make an arrest. As the Court of Appeals put it,
the evidence establishes the officer knew or reasonably should have known that the felon who had just wrecked another vehicle in a high speed chase would again resist arrest by fleeing in a dangerous manner. Moreover, the officer, by electing to attempt the arrest with this knowledge in violation of accepted police standards for a felony arrest in an area where others would likely be, amounted to “a reckless disregard for the safety of others.” T.C.A. § 55-8-108.
T.C.A. § 55-8-108(e), which became effective the day before the accident that is the basis of this action occurred, expressly provides that:
The fact that law enforcement personnel pursue an actual or suspected violator of a law or ordinance who flees from such pursuit shall not render the law enforcement personnel, or his or their employers, liable for injuries to a third party proximately caused by the fleeing party unless the law enforcement personnel *166were negligent in his or their conduct and such negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries to the third party.
There was no showing of negligence on the part of Officer Henderson in the operation of his automobile. In Nevill v. City of Tullakoma, 756 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn.1988), decided before the above statute became effective, we held that the mere decision of a police officer to pursue a lawbreaker could not be the basis for imposing liability on the officer for the acts of the pursued lawbreaker. As pointed out in that opinion:
The duty of police officers is to enforce the law and to make arrests in proper case, not to allow one being pursued to escape because of the fear that the flight may take a course that is dangerous to the public at large.
The opposite would, we think, be an unnecessary restriction on the ability of police officers to carry out their duties. In every ease where a police officer sought to stop a motorist for a traffic violation [or to make a felony arrest], it would become a jury question whether the act of the officer was the proximate cause of any harm the motorist might cause in trying to avoid arrest. In our judgment any police officer would hesitate to make an arrest involving a moving automobile within or close to a city for fear that the subject being arrested would flee and cause harm to others for which the officer might be held responsible.
The Court also agreed with the quoted statement from Reed v. City of Winter Park, 253 So.2d 475, 477 (Fla.App.1971),
... that in pursuit of an escaping offender, a police officer who operates his vehicle with due care (in light of the standard by which his conduct should be judged) is not responsible for the acts of the pursued offender, although the pursuit may have contributed to the reckless driving of the pursued since the officer is not obliged to allow him to escape.
Under the Nevill decision, and in light of the standard of care set forth in T.C.A. § 55-8-108(e), we find no basis for holding Officer Henderson and his employer, the City of Spring City, liable for damages for the death of Mr. Kennedy. The sole proximate cause of the accident and the resulting death was the negligence of Richard Thomas.
The judgment of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is reversed, and the cause is dismissed. Costs will be paid by the appellee, and her surety.
DROWOTA, C.J., dissents.