concurring on motion for rehearing.
For a contract of employment to be created, the employer must unequivocally indicate a definite intent to be bound not to terminate the employee except únder clearly specified circumstances. See Montgomery County Hosp. Dist v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex.1998). An employee who has no formal agreement with his employer cannot construct one out of indefinite comments, encouragements, or assurances. See id. Therefore, an employer’s statement that an employee will not be discharged as long as his work is satisfactory or that the employee would be discharged only for good cause do not manifest a definite intent not to terminate an employee under clearly specified circumstances because there is no agreement as to what “satisfactory” or “good cause” encompasses. See id.
Importantly, however, the fact that the particular statements addressed in Brown were not, as a matter of law, sufficiently specific to create a contract does not change the general rule that whether an agreement was reached by the parties is a question of fact where the existence of the agreement is disputed. See, e.g., Preston Farm, & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. BioZyme Enterprises, 625 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Tex.1981); State BaR of Texas Pattern Jury Charges — Business, Consumer & Employment PJC 101.1, 101.3 (1997) (jury question and instruction on existence of agreement). In this case, Miksch’s affidavit attached to her summary judgment response states that she specifically asked her supervisor, Mize, whether her husband’s operation of a Chevron station would pose any problem with her position at Exxon. The affidavit further states that Mize told her that the operation of the Chevron station “would not be a problem at all” and that Mikseh understood from this that Mize was speaking on behalf of Exxon and that he had thereby agreed that Exxon would not object to any conflict of interest arising from her husband’s operation of the Chevron station.
Unlike the situation in Brown, there is no lack of specificity here. The only circumstance to which Mize’s alleged statement eould pertain is the application of Exxon’s conflict policy to the operation of the service station by Miksch’s husband. In that regard, reasonable minds could differ as to whether, under the circumstances in which it was made, Mize’s alleged statement conveyed an intent to contractually bind Exxon to waive its conflict policy. Because a fact issue therefore remains in this ease whether the alleged actions of the parties created an agreement to modify their employment relationship, summary judgment eould not properly be granted on that claim for lack of specificity.