(dissenting).
Appellant made a prima facie case by introducing a copy of the Arizona judgment at trial. Hamilton v. Newberry, 412 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Civ.App.1967, writ ref. n.r.e.). There is a presumption that this judgment was valid, and this presumption was not rebutted. Roberts v. Hodges, 401 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Civ.App.1966, writ ref. n.r.e.). Therefore, I would hold that appellant is entitled to have her judgment enforced under the full faith and credit clause, Section 1, Article IV of the Constitution of the United States.
I would also hold the “minimum contacts” theory applicable for in personam jurisdiction in matters arising out of the marriage relationship. Mizner v. Mizner, 84 Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679 (1968) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847, 89 S.Ct. 130, 21 L.Ed.2d 1117 (1968); Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal.App. 2d 443, 14 Cal.Rptr. 417 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 985, 82 S.Ct. 600, 7 L.Ed.2d 523 (1962); Scott v. Hall, 203 Kan. 331, 454 P.2d 449 (1969); Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis.2d 659, 176 N.W.2d 362 (1970); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okl.1970); Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656 (1971). There is little doubt under the record before us that the Arizona court had the required jurisdiction under the “minimum contacts” doctrine.
In any event, I am convinced that the majority are in error in holding that only that part of the military retirement benefits which accrued while the parties were living as man and wife in community property states is subject to division as community property. These benefits vested when the parties retired in á community property state. The appellant then became entitled to her portion of that part of the interest in the retirement plan which was earned while the parties were man and wife. Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660 (Tex.Civ.App.1968, writ dism’d); Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.Civ.App.1960, no writ); Wilkerson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 44 T.C. 718 (1965), aff’d 368 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1966); Busby v. Busby, 439 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.Civ.App.1969), aff’d 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1970).
I would grant appellant’s motion for rehearing, reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment enforcing the Arizona decree and judgment for arrears in alimony. Should I err as to the enforceability of the Arizona judgment, I would render judgment awarding appellant one-half interest in that part of appellee’s military retirement which was earned while the parties were man and wife.