concurring and dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s conclusion there was not an actual conflict of interest. However, for the following reasons I join the judgment.
I.
After the prosecution rested its case-in-chief, counsel for appellant revealed the plea negotiations to the trier of fact, in this case the judge. Counsel made it clear that the plea negotiations were being revealed to protect herself from any possible future action by appellant.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’m Barbra Sla-vin. I’m the court-appointed defense attorney. For purposes of perfecting the record as to my representation and prior plea negotiations, I’m going to ask Mr. Monreal some questions relating to the previous plea bargaining negotiations.
Mr. Monreal, in late May of 1992, do you recall contacting me by phone indicating you were, for lack of better words, fairly stressed out and anxious to get out—
A: Yes, I was very anxious.
*566Q: —out of jail? At that time, did you ask me to try and negotiate a plea bargain in your behalf?
A: Well, we had a misunderstanding, Barbra. We were supposed to have trial already, and I wanted to come to trial as soon as possible.
Q: Right. But in lieu of the fact that there had been two and three month intervals between trial settings, did you not indicate that if I could get it reduced to something like eight years and getting rid of the aggravated and repeater counts, that you might consider the plea agreement?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Okay. And did you not come to the courtroom of Master Andrew Carruth-ers, which was in this same building, on June the 10th, 1992? Do you recall that?
$ * * * * *
A: Yes.
Q: And at that time, were you told that an offer had been made by [the State] to reduce the offense to indecency with a child, dropping the aggravated portions and removing the repeater count?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And you did understand that you could have pled that day and gotten that plea bargain?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
By abandoning, in the middle of trial, the interests of her client to protect herself against some future action by appellant, counsel demonstrated an actual conflict of interest. To hold otherwise is sheer folly.
II.
The question now becomes whether the standard of Cuyler or Strickland is appropriate in this case. Cuyler, traditionally, has been the standard in conflict of interest cases dealing with multiple representation. See, James v. State, 763 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex.Cr. App.1989); and, Perillo v. State, 758 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). In Beets v. Collins, 986 F.2d 1478, 1483 (5th Cir.1993), the Fifth Circuit stated, “although Cuyler involved a situation of multiple representation, the Court’s opinion did not purport to limit its discussion of conflicts of interest to circumstances involving multiple representation.” Id., at 1483.1
In Beets, the Court was faced with an attorney who represented the defendant, and was a possible witness in her ease. Beets alleged this was a conflict of interest under Cuyler. The Court discussed the differences between Cuyler and Strickland:
... Cuyler sets a lower threshold for a sixth amendment violation (the ‘adverse effect’ test) where, in the case of multiple representation, one cannot know for sure what tactical decision counsel would have made absent the conflicting duties to clients. If the conflict existed only between the lawyer’s self interest and the defendant’s interest, however, the only relevant standard of harm is the effect of a decision on the defendant’s case; that effect can be measured by Strickland’s ‘prejudice’ standard. The Supreme Court will have to sort out this quandary.
Id., at 1484 (emphasis added). Finding the rationale of Beets persuasive, I would hold Strickland is the appropriate standard in the *567instant case.2
III.
I would apply Strickland to the instant case in the following manner. The first prong of Strickland was met when trial counsel demonstrated an actual conflict of interest by abandoning the interests of her client to protect herself against some future action by appellant.3 The effect of the conflict was to place before the fact finder evidence which is inadmissible under Tex.R.Crim.Evid. 410.4
Under the second prong, we must determine whether the conflict of interest undermines confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. In my opinion, the second prong is not met because the trial judge was the trier of fact. Trial judges are presumed to ignore inadmissible evidence. Kimithi v. State, 546 *568S.W.2d 323, 327 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).5 Additionally, trial judges understand a defendant may plead guilty for a reason other than guilt.
With these comments, I join only the judgment of the Court.
. This Court has recognized the Cuyler standard may be appropriate in a non-multiple representation case. In Cantu v. State, 930 S.W.2d 594, 599 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), in considering the representation of an attorney who had been suspended from the practice of law, we stated:
Of course, the particular circumstances surrounding an attorney's suspension or disbarment may give rise to an actual conflict of interest. See United States v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132 (3rd Cir.1980) (counsel who committed a crime entered into a plea bargain with the same U.S. attorney’s office and judge who participated in counsel’s client’s trial). However, such cases may generally be addressed under the standards formulated for conflicts of interest by the Supreme Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 259 (3rd Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 3477, 87 L.Ed.2d 613 *567(1985); Vance, 64 F.3d at 124-125, Mouzin, 785 F.2d at 699.
. In Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Cr.App.1986), the Strickland standard was adopted by this Court. A two-step analysis is required:
First, the reviewing court must decide whether trial counsel's performance failed to constitute "reasonably effective assistance.” Stated differently, the question is whether trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. If counsel's performance fell below the objective standard, the reviewing court must undertake the second step of determining whether there is a "reasonable probability" the result of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. A reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Ex parte Menchaca, 854 S.W.2d 128, 131 (Tex. Cr.App.1993).
See, Austin v. State, 934 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex.Cr. App.1996)
. Every criminal defense attorney is aware of the possibility of a subsequent claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In many cases these claims are not made until years after trial and appeal. Because of the awareness and delay, attorneys rightfully feel the necessity to document the effectiveness of their representation should a subsequent claim arise. There are many ways for this documentation to occur. Counsel could provide documentation by regular correspondence to the client notifying the client of the status of the case and the options available, and the responses from the client of which options to pursue. Or, counsel could prepare a statement, affidavit, recording or video tape, containing the actions taken by counsel and the reasons therefor and have the document signed, acknowledged, etc., by the client. If the documentation relates to the offer/acceptance of a plea bargain, this matter should be addressed when the plea bargain negotiations have broken down and the case is scheduled for trial. Moreover, these matters should never be made a part of the trial record. The discussions of whether to accept a plea bargain are confidential communication protected by the attorney/client privilege and, therefore, may not be disclosed to any third party, including the trial judge and/or court reporter, without the client’s permission. Tex. R.Crim.Evid. 503; Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949 (Tex.Cr.App. 1997).
In the instant case, had counsel documented her representation of appellant in any of the ways suggested above, she could have defended herself in the face of a subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the trier of fact would not have known appellant offered to plead guilty to a lesser included offense.
.Rule 410 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which was later withdrawn;
(2) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule II of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding a plea of guilty or nolo contendere which was later withdrawn; or
(3) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere or which result in a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere later withdrawn. However, such a statement is admissible in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it.
It is clear the exchange between appellant and Slavin was not admissible under Rule 410. The Fifth Circuit has established a two prong test to determine whether a discussion is a “plea negotiation” and therefore inadmissible under the rule: (1) whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion; and, (2) whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir.1978). Both prongs of this test have been met in the instant case. Therefore, the testimony elicited by appellant's counsel was expressly inadmissible before the fact finder.
. I am aware of our opinion in Gipson v. State, 844 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), which held Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(2) applies where the trial judge’s judgment was based upon inadmissible evidence. However, the instant case is distinguishable because there is no showing the trial judge considered the inadmissible evidence in determining appellant’s guilt or punishment whereas the trial judge in Gipson admitted she considered the inadmissible evidence. Id., 844 S.W.2d at 741.