concurring.
I join the majority opinion, subject to the observation that I have been in a minority position in a number of the background decisions. Thus, I remain circumspect about: reading Section 977 of the Election Code as sanctioning discretionary cost awards against candidates, see In re Nader, 588 Pa. 450, 468-70, 905 A.2d 450, 461-62 (2006) (Saylor, J., dissenting);1 the character, scope, and legal significance of the signature irregularities noted in the Nader matter, see In re Nader, 580 Pa. 134, 135-8 & n. 13, 860 A.2d 1, 1-10 & n. 13 (2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting); and the import of potential inferences which may be drawn from truly wide scale signature impro*571prieties in situations where these may be tied to the candidate himself. See In re Payton, 596 Pa. 469, 470-72, 945 A.2d 162, 168-64 (2008) (Saylor, J., concurring).
. Although this is not a case in which costs were assessed against a candidate, the mutuality reflected in the prevailing interpretation of Section 977 makes it necessary to consider the impact on the elective franchise in determining the appropriate judicial approach to costs awards.