OPINION BY
Judge McGINLEY.This is an appeal from an Adjudication and Order of the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner (Commissioner), dated February 16, 2010, which reversed the determination issued by the Insurance Department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Department) which held that State Farm Mutual Insurance Company’s (State Farm) nonrenewal of automobile *571insurance did not violate Act 68,1 the law governing nonrenewal of automobile insurance policies.
On April 9, 2009, State Farm issued a Notice of Cancellation to John B. Farley (Mr. Farley) and informed him that his private passenger automobile insurance policy would not be renewed because of the following accidents:
03/11/2009 Insured hit parked claimant. Property Damage — $394 Collision — $765 02/20/2009 Insured opened door into claimant.
Property Damage — $592
Notice of Cancellation (Notice), July 7, 2009, at 1.
Mr. Farley sought Departmental review of his nonrenewal and asserted he had “a good record with [State Farm], so far as driving safety is concerned.” Notice at 2. On April 16, 2009, the Department issued an investigative report and concluded that State Farm’s actions complied with Act 68 because:
Act 68 permits an insurance company to non-renew your policy for a variety of reasons, including two or more accidents under the policy during the past three years, if total damage payments exceed $1350, regardless of who was at fault in the accidents. Insurance companies may not rely upon certain types of accidents in terminating a policy....
During our review of your non-renewal, we determined that: the accidents of March 11, 2009 and February 20, 2009 would support non-renewal of the policy.
Department’s Investigative Report, April 16, 2009, at 1.
Mr. Farley appealed the Department’s decision. A hearing was held on August 27, 2009, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, attended by Mr. Farley, assisted by counsel, and two witnesses for State Farm.
Jane Hong (Hong), an underwriting team manager for State Farm, testified that two claims were paid by State Farm for two automobile accidents, one which occurred February 20, 2009, and the other which occurred March 11, 2009. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), August 27, 2009, at 13-16; Reproduced Record (R.R.), at 12a-13a. State Farm presented copies of the nonre-newal notice and claim records to corroborate Hong’s testimony. State Farm paid out $592.92 for the February claim and $1,159.68 for the March claim. N.T. at 15-16.2
Mr. Farley did not dispute the occurrence of the two incidents, or that State Farm paid out the respective amounts. However, he maintained that the February 20, 2009, accident should not have been *572considered an “accident” for nonrenewal purposes, but rather an “occurrence.” N.T. at 26; R.R. at 16a. Regarding that claim, Mr. Farley testified that he parked his vehicle in the parking lot at his place of employment. N.T. 27-28, 31, 36; R.R. at 16a, 17a, 18a. As Mr. Farley exited his vehicle, his car door struck a coworker’s parked truck above the wheel well. N.T. at 27-28; R.R. at 16a. Mr. Farley observed that the damage to the other vehicle was limited to a “small spot of chipped paint with no damage to the metal.” N.T. at 27; R.R. at 16a. Mr. Farley reported the incident to State Farm, which ultimately compensated the coworker for the damage. N.T. at 29; R.R. at 16a.
On February 16, 2010, the Commissioner issued the Adjudication and Order (Order) and reversed the Department’s decision:
In the present case, the insured’s vehicle was lawfully parked at the time of the February 20, 2009 accident and the accident should not have been used to non-renew the policy. It makes no difference whether the insured was negligent while opening his car door, because an insured’s fault with respect to accidents used for nonrenewal is immaterial. [Musto v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 683 A.2d 1325 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) ]. The General Assembly in Act 68 chose to exclude accidents of particular types rather than excluding accidents where the insured is not at fault. Perry v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 484 [485] A.2d 516 (Pa.Cmwlth.1984); Komada v. Browne [97 Pa.Cmwlth. 19], 508 A.2d 1284 (Pa.Cmwlth.1986)....
Opening the door of a lawfully parked car in the face of an oncoming vehicle which then strikes the door does not prevent that accident from being excluded from nonrenewal use. Zito/Allstate, PH89-06-08 (1989).... Mr. Farley’s automobile was lawfully parked when he opened his door into the side of his coworker’s vehicle. The resulting accident was excluded from use in a nonrenewal, meaning that the policy was nonrenewed based upon only one non-excluded accident.
An insurer may not refuse to renew a policy of automobile insurance on the basis of one accident within the thirty-six (36) month period prior to the upcoming anniversary date of the policy. 40 P.S. § 991.2003(b). Therefore, the Commissioner finds that State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company’s nonrenewal of John B. Farley’s automobile insurance policy violates Act 68.
Order, February 16, 2010 at 6-7.
I. Whether The Exclusion For Parked Vehicles Contained In Section 2003(a)(13)(i) Of Act 68 Applies When Mr. Farley’s Conduct Was Negligent And His Conduct Unquestionably Caused Damage To The Other Vehicle?3
State Farm contends the Commissioner erred as a matter of law when he concluded Mr. Farley’s negligence was irrelevant when the accident falls within the narrow exclusion contained in Section 2003(a)(13)(i) of Act 68.
Section 2003 (Discrimination prohibited) of Act 68, 40 P.S. § 991.2003, provides that an insurer may not cancel or refuse to write or renew a policy of automobile in-*573sur anee for “[a]ny accident which occurred under the following circumstances:
(i) automobile lawfully parked (if the parked vehicle rolls from the parked position, then any such accident is charged to the person who parked the automobile);
(ii) the applicant, owner or other resident operator is reimbursed by or on behalf of a person who is responsible for the accident or has judgment against such person;
(iii) automobile is struck in the rear by another vehicle and the applicant or other resident operator has not been convicted of a moving traffic violation in connection with this accident;
(iv) operator of the other automobile involved in the accident was convicted of a moving traffic violation and the applicant or resident operator was not convicted of a moving traffic violation in connection with the accident;
(v) automobile operated by the applicant or any resident operator is struck by a “hit-and-run” vehicle if the accident is reported to the proper authority within twenty-four (24) hours by the applicant or resident operator;
(vi) accident involving damage by contact with animals or fowl;
(vii) accident involving physical damage, limited to and caused by flying gravel, missiles or falling objects;
(viii) accident occurring when using automobile in response to any emergency if the operator of the automobile at the time of the accident was a paid or volunteer member of any police or fire department, first aid squad or any law enforcement agency. This exception does not include an accident occurring after the automobile ceases to be used in response to such emergency; or (ix) accidents which occurred more than thirty-six (36) months prior to the later of the inception of the insurance policy or the upcoming anniversary date of the policy.
(b) An insurer may not cancel or refuse to renew a policy of automobile insurance on the basis of one accident within the thirty-six (36) month period prior to the upcoming anniversary date of the policy.
In Phillips v. Insurance Commissioner, 980 A.2d 687, 689 (Pa.Cmwlth.2009), this Court reiterated the proper allocation of the burden of proof between the insurer and the insured pursuant to Act 68:
The insurer bears the bears the burden of proving that it complied with Act 68. The insurer must establish that two accidents occurred within a thirty-six month period. McDonnell v. Insurance Department, 94 Pa.Cmwlth. 381, 503 A.2d 1042 (1986). In addition, the insurer must make payments in excess of $1,150.00 as a result of the accidents. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1799.3. Once the insurer shoulders this burden, the burden shifts to the insured to establish that there are circumstances which warrant exclusion from nonrenewal. Kramer v. Department of Insurance, 654 A.2d 203 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995).
Here, State Farm established that there were two accidents in a thirty-six month period which required it to pay out more than the threshold amount of $1,150.00.
However, the Department counters that Mr. Farley satisfied his burden because the plain language of Section 2003 of Act 68, 40 P.S. § 991.2003(a)(13)(i), precluded State Farm from considering Mr. Farley’s February 20, 2009, accident for nonrenewal purposes because Mr. Farley’s vehicle was “lawfully parked” at the time his car door struck his co-worker’s car.
In Musto v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 683 A2d 1325 (Pa.Cmwlth. *5741996), Aetna informed Janice and Joseph Musto (Musto) that Musto’s automobile insurance policy would not be renewed because of a “February 1992 speeding violation, a September 1992 total collision claim, and a November 1993 property damage claim.” Id. at 1326. After a hearing, the Commissioner concluded that “Musto failed to demonstrate that either accident fell within one of Act 78’s[4] exclusions that prohibit an insurer from refusing to renew a policy based on certain types of accidents.” Id. at 1326. The Commissioner concluded that Aetna’s non-renewal of Musto’s policy did not violate Act 68.
On appeal Musto argued among other things that “the renewal was improper because the insured [Musto] was not at fault in one of the two accidents.” Id. at 1326. This Court noted:
Section 3 of Act 78 states, in pertinent part, that no insurer shall refuse to renew a policy of automobile insurance for accidents that occurred more than 36 months prior to the later of the inception of the policy or the upcoming anniversary date. 40 P.S. § 1008.3(a)(13)(ix). Neither shall an insurer refuse to renew on the basis of one accident within the 36-month period pri- or to the upcoming anniversary date. 40 P.S. § 1008.3(b). This section makes no broad exception for accidents in which the insured was involved, but for which the insured believes he or she was not at fault. Komada v. Browne, 97 Pa.Cmwlth. 19, 508 A.2d 1284 (1986). Even accidents in which blame could not be reasonably placed on the insured may be considered in the insurer’s decision not to renew. Hallowell v. Insurance Department, 105 Pa.Cmwlth. 143, 523 A.2d 826 (1987), petition for allowance of appeal denied sub nom. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance, 517 Pa. 619, 538 A.2d 501 (1988). Accordingly, Aetna was permitted to consider both of the accidents cited in the notice of nonrenewal regardless of whether Musto was at fault, (emphasis added).
Id. at 1326.
Here, the rationale enunciated in Musto supported the Commissioner’s determination that “fault is immaterial” when considering whether the accident falls within one of the nine exceptions under Section 2003(a)(13) of Act 68, 40 P.S. § 991.2003(a)(13). The query before this Court is whether, as the Commissioner determined, Mr. Farley’s car was legally parked when his car door struck another vehicle. Act 68 does not define the term “parked” and there is no case law to provide guidance on this issue. However, the Commissioner has addressed a similar circumstance in prior decisions:
The only requirement in the statute is that the automobile be lawfully parked. It does not require that the insured’s vehicle must be struck, nor does it require that the insured be free of fault other than by securing the parked vehicle against rolling. This contrasts with other exclusions (rear-end collision and hit-and-run accidents) where the statutes require that the insured vehicle be “struck” by another vehicle for the accident to be excluded. 40 P.S. § 991.2003(a)(13)(iii) and (v).
The plain language of the statute has not been negated by adjudications interpreting it. It is true that prior Commis*575sioner adjudications made findings that the insured’s automobile door was struck by an oncoming vehicle, but no adjudication has held that the insured must be blameless for the exclusion to apply. To the contrary, in Suder/North River, PH89-06-06 (1989), the insured opened the door in the face of an oncoming vehicle and was adjudicated as liable to the other driver at arbitration. Nonetheless, the Commissioner held that “[bjecause the insured’s vehicle was lawfully parked at the time of the accident, it is excluded from consideration under Act 78. ” Slip op. at 8. In similar circumstances, in Zito/Allstate, PH89-06-08 (1989), the accident was excluded because “it is equally clear that insured’s vehicle was lawfully parked on September 1, 1988 when the collision between insured’s passenger door and the other vehicle occurred.” Slip op. at 7 (emphasis in original). The exclusion in both cases hinged on the insured’s vehicle being lawfully parked and thus coming within the language of the statute, and not upon whether the insured’s door struck the other vehicle, was struck by the other vehicle, or both.
Order Denying Reconsideration, March 16, 2010, at 3^4.
“An administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute for which it has enforcement responsibility is entitled to great deference and will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.” Popowsky v. Pennsylvania Public Utility, 550 Pa. 449, 706 A.2d 1197 (1997), quoting Alpha Auto Sales v. Department of State, 537 Pa. 353, 644 A.2d 153 (1994). Because Mr. Farley’s car was legally parked at the time of the accident the record accident fell within Section 2003(a)(13)(i) of Act 68. State Farm was precluded from considering the February 20, 2009, accident when it refused to renew his insurance.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of April, 2011, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
. Act of June 17, 1998, P.L. 464, No. 68 § 1, 40 P.S. §§ 991.2001-991.2013. This Act substantially reenacted the Automobile Insurance Act, Act of June 5, 1968, P.L. 140, No. 78, (formerly 40 P.S. §§ 1008.1-1008.11) (repealed by Act of June 17, 1998, P.L. 464, No. 68 § 3) (Act 78).
. James McDeemus (Mr. McDeemus), a Claim Representative for State Farm, testified concerning the cost of the February 2009 claim:
Mr. McDeemus: ... [YJou'll see several things which makes this repair more than simply just touching up that spot. If you were to paint that section, you need to clear coat the entire panel. To clear coat the entire panel, if you look at the top, you see there's a cover; there’s also a rail that runs along the top ridge of the cover. Those both need to be removed to clear coat it. We have the rear bumper, which would need to be removed to get clear coat behind it. You have the taillight which would need to be removed and then reinstalled after-wards to get the clear coat behind it. So though it looks like just a small nick, by industry standards on repairing, once you start actually figuring out what you need to do to repair the vehicle, the numbers begin to add up very quickly.
N.T. at 43-44; R.R. at 20a.
. This Court's review is limited to a determination of whether an error of law was committed, whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, or whether constitutional rights were violated. Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Insurance Department, 719 A.2d 825 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).
4. Act 68 contains essentially the same restrictions on termination of automobile insurance policies previously contained in Act 78.