CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
SHOGAN, J.:I agree with the learned majority that Appellant’s challenge to the reinstituted charges is waived. However, I respectfully disagree that the warrantless search of Appellant’s vehicle was a reasonable inventory search.
In determining whether a proper inventory search occurred, the first inquiry is whether the police had lawful custody of the vehicle.1 The second inquiry is whether the police conducted a reasonable inventory search. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 999 A.2d 616, 619 (Pa.Super.2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Henley, 909 A.2d 352, 359 (Pa.Super.2006) (en banc)). We have explained that, “[o]nce the police have taken lawful custody of a vehicle, the police may conduct an inventory search of the vehicle if concerns for an inventory search arise.” Henley, 909 A.2d at 359 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).
“The reasonableness of the search turns on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Commonwealth v. Brandt, 244 Pa.Super. 154, 366 A.2d 1238, 1242 (1976) (en banc). “[A]n inventory search is reasonable if it is conducted pursuant to reasonable standard police procedures and in good faith and not for the sole purpose of investigation.” Thompson, 999 A.2d at 621 (citing Henley, 909 A.2d at 359). The purpose of an inventory search is to protect the contents of the vehicle for the benefit of the owner, not to uncover evidence. Brandt, 366 A.2d at 1241; Commonwealth v. Burgwin, 254 Pa.Super. 417, 386 A.2d 19, 20 (1978) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 254 (Pa.Super.2000). Once the police suspect contraband in the vehicle, they can no longer classify their search as one done for inventory purposes; they must obtain a search warrant. Commonwealth v. Casanova, 748 A.2d 207, 212 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, 570 Pa. 682, 808 A.2d 569 (2002). “[I]t should be only in the atypical case that police officers would find it necessary to conduct a general inventory search of an impounded vehicle.” United States v. Abbott, 584 F.Supp. 442, 448 (W.D.Pa.1984), affirmed, 749 F.2d 28 (3d Cir.1984).
Here, Corporal Wealand conducted a search of Appellant’s vehicle where concerns for an inventory search did not arise. Henley, 909 A.2d at 359. According to Corporal Wealand, he searched Appellant’s vehicle because it was going to be towed, and he based his decision to tow the vehicle on the Motor Vehicle Code and police procedure. The former provides that the police are authorized to tow a vehicle if there is a public safety concern. 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 6309.2(a)(1). Yet, Corporal Wea-land confirmed there was no public safety concern: Appellant’s vehicle was moveable, it was not obstructing traffic, Appellant could have called a friend to remove the vehicle, and there was nothing of value visibly within the vehicle that needed to be safeguarded. Id. at 15-16. Also, the Commonwealth presented no evidence that the inventory search took place pursuant to Harrisburg Police Department’s standard procedures. N.T., 9/22/09, at 3-15. *1269Thus, the record does not support Corporal Wealand’s decision to search and tow the vehicle based on his care-taking function. Hennigan, 753 A.2d at 260.
Furthermore, even assuming Corporal Wealand’s initial motive was to inventory the vehicle before towing, the motive became investigatory upon his discovery of marijuana seeds in Appellant’s eyeglass case.2 Evidence found after that point— ie., weapons in the truck — should have been suppressed unless recovered pursuant to a search warrant. Burgwin, 386 A.2d at 21-22; Casanova, 748 A.2d at 212.
Paraphrased, the analysis in Burgwin fairly summarizes my position:
The circumstances revealed ... that there was a search of a locked trunk, that [Appellant] ... [was] in custody and [was] not asked about disposition of the automobile, nor [was he] asked whether an inventory was necessary, that the police had indicia sufficient for them to believe that incriminating evidence may well be discovered by a search of [Appellant’s] car, and that there was no valuable personal property in plain view. Taking all of these circumstances into consideration ... the search of [Appellant’s] automobile was an investigatory search and not a search incident to the police’s caretaking function.
Burgwin, 386 A.2d at 21.
Based on this record, I would have reversed the suppression court’s order. Accordingly, I dissent.
. Whether the police had lawful custody of the vehicle is not at issue in this case. Because Appellant’s operating privilege was suspended, he could not drive the vehicle. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.2(a)(1).
. That evidence was suppressed.