*522OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE BY
PANELLA, J.:This is an appeal from an order of the Philadelphia Gun Court which authorized random, warrantless searches as a condition of probation and parole for Appellant, David A. Wilson. Wilson raises a number of challenges to this condition, imposed by the Honorable Susan I. Shulman, on August 18, 2008, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. After careful review, we affirm the condition as it applies to the probationary sentence, but are required to vacate with respect to the state parole aspect of the sentence.
We begin with a brief background of the Philadelphia Gun Court. On January 10, 2005, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas instituted the Gun Court.1 The Philadelphia Gun Court was “constituted in response to the increasing number of weapons offenses being committed in Philadelphia and the inherent danger to the community when weapons are possessed on the streets illegally.”2 A case is transferred to the Philadelphia Gun Court when the most serious charge is a violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (“VUFA”). The Philadelphia Gun Court provides for a prompt disposition of firearm offenses and works to improve “the coordination of the efforts by numerous agencies and nonprofit organizations in reducing the number of illegal guns on the streets of Philadelphia....”3 Importantly, the “infrastructure” of the Philadelphia Gun Court allows for the “direct and immediate response to defendants who violate Court Orders and who are recidivists.”4
The four years preceding the formation of the Philadelphia Gun Court were years of intense violence in Philadelphia: from 2000 to 2004, the city experienced more than 300 murders per year. See Murders on rise in Philadelphia, USA Today, December 12, 2005, available at http:// usatoday.eom/news/nation/2005-12-04-murders-philadelphia — x.htm. (last visited September 8, 2010). Philadelphia’s murder rate in 2004, of 22.4 per 100,000 residents, was “the highest of the nation’s 10 largest cities and rank[ed] third among the 25 largest, behind Baltimore and Detroit.” Id. Eighty percent of the murders in Philadelphia were shooting deaths, ten percent higher than the national average. See id.
In 2008, Wilson appeared in the Philadelphia Gun Court charged with three counts of VUFA5 and of possession of a controlled substance.6 Following a bench trial, Wilson was found guilty of the charges. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a condition of probation which authorized probation agents to conduct random, warrantless searches of Wilson’s residence for weapons, a condition routinely imposed in the Philadelphia Gun Court. The trial court also entered an order imposing the same condition for Wilson’s parole.
On appeal, Wilson first argues that such a probation condition constitutes an illegal sentence. Specifically, he claims that the condition of probation subjecting him to *523random searches of his residence was imposed by the trial court without legal authority, as it runs afoul of 61 Pa.Stat. § 331.27b,7 which mandates that a probation officer may conduct a property search only upon “reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the possession of or under the control of the offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.” 61 Pa.Stat. § 331.27b(d)(2) (emphasis added). Wilson additionally claims that the parole condition also constitutes an illegal sentence as the trial court had no authority to impose parole conditions when the maximum term of imprisonment is more than two years, as is the case here. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, contends that Wilson’s sentencing claims present a challenge to the discretionary aspect of sentencing, which, it argues, Wilson has waived by failing to raise them at sentencing or in post-sentence motions.8
Wilson then goes on to argue that § 331.27b controls and that “[w]ithout a legal basis” the probation condition imposed by the trial court is in violation of the Constitutions of the United States and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Appellant’s Brief, at 9.
After reviewing the arguments of the parties, we find that the two sentencing claims raise challenges to the legality of the sentence imposed. Furthermore, we hold that the trial court had the authority under the Sentencing Code to authorize random, warrantless searches of Wilson’s residence for weapons as a condition of probation, as this condition was reasonably related to Wilson’s rehabilitation and public safety; that § 331.27b, by its plain terms, applies only to searches made by probation officers acting on their own authority without judicial sanction; and that such a condition does not run afoul of the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions. We further find, however, that the trial court did not have the authority to impose a condition on Wilson’s parole. A full discussion follows.
The trial court succinctly set forth the facts of this case.
At [the bench] trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Lieutenant Kevin Wong and Officer Jeffrey Mastalski. On September 1, 2007, at approximately 4:50 a.m., Officer Wong was on duty in full uniform and a marked patrol car in the vicinity of the 3900 block of Mellon Street, in the city and county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. There, he observed [Wilson] “standing by a light colored autofmobile] pointing a handgun through the passenger window at the driver.” Officer Wong exited his patrol car, called for backup, and approached [Wilson] with his gun drawn.
Officer Wong immediately ordered [Wilson] to put his weapon down. Although [Wilson] partially complied by placing the gun down by his side, no longer pointing it through the vehicle’s *524window, he nonetheless refused to drop the weapon. Instead, [Wilson] initially walked toward the Officer with the gun in hand, and then proceeded onto the porch of a nearby residence, located at 8948 Mellon Street. After Officer Wong again ordered him to drop the weapon, [Wilson] finally complied, and placed himself on the ground in compliance with the Officer’s orders.
Officer Mastalski arrived on the scene only moments later, and observed [Wilson] laying on the ground. After Officer Wong recovered [Wilson’s] gun, he handed the weapon to Officer Mastal-ski.... [It was a loaded .38 caliber revolver.] Officer Mastalski then frisked [Wilson] and recovered seven packets of marijuana along with five packets of cocaine.
Among other exhibits submitted into evidence, the Commonwealth presented the Quarter Sessions file from a previous case, establishing that [Wilson] had a prior conviction for an offense enumerated under Section 105 of the Uniform Firearms Act.
Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, 3/4/08, at 2-3 (citations to record and footnotes omitted).
As a result of the above evidence and testimony, the trial court found Wilson guilty of violating sections 6105, 6108 and 6110.2 of the Uniform Firearms Act, as well as knowingly and intentionally possessing a controlled substance. The court then sentenced Wilson to a term of imprisonment of 2y¿ to 5 years, to be followed by 3 years probation. As stated above, this timely appeal followed.
We must first determine whether Wilson’s challenge of the condition imposed on his probation and parole is a challenge to the legality of the sentence or whether it is, instead, a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing. A challenge to the legality of a sentence may be raised as a matter of right, is non-waivable, and may be entertained so long as the reviewing court has jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 19-20 (Pa.Super.2007) (en banc). An illegal sentence may be reviewed sua sponte by this Court. See Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897, 903 (Pa.Super.2010). Conversely, when the discretionary aspects of a judgment of sentence are questioned, an appeal is not guaranteed as of right. See Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1274 (Pa.Super.2006) (explaining that to appeal the discretionary aspects of sentencing an appellant must have (1) preserved such claims and (2) provided a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief, which raises a substantial question for our review).
Wilson does not claim that the condition imposed by the trial court constituted an abuse of discretion, but rather, that the trial court ordered a condition of his probation and parole for which it had no statutory authority. “Under Pennsylvania law, a challenge to the validity of a sentence is a challenge to its legality.” Commonwealth v. Arest, 734 A.2d 910, 912 n. 2 (Pa.Super.1999). “If a court does not possess statutory authorization to impose a particular sentence, then the sentence is illegal and must be vacated.” Id. (citation omitted). See also Robinson, 931 A.2d at 21 (an illegal sentencing claim is one which implicates “the fundamental legal authority of the court to impose the sentence it did.”); Commonwealth v. Pinko, 811 A.2d 576, 577 (Pa.Super.2002) (“The matter of whether the trial court possesses the authority to impose a particular sentence is a matter of legality.”).
We recently applied the foregoing legal principles in Commonwealth v. Meats, 972 A.2d 1210 (Pa.Super.2009). In Meats, a *525panel of this Court considered a sentencing order in which the trial court ordered that Mears be subjected to random searches by the Gun Violence Task Force while he was on probation or parole. On appeal, Mears argued that the trial court imposed a “condition of parole contrary to statutory law and state and federal constitutional protections....” Id., at 1211. The panel noted that “[t]he issue of whether the trial court possessed the authority to impose a particular sentence implicates the legality of the sentence[,]” and then found that the claim implicated the legality of the sentence imposed as the issue presented on appeal “ultimately concerns the statutory authority for the imposition of a condition of sentence.... ” Id. (citing Pinko, supra).
As Wilson claims that the trial court lacked the statutory authority to impose the probation and parole condition, the challenge to his sentence thus lies not with its discretionary aspects, but with its legality. See id.
A claim that the trial court erroneously imposed an illegal sentence is a question of law and, as such, our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 980 A.2d 667, 672 (Pa.Super.2009), appeal denied, 605 Pa. 700, 990 A.2d 730 (2010). We therefore proceed to address whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it subjected Wilson to random, warrantless searches of his residence as a condition of his probation.
“The primary concern of probation, as well as parole, is the rehabilitation and restoration of the individual to a useful life.” Commonwealth v. Mullins, 591 Pa. 341, 347, 918 A.2d 82, 85 (2007). We have explained that
[a] probation order is unique and individualized. It is constructed as an alternative to imprisonment and is designed to rehabilitate a criminal defendant while still preserving the rights of law-abiding citizens to be secure in their persons and property. When conditions are placed on probation orders they are formulated to insure or assist a defendant in leading a law-abiding life.
Commonwealth v. Hartman, 908 A.2d 316, 320 (Pa.Super.2006) (citation omitted). So long as the conditions placed on a probationer “are reasonable, it is within a trial court’s discretion to order them.” Id. (citation omitted).
Section 9754(b) of the Sentencing Code permits the trial court to “attach such of the reasonable conditions authorized by subsection (c) of this section as it deems necessary to insure or assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life.” 42 Pa. Cons. StatAnn. § 9754(b). One of the conditions of subsection (c) is that the defendant be forbidden to possess firearms. See 42 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 9754(c)(7). An additional condition of subsection (c) is a catchall provision by which the trial court can impose a condition “[t]o satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience.” 42 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 9754(c)(13).
As mentioned, as a condition of probation, the trial court ordered that Wilson be subjected to random, warrantless searches of his residence for weapons. The trial court was no doubt aware that “[ujnlike the ordinary criminal, probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence.... ” United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1309 (11th Cir.2005). Further, as the United States Supreme Court has cautioned, “it must be remembered that the very assumption of the institution of probation is *526that the probationer is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001).
Here, the trial court was confronted with a convicted felon who possessed a handgun in violation of the law and carried that handgun on a street in Philadelphia, ultimately pointing it at a motorist. See N.T., Waiver/Sentencing Hearing, 8/18/08, at 11-13. Faced with such a recalcitrant individual, the trial court carefully crafted the condition authorizing random, warrant-less searches to ensure compliance with probationary rules and to support Wilson’s effective rehabilitation.
This condition, given Wilson’s criminal history, is eminently reasonable because the provision of random, warrant-less searches was clearly tied to Wilson’s rehabilitation and protection of the public. See 42 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 9754(b), (c)(13).9 Such a condition is especially reasonable in light of the epidemic of gun violence in Philadelphia.10 State courts are confronted with the task of deterring violent gun crimes and ensuring the protection of the public. They must be afforded every available and lawful tool in their arsenal to effectively stem this deadly tide of violence plaguing too many of our cities. Under such dire circumstances, we find the trial court’s condition of probation entirely appropriate.
Wilson argues, however, that 61 Pa.Stat. § 331.27b controls and statutorily precludes the trial court from ordering a probation condition permitting random, war-rantless searches. We disagree.
Section 331.27b provided, in pertinent part, the following:
(2) A property search may be conducted by any officer if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that the real or other property in the possession of or under the control of the offender contains contraband or other evidence of violations of the conditions of supervision.
61 PaStat. § 331.27b(d)(2) (emphasis added).
Wilson relies on this statute to argue that the probation condition at issue here — random, warrantless searches for weapons — is unlawful as it permits searches of Wilson’s residence without reasonable suspicion. But we read this statute differently.
A plain reading11 of § 331.27b discloses that it pertains to searches made by probation officers acting on their own authority without judicial sanction. In this case, the trial court itself ordered the condition of random, warrantless searches expressly as *527a condition of probation. As noted above, the condition imposed by the trial court comports with the protections offered by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. In no way does § 331.27b limit the authority of the trial court to impose, when appropriate, a condition of probation that the probationer be subjected to random, warrantless searches.
In support of his position, Wilson relies on Williams, supra. Williams, however, is readily distinguishable. In Williams, our Supreme Court found that an agreement prepared by a parole officer and signed by the parolee, which permitted warrantless searches, acted only “as an acknowledgement that the parole officer [had] a right to conduct reasonable searches of [the parolee’s] residence ... without a warrant.” Id., 547 Pa. at 588, 692 A.2d at 1036. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court went on to define a reasonable search as one requiring reasonable suspicion. Unlike the situation in Williams, the trial court-here specifically found that a condition of random, warrant-less searches was necessary to insure Wilson’s compliance with the court’s directive that Wilson not have possession of a gun while on probation. See N.T., Waiver/Sentencing Hearing, 8/18/04, at 62-64.
Wilson also relies on In re J.E., 594 Pa. 528, 937 A.2d 421 (2007), where our Supreme Court ruled that a juvenile probation officer’s warrantless search of a probationer’s bedroom must be supported by a reasonable suspicion that the juvenile possessed contraband or was in violation of the conditions of his supervision. The Court’s holding was predicated on § 6304 of the Juvenile Act,12 which contains language similar to § 331.27b in that it permits a search of the juvenile’s person or property where there is reasonable suspicion for the probation officer to believe that the juvenile possessed contraband or was in violation of his probation conditions. Again, however, In re J.E. is distinguishable from this case as the warrantless search was conducted solely on the probation officer’s authority and not on a finding of a trial court that the search was a necessary condition of supervision. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s probation condition does not run afoul of § 331.27b.
Wilson also contends that the probation condition runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As the condition is reasonably related to the supervision and rehabilitation of the probationer, we find that a warrantless probation search is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. “[B]y virtue of their status alone, probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” Samson v. California, 547,U.S. 843, 849-850, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006).13 A probationer has limited Fourth Amendment rights because of a diminished expectation of privacy. See Commonwealth v. Curry, 900 A.2d 390, 394 n. 2 (Pa.Super.2006).
The United States Supreme Court, on many occasions, has recognized a State’s obligation to protect the public and properly supervise convicted felons, and “has repeatedly acknowledged that a State’s interests in reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth *528Amendment.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 853, 126 S.Ct. 2193. In furtherance of this responsibility, states do “not have to ignore the reality of recidivism or suppress its interests ‘in protecting potential victims of criminal enterprise’ for fear of running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.,, at 849, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587).
Numerous courts across the country have upheld similar probation orders.14 See, e.g., Schoenrock, supra; Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding warrantless search provision in probation order is valid under Fourth Amendment without reasonable suspicion as long as search is in furtherance of purposes of probation and not harassment); State v. Morgan, 206 Neb. 818, 827, 295 N.W.2d 285, 289 (1980) (holding warrantless search provision in probation order is constitutionally valid when it contributes to rehabilitation process and search is conducted in a reasonable manner); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 142 N.H. 16, 30-32, 696 A.2d 530, 540-541 (1997) (holding search provision in probation order authorizing random, war-rantless searches is constitutional under Fourth Amendment and New Hampshire Constitution if related to the rehabilitation or supervision of probationer and search is reasonable in time, scope, and frequency); State v. Smith, 589 N.W.2d 546, 548 (N.D.1999) (holding that under Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion is not constitutionally required for a warrantless probation search when conducted in a reasonable manner); Jones v. State, 41 P.3d 1247, 1257-1258 (Wyo.2002) (random, war-rantless search of probationer’s home imposed as a condition of probation does not necessarily violate Fourth Amendment as long as “reasonable grounds” for such a search exist and finding such “reasonable grounds” where probationer was convicted of DWUI and random searches for alcohol are necessary for the state to accomplish purposes of probation).
It must be emphasized that individualized suspicion is not, in all instances, the sine qua non in analyzing reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has conceded that although “some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure!,] • • • the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.” United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). See also Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (rejecting claim that “any measure of individualized suspicion ... is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance”); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639, (1989) (“[A] showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable.”). Indeed, as noted, the United States Supreme Court recently upheld a California law requiring parolees to consent to random, suspicion-less searches. See Samson, supra.
Wilson further maintains that Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution pro*529vides greater protection than that required by the Fourth Amendment. We recognize that our Supreme Court has held “that Article I, Section 8 often provides greater protection since the core of its exclusionary rule is grounded in the protection of privacy while the federal exclusionary rule is grounded in deterring police misconduct.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 591, 692 A.2d 1031, 1038 (1997). However, we find no difference in the standards to be applied under the issues herein.
In Williams, the Court noted that “the [federal] constitutional rights of a parolee are indistinguishable from that of a probationer.” Id., 547 Pa. at 585 n. 7, 692 A.2d at 1035 n. 7. The Court then examined whether Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than that required by the Fourth Amendment. The Court concluded that it could “find no justification from the parole search at issue ... to discern a reason to articulate a different standard for the legality of the search under Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution than under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Id., 547 Pa. at 593-594, 692 A.2d at 1039. Therefore, there being no difference in the standard of review under the federal constitution and state constitutions, Wilson’s argument that Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution offers greater protection must fail.
We next address Wilson’s claim that the trial court was without legal authority to order, as condition of parole, that he be subject to random, warrantless searches of his residence, and that he not own or possess a firearm.
At sentencing, the trial court stated, among other things, the following:
When you are on my probation — there will also be 20 hours of community service, random drug screens. The gun in this case will be relinquished and destroyed. You’re never permitted to own or possess a firearm for even the shortest briefest amount of time. When you are released, you are not permitted to reside in a household where there is a firearm. I’m going to sign an Order that will allow for your house, your residence, to be searched when you are released for firearms.
You’ve been on probation before, right?
[[Image here]]
Forget that probation you’ve ever been on before. Because gun court probation is nothing like that. There is no stricter probation than gun court probation.
N.T., Sentencing, 8/18/08, at 63-64 (emphasis added).
In the sentencing order, the trial court imposed, among others, the following conditions on Wilson:
Other — GUN COURT PROBATION.
Weapons — Do not own or possess firearms: Do not own or possess firearms.
Weapons — Surrender Firearms: Surrender Firearms.
Other — RANDOM SEARCHES: DEFENDANT SUBJECT TO RANDOM SEARCHES OF HIS RESIDENCE FOR FIREARMS.
Order, dated 8/18/08.
In another order issued by the trial court the same day, there is reference to “probation and/or parole.” The order states the following:
AND NOW, this 18th day of August, 2008, it is hereby ORDERED that as a condition of defendant’s probation and/or parole on the charge of Violation of Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA), Section 6105, and for the duration of the defendant’s probation and/or parole period, defendant is subject to random searches of his/her residence. The *530search will be limited to the space occupied by the defendant. The searches will be conducted by agents of the Gun Violence Task Force.
Order, dated 8/18/08 (emphasis in italics added).
Thus, in this case there is an unfortunate discrepancy between the statements of the trial court at sentencing, where lawful probation conditions were imposed, and the sentencing order where both probation and parole conditions were imposed. It is well-established that the sentencing order takes precedence over the sentencing transcript where there is a discrepancy between the sentence as written and as orally pronounced. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 897 A.2d 504, 507 n. 7 (Pa.Super.2006); 28 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 137:25. See also Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 433 Pa.Super. Ill, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (1994) (“Oral statements made by the judge in passing sentence, but not incorporated in the written sentence signed by [the sentencing judge], are not part of the judgment of sentence.”).
Therefore, the one order, by its plain terms, imposes conditions on Wilson’s parole. In Commonwealth v. Mears, 972 A.2d 1210 (Pa.Super.2009), as mentioned, a panel of this Court considered a sentencing order in which the trial court ordered that Mears be subject to random searches by the Gun Violence Task Force while he was on probation or parole. On appeal, Mears argued that the trial court imposed a “condition of parole contrary to statutory law and state and federal constitutional protections[.]” Id., at 1211.
The panel in Mears noted that the trial court did not sentence Mears to probation and that the trial court imposed a sentence with a maximum term of incarceration of two or more years. See id., at 1212. It then explained that as Mears had been sentenced to a term of incarceration of two or more years, his parole “would be under the exclusive supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole ... and not the Court of Common Pleas.” Id. (citing 61 Pa.Stat. § 331.17 and Commonwealth v. Camps, 772 A.2d 70, 74 (Pa.Super.2001)). “Therefore,” the panel found, “any condition the sentencing court purported to impose on Appellant’s state parole is advisory only.” Id. (citing 61 Pa. Stat. § 331.18). Accordingly, the panel held that the condition of parole imposing random searches “is of no legal force, as the trial court was without authority to impose the condition.” Id. Such a condition, the panel observed, would have to be imposed by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. See id. Therefore, the panel vacated the portion of the sentence that imposed the disputed condition, but otherwise affirmed the balance of the judgment of sentence and found no need to remand for re-sentencing. See id.
Here, as mentioned above, the trial court imposed a sentence with a maximum term of more than two years and also ordered a special condition of Wilson’s parole — the random, warrantless search for weapons. As stated above, such a condition is a legal nullity. See Mears, 972 A.2d at 1212. Accordingly, we vacate only the portion of Wilson’s sentence that imposes the condition of random, warrantless searches on his parole. The judgment of sentence is proper in all other respects. Because the trial court’s sentencing scheme has not been disturbed, we need not remand for re-sentencing. See id.
Wilson’s final claim that the trial court improperly imposed the condition that he “never own or possess a firearm during his parole” is unsubstantiated by the record. Appellant’s Brief, at 32. There is simply no such order imposing such a parole condition. The trial court, however, *531did impose such a condition on Wilson’s ■probation. Of course, as a convicted felon, Wilson cannot legally own or possess a firearm. See 18 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. 8 6105(a).
In conclusion, we find that the trial court’s authorization of random, warrant-less searches of Wilson’s residence for weapons as a condition of probation is lawful under § 9754(b) of the Sentencing Code as the condition was reasonably related to Wilson’s rehabilitation and public safety.
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part in accordance with this Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Opinion in Support of Affirmance by PANELLA, J. joined by STEVENS, J., SHOGAN, J. and ALLEN, J.
Concurring Statement by P.J. FORD ELLIOTT concurring in the result in support of affirmance.
Opinion in Support of Reversal by LAZARUS, J. joined by GANTMAN, J., DONOHUE, J. and MUNDY, J.
. See Philadelphia Gun Court Fact Sheet, The Philadelphia Courts, First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, available at http://courts.phila. gov/pdf/notices/2005/notice-2005-guncourt-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited September 8, 2010).
. Id.
. Id.
. Id.
. 18 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 6105, 6108 and 6110.2.
. 35 Pa.Stat. § 780 — 1.13(a)(16).
. Section 331.27b was repealed by 2009, Aug. 11, P.L. 147, No. 33, § 11(b), made effective October 13, 2009. The authority of county probation agents to supervise their offenders is now codified at 42 Pa. Cons.StatAnn § 9912. We refer to § 331.27b as it was the statute in effect at the time of Wilson’s sentencing on August 18, 2008. The newly enacted codification, however, retains the same language as the previous statute.
. The Commonwealth also maintains that Wilson’s sentencing claims are not ripe for review insofar as Wilson is not yet on probation or parole. We note, howevér, that Wilson’s sentence, of which the condition of probation is an integral part, is a final and immediately appealable judgment. Therefore, the issues are properly before us.
. Federal law on probation conditions is similar to Pennsylvania law as "[t]he test for validity of probation conditions, even where ‘preferred’ rights are affected, is whether the conditions are primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public.” United States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir.1989). In Schoenrock, the court held that a condition of probation that subjected the probationer to random, warrantless searches was reasonable as the condition was related to rehabilitation and protection of the public.
. See, e.g., Jon Hurdle, Philadelphia Struggles to Quell an Epidemic of Gun Violence, N.Y. Times, April 15, 2007, available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2007/04/15/us/l 5 pliiladelphia.html (chronicling prevalence of violence committed with firearms in Philadelphia) (last visited June 22, 2010).
.“The Statutory Construction Act provides that in interpreting a statute it is incumbent that the reviewing court endeavor to ascertain the intent of the Legislature and that when the words of a statute are clear and free of ambiguity we must interpret those words by their plain meaning.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 603 Pa. 223, 283, 983 A.2d 666, 703 (2009).
. 42 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann § 6304.
. In Samson, the Court upheld a California law requiring parolees to consent to random, suspicionless searches.
. We "recognize ... that the holdings of federal circuit courts bind neither this Court nor the trial court, but may serve as persuasive authority in resolving analogous cases.” Montagazzi v. Cristi, 994 A.2d 626, 635 (Pa.Super.2010) (citation omitted). The same, of course, is true of decisions from our sister states. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. National Bank & Trust Co. of Central Pennsylvania, 469 Pa. 188, 194, 364 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1976).