dissenting.
I agree with the results reached in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brock.
I find nothing in the uninsured motorist statutes or our present case law that prevents this Court from expanding the definition of uninsured motorist to embrace all situations where other insurance or benefits of any kind pay less than the statutory minimum under the financial responsibility law.
In the unreported case, Sessler, et a1. v. Story, et al., released November 29, 1976 at Nashville, the plaintiff had uninsured motorist coverage in two separate policies containing identical “other insurance” provisions, that made each policy “excess” insurance only, over any other similar insurance available. For some reason not revealed in that record, plaintiff had settled with one of the uninsured motorist carriers for five thousand dollars and was suing the other carrier for five thousand dollars. Relying upon the same quotation from Terry v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 510 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn.1974) quoted by Mr. Justice Brock in his dissent, we allowed recovery against the defendant insurance company upon the following rationale:
“Here, we are confronted with the factual situation that an insured is covered by two policies with identical uninsured motorists provisions and the insureds carrier seeks the protection of a policy provision that would limit its insured to one-half the statutory minimum of $10,000. We think that result is in conflict with the purpose of the legislature in mandating uninsured motorist coverage. It follows that the first paragraph of the ‘other insurance’ provision, declaring the Story’s policy to be excess insurance must yield to the statutory purpose.” Sessler, et al. v. Story, et al., pp. 4-5.
The result in this case is clearly in conflict with the statutory purpose we declared in Sessler, and I think that statutory purpose is equally applicable to this factual situation and requires a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $7,700.
BROCK, Justice,dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority’s interpretation of prior case law that “Tennessee has not adopted a ‘broad form’ of uninsured motorist coverage.” However, in my view the uninsured motorist issue in the ease at bar does not turn on that conclusion. While I agree with the overall validity of certain exclusions and restrictions contained in uninsured motorist policies,1 I am of the opinion that in this case our focus should be on the overall purpose of the act.
*482I would concede that the policy covering the decedent in this case gives a restrictive definition of an uninsured automobile; but, unlike the restrictions and exclusions that this Court has refused to find invalid, the definition of an uninsured motorist can be gleaned from the statutes. Obviously, the definition is sketchy and ambiguous but, nevertheless, because this Court is confronted with a legislative mandate on the subject, insurance policy definitions should not be allowed to control the outcome of this case. Contra: Stone v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 397 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn.App.1965).
T.C.A., § 56-7 — 1201, begins by mandating that all automobile liability insurance policies issued in this state must contain uninsured motorist coverage in an amount not less than that required by the financial responsibility law, unless the insured rejects such coverage. The statute states that the purpose of this coverage is “for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.” In my opinion the majority’s interpretation of the statute does not effectuate the avowed legislative purpose of protecting the citizens of this state.
Moreover, the statute does not make good sense if it is interpreted to prevent a recovery up to the limits set by the financial responsibility law in this case. The decedent Rogers paid a premium for uninsured motorist coverage of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident, yet his estate has received only $2,300 from all insurance sources. The decedent would have been in a better position had he been injured by a tortfeasor with no insurance whatsoever. While the majority concedes that this result may be harsh they do not explain how such a construction squares with the legislative purpose.
With respect to the underinsured coverage issue in this case the majority acknowledges that “[h]ad the decedent purchased uninsured motorist coverage with limits equal to his liability insurance coverage, $20,000 per person and $40,000 per accident, then, of course, his administrator would be entitled to recover from his own carrier in this case.” Upon scrutiny this construction would have allowed the decedent’s estate to recover $7,701 from his own uninsured motorist coverage had he paid the premium for $1 more of insurance! I do not believe the General Assembly intended such a result.
Beyond the mere equities of this case and aside from common sense, I would contend that a contrary position is supported by our case law. The majority cites Shoffner v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 494 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn.1972), for the proposition that the statutory scheme was “not designed to provide an individual with any greater protection than would have been available had he been injured by an insured motorist.” However, the majority also points out that Shoffner contains language to the effect that the purpose of the act is to provide protection up to the minimum statutory limit.
Since Shoffner was decided, there have been several other cases which have addressed the difficult question of discerning the legislative purpose that prompted the enactment of the uninsured motorist statutes. In Terry v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 510 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn.1974), this Court construed T.C.A., § 56-7 — 1205,2 and decided that insurance policies could restrict uninsured motorist coverage by way of “Other Insurance” clauses. However, in *483Terry, Chief Justice Dyer reached that conclusion based upon the following rationale:
“It results, and we so hold, by enactment of T.C.A. § [56-7-1205] as a section of our uninsured motorist statutes, it is the legislative purpose to provide an insured motorist a right of recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy only up to the statutory required minimum [T.C.A. § 56-7 — 1201], and provisions in such policies, approved by the Commissioner of Insurance, operating to reduce such coverage where other coverage or benefits are available to the insured arising from accident causing the loss, are valid if such provisions do not operate to deny payments to an insured of less than the statutory minimum.
“Prior decisions of this Court in conflict with this opinion are modified to conform to this opinion.” (Emphasis added.) 510 S.W.2d at 513-14.
In State Automobile Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cummings, 519 S.W.2d 773 (Tenn.1973), Justice Fones elaborated further:
“While we do not applaud either the draftsmanship or the existence of T.C.A. § [56-7-1205], we must give it the effect that its reasonable construction demands. The Legislature has stated that nothing in the Uninsured Motorist statutes is to be construed as requiring coverage beyond the sum of $10,000, either alone or in combination with similar coverage, and has expressly authorized all policies to contain provisions to avoid duplication of insurance and other benefits.
“We hold that said section must be construed as authorizing policy provisions that may validly limit the recovery of a tort victim insured by uninsured motorist coverage to a maximum collection of $10,-000 (or the policy limits) from all insurance or other benefits available to him.” 519 S.W.2d at 775.
With further reference to Shoffner, I disagree with two basic propositions which were mentioned in that case. First, Shoff-ner implied that T.C.A., § 56-7 — 1205, restricts recovery pursuant to the uninsured motorist coverage to situations in which the tortfeasor is not in compliance with the financial responsibility law. On the contrary, the language of § 56-7-1205 simply prohibits the limits of such coverage from being increased beyond the limits established by the financial responsibility law if an insured never requests additional coverage; thus, a plaintiff’s recovery is not expressly restricted to situations involving tortfeasors v/ho are not in compliance with the law.
The foregoing conclusion is also the basis of my second disagreement with Shoffner. Shoffner stated that the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to place an insured “in as good a position as, but no better position than he would occupy if he had been injured by an individual who complied with the financial responsibility law.” 494 S.W.2d at 759. The legislative purpose as I see it is to provide insurance for victims of accidents who are unable to recover insurance benefits from tortfeasors in an amount at least equal to the amount established by the financial responsibility law. The purpose stated in Shoffner ignores the fact that an insured pays an extra premium in order to receive coverage in the event an uninsured motorist injured him. Moreover, T.C.A., § 56 — 7—1201, mandates that this coverage be in an amount at least equal to the amount set by the financial responsibility law. As we stated in Thaxton v. Travelers Indem. Co., 555 S.W.2d 718 (Tenn.1972), “[t]he insurance [uninsured motorist insurance] required by the statute is for the loss suffered by the insured, not the liability incurred by the uninsured motorist.” Id. at 720. The policy owner insures himself, not the uninsured motorist. Finally, the author of Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Tennessee, 43 Tenn.L.Rev. 663 (1976) reached the following conclusion concerning the purpose of the statutory scheme:
“The statutory mandate that UM coverage apply in the underinsured situation clearly indicates a legislative desire for a liberal construction. Even the ‘narrow’ decisions beginning with Shoffner conceded that a UM insured cannot be denied a minimum UM recovery. At the *484next opportunity, the Tennessee courts should adopt the progressive view that unless a vehicle’s liability insurance inures to plaintiff’s benefit, that vehicle is to be considered uninsured for purposes of the UM Act.”
Applying the foregoing reasoning to the facts at bar, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that because the tortfeasor in this case was in compliance with the financial responsibility law the victim is not entitled to recover insurance proceeds for which a premium was paid. I agree with the conclusion reached in the cited law review article that, because the tortfeasor’s liability insurance did not inure to the benefit of the plaintiff in an amount equal to the financial responsibility law, T.C.A., § 56-7— 1201, mandates recovery up to that amount. The overall purpose of the statute requires that result. On many occasions this Court has refused to apply the literal language of a statute when such a construction would produce a result which is contrary to the apparent legislative purpose. See, e. g., Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn.1975).
In my opinion the legislature intended that the citizens of this state should be insured up to the minimum amount established by the financial responsibility law. Thus, I would look beyond the insurance legalese contained in the statutory scheme and would allow the recovery that the purpose of the act demands.
. See, e. g., Hill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 535 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn.1976) and Terry v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 510 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn.1974).
. T.C.A., § 56-7-1205, provides the following:
“Minimum policy limits not increased. —Nothing contained in §§ 56-7-1201 — 56-7-1206 shall be construed as requiring the forms of coverage provided pursuant to §§ 56-7-1201 — 56-7-1206, whether alone or in combination with similar coverage afforded under other automobile liability policies, to afford limits in excess of those that would be afforded had the insured thereunder been involved in an accident with a motorist who was insured under a policy of liability insurance with the minimum limits described in § 55-12-107, or the uninsured motorist liability limits of the insured’s policy if such limits are higher than the limits described in § 55-12-107. Such forms of coverage may include such terms, exclusions, limitations, conditions and offsets, which are designed to avoid duplication of insurance and other benefits.”