I respectfully dissent. If one spouse assaults the other, the wronged spouse can obtain not only a disproportionate share of the estate in a divorce proceeding but, if necessary to compensate fully for the wrong done, a judgment for actual damages and, on the requisite showing, punitive damages against the wrongdoer.1 The same rule applies if one spouse intentionally inflicts emotional distress on the other2 or negligently injures the other.3 But if one spouse defrauds the other of an interest in community property, the wronged spouse’s sole redress is a disproportionate share of the estate in a divorce proceeding. That is the Court’s holding in this ease. The Court’s only rationale for treating fraud on a spouse differently from other intentional torts is that fraud does not involve personal injuries. Why recovery should depend on whether damages are personal or economic the Court does not explain, except to say at one point that “redress is available in the present case without the creation of a separate tort cause of action between spouses.”4 But'the redress of a disproportionate division of the community is equally available for torts causing personal injuries, yet that has not kept the Court from *591providing for recovery of actual and punitive damages if necessary to fully compensate the wronged spouse. The Court does not, indeed cannot, explain why an uneven division of the community estate is inadequate relief for personal injuries but adequate for fraud.
Moreover, “the creation of a separate tort cause of action” for fraud is unnecessary. It was necessary for the Court to create a tort cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because one had never existed in Texas. But a cause of action for fraud has existed for centuries. All that is necessary for it to be asserted between spouses is for the bar of interspousal immunity that prevented one spouse’s suing another to be removed, and that has already been done repeatedly. But today, that bar is resurrected and replaced for one kind of claim— fraud. I see no reason why spouses should be allowed to sue each other for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence, but not for fraud.
The Court’s rule creates anomalies that cast doubt on its wisdom. For example, I suppose one spouse can still sue the other for fraud relating to separate property and recover damages as in any other case. Only when a spouse defrauds the other out of community property is recovery limited to a division of the estate in a divorce proceeding. Also, to the extent such fraud inflicts emotional distress, the wronged spouse will be entitled to recover mental anguish damages and punitive damages in excess of the community directly against the wrongdoer. But the wronged spouse’s economic damages must be satisfied from the community estate. It seems exactly backwards to me to allow full recovery of mental anguish and punitive damages that have no definite measure but only limited recovery of economic damages that can be determined to the penny.
Nothing in the nature of joint interest in property precludes a fraud action. A partner, for example, can sue another partner for fraud that injures the partnership.5 Nor does the fact that recovery would go to the community, in which the wrongdoer has an interest, preclude a fraud action. Again, the same is true of one partner’s suit against another for defrauding the partnership. The wrongdoer is simply denied any benefit from the recovery. Any justification for the Court’s rule must therefore lie in the nature of the spousal relationship. But while there are good reasons not to allow spouses to sue each other at all, if that historic immunity is to be removed, as the Court has held it should be, it is difficult to see why it should be removed for only some causes of action and not others.
The record is unclear whether Karen Sue Schlueter can obtain full compensation for her husband’s fraud on the community by an uneven division of the estate. From the district court’s findings, it appears that the estate had a net value of $122,600. If that estate were evenly divided, each spouse would receive $61,300. The jury found that the community’s actual damages were $47,-850, and that $50,000 punitive damages should be assessed Karen’s husband, Richard Stephen Schlueter. His half of the community is less than the damages awarded by the jury. Thus, awarding Karen the entire community estate would not fully compensate her for the damages found by the jury. The district court reduced those damages to $42,-850 for reasons that are not entirely clear. Richard’s share of the community would still not be enough to cover those reduced damages unless it was at least 35 percent.
This is not an isolated case. In Vickery v. Vickery,6 Glenn Vickery deceived his wife, Helen, into agreeing to a divorce on the pretense of removing her share of the community from liability to a potential judgment against him. In fact, Glenn immediately married Helen’s former best friend and attempted to retain a large portion of the community for himself. The district court awarded Helen actual and punitive damages against Glenn, in addition to an uneven divi*592sion of the community. Applying the rule announced in the present case, the Court reverses the lower courts in Vickery. Because of the size of the Vickery estate, it may be possible for Helen to obtain complete redress, although that is far from clear. In any event, full compensation to Helen is not a matter of concern to the Court, any more than full compensation to Karen Schlueter is.
There were strong reasons to preserve interspousal immunity from suit. There were even stronger reasons not to create a tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and allow it to be asserted between spouses.7 But given that the Court has consistently rejected arguments against tort claims between spouses, little reason survives to justify allowing claims for everything but fraud, except perhaps that enough is enough. If that is the real rationale for today’s decision, it simply comes too late. I would allow one spouse to recover damages from the other for fraud on the community. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
. Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex.1987).
. Ante at 587-588.
. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b — 4.05 (“A partner is liable to a partnership and the other partners for a breach of the partnership agreement or for a violation of a duty to the partnership or the other partners under [the Texas Revised Partnership Act] that causes harm to the partnership or the other partners.”).
. 1997 WL 751995 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. pending).
. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 626 (Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 629 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).