(dissenting).
I concur in that part of this Court’s judgment discharging the relator, Robert Thomas. I would enter the same judgment of discharge as to Robert Thomas’ attorney, Ernest J. Browne, Sr., and therefore dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion and judgment which reaches a contrary result as to him.
The injunction of the 60th District Court, which was alleged by the complainant (Mrs. Austin’s attorney) to have been violated, named only Thomas. He was enjoined from “taking any steps whatsoever” to consolidate the Austin case pending in the 60th District Court with the Crain case pending in the 58th District Court, or to oust the 60th Court of its jurisdiction in the Austin case. Browne was bound thereby only as Thomas’ attorney by reason of Rule 683, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Whether the injunction was valid or invalid, it cannot be denied that Thomas and Browne had a right to appeal therefrom before being charged by opposing counsel with a disobedience under Rule 692, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Any denial of that right would be a denial of due process.1 On the same day the injunction was entered by the 60th Court, September - 29, 1975, Thomas and Browne gave notice of appeal from the injunction and filed an appeal bond. The transcript was duly filed with the Court of Civil Appeals on October 20, 1975.
In the meantime, while the appeal from the injunction was pending, all parties made a complete settlement of both lawsuits shortly before October 31, 1975, evidenced by written memoranda and agreed judgments to be entered in each case. The settlement provided that, in consideration of Mrs. Austin taking a nonsuit or a “take nothing” judgment in the 60th Court and paying Thomas a cash settlement, the parties would mutually release each other of all claims pending in both cases. The $154,-000 and accrued interest in the registry of the 58th Court was to be awarded by judgment of that court to H. E. Investments, less certain attorney fees awarded to the attorney for the Crains, whose property was to be released from all liens. Judgments carrying out the settlement were prepared and signed by the attorneys for all parties on or about October 31, 1975, with the attorneys for Mrs. Austin agreeing to get the judgments signed by the respective courts. The 58th Court judgment was signed on October 31, 1975, and the 60th Court judgment was delivered by the Austin attorneys to the judge of that court on or about the same date. Whereupon, the appeal from the injunction of the 60th Court was dismissed by Thomas and Browne on November 4 as being moot.
It was not until nearly three months later that Thomas and Browne learned that the final judgment had not been signed by the 60th Court prior to the dismissal of their appeal from the injunction. This knowledge came when they were served with a show cause order issued upon a complaint filed by Mrs. Austin’s attorney on January 20, 1976, asserting that on September 30th Thomas and Browne had violated the 60th Court’s injunction of September 29, 1975. The complaint was filed by the same attorney whose responsibility it was for having the final judgment signed by the 60th Court on or about October 31, 1975.
Relators contend they were denied due process when Mrs. Austin’s attorney failed *88to obtain entry of the final judgment in the 60th Court as agreed upon and waited until after relators had dismissed their appeal from the injunction before advising relators that the judgment had not been signed. Under the circumstances, I agree that this argument has merit insofar as the parties and their attorneys are concerned. This contempt proceeding was not initiated by the judge of the 60th District Court under his general power to punish for contempt. Rather, the complaint in this proceeding was filed by Mrs. Austin’s attorney under Rule 692, which applies to injunctions in pending cases. If the final judgment had been entered as agreed upon on or about October 31, 1975, there would have been no case, controversy, or ancillary injunction pending in the 60th Court when the complaint was filed against relators on January 20, 1976. It was stipulated by the parties that relators’ appeal from the injunction was dismissed because of the settlement. Mrs. Austin’s attorney testified: “We contemplated a take nothing judgment would be entered by Judge Combs [60th Court] .. I presented, directly or indirectly, that proposed judgment to Judge Combs . on or about November 1, 1975.” Judge Combs testified that he would have signed the judgment if he had been asked to do so.2 Failure of complainant to ask for the judgment to be signed, or to notify relators that it was not signed, prior to relators’ dismissal of their appeal from the injunction obviously resulted in a denial to relators of the due process of law to which they were entitled both as to their appeal and the contempt proceeding.
While circumstances of this nature resulting from a settlement by the parties may not prejudice the power and right of a court to initiate its own independent proceeding for criminal contempt, they should positively foreclose and estop the parties to the settlement and their attorneys from initiating a contempt proceeding for their own vindication or punishment of the opposing parties. This was the effect of the holding in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911), which is cited by the majority. In that case the Court held that as far as the parties were concerned, settlement of the main case necessarily settled every proceeding which was dependent on it, stating:
“ . . . when the main cause was terminated by a settlement of all differences between the parties, the complainant did not require, and was not entitled to, any compensation or relief of any other character. The present proceeding [contempt] necessarily ended with the settlement of the main cause of which it is a part. Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. [324] 328, 333, 24 S.Ct. 665, 48 L.Ed. [997] 1002, 1004; Worden v. Searls, 121 U.S. [14] 27, 7 S.Ct. 814, 30 L.Ed. [853] 858; State v. Nathans, 49 S.C. [199] 207, 27 S.E. 52. The criminal sentences imposed in the civil case, therefore, should be set aside.” (Pp. 451-452, 31 S.Ct. at 502.)
Relators also assert that there was a lack of due process because the affidavit and show cause order did not describe or notify them of the specific acts of contempt on which they were to be tried. The affidavit and the subsequent show cause order merely alleged that “in disobedience of such temporary injunction, at 1:30 o’clock p. m., on September 30, 1975, the said Ernest J. Browne and Robert L. Thomas appeared for and on behalf of the Motion to Consolidate the two cases into the case pending in the 58th District Court . . . .” This complaint was wholly insufficient to constitute a basis on which to predicate a prosecution for contempt based upon disobedience of the terms of injunction. The injunction did not enjoin Thomas or Browne from appearing at the hearing on the motion to consolidate.3 It prohibited only the taking of any *89future steps to consolidate the causes. No such steps constituting disobedience of the injunction were specifically described in the complaining affidavit as provided in Rule 692. The affidavit that Thomas and Browne “appeared for and on behalf” of the motion to consolidate was a mere conclusion. It failed to specify how or by what means, either in words or actions, that rela-tors had disobeyed the terms of the injunction.
Constructive contempt being in the nature of a criminal proceeding, it has been repeatedly held that due process demands notice of the specific violation charged. In holding a contempt judgment void in Ex Parte Edgerly, 441 S.W.2d 514 (Tex.1969), this Court said:
“ . . . Due process of law demands that before a Court can punish for a contempt not committed in its presence, the accused must have full and complete notification of the subject matter, and the show cause order or other means of notification must state when, how and by what means the defendant has been guilty of the alleged contempt. 12 Tex. Jur.2d Contempt § 48 (1960). See also Ex parte Ratliff, 117 Tex. 325, 3 S.W.2d 406, 57 A.L.R. 541 (1928); Ex parte White, 149 Tex. 155, 229 S.W.2d 1002 (1950); Ex parte Winfree, 153 Tex. 12, 263 S.W.2d 154, 41 A.L.R.2d 1259 (1954); Ex parte Hardin, 161 Tex. 567, 344 S.W.2d 152 (1961); Ex parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.Sup.1967). ...”
Since the affidavit and show cause order did not describe or specify the actions or words for which relator Browne has been held in contempt, they did not afford him the due process to which he was entitled under Rule 692 and the above cited authorities.
Accordingly, I would hold the contempt order invalid and discharge both of the rela-tors.
McGEE and DENTON, JJ., join.
. This is true regardless of the merits of the appeal. It should be observed, however, that relators’ appeal was not frivolous. From the record in this proceeding it is apparent that Mrs. Austin had neither allegations nor proof that she had resorted or attempted to resort to any remedy at law or that such remedy would be inadequate, all of which is essential in this type of injunction suit. Lancaster v. Lancaster, 155 Tex. 528, 291 S.W.2d 303 (1956); Powers v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 440, 78 S.W.2d 951 (1935). The judge of the 60th Court testified that he recommended to Mrs. Austin’s attorney that he not file the injunction because of local rules by which the consolidation in the 58th Court could be avoided. The existence of that adequate remedy was effectively demonstrated on the day after the consolidation, when the presiding judge of the Jefferson County District Courts set aside the consolidation order and restored the Austin case to the 60th Court.
. He explained his failure to sign it as follows: “One reason I did not know what effect it might have on the show cause to hold in contempt. However, regardless of that facet, I would have gone ahead and signed it had anyone talked to me about it and told me that it was holding up anything, or that anyone was concerned about it.”
. Mrs. Austin’s application for injunction had an additional prayer that Thomas be restrained *89“from proceeding with a Motion to Consolidate, or consenting to the consolidation ■ . . . but this portion of her prayer was not included in the injunction as issued by the 60th Court.