There are two issues presented in this case. The first is whether a district judge (who is not a successor judge) may employ contempt power, to punish violation of another judge’s order entered in a different division of the court and in a different case. The second issue is whether a district judge is bound to obey an administrative order of the Chief District Judge which requires a grant of continuances in “instant appointment cases.”
On January 27, 1995, Donna Brutley, appellant, was convicted in Division 101, the traffic division of the Jefferson District Court, of driving on a suspended license. She was represented by a public defender in this matter and was ordered to pay two-hundred dollars for that representation. Subsequently, eight bench warrants were issued against appellant for failure to remit the two-hundred dollar payment.
On March 29, 1996, appellant appeared before the Honorable Joseph Ray in Division 105, the felony examining division of the Jefferson District Court, on a charge of possession of a forged instrument. Prior to taking a plea from appellant Judge Ray sent the sheriff to find the “first public defender” available, to represent appellant on the felony charge. Consequently, an “instant appointment” was made, resulting in Sue Martin, of the Public Defender’s office, representing appellant.
The previously issued bench warrants were brought up for the first time by Judge Ray after the “instant appointment” was made. Martin asked to be granted a continuance on that matter, in accordance with an order of the Chief District Judge mandating continuances when requested in cases of instant appointments. Judge Ray refused to grant a continuance, but gave Martin the opportunity to withdraw from the case. Had Martin chosen to withdraw, the case would have been passed for thirty (30) days during which time appellant would have been taken into custody.
For ethical reasons, Martin chose not to withdraw and instead went along with the plea agreement on the forged instrument charge. Subsequently, appellant was found to be in contempt for failing to pay the two-hundred dollar public defender fee and sentenced to thirty (30) days in jail.
The Jefferson Circuit Court affirmed the sentence holding that “[t]he Chief Judge ... is purely an administrative position. No other district judge including the Chief Judge has the authority to ‘bind the hands’ of another district judge by issuing any order affecting the legal business of their Court.”
*22We agree with the Circuit Court on this particular issue, but reverse on other grounds.
I. JURISDICTION
Appellant’s first argument in this regard is that the structure and operation of Kentucky’s Court of Justice divested the district judge of jurisdiction over the issue of appellant’s failure to pay the public defender’s fee. It is appellant’s contention that according to SCR 1.040(4), the contempt action arising from non-payment of the public defender’s fee, should have been heard by the same district judge who presided over the initial charge which resulted in the imposition of the fee, or if that judge were not available a proper successor judge.
We agree with appellant on this point. SCR 1.040(4)(c) clearly states that, “[i]n the absence of good cause to the contrary, all matters connected with a pending or supplemental proceeding shall be heard by the judge to whom the proceeding was originally assigned.” While there is an exception to this rule when the judge conducting the contempt proceeding is a successor judge, it is not applicable in the present case because Judge Ray was not a successor judge.
The language of SCR 1.040(4)(c) is not obscure. It means that in every district court, any supplemental proceeding—such as contempt sanctions to collect a public defender fee—shall be heard by the judge to whom the proceeding was originally assigned. In the case at bar, regardless of how the previous traffic case came to be on the felony examining division docket, absent a finding of good cause to the contrary, the public defender fee was to be heard by the judge who imposed it in the first place, or a proper successor judge.
In Richmond v. Commonwealth, Ky., 687 S.W.2d 642 (1982), the issue raised before this Court was whether a judge’s power to issue a search warrant was limited to the district in which he or she was elected. We held that a legally elected or appointed district judge has the authority to act throughout the Commonwealth. However, that authority is “subject to the administrative authority of the respective chief judges and the Chief Justice and subject to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.” Id. at 646. In Richmond, unlike the case at bar, there was no statutory or court rule impediment to the exercise of authority to issue search warrants. In the case at bar, SCR 1.040(4)(c) expressly governs the placement of supplemental proceedings and therefore distinguishes it from Richmond.
The Commonwealth has argued, both in its brief and during oral argument, that the fact that the district judge had before him a defendant whose record included eight bench warrants constituted good cause. The argument being that, based on respondent’s past record it could readily be assumed that she would not appear for the matter had the judge scheduled the proceeding to be held at a later date.
If, in fact, the only two options available to Judge Ray were to hold the proceeding or to allow appellant to leave the courtroom of her own volition with eight outstanding bench warrants, we would agree that good cause was present. However, there were other options available to the judge. The presiding district judge could have very easily had a bailiff or sheriff escort appellant to the appropriate division, where a contempt order could have been issued by the judge who issued the bench warrants or at the very least a proper successor judge. Failing that, appellant could have been remanded to jail and taken to Division 101 on the next court day. That being the case, we can find nothing in the record constituting good cause or any reference by the district judge to a finding of good cause, we therefore reverse.
II. CHIEF JUDGE’S ORDER
In August 1995, the Chief District Judge of Jefferson County entered an order providing that, in eases of instant appointments, judges are to grant continuances upon request of counsel for “more time to prepare the case.” During the district court proceeding, appellant’s appointed counsel advised Judge Ray of the existence and terms of the order entered by the Chief District Judge, but to no avail. Appellant argues before this Court that the District Judge was bound to *23obey the administrative order of the Chief District Judge. We disagree with appellant on this issue. Although SCR 1.040(3)(a) allows the Chief District Judge to prepare “rules” as required “to expedite and facilitate the business of the court,” the “standing order” involved here exceeds that authority.
SCR 1.040(3) contemplates the Judge supervising administrative matters, however, the order in this case addresses the legal business of the court. The Chief Judge, being this Court’s delegate, has considerable discretion in administrative decisions, however no other District Judge has the authority to “bind the hands” of another District Judge by issuing any order which limits the discretionary ruling of another judge. The granting of a continuance has long been left to the sound discretion of the trial court. It is fundamental for a judge to have the right to decide when it is appropriate to grant a continuance in any given case. Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 269 S.W.2d 208 (1954); Knuckles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 261 S.W.2d 667 (1953).
We do not find it necessary to delineate within this opinion what the Chief Judge is permitted to do administratively. Suffice it to say any local rules placed into effect by the Chief Judge must be in accordance with SCR 1.040 and consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rules of the Supreme Court. RCr 9.04 clearly states that the authority to grant a continuance is within the discretion and power of each judge. Therefore any “rule” interfering with that discretion exceeds its scope.
This Court does not find persuasive the argument put forth by appellant and would affirm the Circuit Court on this issue.
For the reasons stated in Section I of this opinion the decision of the Circuit Court is reversed.
LAMBERT, and STUMBO, JJ., concur. JOHNSTONE, J., concurs in result only, and files a separate concurring opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins this concurring opinion. COOPER, J., files a separate opinion in which he concurs with Part II of the majority opinion and dissents from Part I.