joins this opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with Part II of the majority opinion, but must respectfully dissent from Part I thereof.
Appellant had ignored eight bench warrants issued for her to appear and show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court for also ignoring an order issued by a judge of the Jefferson District Court that she pay a $200.00 public defender’s fee. Having finally obtained her presence in the Jefferson District Court, Judge Ray proceeded with the show cause hearing, found Appellant to be in civil contempt of court, and sentenced her to thirty days in jail. Appellant does not assert that she was denied the right to present a defense at the show cause hearing, or even that she had a defense. She only claims that the show cause hearing was held by the wrong judge, an objection she did not raise during the district court proceedings against her. This argument was first raised during the appeal to the Jefferson Circuit Court. Remarkably, this unpreserved and seemingly quixotic argument has prevailed, and we now reverse the Jefferson Circuit Court, but do not remand to the Jefferson District Court for a new hearing before the correct judge, whomever he or she might be. The reason, of course, is that Appellant has long since served her thirty days and presumably has no interest in the outcome of this dispute between the public defender’s office and Judge Ray.
Judge John D. Carroll, one of the most brilliant and experienced jurists ever to sit on our highest court, had this to say in a similar case:
The Jefferson circuit court is composed of seven branches or divisions, presided over by seven judges; six of them having civil jurisdiction and one criminal jurisdiction. But these seven divisions constitute only one court, namely, the Jefferson circuit court, and these seven judges merely preside over divisions of that court. A *24contempt against the authority of any of these judges or courts would be a contempt against the authority of the Jefferson circuit court, and any of the judges or any of the courts would have jurisdiction to proceed against any person guilty of a contempt against the authority of any of the judges or any of the courts composing the Jefferson circuit court, although the contempt might not have been committed against the authority of the particular judge or particular court in which the proceeding for contempt was instituted and heard. It is therefore not material whether the particular contempt here in question was committed by Melton against the authority of Judge Field or the division of the court presided over by Judge Field, because, if it was a contempt against the authority of any of the other judges or any of the other courts, Judge Field would have jurisdiction to hear and determine the contempt proceeding.
Melton v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 642, 170 S.W. 37, 39 (1914).
Supreme Court Rule 1.040(4)(c), which is the cornerstone of the majority opinion, provides as follows:
In the absence of good cause to the contrary, all matters connected with a pending or supplemental proceeding shall be heard by the judge to whom the proceeding was originally assigned.
The obvious intent of this rule is to avoid a circumstance where one judge would hear part of the evidence in a case and another judge would hear the rest. The record in this case does not tell us which of the twenty-three judges of the Jefferson District Court entered the initial order requiring payment of the public defender’s fee, or which judges (presumably more than one, since the judges are regularly rotated from one division to another) issued the eight bench warrants. Since the issue was not raised during the contempt hearing held by Judge Ray, there is not even proof that the original order was not issued by Judge Ray, himself. Regardless, the issue heard at the contempt hearing (had Appellant paid the public defender fee and, if not, why not?) was a different issue than the one already decided by the unidentified original judge (what was a reasonable fee and could Appellant afford to pay it?). Appellant does not’explain what advantage might have inured to her if she had been escorted around the Hall of Justice until the previous, unidentified judge was found, so that he or she could have been apprised of the same information as was Judge Ray, i.e., the fee had not been paid and Appellant had no defense to present.
Finally, contrary to the argument advanced by Appellant and embraced by the majority of this Court, SCR 1.040(4)(c) neither states nor implies that if the judge who heard the original cause is unavailable, it shall be heard by a “successor judge,” presumably whomever has been rotated into the traffic division on the day Appellant was finally brought to court. Why would that judge be in a better position to hear and decide this case than any other judge of the Jefferson District Court, e.g., Judge Ray?
In the absence of any proof of the identity or availability of the judge who issued the original payment order (assuming it was not Judge Ray), I am unable to conclude that Judge Ray was proceeding outside his authority or in the absence of good cause. But even if that were not so, the argument that Judge Ray was without authority to preside over Appellant’s case could not be raised for the first time on appeal. Cf. Bussell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 882 S.W.2d 111 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1174, 115 S.Ct. 1154, 130 L.Ed.2d 1111 (1995); Crane v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 813 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1069, 113 S.Ct. 1020, 122 L.Ed.2d 167 (1993). I would affirm this case in all respects.