The general issue to be decided in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the adoption of A.R.M., a nine year old female, by her maternal grandmother (petitioner) over the objection of the natural father (father). The specific questions presented are whether father abandoned A.R.M. and whether the adoption is in the best interests of the child. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Preliminarily, we note that it is the prerogative of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. We, as an appellate court, review the facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order. In the Interest of R.H.S., 737 S.W.2d 227, 236 (Mo.App.1987). With those precepts firmly in mind, we now review the record.
A.R.M. was bom on June 4, 1978. She lived with her father and mother in an apartment which was located above the apartment in which her paternal grandparents lived. Her paternal grandmother frequently baby-sat with her.
A.R.M. was approximately three and one half years of age when her father murdered her mother. Father was tried and convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment. This court reversed that conviction and remanded for a new trial. After a second trial, father was again convicted of murder in the second degree and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. This court affirmed the second conviction and we adopt the following facts from the opinion rendered in that case:1
[Father] and the victim, [mother], were married in February, 1977. On Friday, August 21, 1981, [mother] left the apartment she shared with [father], taking their daughter with her, and moved in with her mother, [petitioner].
[Father] was extremely upset that [mother] had moved out of their apartment. He spent the weekend outside [petitioner’s] house trying to persuade [mother] to return. On Saturday, at 3:30 a.m., [mother’s] sister noticed [father] waiting outside the house and, at his insistence, took him upstairs to see [mother]. [Mother] refused to see him and told him to get out. [Father], at first, refused to leave but finally left at [petitioner’s] insistence. On Sunday morning, [father] appeared again and began shouting for his daughter. After a period of time, [petitioner] came out, and [father] told her ‘everyone was against him’ and, if [mother] didn’t come back to him, he would blow up [petitioner’s] house.
On Monday, August 24, [mother] filed for an order of protection, and, while in the courtroom, [father] followed [mother] as she repeatedly changed her seating. After the order of protection was issued, [mother], afraid to return to her car alone, was accompanied by a deputy sheriff. When they reached her car, they discovered the spark plugs had been disconnected; a deed [father] admitted he committed.
[Father] also repeatedly threatened to kill [mother]. On the same Monday, [father] told a friend of his he could not stand losing [mother] and he would kill her, then take an ‘overdose’ to avoid the consequences. Also, on that Monday and on the next day, [father’s sister] overheard [father] tell [mother] by phone that if she did not come back to him, he would kill her and himself. Then, on Wednesday morning, August 26,1981, the day of [mother’s] death, [father] and [mother] were seen and heard arguing in front of [mother’s] place of work. [Father] was overheard to say, ‘if I can’t have you, nobody else will. You will be one dead
Around noon, on Wednesday, [father’s sister] saw [mother] leaving work. [Father] followed [mother] in his car. At that time, [father’s sister] was leaving work with a [co-worker] to eat lunch. *88She felt ill, however, and [a co-worker] drove [father’s sister] to her apartment, which is in the same building and directly below [father’s] apartment. When they reached [father’s sister’s] apartment, [a co-worker] and [father’s sister] saw the cars of [father], and [mother] parked outside.
After entering her apartment, [father’s sister] went to lie down. When she reached her bedroom, she heard some moaning and the sound of [mother’s] voice saying, T love you,’ coming from the upstairs apartment. [Father’s sister] sensed something was wrong and called [father] on the phone. [Father] answered and told [father’s sister] to come up and see what was wrong for herself.
[Father’s sister] and [a co-worker] went upstairs. They proceeded to the back bedroom and discovered [mother] lying across the bed with a stab wound in her stomach. [Mother’s] brassiere and blouse were pulled up over her breasts and her pants were pulled down to her ankles. [Father] stood near the bed with two knives in his hands, a large kitchen knife and a smaller steak knife. [Father] said he was not going to jail for murder and he was going to kill himself. He then fled with the knives. [Mother] died enroute to the hospital. Subsequently, [father] was apprehended by police in Greenville, Indiana.
At the second trial, father testified that mother unexpectedly appeared at his apartment to get baby clothes. He said that mother went into the child’s bedroom, pulled a large kitchen knife from her purse and assaulted him. A struggle ensued and mother fell on top of the knife. He picked mother up, placed her on the bed and pulled her blouse up and pants down to see where she was injured.
° In considering father’s testimony at his second criminal trial, this court opined:
[Father’s] urged theory is not only unreasonable, it borders on the bizarre. After [father’s] consistently repeated threats to kill [mother], [father] would have a reasonable person believe [mother] came to his apartment, alone, proceeded to assault him with a knife and then conveniently fell on the knife.
More important, the operative facts, if viewed rationally, are inconsistent with [father’s] proffered theory of innocence.
Father also pleaded guilty to the crime of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to a concurrent two year term. That possession conviction resulted from a crime he had committed while on bond between the two murder trials. He admitted using illegal drugs both in and out of the penitentiary.
Father sired twins while on bond between the murder convictions. Later, during his incarceration, he married the twins’ mother. She is currently unemployed and supports the twins, along with another son, from ADC (Aid to Dependent Children) payments. The father has expressed a desire that either his current wife or his mother (the paternal grandmother) adopt A.R.M.
Petitioner is a married woman in her late forties. She has had custody of A.R.M. since the murder. On November 17,1981, the trial court granted petitioner legal and actual custody of A.R.M. Petitioner filed a petition for transfer of custody and adoption on January 6, 1988, alleging that father had willfully abandoned A.R.M. for at least one year prior to the filing of the petition. At two adoption hearings, one held in October 1983 and another in May 1986, there was evidence that, since November 1981, father had sent only a few letters and cards to A.R.M. He had sent no gifts, with the exception of a Christmas gift furnished to him by a charitable organization. He had sent no money, despite the fact that he was presently earning a minimal income while incarcerated and had previously earned an income while out on bond.
Section. 453.040(5) RSMo (1986), which took effect after August 13, 1982, requires a period of at least six months’ abandonment for a child one year of age or older. That statute provides that consent for adoption by a natural parent is not required where a parent abandons a child for six months or willfully, substantially and *89continuously neglects a child for that period of time. In the present case, the trial court found abandonment, not neglect. We first focus on the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that father abandoned A.R.M.
Adoption proceedings are statutory. See Sections 453.055 — .503 RSMo (1986). Adoption statutes are strictly construed in favor of the natural parents. In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Mo. banc 1984). A court may grant an adoption without parental consent upon finding willful abandonment by a parent for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition. Section 453.040(5) RSMo (1986).
Abandonment is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of custody with the intent to never again claim any rights or duties of a parent. In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., 701 S.W.2d 534, 543 (Mo.App.1985). Abandonment must be established by clear, cogent and convincing evidence that instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative when weighed against opposing evidence. In the Interest of J.A.J., 652 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo.App.1983).
Each adoption must be judged on its own unique set of facts. In re the Adoption of M.D.L., 682 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Mo.App.1984). Imprisonment of a parent does not per se constitute abandonment. In re Adoption of K.L.G., 639 S.W.2d 619, 626 (Mo.App.1982). “On the other hand, a majority of the decisions hold that under appropriate circumstances imprisonment may constitute abandonment.” Id.; see also Adoption of M.D.L., 682 S.W.2d at 889.2
In the instant case, father intentionally murdered his wife, A.R.M.’s mother, and fled from the state immediately thereafter. He was subsequently convicted of that murder and of possession of a controlled substance. He admitted his use of drugs both in and out of the penitentiary. He is presently imprisoned for a term of twenty years.
Although father’s incarceration is not per se determinative of his abandonment of A.R.M., the nature of the crime father committed to warrant such incarceration was a relevant factor for the juvenile court to consider. In Interest of Baby Girl W., 728 S.W.2d 545 (Mo.App.1987) involved the termination of the parental rights of a young father who was incarcerated as a result of a probation revocation for a burglary and stealing conviction when he was 17 years old. The termination of his parental rights granted by the trial court was reversed on appeal because “[t]here never was any recognition of even an ultimate prospect to reconcile father and daughter, only a studied purpose to consummate the adoption.” Id. at 549.
Baby Girl W, however, is factually inap-posite to the present case. Here, the child’s father was sentenced for the murder of A.R.M.’s mother. In contrast to the crime committed by the father in Baby Girl W.f the nature of the crime itself in the present action, i.e., the intentional murder of one parent by another, resulted in the disintegration of the family unit and left the child without even a modicum of parental nurturing during the incarceration of the remaining parent.
It is difficult to conceive of a more calamitous event for a child than the murder of her mother by her father. It is absurd for the perpetrator of such a vile act to argue that he should retain his parental *90rights concerning that child. We can presume that father knew of the probable devastating effect of his actions on A.R.M. and of the inevitable lengthy separation from her as a consequence of his incarceration. The crime itself creates an irreparable emotional estrangement of the child from the father. His lengthy sentence will result in a physical separation during all of A.R.M.’s formative years. There is not a scintilla of hope that he could actually resume his parental responsibilities.
In addition, the critical period for determining if the conduct of father demonstrated abandonment of A.R.M. is six months prior to January 6,1983, the date on which petitioner filed the petition of adoption. Petitioner has had legal and actual custody of A.R.M. since November 1981. Since that time, father has maintained only sporadic communication with A.R.M. by way of cards and letters. These attempts at correspondence, at best, constitute merely token efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship. Admittedly, father has limited resources available to him during his incarceration; but he has made no contribution in any form to the support of A.R. M. He has sent no gifts or money. He went to prison without making any provision for the support of A.R.M. during his term of imprisonment. He also has indicated his willingness to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights relative to A.R.M. should the court permit him to choose A.R. M.’s new parent. By word and by deed father has demonstrated his desire to sever all parental relationship with A.R.M.
There is evidence in the record which indicates that, after the murder of A.R.M.’s mother, petitioner prevented contact between father and A.R.M. and between father’s family and A.R.M. There is also evidence in the record that father attempted to maintain more than token contact with his child, albeit not pecuniary.3 We concede that petitioner may not create the grounds for a nonconsensual adoption. Had the facts supported such an occurrence, it would have been improper for petitioner to prevent father from communicating with A.R.M. and then to claim that father’s lack of communication established abandonment.
Two things are noteworthy regarding that evidence. First, that evidence was not evidence proffered by petitioner, but came from father’s evidence or cross-examination of witnesses by father’s counsel. We assume that the trial court resolved any conflicts in the evidence favorably to petitioner, not to father. It is not our function, as an appellate court, to try the case de novo. See Rule 73.01(c).
Secondly, a multiplicity of factors directly attributable to father constituted the abandonment. Even if petitioner prevented A.R.M.’s contact with father or with father’s family, that issue is irrelevant in this case to the question of abandonment. We would not be surprised if the relationship between petitioner and father and his family is less than cordial. In view of the circumstances, it would not be unusual if petitioner did not encourage this child of tender years to maintain a relationship with the murderer of her mother or from an association with that murderer’s family.
The father destroyed the bond of parent and child. In so doing, he abandoned his child by intentionally, without just cause or excuse, withholding from his daughter his presence, care, protection, maintenance and the realistic opportunity for love and filial affection. In re Adoption of K.L.G., 639 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Mo.App.1982). The record is replete with substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding of abandonment. Clearly, there was no abuse of discretion.
We next address the issue of whether petitioner’s adoption of A.R.M. would be in the best interests of the child. Petitioner has, in effect, been the sole parent for *91the child since A.R.M. was approximately three and one half years of age. Petitioner is married and is able to provide a positive home environment for A.R.M. The child is in good health, is well cared for, and is an “A” and “B” student at the neighborhood parochial school which she attends.
Our review of the record convinces us that the finding by the trial court that an adoption by petitioner would be in the best interests of A.R.M. was not an abuse of discretion. This litigation should come to an end. A.R.M. should be permitted to go on with her life in a loving and nurturing environment, an environment which perhaps will allow her to partially heal from the terrible harm which her father has inflicted on her.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.4
DOWD, SMITH, KELLY, REINHARD, STEPHAN, CRIST, SIMON, CARL R. GAERTNER, and GARY M. GAERTNER, JJ., concur. SATZ, C.J., and GRIMM, J., concur in result only. KAROHL, J., dissents in separate opinion. PUDLOWSKI, J., concurs in dissent.. In the adoption proceeding, the trial court took judicial notice of the court file in the father’s criminal case which included the opinion of this court affirming father’s conviction. We quote from that opinion without citation, in order to preserve the anonymity of A.R.M.
. The present termination of parental rights statute Section 211.447.3(6) RSMo (1986) was not in effect at the time this case was tried. It provides in pertinent part that, when considering whether to terminate the parent-child relationship because of, inter alia, abandonment:
3. [T]he court shall evaluate and make findings on the following factors, when appropriate and applicable to the case:
* * * * * it (6) The conviction of the parent of a felony offense that the court finds is of such a nature that the child will be deprived of a stable home for a period of years; provided, however, that incarceration in and of itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights....
This particular legislative enactment does not represent a change in the law, but simply reflects a legislative recognition of existing case law.
. Lack of payment by a parent for the cost and maintenance of a child, when financially able to do so, is a factor to be considered by the trial court in deciding to terminate parents rights based on abandonment as well as neglect. Section 211.447.3(3). Again, this reflects a legislative recognition of existing case law. See, e.g., In the Interest of J.H.H. v. J.D., 662 S.W.2d 893 (Mo.App.1983).
. In view of the statement in the dissenting opinion that the majority opinion is in conflict with . previous opinions of the Missouri Supreme Court and other courts of appeal, we would point out that this case was certified to the Supreme Court by the dissenting judges pursuant to Rule 83.01. The Supreme Court then entered the following order: "Failing to perceive the conflict of cases suggested by the certifying judge, the Court orders this case retransferred to the Missouri Court of Appeals — Eastern District.” In the Interest of A.R.M., No. 70262, Order (Mo. banc March 3,1988).