The conviction is for violation of Sec. 5 of Art. 5154(a) V.A.C.S., which reads as follows:
“All labor union organizers operating in the State of Texas shall be required to file with the Secretary of State, before soliciting any members for his organization, a written request by United States mail, or shall apply in person for an organizer’s card, stating (a) his name in full; (b) his labor union affiliations, if any; (c) describing his credentials and attaching thereto a copy thereof, which application shall be signed by him. Upon such applications being filed, the Secretary of State shall issue to the applicant a card on which shall appear the following: (1) the applicant’s name; (2) his union affiliation; (3) a space for his personal signature; (4) a designation, ‘labor organizer’; and (5) the signature of the Secretary of State, dated *251and attested by his seal of office. Such organizer shall at all times, when soliciting members, carry such card, and shall exhibit the same when requested to do so by a person being so solicited for membership.”
A fine of $500 was assessed as punishment.
It is contended that the above quoted Sec. 5 of Art. 5154 (a) V.A.C.S. is in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act and is therefore inoperative.
This question was before the courts in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 89 L.Ed. 430, by certiorari from the Supreme Court of Texas, whose opinion is reported in 174 S.W. 2d 958 (Ex parte Thomas).
In Ex parte Thomas, 141 Texas, 591, 174 S.W. 2d 958, 960, 961, the Supreme Court of Texas said:
“The right of the State under its inherent police power to regulate labor unions in order to protect the public welfare appears to be almost beyond question.***
“A careful reading of the section of the law here under consideration will disclose that it does not interfere with the right of the individual lay members of unions to solicit others to join their organization. It does not affect them at all. It applies only to those organizers who for a pecuniary or financial consideration solicit such membership. It affects only the right of one to engage in the business as a paid organizer, and not the mere right of an individual to express his views on the merits of the union. Furthermore, it will be noted that the Act does not require a paid organizer to secure a license, but merely requires him to register and identify himself and the union for which he proposes to operate before being permitted to solicit members for such union. The Act confers no unbridled discretion on the Secretary of State to grant or withhold a registration card at his will, but makes it his mandatory duty to accept the registration and issue the card to all who come within the provisions of the Act upon their good-faith compliance therewith.
“That the Legislature was justified in concluding that that part of the Act here under consideration was necessary for the protection of the general welfare of the public, and particularly the laboring class, can hardly be doubted.”
*252In Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, the contempt conviction for violation of the injunction, upheld by the Supreme Court of Texas in Ex parte Thomas, was reversed, the majority holding that the statute (Art. 5154(a) “as it was applied in this case imposed previous restraint upon appellant’s rights of free speech and free assembly . . .” The facts were that Thomas addressed a mass meeting of workers, for which purpose he came to Texas, and at the end of his speech asked persons present to join the union.
It was urged, as here, that the application of the statute was inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act. In this connection the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of U.S. said:
“That the State has power to regulate labor unions with a view to protecting the public interest is, as the Texas court said, hardly to be doubted. They cannot claim special immunity from regulation. Such regulation however, whether aimed at fraud or other abuses, must not trespass upon the domains set apart for free speech and free assembly***
“*** Upon the re-argument attention was given particularly to the questions whether and to what extent the prohibitions of Sec. 5, or their application in this case, are consistent with the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. Both the parties and the Government, which has appeared as amicus curiae, have advanced contentions on this issue independent of those put forward upon the question of constitutionality. Since a majority of the Court do not agree that Sec. 5 or its present application conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act, our decision rests exclusively upon the grounds we have stated for finding that the statute as applied contravenes the Constitution.”
Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion and removed any doubt that a majority of the court agreed only that the contempt judgment should be reversed because the injunction was an effort to forestall Thomas from speaking at all, the contempt being based, at least in part, on the fact that he did make a public speech.
Appellant relies upon Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 89 L.Ed. 1782, wherein the Supreme Court of the United States held two sections of a Florida statute regulating labor union activities to be repugnant to the National Labor Relations Act.
*253Hill was enjoined from further acting as the union’s business agent until he obtained a state license under Sec. 4 of the Florida statute, which provided that no one shall be licensed as a “business agent” of a labor union who has not been a citizen of the United States for more than ten years, who has been convicted of a felony or who is not a person of good moral character. The statute provided for a $100 fee to accompany the application for such license, and for a 30 day period to permit the filing of objections, the application to then be passed on by a board created for the purpose. Also the statute required annual license and reports.
The Supreme Court of U.S. said of those provisions of the Florida statute:
“To the extent that Sec. 4 limits a union’s choice of such an ‘agent’ or bargaining representative, it substitutes Florida’s judgment for the workers’ judgment.”
“The collective bargaining which Congress has authorized contemplates two parties free to bargain, and cannot thus be frustrated by state legislature. We hold that Sec. 4 of the Florida Act is repugnant to the National Labor Relations Act.”
The injunction sought against the union was that it had operated without obtaining a state license as required by Sec. 6 of the Florida Statute.
The Court in holding that this statute infringed the Labor Relations Act, said:
“Section 6, as here applied, stands no better. The requirement as to the filing of information and the payment of a $1.00 annual fee does not, in and of itself, conflict with the Federal Act. But for failure to comply, this union has been enjoined from functioning as a labor union. It could not without violating the injunction and also subjecting itself to the possibility of criminal punishment even attempt to bargain to settle a controversy or a strike. It is the sanction here imposed, and not the duty to report, which brings about a situation inconsistent with the federally protected process of collective bargaining..... This is true because if the union or its representatives acted as bargaining agents without making the required reports presumably they would be liable both to punishment for contempt *254of court and to conviction under the misdemeanor section of the act. Such an obstacle to collective bargaining cannot be created consistently with the Federal Act.
“Nor can it be argued that our decision in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, ante, 430, 65 S Ct 315, forecloses such result. In that case we did not have, as here, to deal with such a direct impediment to the free exercise of the federally established right to collective bargaining.
“Our holding is that the National Labor Relations Act and Secs. 4 and 6 of the Florida Act as here applied cannot ‘move freely within the orbit of their respective purposes without infringing upon one another.’ ”
As we understand the foregoing decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the contention here raised was overruled in Thomas v. Collins, supra. In Hill v. Florida the distinction between the Texas and Florida statutes was recognized. The Florida Statute as applied was found to create an obstacle to collective bargaining inconsistent with the National Labor Relations Act. No such obstacle or “frustration” appears here. We cannot agree that Hill v. Florida overruled the holding in Thomas v. Collins, or that it is authority for striking down Sec. 5 of Art. 5154(a) V.A.C.S. as repugnant to the National Labor Relations Act.
On the other hand we consider the cases cited as authority for our holding that Art. 5154(a) and its application here does not conflict with the National Labor Relations Act and did not deprive appellant of his constitutional right of freedom of speech as guaranteed under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and under Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution of Texas. See also A.F. of L. v. Mann, 188 S.W. 2d 276.
The information alleged, among other things, that appellant was a “labor organizer employed by the International Fur 6 Leather Worker’s Union of the United States and Canada, to solicit members for said union” and that he did solicit Joe Mata to become a member of said union without having been issued an organizer’s card by the secretary of state.
We overrule the contention that the information was vague and indefinite for failure to specify the statute under which it was drawn. See 23 Texas Jur. 634, 635, Sec. 33; Alsup v. State, 91 Texas Cr. Rep. 224, 238 S.W. 667; De Santiego v. State, *255146 Texas Cr. Rep. 394, 176 S.W. 2d 175; Arts. 405 and 411 V.A.C.C.P.; Ehrke v. State, 134 Texas Cr. Rep. 222, 115 S.W. 2d 631.
Also we are unable to agree that the statute is void for uncertainty because it contains no definition of the word “solicit.”
It was shown that appellant, without applying for or securing a labor organizer’s card from the secretary of state, approached Joe Mata and on several occasions requested that he join such union and delivered to him an application card for that purpose.
Appellant testified that he came from North Carolina to San Antonio as an employee of said union, arriving October 27. He admitted having several conversations with Joe Mata regarding the organizing of a local among the workers of the Nelson Tanning Plant but contended that he did not solicit Mata to join his union but wanted to get him to assist in establishing a local. “It was more of a survey. I wasn’t really asking about joining the union. Didn’t have one to join. I mean I first had to find out those things, and Mata was just one of the people I had to see.”
Appellant contends that it was essential for the state to allege and prove that appellant was a “paid” employee of a labor union and that the state failed to offer such proof.
A “Labor Organizer” is defined in Art. 5154(a) to be “a person who for a pecuniary or financial consideration solicits memberships for a labor union.”
Having alleged that appellant was a “labor organizer” it was not necessary that the complaint and information also allege that appellant solicited memberships for a pecuniary or financial consideration.
As to the proof, as stated, appellant testified to his being employed by the union named. He also testified that he opened a bank account with his first week’s pay, and the duplicate deposit slip was introduced in evidence.
We find this evidence sufficient to establish that appellant received a financial or pecuniary consideration for his labor organizing work.
*256The remaining contentions of error have been considered and are overruled.
The evidence is deemed sufficient to sustain the jury verdict and we find no reversible error.
The judgment is affirmed.