During the jury voir dire stage of his trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on charges, among others, of carjacking, robbery, first degree assault, and reckless endangerment, Respondent, Wilbert Hardy, informed the judge that he was “thinking about changing [his] attorney or something.” *616Hardy explained the reasons underlying his dissatisfaction with his trial counsel. The court remonstrated that Hardy discharging his present counsel might prove deleterious to his defense. In response, Hardy abandoned any initiative to change his trial counsel and the trial continued, resulting in convictions on the above charges. Upon appellate review, we are asked to determine whether Hardy’s statement that he was “thinking about changing [his] attorney or something” qualified as a request to discharge counsel under Maryland law and rules and, if so, whether the trial court addressed properly the request. For reasons we shall explain, we hold that: (1) Hardy’s statement constituted a request to discharge defense counsel; (2) Maryland Rule é-^lACe),1 which dictates the procedure a trial court must follow in response to a request to discharge counsel, does not apply after voir dire begins; and, (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in how it addressed Hardy’s request to discharge his counsel during trial. As such, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals that held, in pertinent part, to the contrary.
I. FACTS
On 19 February 2006, around 1:30 a.m., an officer of the Baltimore City Police Department discovered Emmitt Camm *617leaning against a gas station pump in the 2500 block of Liberty Heights Avenue in Baltimore. Camm appeared to have been beaten severely. Paramedics transported him to Sinai Hospital for treatment. Camm informed police that he had been driving his Ford Explorer when two men, one of whom he identified as an acquaintance, “Will,” stopped him and asked for a ride. At some point during their travels thereafter, the men told Camm to pull over. Camm stopped the car and stepped out, at which time the men advanced on him and demanded his “property.” The men threatened Camm with a knife, beat him, and threw him into the trunk of his car. Camm “got out somehow” and stumbled to the gas station where the police found him. All in all, the men stole Camm’s wallet, cell phone, car keys, and vehicle. Approximately a month after the attack, Camm identified from a police photo array “Will” as the Respondent, Wilbert Hardy. Police arrested Hardy on 20 June 2006.
At the outset of Hardy’s trial in the Circuit Court on 19 March 2007, immediately prior to the colloquy at issue in this appeal, the court swore the venire panel, introduced the factual allegations of the case to the venire, and proceeded to ask the venirepersons several questions and receive their responses. The court then asked counsel and Hardy to approach the bench to discuss further voir dire inquiries. At the bench, the following exchange commenced the colloquy that we consider pointedly in this ease:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Also, my client wanted to address the court.
THE COURT: About what?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He won’t tell me.
THE COURT: No. You sit down, sir. The only thing you should have addressed me on is whether you wanted that 12 years.[2] You not wanting it you’re getting exactly what you asked for, a trial.
*618[HARDY]: I’m saying I haven’t changed about me wanting a trial. I’m thinking about changing the attorney or something.
THE COURT: Okay. Sit down a minute.
[HARDY]: She [my attorney] asking me about taking time. I’m not going to do this. That’s what I’m saying[3]
THE COURT: Well, sir, at this point actually, you only have two options. One is to discharge your lawyer and proceed to represent yourself, which I would not recommend. You have a constitutional right to represent yourself. But I don’t feel that I am able to force her to sit at the trial table and assist you. Now if you have another lawyer who is ready, willing and able to step in her shoes, by all means, fire her if the other person is ready to step in. [HARDY]: I’m not saying that—no disrespect—I’m saying, I haven’t talked to my lawyer an hour in over a year. I’ve had her for a year. I haven’t even talked to my lawyer one hour. I’m saying, that’s no time to prepare a case. I spoke to her 15 minutes with her out in Hagerstown [a detention facility] because she had to leave. I can’t prepare a case in 15 minutes (inaudible).
THE COURT: I can’t believe that counsel would have only talked to you 15 minutes. Is that—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. We spoke—when I went to visit him in Hagerstown I was kicked out because there were—they ended it, but we spoke for 20, 25 minutes. And we have spoken extensively on Friday [16 March]. That was well over an hour.
*619THE COURT: See, sir, what you’re saying is basically you’re upset because you believe that her suggestion to you that you take time on this case she’s trying to throw you. Is that what you’re saying?
[HARDY]: I feel like she don’t believe in me. You know what I’m saying. She asked me to take time for something I didn’t do.
THE COURT: She’s got to. The same way I had to go over what you were charged with, what the elements were and what the offer was so that you don’t turn around and say, they never told me. You understand, sir? Ethically she’s got to do that.
[HARDY]: She’s been telling me about take the time every time I see her she says something about taking some time.
THE COURT: That’s because you’re exposed to so much more. That’s why. She’s a good lawyer.
[HARDY]: I’m not saying she’s not a good lawyer. I’m just saying (inaudible).
THE COURT: She’s going to work hard for you.
[HARDY]: All right.
THE COURT: She’s only doing what anybody else does. A decision whether or not you want to take time is in your hands, not in her hands. You understand? That’s why she’s telling you. That’s why I told you. So it couldn’t come up later on, say, look, that judge didn’t even tell me. You see?
[HARDY]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Okay. You all can step back.
(Emphasis added.)
The judge revisited the matter of Hardy’s earlier expressed dissatisfaction with his defense counsel at the close of voir dire. The court asked counsel and Hardy to approach the bench to note any exceptions to the voir dire questions it had asked. After he gave the lawyers the opportunity to note these exceptions, the judge addressed Hardy:
*620THE COURT: ... [S]ir, do you feel better about—after talking to me about—
[HARDY]: (inaudible) wanted to finish talking to my attorney before I come back in the courtroom.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We’ll speak again during the lunch break.
THE COURT: Yeah, you will. To be quite honest, sir, she’s only giving her—you, her opinion based on what she has seen me do to people involved in violent offenses with any record. She’s just giving you her—you her honest opinion. You see what I mean. Nothing person[al], but she’s really telling you the way it is.
[HARDY]: I understand what you’re saying. (Inaudible.) THE COURT: All right.
Hardy did not make any further statements during trial bearing on dissatisfaction with or discharging his counsel. The jury convicted Hardy on the specific counts mentioned at the outset of this opinion.4
II. APPELLATE HISTORY
After he was sentenced, Hardy noted timely an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, in which he alleged that four errors in the proceedings before the Circuit Court merited reversal of his convictions.5 In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court reversed Hardy’s convictions and remanded the case to the Circuit Court for a new trial, holding *621that the trial court, in addressing Hardy’s concerns regarding his trial counsel, failed to adhere to the mandatory procedures for consideration of requests to discharge counsel contained in Rule 4-215(e).6
The State filed timely a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted, 411 Md. 740, 985 A.2d 538 (2009), to consider the following issues: (1) whether Hardy’s statement that he was “thinking about changing the attorney or something” qualified as a request to discharge his counsel, (2) if so, whether Rule 4-215(e) applies to such requests after voir dire begins, and (3) if Rule 4-215(e) applies, whether the trial court’s colloquy with Hardy complied with the Rule’s mandates.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When applicable, Rule 4-215(e) demands strict compliance. “The provisions of the rule are mandatory” and a trial court’s departure from them constitutes reversible error. Williams v. State, 321 Md. 266, 272, 582 A.2d 803, 806 (1990). Where a motion to discharge counsel is made during trial, however, Rule 4-215(e) does not apply, and we evaluate the trial court’s ruling on a motion to discharge counsel under the far more lenient abuse of discretion standard. State v. Brown (hereinafter “Brown ”), 342 Md. 404, 429, 676 A.2d 513, 525 (1996). We have noted that a court abuses its discretion in this regard only when it acts “ “without reference to any guiding rules or principles,’ ” Brown v. State, 373 Md. 234, 250, 817 A.2d 241, 250 (2003) (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312, 701 A.2d 110, 118 (1997)),7 and that we find an abuse of discretion only when the court’s *622act is so untenable as to place it “ ‘beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally acceptable,’ ” Brown v. State, 373 Md. at 250, 817 A.2d at 250 (quoting North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1032 (1994)).
IY. ANALYSIS
As we shall explain, we hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error in its response to Hardy’s request to discharge his trial counsel. As a threshold matter, we find that Hardy’s statement regarding “thinking about changing [his] attorney or something” qualifies as a request to discharge counsel because a trial court reasonably should have interpreted it as such. We determine, however, that the court, in responding to Hardy’s request, was not required to comply literally with the strictures of Rule 4-215(e) because the request was raised after the beginning of voir dire, which, in our view, constitutes a “meaningful trial proceeding.” Accordingly, we review the trial court’s handling of Hardy’s request under an abuse of discretion standard. Finding none, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which granted Hardy a new trial on its resolution of this issue alone.
A. Hardy’s statement qualified as a request to discharge his counsel.
At the outset, we address the threshold question of whether Hardy’s statement regarding “thinking about changing [his] attorney or something” qualifies as a request to discharge counsel. We have observed that “any statement by the defendant from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant desire[s to discharge his counsel is] sufficient” for the court to consider that statement as a request to discharge counsel. Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 127, 406 A.2d 98, 101 (1979). There is no “talismanic phrase” that a defendant must utter to make such a request, Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 124, 486 A.2d 163, 169 (1985); rather, the defendant need only indicate reasonably to the court a desire to discharge his or her counsel in order to engage the requirement that the court consider the defendant’s motion. State v. *623Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 631, 870 A.2d 217, 225 (2005); see also Snead, 286 Md. at 130, 406 A.2d at 102 (noting that former rule governing procedure for requests to discharge counsel is triggered “when a defendant indicates a desire or inclination to waive counsel” (emphasis added)). A defendant makes such a request even when his or her statement constitutes more a declaration of dissatisfaction with counsel than an explicit request to discharge. See, e.g., Campbell, 385 Md. at 632, 870 A.2d at 226 (finding request to discharge counsel when defendant stated “I don’t like this man as my representative---We had conflicts way before this ever started”); Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 607, 536 A.2d 1149, 1160 (1988) (treating as request to discharge counsel defendant’s statement that “[i]f possible I would rather get rid of her [my attorney], get new [sic] attorney”); Leonard, 302 Md. at 125, 486 A.2d at 170 (declaring request to discharge counsel “obvious” where defendant said “can I get appointed another counsel? ... Well, he’s not representing me then”); Snead, 286 Md. at 131, 406 A.2d at 103 (finding request to discharge counsel when defendant said “I don’t want no attorney then”).
Hardy’s statement here was hardly talismanic, but it communicated nevertheless his unhappiness (albeit a passing state of mind at the time) with his trial counsel clearly enough to constitute a request to discharge counsel. Although not worded as a decisional motion, Hardy’s declaration that he was “thinking about changing the attorney or something” reasonably should have led a trial judge to conclude that Hardy wanted, or at the very least was inclined, to discharge his counsel. That is all that Maryland law requires in order for a court to consider his statement a request to discharge counsel and address the matter accordingly. As in Campbell, Fowlkes, Leonard, and Snead, Hardy’s statement was an indication of dissatisfaction with his lawyer, and, likewise, Hardy’s statement qualifies as a request to discharge defense counsel.8
*624B. Rule U-215(e) does not apply to requests to discharge counsel made after voir dire has begun.
Having concluded that Hardy made a legitimate request to discharge his trial counsel, we must determine whether the trial judge’s consideration of that request is governed purely by its discretion, or whether it should be circumscribed by the procedural demands of Rule 4-215(e), which provides, in relevant part:
Discharge of counsel—Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney ... the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel.
Rule 4-215(e). As we shall explain, we conclude that Rule 4-215(e) does not apply literally once voir dire begins, and, therefore, the trial judge was not obliged necessarily to adhere to the Rule’s strict procedural requirements in considering Hardy’s request.
We have held that Rule 4-215(e) ceases to apply as soon as “meaningful trial proceedings” begin. Brown, 342 Md. at 427-28, 676 A.2d at 525.9 We refused to draw a bright line *625definition delimiting the precise moment that marks the beginning of “meaningful trial proceedings,” see id. at 423, 676 A.2d at 522 (declining to adopt “an inflexible rule of per se untimeliness”), choosing rather to evaluate each situation on a case-by-case basis. Our case law makes clear that “meaningful trial proceedings” commence no later than by the time the court instructs the jury, see State v. Wischhusen, 342 Md. 530, 543, 677 A.2d 595, 601 (1996) (holding that “meaningful trial proceedings” had commenced by.time of potential motion to reinstruct the jury), and after the State begins to present evidence, see Brown, 342 Md. at 429, 676 A.2d at 525 (concluding that “meaningful trial proceedings” had commenced by time of request made after the State had presented evidence). Conversely, courts in this State have observed that “meaningful trial proceedings” have not commenced at the time of pretrial hearings, see Joseph v. State, 190 Md.App. 275, 288, 988 A.2d 545, 553 (2010) (applying Rule 4-215(e) to request raised at hearing “on the eve of trial”); Hawkins v. State, 130 Md.App. 679, 688, 747 A.2d 759, 764 (2000) (same; request was raised immediately before a suppression hearing), or at the defendant’s first appearance on the morning of trial, see Gonzales v. State, 408 Md. 515, 537, 970 A.2d 908, 921 (2009) (applying Rule 4-215(e) on defendant’s initial appearance before the trial court the morning of his trial).
We also have defined “meaningful trial proceedings” in a functional sense. Under this definition, “meaningful trial proceedings” have begun whenever allowing the defendant to discharge or substitute his legal counsel would pose a risk either of disruption of trial procedure or of confusing the jury. In Brown, for example, we cautioned that the right of a defendant to discharge his defense counsel should be limited once trial begins “to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice,” particularly the defendant’s “tactic[s] to delay the proceedings or to confuse the jury.” 342 Md. at 414-15, 676 A.2d at 518.10
*626With regard to requests to discharge defense counsel that are made during voir dire (such as Hardy’s), we hold that Rule 4-215(e) does not apply because “meaningful trial proceedings” have commenced by the time of these requests. Admittedly, no controlling precedent dictates directly this result. Our cases establish clearly that “meaningful trial proceedings” have not begun before voir dire commences (at pre-trial hearings and at a defendant’s first appearance in court on the morning of his or her trial) -and that they have begun after voir dire concludes (after the State presents evidence and during jury instructions), but the question of whether they have begun at a point during voir dire is one of first impression in this State.11
*627Two considerations inform our conclusion that the proper resolution of this issue is that “meaningful trial proceedings” have begun when a request to discharge counsel is made during voir dire. First, voir dire is a “meaningful trial proceeding” under the plain meaning of the phrase. There can be no trial without a trier of fact, and there can be no trier of fact in a jury trial without the jury selection process of voir dire. As such, the voir dire process represents a necessary step in any jury trial, and, therefore, with the beginning of voir dire, meaningful trial proceedings must have begun.
Second, voir dire is a “meaningful trial proceeding” under the functional definition of the phrase. In situations where Rule 4-215(e) applies, it permits essentially a criminal defendant to discharge defense counsel almost at will. When the process of jury selection begins, however, the soon-to-be members of the jury share the courtroom with the defendant and defense counsel. From this point on, allowing the defendant to change at will his or her representation, as Rule 4-215(e) permits, would risk confusing the prospective jurors, one of the concerns against which Brown warns. For example, jurors simply may become confused by seeing the defendant appear with an attorney one moment and without one the next, or, because defense counsel’s trial strategy may affect the questions and challenges posed during voir dire, jurors may be confused when a defendant’s motion to discharge counsel is granted and defendant embarks on abrupt and apparent change to that strategy. In addition, allowing such a change to defense counsel after the entire venire panel is summoned to the courtroom poses a considerable risk of disruption to the trial proceedings in that courtroom, to the court’s jury assignment system (as it is compelled to work around the court’s consideration of the defendant’s request), and to the court’s administration as a whole.
*628To avoid the dangers of confusion to the jury and disruption of trial proceedings that Broum counsels against, and in accordance with the plain meaning of the words of the applicable rule, we hold that “meaningful trial proceedings” have begun after a trial court has begun the voir dire process in a criminal trial. As such, Rule 4-215(e) does not apply literally here to the court’s consideration of Hardy’s motion to dismiss his trial counsel, which was brought after several voir dire questions had been asked. As noted supra, because Rule 4-215(e) does not apply, we consider next whether the trial court’s consideration of Hardy’s request to discharge counsel was a proper exercise of its discretion.
C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in addressing Hardy’s request to discharge his defense counsel.
When a defendant makes a request to discharge counsel at a time when Rule 4-215(e) does not apply strictly, “[t]he court must conduct an inquiry to assess whether the defendant’s reason for dismissal of counsel justifies any resulting disruption” and rule on the request exercising broad discretion. Brown, 342 Md. at 428, 676 A.2d at 525. The court’s burden in making this inquiry is to provide the defendant the opportunity to explain his or her reasons for making the request; in other words, the court need not do any more than supply the forum in which the defendant may tender this explanation. See Campbell, 385 Md. at 635, 870 A.2d at 228 (stating that “the trial judge was not required to make any further inquiry” after the defendant made clear his reasons for wanting to dismiss his counsel); Brown, 342 Md. at 430, 676 A.2d at 526 (describing court’s burden as duty to “provide an opportunity for [the defendant] to explain his [or her] desire to discharge counsel” (emphasis added)).12
*629If the court provides this opportunity, how to address the request is left almost entirely to the court’s “sound discretion.” Brown, 342 Md. at 426, 676 A.2d at 524. According to Brown, the court should consider six factors in exercising its discretion in this regard:
(1) the merit of the reason for discharge; (2) the quality of counsel’s representation prior to the request; (3) the disruptive effect, if any, that discharge would have on the proceedings; (4) the timing of the request; (5) the complexity and stage of the proceedings; and (6) any prior requests by the defendant to discharge counsel.
342 Md. at 428, 676 A.2d at 525. All six of these factors, however, may be considered in a brief exchange between the court and the defendant about the defendant’s reasons for requesting the dismissal of defense counsel. For example, in Campbell, the defendant was allowed to explain at the close of the State’s case why he believed his attorney was not acting in his interest. 385 Md. at 623-24, 870 A.2d at 221. The court then replied “we are beyond that at this point, sir.... He is representing you.” Id. at 624, 870 A.2d at 221. We found that the trial court considered adequately within this brief exchange the six Brown factors and, as such, exercised properly its discretion in denying the defendant’s request, id. at 636, 870 A.2d at 228, even though it did not inquire into the reasons for the request beyond the defendant’s brief explanation of them, and did not announce the reasons for its denial of the defendant’s motion beyond the short assertion that the defendant’s counsel “hasn’t done anything to not represent you,” id. at 624, 870 A.2d at 221.
From this principle, it follows that trial courts abuse their discretion when they fail to allow a defendant any opportunity to explain his or her request at all, thus making it impossible to consider the six factors in Brown. In that case, *630we found that the trial court abused its discretion under just such circumstances. After the close of the State’s case, Brown’s lawyer told the court that Brown wished to dismiss him. Brown, 342 Md. at 429, 676 A.2d at 526. The court asked the lawyer the reasons for the request, to which the lawyer responded “I guess on the advice of his father [who had spoken to him in court that day].” Id. The court replied, “We are in the middle of trial. We will proceed. Go ahead.... You are still counsel....” Id. at 429-30, 676 A.2d at 526. We held that the court abused its discretion because its inquiry was “superficial” and did not adequately provide the defendant an opportunity to explain completely his request. Id. at 431, 676 A.2d at 526.
In the present case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by handling Hardy’s request to discharge his counsel as it did. Hardy’s main contention is that the judge never asked him directly for an explanation of the reasons underlying his desire to discharge his attorney. Hardy, however, explained those reasons anyway, albeit on his initiative. While Brown states that the court must “conduct an inquiry” into requests like Hardy’s, id. at 428, 676 A.2d at 525, we have held—in Brown itself and elsewhere—that the only burden this places on the court is the duty to provide an opportunity for the defendant to give an explanation. The trial court here carried that burden. It did not order Hardy to silence when he began to give the reasons for his request; rather, it allowed Hardy to explain, as fully as he chose, those reasons before continuing with the trial. That the court did not ask a question that led to this explanation is inconsequential on this record. The purpose of the requirement that the court inquire into the reasons for a request to discharge defense counsel is to elicit precisely the kind of response that Hardy gave here voluntarily. That response having been given as fully as Hardy desired and voluntarily, the trial judge in this case fulfilled his duty to provide Hardy the opportunity to explain his request.
*631As the court did not foreclose Hardy’s opportunity to explain his request to discharge counsel, it committed no reversible error. Although earlier in the proceedings it appeared as though the judge might foreclose such contentions without any consideration whatsoever, the court allowed Hardy to explain his request without interruption. The court, in fact, asked more questions of Hardy and of his counsel to clarify Hardy’s explanation than did the court in Campbell. Unlike the court in Brown, the judge here allowed Hardy to explain his motion without interruption, after which it considered the motion briefly and discussed with Hardy the dangers of proceeding as a self-represented defendant, at which point Hardy (presumably appreciating the wisdom of proceeding with counsel) abandoned his request. Because the court provided Hardy with sufficient opportunity to explain himself, it did not abuse its discretion in addressing Hardy’s motion to dismiss his trial counsel as it did.13 Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which granted Hardy a new trial. Because the intermediate appellate court *632did not address Hardy’s three other claims of trial error, it must, on remand, consider them.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT.
. Maryland Rule 4-215, entitled "Waiver of counsel,” provides, in pertinent part:
(e) Discharge of counsel—Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant’s request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel. If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsection (a)(l)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior compliance.
Md. Rule 4-215(e) (2007).
. Presumably, Hardy rejected previously the State's plea offer of a sentence of 12 years.
. The original trial transcript reads:
[HARDY]: I’m saying, I haven’t changed about wanting a trial. I’m thinking about changing the attorney.
THE COURT: Okay. Sit down a minute.
[HARDY]: (inaudible). That’s what I'm saying.
As Hardy’s statements in this regard are critical to this appeal, the parties requested that the court reporter review the audio recording of this exchange to determine what Hardy said where the transcript is marked "(inaudible).” The excerpt from the transcript recounted supra includes the corrections made by the court reporter on 10 May 2010 in response to this request.
. The jury acquitted Hardy on a charge of conspiracy to carjacking.
. The Court of Special Appeals stated the alleged errors raised by Hardy as:
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to follow the dictates of Md. Rule 4-215(e)[;]
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after jurors were given the verdict sheet prior to the start of trial[;]
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in giving preliminary instructions to the juiy[; and,]
4. Whether the trial court erred in giving examples regarding the commission of a rape during the instructions to the jury[.]
. Having found reversible error in the trial proceedings based upon the first of Hardy’s allegations, the Court of Special Appeals declined to consider the other three issues Hardy raised in his appeal on the ground that they were unlikely to reoccur in a new trial. Hardy does not seek review of those issues in this Court.
. The parties in Brown v. State, 373 Md. 234, 817 A.2d 241 (2003), apparently are of no relation to those in Brown, 342 Md. 404, 676 A.2d 513 (1996), referred to frequently throughout this opinion.
. The State insists that Hardy's statement was too vague and indecisive to amount to a request to discharge his attorney, and that it warranted *624no inquiry by the court into Hardy's reasons for wanting to fire his lawyer. Even if Hardy did not intend to make such a request definitively, however, the fact that he was considering the possibility of discharging counsel suggests that some consideration by the court into his rationale was appropriate.
. The Brown opinion seemed to consider the phrase "meaningful trial proceedings” as synonymous with the phrase "start of trial.”
. In Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.1977), the case from which we drew the "meaningful trial proceedings” standard espoused in Brown, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
*626[i]f there is to be a Rubicon beyond which the defendant has lost his unqualified right to defend pro se, it makes far better sense to locate it at the beginning of defendant’s trial.... [A] mid-trial change to a pro se defense may be thought to disrupt the continuity of ongoing proceedings....
Id. at 894. The court also suggested that the critical factor in determining the point during trial at which the die is cast and a defendant’s right to represent himself or herself should be curtailed is whether there is " 'danger of disrupting proceedings already in progress’ ” at that point. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir.1965)).
. The law on this issue among other jurisdictions facing the same or similar issue is in conflict. The State cites a number of federal and state cases in support of the proposition that meaningful trial proceedings begin with the process of selecting a jury. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 108-09 (2d Cir.1998) (holding meaningful trial proceedings had commenced when a request to discharge counsel was raised after 19 days of voir dire); United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir.1979) (noting meaningful trial proceedings had "consumed one day during which counsel had conducted their voir dire examination”); Commonwealth v. El, 602 Pa. 126, 977 A.2d 1158, 1163 (2009) (stating that "proceedings become 'meaningful' as soon as the selection of jurors begins”); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 727, 644 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2007) (suggesting the typical beginning of meaningful trial proceedings is the beginning of voir dire or the introduction of the courtroom participants before the venire). Hardy, meanwhile, cites an equally formidable list of cases that hold that meaningful trial proceedings begin only after a jury is selected and sworn. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 291 F.3d 1100, 1114 (9th Cir.2002) (holding requests to proceed pro se timely if raised before the jury is selected or empaneled); Chapman, 553 F.2d at 887 (holding that a jury must be selected before meaningful trial proceedings begin); *627Applegate v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Ky.2009) (defining beginning of meaningful trial proceedings as when the jury is selected or empaneled); State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 72 P.3d 831, 836 (2003) (finding meaningful trial proceedings begin when the jury is empaneled).
. We agree with the State’s suggestion that it is the defendant’s duty to explain fully the reasons for the request after this opportunity has been provided, rather than there being a continuing burden on the trial judge to probe the defendant with questions until the defendant has given a fuller answer. Not only would it be difficult to determine the precise *629point at which this proposed mandatory line of questioning should cease, but there is no reason that a defendant with valid cause for dismissing his or her attorney should not be forthcoming with all of his or her reasons for requesting that dismissal.
. Hardy contends also that the trial court should have conducted further inquiry into the question of how much time he and defense counsel spent together in preparation for the trial, and of whether that amount of time (in view of the significance and number of charges facing Hardy) was so limited as to render ineffective defense counsel’s assistance to Hardy. In effect, Hardy asks us to mandate that trial courts conduct a sort of “trial within a trial” if defendants raise claims regarding the alleged ineffective assistance of defense counsel during trial proceedings. We decline to impose any such requirement. To compel these subordinate proceedings during trial would present an undue burden on the court, a certain disruption to the trial process, and a procedural quirk ripe for abuse by defendants seeking to introduce error or delay the conduct of their trials. Moreover, such a requirement would contradict directly our frequently repeated rule “that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel generally should be raised in a post-conviction proceeding,” Smith v. State, 394 Md. 184, 199, 905 A.2d 315, 324 (2006), where evidence concerning the effectiveness of counsel's representation is likely to be clearer. Hardy may have grounds to bring a post-conviction action under Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Article, § 7-102(a)(4), but he is not entitled to a new trial simply because the court did not consider in greater depth his incipient claim that he was not represented effectively by his defense counsel.