ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
Both appellant and appellee have filed motions for rehearing in this case. Appel-lee asserts this court erred: (1) in reversing the judgment on a point not assigned; (2) in reversing on a point not stated or briefed; (3) in holding that plaintiff was not a public official for defamation purposes; (4) by failing to hold as a matter of law that appellant was both a public official and a public figure; (5) by holding that a news media can be held liable in damages upon a news story accurately reported; (6) by, in its ruling, violating the established rule of law that it is the duty of the appellate court to sustain the judgment of the trial court if that judgment is correct upon any theory of law; and (7) in denying due process by reversing the judgment of the trial court upon grounds not supported by the record. Appellant asserts error on the part of this court in failing to reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to compel answers to disclose names of witnesses.
In advancing its first two assertions, ap-pellee has apparently overlooked points of error five, six and seven of appellant’s brief wherein he specifically attacked the finding of the trial court that appellant was a public figure as a matter of law and its counterpoint five wherein appellee asserted that, as a matter of law appellant was a public official and a public figure. Examination of the opinion will reveal that appellant’s points of error five through seven *852were granted and the basis therefor explained.
It must also be remembered that this was an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment. In summary judgment cases the summary judgment granted should be affirmed only if the summary judgment record establishes a right thereto as a matter of law and the movant must establish that it is entitled to the judgment by reason of the matters set out in the motion. Clear Creek Basin Auth. v. City of Houston, 573 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.1978); Gibbs v. General Motors Corporation, 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.1970); Harrington v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Houston and Harris County, 452 S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex.1970). The burden of demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact is upon the movant and all doubts are resolved against him. Womack v. Allstate Ins. Company, 156 Tex. 467, 296 S.W.2d 233, 235 (1957); Lindley v. Smith, 524 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, no writ); Cox v. Bancoklahoma Agri-Service Corp., 641 S.W.2d 400, 402 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, no writ).
This court did not hold that a news media could be held liable in damages upon a news story accurately reported. We did hold that, under the rules governing the consideration of an appeal from a summary judgment, the summary judgment evidence under consideration in this appeal did not support a finding that, as a matter of law, appellant was a “public official” or “public figure.” We pointed out that since appellee had not asserted a right to summary judgment upon a negligence theory it was not necessary to determine if the summary judgment proof negated the existence of any fact issue with regard to negligence. Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
We have also considered appellant’s motion for rehearing and we remain convinced our ruling on this point was correct. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is also overruled.