concurring.
I respectfully concur in the result reached by the majority. I agree with the majority’s position that attorney Allen King’s conduct is reprehensible; however, I would not reverse and remand the case for that reason. I would, however, reverse and remand this ease relying on appellant’s second point of error, i.e., that the evidence is factually insufficient to show that William Kerr’s claim was covered under the subject insurance policy.
Special Issue Question No. 1 asked, “Was the accident in question a covered loss and not excluded under the 1983 policy?” The jury answered in the affirmative. The majority upheld the jury’s finding on these two issues. Before a court of appeals can set aside a jury’s determination of fact, it must consider and weigh all the evidence supporting and contrary to the jury’s determination. Sosa v. City of Batch Springs, 772 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Tex.1989); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951). The proper standard of review requires a court of appeals to consider, weigh and compare all the evidence in the record pertinent to the issue under consideration and articulate why the original finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly demonstrates bias. Sosa, 772 S.W.2d at 72; Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). In other words, when reversing a trial court’s judgment after concluding the supporting evidence is insufficient, the court of appeals must detail the relevant evidence and clearly state why the evidence is factually insufficient. INA of Texas v. Briscoe, 780 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.1989). A court of appeals’ conclusion that additional or better evidence might have been presented on the issue under consideration is not a substitute for the analysis required by Pool. Sosa, 772 S.W.2d at 72.
The “NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION MASTER INSURANCE POLICY” providing Kerr’s coverage stated, in relevant part:
II. COVERAGE. The underwriters will pay on behalf of the Individual Insured Member all sums which the Individual Insured Member shall become legally obligated to pay as damages, all as hereinafter defined as included within the terms, “ultimate net loss”, excess1 over and above any other valid and collectible insurance, because of (a) bodily injury,
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caused by an occurrence and rising out of the use by the Individual Insured Member of firearms, ... but only while engaged in the following activities:
(i) Hunting or trapping on public or private land.
*529The evidentiary facts show that Carlton Norrell, William Kerr and A.T. Wolfe went deer hunting. They rented a vehicle from Richard Lee which they used to drive to and from the hunting fields. On the last hunting day, they decided to leave the hunting fields and return the vehicle. According to Kerr, Norrell told him to keep his holster and gun on his hip in case they saw a deer on the way back. On the way back, they had a flat tire. Norrell started changing the tire. Kerr, intending to assist Norrell, removed his pistol from his belt in order to place it inside the vehicle. Kerr dropped the pistol. It discharged, killing Norrell.
Michael Holland, the designated representative of the C.J. Warrilow syndicate, testified that in his opinion, intent is a major consideration in determining whether a person is hunting. He also said that the person alleged to be hunting is in the best position to say whether or not he was actually hunting.
On the day of the incident, Kerr (the person who dropped the pistol) gave a statement to Officer Chaffin. Kerr stated, “[W]e just decided that this being the last day of this season, we’d give it up and go on home_just quit for the ... year_ [W]e got into the Jeep and started home.” During trial, Kerr testified that their hunt would have continued until their arrival at Lee’s; however, he also said that while leaving the hunting fields, they got on a road and drove four or five miles to a gate. Once they passed through this gate, and continued to Lee’s place, permission to hunt would be required. Kerr did not have permission to hunt in this area and would not have shot anything without it. The incident occurred after all of the men had passed through this gate. Kerr admitted that at the time of the incident, he was not looking for something to shoot; rather, he was concentrating on placing his pistol inside the vehicle and changing the tire.
Michael McLain, a field officer with the Colorado Division of Wildlife, arrived at the scene within minutes of the incident. Kerr told McLain the details of the incident. McLain testified that there was no indication of hunting. McLain also filled out an accident report. The report asked whether the victim (Norrell) was hunting. Officer McLain indicated that he was not. McLain based his answer on his discussions with Kerr and Wolfe. He also based his answer on the fact that the incident occurred on a paved road surrounded by private property. McLain testified that they would have needed permission to hunt on the adjoining private property.
The pertinent language in the policy indicates that Kerr enjoyed coverage “only while engaged in” hunting. Our Legislature has said that “hunt” “includes take, kill, pursue, trap, and the attempt to take, kill, or trap.” Tex.Parks & Wild.Code Ann. § 61.005(1) (Vernon 1976). In the instant case, all of the circumstances indicate that prior to and during the incident, actual hunting had ceased and the men were now on a different mission, i.e., returning the rented vehicle to Mr. Lee. Having examined all of the evidence, I would conclude that the greater weight and preponderance of all the credible evidence is that William Kerr was not engaged in hunting at the time of the incident. I would grant a new trial on this issue.
The majority sustained point of error twenty-one and held that the trial court abused its discretion “by failing to order his [attorney King’s] withdrawal and by failing to grant Warrilow’s motion for mistrial when the nature of attorney King’s testimony [as an expert witness] became apparent.” There is no question that King violated the ethical provisions of Disciplinary Rule 5-102[A] and the exceptions stated in Disciplinary Rule 5-101[B][l]-[4]. See Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. Title II, Subtitle G (Vernon 1988).2 These rules were enacted to protect the clients of attorneys and the public in general from the intentional wrongdoing and/or mistakes of attorneys. Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 709 *530S.W.2d 225, 232 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Breaches of these rules result in the attorney receiving private or public reprimand, suspension, or disbarment. These remedies are uniquely appropriate because they prevent the client from suffering any further mistreatment due to counsel’s ethical misconduct.
I do not believe, however, that King’s conduct warrants reversal of the trial court’s judgment. Professor John F. Sutton, Jr., in his article The Testifying Advocate, 41 Texas L.Rev. 477 (1963), stated, relevant to this discussion, that:
The advocate’s interest — occasioned by his fee or merely by an advocate’s partisan instinct — in seeing his client prevail lessens, not strengthens, his credibility and the weight of his testimony. Whenever a lawyer’s testimony is given unusual weight by a particular jury or judge, the lawyer’s demeanor and his standing in the community and similar factors are likely responsible. The circumstance that he is both advocate and witness does not itself enhance his standing as a witness or make his advocacy more appealing. The appearance of a particular lawyer as either a witness or an advocate may be influential with judge and jury, by reason of reputation or personal magnetism, but it is difficult to see how the fact that he simultaneously appears as both could increase his influence on the trier of fact, [footnote omitted]
Apparently, the majority fears that King, by acting as both witness and advocate, somehow enhanced his standing as a witness, and by reversing the judgment on this point, they obviously assume that the jury lacked the intelligence to consider and weigh the effect of King’s interest in the case. An interested witness’ testimony need not be prohibited, because a jury can and will weigh the effect of the interest. Seaboalt v. Vandaveer, 231 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1950, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In the present case, King’s partisan interest is so keenly evident that even the most unsophisticated jury would, could, and in this case did consider his testimony in light of his allegiance to his client’s position.
Furthermore, the testifying advocate is more easily impeachable because of the interest he may have as an advocate in the outcome of his client’s case. In Wilson v. Wilson, 89 Neb. 749, 132 N.W. 401 (1911), an attorney, who was the defendant wife’s principal witness in a divorce action, appeared as her divorce counsel. The Nebraska Supreme Court criticized the attorney’s conduct, saying that his dual role as witness-advocate “is against the ethics of the legal profession, is unseemly, and no doubt weakens the defendant’s case. (Emphasis added.) Wilson, 132 N.W. at 404.
In any given case, the trier of facts may be justified in giving little weight to a witness-advocate’s testimony. Many factors affect the weight of a witness’ testimony, however, and the question of weight of evidence usually is best left to the trier of facts. Seaboalt, 231 S.W.2d at 667. In the present appeal, the record does not reflect, and appellants fail to argue, that King’s testimony was untruthful or lacking in credibility. Appellants certainly had the opportunity to expose any weaknesses in King’s testimony in a thorough cross-examination. In the present case, King’s dual role did not, as such, cause the rendition of an improper judgment. The majority does not refer to the record to show where or how cross-examining King handicapped defense counsel. I note that when a retrial occurs, King will still be an expert witness and, perhaps, an attorney even though he may or may not serve again as Kerr’s trial counsel. Retrial will not make defense counsel’s opportunity to impeach King’s testimony any easier. The majority’s opinion as it now stands punishes the client for the sins of the attorney. The disciplinary rules, however, were not designated to penalize the litigant; rather, their purpose is to delineate the duties an advocate in a judicial proceeding owes to his client. By denying the proper weight of King’s testimony, the majority imputes King’s professional indiscretions to his client.
*531I condemn King’s practice of acting as both witness and advocate for his client. Ample justification for preventing this practice from becoming prevalent is found in the need to maintain due respect for the integrity of the legal profession, which is bound to suffer from such conduct.3 King should be sanctioned by whatever punishment the Texas Supreme Court or our district grievance committee finds appropriate. I conclude, after careful consideration and by reflective thinking, that attorney King’s conduct did not prejudice the opposing party to such an extent that it caused or probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict. Compare Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1) (judicial error).
I would not hold that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order attorney King’s withdrawal and/or by not granting Warrilow’s motion for mistrial when the nature of attorney King’s testimony became apparent.
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial as set out in its premises.
. Emphasis in original.
. See also Tex.Gov't Code Ann. Title II, Subtitle G, Rules 1.15 and Rule 3.08 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
. Our Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals recently adopted "The Texas Lawyer's Creed — A Mandate for Professionalism" in response to the growing practice of abuse of the legal system. These courts urge our profession to rededicate itself to the practice of law "so we can restore public confidence in our profession, faithfully serve our clients, and fulfill our responsibility to the legal system." The considerable lack of ethical judgment presented in other cases as well as this one indicates that this creed appears at a most auspicious time. See Millhouse v. Wiesenthal, 775 S.W.2d 626 (Tex.1989); Cosgrove v. Grimes, 774 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.1989). Neither justice nor our fellow man is served until the principles stated in this creed become the moral fabric that all lawyers wear throughout their personal and professional lives.