Opinion by
Judge CONNELLY.Plaintiff, Taylor Wyeoff, was seriously injured at a winter event held by defendant, Grace Community Church (Grace). Plaintiff and her insurer, intervenor American Medical Security Life Insurance Company (insurer), sued Grace and another defendant. Claims against that other defendant are addressed in Wycoff v. Seventh Day Adventist Ass'n, 251 P.3d 1258 (Colo.App.2010).
The jury returned verdicts against Grace totaling more than $4 million. The court reduced the total to $2 million (the limits of Grace's insurance), awarding some $1.775 million to plaintiff and $225,000 to insurer. After prejudgment interest and costs, the court entered judgment of $2.6 million for plaintiff and $324,000 for insurer. We generally affirm but vacate the judgment, and we order the trial court to enter judgment in the higher amounts unreduced by any insurance limits.
I. Background
Plaintiff was seventeen years old at the time of the accident. Though not a church member, she was one of sixty youths to *1263attend a three-day, two-night event that Grace called "Winterama 2005."
Grace contracted with Seventh Day Adventist Association of Colorado (SDA) to hold the event at Glacier View Ranch, in Ward, Colorado. Grace paid SDA for rooms, meals, and use of the ranch.
Plaintiff's father paid Grace $40 for plaintiff to attend the event. Grace states that plaintiff did not pay more because it awarded her a "partial scholarship." Plaintiff and her mother signed Grace's one-page "Registration and information" form, which Grace contends released the personal injury claims now at issue.
After arriving and checking in at the ranch, plaintiff participated in church-sponsored activities. One activity was riding an inner tube tied to an all terrain vehicle (ATV) driven around a frozen lake. This activity had been conducted in past years by Grace, and also by SDA, without incident.
A large boulder was embedded in the lake some thirty-five feet from shore. A Grace chaperone, accompanied by another man, drove the ATV towing youth participants around the frozen lake. Plaintiff got on an inner tube, and the chaperone began towing her. On plaintiffs second loop around the lake, the Grace chaperone drove the ATV between the boulder and shoreline. Plaintiff's inner tube, still tied to the ATV, veered off and crashed into the boulder.
The crash broke plaintiff's back. She was rushed to intensive care and was hospitalized for several weeks. She suffered loss of bowel and bladder control, loss of vaginal sensation, and numbness in both legs making it difficult for her to walk and unable to run, bend, or squat.
II. Enforeeability of the Alleged Release
A. Background
The purported release was in a one-page "Registration and information" form. It consisted of the third sentence (emphasis not in the original) in the following paragraph:
I give permission for my child to participate in [Grace's] Winterama 2005 and all activities associated with it. I further give consent for any medical treatment necessary to be given to my child in case of injury or sickness. I will not hold Grace Community Church or it's [sic] participants responsible for any liability which may result from participation. I also agree to come and pick up my child should they not obey camp rules.
The form was the subject of trial testimony after the court denied Grace's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff testified that she knew the activities would include riding on an ATV-towed inner tube but that her mother did not know this. The trial court denied Grace's C.R.C.P. 50 motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case-in-chief, ruling that the jury could find either that plaintiff's mother had not made an informed release or alternatively that Grace had acted in a reckless manner not covered by any release.
Grace did not call plaintiffs mother to testify in the defense case. At the close of all the evidence, and outside the jury's presence, the parties discussed whether and how the jury should be instructed on the purported release. The trial court, for reasons not reflected in the record, ruled as a matter of law that the permission slip did not release Grace. It instructed the jury that the purported release was out of the case and should no longer be considered.
B. Overview of Exeulpatory Clauses Affecting Minors
The validity of exculpatory clauses purporting to release or waive future negligence claims is governed by four factors set out in Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo.1981). Usually, the issue turns on the final factor: "whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language." Id.
In 2002, our supreme court held as a matter of public policy that parents cannot prospectively waive liability on behalf of minor children. Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co., 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo.2002). The next year, the General Assembly superseded Cooper by enacting a statute allowing parents to "release or waive the child's prospective claim for negligence." § 13-22-107(8), C.R.9.2010.
*1264The statute superseding Cooper declared that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions on behalf of their children, including deciding whether the children should participate in risky activities. § 13-22-107(1)(a)(I)-(V), C.R.S.2010. It added that "[slo long as the decision is voluntary and informed, the decision should be given the same dignity as decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment, and religious education." § 18-22-107(1)(a)(V). But it further provided that the statute does not permit a parent to waive a child's prospective claim for "willful and wanton, ... reckless, ... [or] grossly negligent" acts or omissions. § 18-22-107(4).
C. Standard of Review
The relevant facts are undisputed, and our review is de novo. See Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colorado Springs, 220 P.3d 559, 563 (Colo.2009) (de novo review of statutory issues); Jones, 623 P.2d at 376 (de novo review of validity of exculpatory clause prospectively releasing liability claims). Thus, while the record does not reflect the trial court's reasoning, we are able independently to review the form to determine whether it was a legally effective release.
D. Analysis
The statute does not elucidate what is necessary to render a parent's decision to release a child's prospective claims "voluntary and informed," § 18-22-107(1)(a)(V). Grace contends this statutory language simply adopts the Jones standards for adults' prospective releases of their own claims. We disagree.
The statute uses language not found in Jones or its progeny. The supreme court in Jones noted that the release there did not "fall within the category of agreements affecting the public interest." 623 P.2d at 377. The inquiry relevant to this case-"whether the intention of the parties is expressed in clear and unambiguous language," id. at 376-does not expressly require that the decision to release one's own prospective claims be an "informed" one. We presume the legislature was aware of case law in this area, see Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 403-04 (Colo.2010), and that its use of a new term was intended to have some significance. Thus, the statutory requirement that the parental decision be an "informed" one must mean something more than that, as already required by Jones, the form's language be sufficiently clear to manifest intent to release liability.
We need not set forth in this case precisely how much information is required for a parental release to satisfy the statute. An "informed" decision-whether involving a legal or medical consent-typically means the "agreement to allow something to happen, [was] made with full knowledge of the risks involved and the alternatives." Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary 346 (Oth ed.2009) (defining "informed consent"); cf. People v. Maestas, 199 P.3d 713, 717 & n. 9 (Colo.2009) ("informed consent" for decisions waiving conflict-free counsel); Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/Healthone, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 587 (Colo.2004) ("informed consent" for medical decisions). In the present context, however, the legislature allowed parental releases "to encourage the affordability and availability of youth activities in this state." § 18-22-107(1)(a)(VID), C.R.8.2010. Arguably, this legislative aim could be undercut if courts required the same level of information to release a claim as to consent to a medical procedure.
There is no information in Grace's one-page registration form describing the event activities, much less their associated risks. Stating that the children would participate in "Winterama 2005 and all activities associated with it" does not indicate what the activities would involve and certainly does not suggest they would include ATV-towed inner-tube excursions around a frozen lake.
We are not persuaded by Grace's argument that it was denied an opportunity to offer evidence-in particular, testimony of plaintiff's mother-that the parental waiver was informed. We will assume for purposes of this case that a facially deficient exceulpato-ry contract could be cured by extrinsic evidence. But cf. Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc., 127 F.3d 1273, 1275 n. 2 (10th Cir.1997) (noting "some dispute in the Colorado case law about whether a plaintiff's experience or *1265lack of experience should be considered when determining the ambiguity of a release"). Even so, the trial court did not preclude Grace from offering any evidence bearing on the validity of the purported release. And it took this issue away from the jury only after the close of all the evidence. Grace thus could have called plaintiff's mother (whom it had listed as a potential trial witness), but it chose not to do so.
Finally, Grace's clause does not pass muster even under Jones. Such clauses "must be closely scrutinized," Jones, 623 P.2d at 376, because they are "disfavored." Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465, 467 (Colo.2004); accord Boles v. Sun Ergoline, Inc., 223 P.3d 724, 726 (Colo.2010). A release need not contain any magic words to be valid; in particular, it need not specifically refer to waiver of "negligence" claims. Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 784-85 (Colo.1989). But, in every Colorado Supreme Court case upholding an exculpatory clause, the clause contained some reference to waiving personal injury claims based on the activity being engaged in. See, e.g., Chadwick, 100 P.3d at 468 (release detailed risks of hunting trip with animals and participant agreed to "'RELEASE [outfitter} FROM ANY LEGAL LIABILITY ... for any injury or death caused by or resulting from'" participation in hunt); Heil Valley Ranch, 784 P.2d at 782 (release form stated that riding horse involved inherent risks, and participant "EXPRESSLY ASSUMES SUCH RISK AND WAIVES ANY CLAIM HE SHE MIGHT STATE AGAINST THE STABLES AS A RESULT OF PHYSICAL INJURY INCURRED IN SAID ACTIVITIES"); Jones, 623 P.2d at 372 (skydiving plaintiff released company "from any and all liability, claims, demands or actions or causes of action whatsoever arising out of any damage, loss or injury" resulting from "negligence ... or from some other cause").
Grace's form made no reference to the relevant activity or to waiving personal injury claims. The operative sentence (the third one in a paragraph) states only that plaintiff will not hold Grace "responsible for any liability which may result from participation." Surrounding sentences address other issues: the first gives permission to attend; the see-ond consents to medical treatment; and the fourth agrees to pick up disobedient children.
Grace contends its "waiver included liability for 'any' injuries related to 'all activities' conducted at Winterama 2005." But the form does not say this. And nowhere does the form provide parents with information allowing them to assess the degree of risk and the extent of possible injuries from any activity. The form is legally insufficient to release plaintiff's personal injury claims.
IIL Issues Under the Premises Liability Act
Grace contends the court made two errors under the Premises Liability Act, § 13-21-115, C.R.8.2010. First, Grace denies being a "landowner" covered by the Act. Second, it contends that plaintiff was a "licensee" rather than an "invitee." Because the facts relevant to these issues are undisputed, our review is de novo. Lakeview Associates, Ltd. v. Maes, 907 P.2d 580, 583-84 (Colo.1995).
The Act provides the sole remedy against landowners for injuries on their property. Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 328-29 (Colo.2004). A landowner's duties turn on a trial court's determination of whether the plaintiff was an "invitee," a "licensee," or a "trespasser." § 18-21-115(8) & (4), CRS. 2010. The greatest duty is owed to an "invitee": a landowner must "exercise reasonable care" to protect such a person from dangers of which the landowner knew or should have known. Lombard v. Colorado Outdoor Educ. Center, Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 575 (Colo.2008) (construing § 18-21-115(@8)(c)(D). In contrast, a "licensee" is owed lesser, and a "trespasser" owed the least, duties. See Vigil, 103 P.3d at 328.
A. Grace was a "Landowner"
The Act's definition of a "landowner" is broader than the term might suggest. See § 18-21-115(1), C.R.8.2010 (" 'landowner' includes, without limitation, an authorized agent or a person in possession of real property and a person legally responsible for the condition of real property or for the activities *1266conducted or cireumstances existing on real property"). Thus, a "person need not hold title to the property to be considered a 'landowner?" Burbach v. Canwest Investments, LLC, 224 P.3d 437, 441 (Colo.App.2009) (citing Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.3d 1215, 1219 (Colo.2002)).
It is not apparent why Grace seeks to avoid landowner status under the Act. The Act, meant to "protect landowners," § 18-21-115(1L.5)(e), C.R.S.2010 (emphasis added), eliminates common law negligence claims while imposing only a duty of reasonable care toward invitees and even lesser duties toward licensees and trespassers. See Vigil, 103 P.3d at 828-29. If Grace were correct that it was not covered by the Act, it still would have owed plaintiff a duty of reasonable care and could not argue that plaintiff was a mere licensee owed only lesser duties under the Act.
In any event, we have little difficulty concluding that Grace was a landowner as defined by the Act. A landowner includes one "legally responsible ... for the activities conducted on real property." § 18-21-115(1). This definition, which covers one "who is legally conducting an activity on the property," Pierson, 48 P.3d at 1221, plainly encompassed Grace. It was clear, from Grace's reservations agreement and understandings with SDA, that Grace was authorized to conduct (if not principally responsible for conducting) activities involving its group on the ranch property.
Grace's arguments against this straightforward conclusion are unpersuasive. Its argument that SDA owned the property fails, because the Act is not limited to property owners. See Burbach, 224 P.3d at 441.
Grace further argues that it was "only present on the property for a short time" and thus "in a much worse position than SDA to know of the conditions of the property, or to know whether a particular activity would be dangerous on the property." But the Act is not limited to those in exelusive possession of land, see Pierson, 48 P.3d at 1220, and the Act expressly contemplates that there may be multiple landowners in a case. See § 183-21-115(4). There accordingly is no need for a binary choice as to which entity, as between Grace and SDA, was better able to protect plaintiff against injury. If Grace in fact had no reason to know of the relevant danger, that could provide a factual defense at trial rather than an exemption from the Act's coverage.
Grace finally suggests that treating it as a landowner would lead to absurd results because everyone engaged in activities on the ranch, including plaintiff herself, would also be a landowner. The instant appeal does not present any issue regarding who, other than Grace, might have been a landowner. We note, however, that the Act's definition of a landowner does not extend to everyone lawfully participating in activities on land; rather, it covers those "legally responsible ... for the activities conducted" on land. § 13-21~115(1). It is doubtful that a mere participant such as plaintiff was "legally responsible" for the activities conducted at the ranch. Regardless, we are convinced there is nothing unfair, much less absurd, in applying the Act to Grace-an entity that indisputably was responsible for the ATV activity conducted on the ranch.
B. Plaintiff was an "Invitee" rather than "Licensee"
Grace's contention that plaintiff was not an "invitee" but was merely a "lHcen-see" affects the duty owed by Grace to plaintiff, If plaintiff was an invitee, then the trial court correctly instructed the jury that Grace had to use reasonable care to protect against dangers of which it knew or reasonably should have known. Lombard, 187 P.3d at 570-71, 575. In contrast, had plaintiff been a mere licensee, Grace's duties would have been limited to actually known dangers. See Vigil, 103 P.3d at 328. We conclude that plaintiff was an invitee and, therefore, that the trial court correctly instructed the jury regarding Grace's obligations toward her.
An "invitee" is one who enters or remains on another's land "to transact business in which the parties are mutually interested or . in response to the landowner's express or implied representation that the public is requested, expected, or intended to enter or remain." § 18-21-115(5)(a), C.R.S.2010. A *1267"licensee" is one who enters or remains on another's land "for the Heensee's own convenience or to advance his own interests, pursuant to the landowner's permission or consent." § 18-21-115(5)(b). The statute expressly provides that the latter category "includes a social guest." Id.
The principal distinction between an "invitee" and a "licensee" turns on whether that person's presence on the land was affirmatively invited or merely permitted. The See-ond Restatement distinguishes an "invitation" from "mere permission" as follows: "an invitation is conduct which justifies others in believing that the possessor desires them to enter the land; permission is conduct justifying others in believing that the possessor is willing that they shall enter if they desire to do so." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 882 emt. b (1965).
The Second Restatement gives examples of licensees whose presence is merely permitted rather than encouraged. "Examples of licensees" include those "taking short cuts across land with the consent of the possessor," "[Hoafers, loiterers, and those who enter only to get out of the weather, with permission to do so," and and sightseers not in any way encouraged to come." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 880 reporter's notes (1965).
Here, Grace affirmatively encouraged, and did not simply permit, the presence of plaintiff and other youth attendees. Grace sponsored the event, secured access to the land and lodgings, and arranged for meals. It took affirmative steps-including driving plaintiff and the others to the ranch-to facilitate their attendance and participation. To further encourage plaintiffs attendance, Grace provided her with what it describes as a "partial scholarship."
Simply put, Grace invited plaintiff and the other youths to attend its organized event. Grace's actions demonstrate that Grace was affirmatively interested in having youths attend the event. Plaintiff's situation was not comparable to that of a licensee merely permitted but not invited to be on another's land.
Only one type of licensee is categorically deemed not to be an invitee despite having affirmatively been encouraged to enter another's land: a "social guest." See § 18-21-115(5)(b). As one treatise puts it, such a guest "is an invitee who is not an invitee." 5 Harper, Gray, and James on Torts § 27.11, at 284 (3d ed.2008).
We are not persuaded by Grace's contention that plaintiff was merely its social guest. Social hosts do not typically require their guests to sign permission slips and pay for their hospitality. Here, unlike a social guest accepting a host's unrequited hospitality, plaintiff attended an organized group event-for which her father paid Grace $40-intend-ed to serve the mutual interests of the attendees and sponsor.
In contrast to the inapposite licensee categories, plaintiff falls more naturally within the Premises Liability Act's definition of an invitee. The Act creates two sometimes overlapping subcategories of invitees: (1) those present to transact business of mutual interest, and (2) public invitees. § 18-21-115(5)(a); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 882 & emt. a (1965) (creating two similar subcategories, of "business visitors" and "public invitees," but explaining that many invitees could be placed in either class).
Grace contends that plaintiff was not an invitee because her invitation did not involve transacting business and was not extended to the general public. We disagree.
As to the former subcategory, commercial business was transacted between Grace and plaintiff: plaintiff's father paid Grace $40 so plaintiff could attend the event. That Grace ultimately may not have profited (because the $40 was included among monies paid over to SDA or because Grace defrayed remaining costs through award of a "partial scholarship") is not relevant under the Premises Liability Act.
Moreover, those present on land "to transact business in which the parties are mutually interested," § 13-21-115(5)(a), need not invariably be engaged in commercial activity. See generally Bryan A. Garner, Black's Law Dictionary 226 (Oth ed.2009) (definition of "business" can include "transactions or mat*1268ters of a noncommercial nature"); cf. In re Parental Responsibilities of H.Z.G., 77 P.3d 848, 851-53 (Colo.App.2003) (holding that Colorado's long-arm statute, extending personal jurisdiction based on "[the transaction of any business within this state," § 13-21-124(1)(a), C.R.S.2010, applies to noncommercial activities; following out-of-state cases). Thus, other courts have extended "business invitee" status where nonprofit entities encouraged attendance by individuals whose presence provided no apparent economic benefit. See, e.g., Thomas v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 283 N.W.2d 254, 258 (S.D.1979) (visiting high school basketball player injured at a church school gymnasium was the church's "business invitee"); Home v. N. Kitsap School Dist., 92 Wash.App. 709, 965 P.2d 1112, 1118 (1998) (visiting assistant football coach at game where no admission was charged was an invitee because "Thlis presence was related to [public school district's] business of running its schools").
As to the latter subcategory, one can be a "public" invitee where an invitation is extended to "the public, or classes or members of it." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 882 emt. c (emphasis added). Thus, a garden club member was an invitee of an estate "opened to those members of the public who were on the Palm Beach Garden Club tour of homes." Post v. Lunney, 261 So.2d 146, 148 (Fla.1972). And a girl-scout leader was an invitee where a bank allowed the troop ("a segment of the public") free use of its facilities. McKinnon v. Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 68 Wash.2d 644, 414 P.2d 773, 777-78 (1966).
Ultimately, plaintiff was an invitee because Grace's invitation carried an implicit assurance that Grace would act with reasonable care to protect her. See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 600 (2000) ("The real point is that anyone who receives implicit or explicit assurance of safety is entitled to the invitee status and the reasonable care that goes with it."). Grace's post hoe denials of such implicit assurances are unpersuasive. Few youths would attend-and even fewer parents would allow and pay for their child's attendance at-an overnight event whose sponsor disclaimed any intent or ability to make the event reasonably safe.
IV. Pretrial and Trial Proceedings
A. Pretrial Election
Though the case went to the jury only on a Premises Liability Act (PLA) claim, Grace argues that plaintiff should have been required to elect before trial between PLA and negligence claims. But it would have been unfair to compel such an election before resolving Grace's contentions that it was not subject to the PLA. In any event, Grace was not prejudiced by lack of an earlier election. Cf. Thornbury v. Allen, 991 P.2d 335, 340 (Colo.App.1999) (harmless error to instruct jury on both negligence and PLA claims).
B. Evidentiary Ruling
The trial court, over Grace's objection, allowed into evidence the rental agreement that prohibited Grace from using the ATVs to tow anything. Grace renews its CRE 401-403 contentions that this contract was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.
Trial courts have "broad discretion" to decide if documentary evidence should be admitted over relevancy and unfair prejudice objections. Uptain v. Huntington Lab, Inc., 723 P.2d 1322, 1329 (Colo.1986). Here, it was within the trial court's broad discretion to conclude that the rental contract was relevant and had probative value that was not significantly outweighed by any danger of unfair prejudice. That Grace used the rented ATVs for a contractually prohibited activity-the very activity that injured plaintiff-could properly be considered by the jury in evaluating whether Grace used reasonable care under all the cireumstances of this case.
C. Closing Argument
Grace contends that plaintiffs counsel's closing argument was improper in various respects. None of Grace's current objections was timely raised in the trial court. Indeed, after the case had been submitted, Grace's counsel noted just one alleged error in plaintiff's closing argument; as to that single argument, he stated, "I don't know what a *1269remedy for that is, but I think the record should reflect that [this argument] did occur." The trial court responded that "[the record reflects what it was."
Our review of these unpreserved objections is exceptionally limited. There is no civil rule analogue to the criminal rule, Crim. P. 52(b), allowing plain error review. In civil damages cases, moreover, liberty is not at stake and there is no constitutional right to effective counsel. Thus, only in a "rare" civil case, involving "unusual or special" cireum-stances-and even then, only "when necessary to avert unequivocal and manifest injustice"-will an appellate court reverse based on an unpreserved claim of error. Harris Group, Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188, 1195 (Colo.App.2009) (discussing Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 586-87 (Colo.1984), and Robinson v. City & County of Denver, 30 P.3d 677, 684 (Colo.App.2000)).
Grace's unpreserved challenges to plaintiff's closing arguments do not come close to meeting this demanding standard. The closing arguments were not plainly improper and did not result in any manifest injustice.
V. Amount of Judgment
The final issue is whether judgment should have entered in the full amount of the jury verdiets or a lesser amount covered by Grace's insurance. The trial court reduced the judgment to $2 million total but, because it construed Grace's policy to cover them, added prejudgment interest and costs. All sides challenge this amount. Grace contends the trial court acted erroneously (or at least precipitously) in construing the policy to cover prejudgment interest on top of the $2 million policy limits, while plaintiff and insurer contend that the amount of judgment should have been tied to the higher jury verdicts regardless of any lesser insurance coverage carried by Grace. We agree with plaintiff and insurer.
The issue turns on a construction of seetion 7-123-105, C.R.S.2010. That statute dates to 1967, a year after a fractured supreme court case (generating a majority opinion, a separate concurrence, two separate dissents, and an "addendum" by the author of the majority opinion) grappled with the common law doctrine of charitable trust immunity. See Hemenway v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 161 Colo. 42, 419 P.2d 312 (1966). Surprisingly, the statute has never been construed in a published appellate opinion.
Before addressing the statute, we summarize the common law backdrop against which it was enacted. One thing was clear under Colorado common law: funds held in "trust" for charitable purposes could not be "depleted" by a tort judgment. St. Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 468, 238 P. 22, 24 (1925). Later cases also stated, however, that while this "trust-fund rule does not bar an action against a charitable institution based on the tort of its agents," "it does prohibit the levying of an execution under a judgment procured against it in such a suit on any property which is a part of the charitable trust." O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 261, 96 P.2d 835, 835 (1989), quoted and followed in St. Lukes Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 28-29, 240 P.2d 917, 920 (1952).
Colorado cases thus distinguished between a permissible tort suit or judgment against a charity and the exemption of trust funds from levy or execution. In 1960, our supreme court wrote that "so-called charitable immunity does not protect from suit or judgment" and "immunity from attachment of trust funds does not come into play until such attachment is attempted." Michard v. Myron Stratton Home, 144 Colo. 251, 258, 355 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1960).
The distinction became blurred, and confusion was spawned, where it was undisputed a defendant charity had no non-trust-fund assets available to satisfy any judgment. That was the situation in Hemenway, where the justices divided over the propriety of pretrial dismissal. Compare 161 Colo. at 45, 419 P.2d at 313 (affirming dismissal because "no useful purpose would be served by directing this action to proceed to judgment" where parties stipulated there were no non-trust-fund assets available), with id. at 46, 419 P.2d at 314 (McWilliams, J., concurring) (agreeing dismissal should be affirmed, but only because parties had stipulated to it if trust-fund *1270doctrine remained viable), and with id. (Pringle, J., dissenting) (issue was "premature" because "in this State charitable immunity is not immunity from suit or liability for tort, but only a recognition that trust funds cannot be seized upon by execution nor appropriated to the satisfaction of tort liability”).
That confusion should not have extended to the present case, where Grace indisputably had a $2 million insurance policy. Even under common law it was clear that insurance funds could be executed on to satisfy a tort judgment. See O'Connor, 105 Colo. at 261-62, 96 P.2d at 836.
In any event, the author of Hemenway invited Colorado's legislature to address the issue. See 161 Colo. at 49-53, 419 P.2d at 316-17 (addendum of Moore, J.). The General Assembly accepted this invitation a year later when it enacted the predecessor of the statute now codified as section 7-1283-105. See Ch. 827, see. 1, § 31-24-110, 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 655.
The statute, titled "Actions against nonprofit corporations," does two things by its express terms. First, it removes any possible immunity from suit by providing that "[alny other provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any civil action permitted under the law of this state may be brought against any nonprofit corporation." § 7-123-105. Second, it allows for levy and execution against otherwise immune assets of nonprofit entities "to the extent" the entity would be reimbursed by liability insurance. See id. ("the assets of any nonprofit corporation that would, but for articles 121 to 187 of this title, be immune from levy and execution on any judgment shall nonetheless be subject to levy and execution to the extent that such nonprofit corporation would be reimbursed by proceeds of liability insurance policies carried by it were judgment levied and executed against its assets").
Thus, under the statute's plain terms, there is no longer (if there ever was) any impediment to suits against nonprofit organizations. The statute, moreover, does not limit the amount of any resulting judgment, but simply addresses "the extent" to which any such judgment is "subject to levy and execution." Id.
We conclude, under the plain language of the statute and under the prior common law, that the existence and amount of liability insurance provides no basis for limiting a judgment against a nonprofit or charitable defendant. Rather, the issue of liability insurance is relevant only when a plaintiff seeks to levy and execute on a judgment.
Here, therefore, it is premature to construe Grace's insurance policy to determine the extent of its coverage, including whether the policy would cover prejudgment interest in addition to any liability limit. Regardless of insurance coverage, plaintiff and insurer were entitled to entry of judgment against Grace to the full amount of a judgment that would have been entered against a for-profit entity. Whether and to what extent plaintiff and insurer ultimately can execute on their judgment is a separate issue that need not be decided at this juncture.
VI. Conclusion
The judgment is vacated as to the amount, and the case is remanded for entry of a new judgment unreduced by any limits on Grace's insurance coverage. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
Judge CARPARELLI concurs. Judge FURMAN dissents.