ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Both petitioner, Brannon, and respondent, Gulf States Energy Corporation, have filed motions for rehearing. Brannon asks that we delete from our opinion any inference of a possibility that Gulf States may now own an interest in the 1973 Martin 202 acre lease, which was conveyed by quitclaim deed from the Internal Revenue Service to Brannon, et al. Brannon states that this issue has been litigated and determined against Gulf States in another lawsuit in Coleman County. The record in this case does not reveal any such prior litigation, and it has been referred to for the first time in Brannon’s motion for rehearing. Brannon further argues that by judicial admissions, estoppel, and election of an inconsistent remedy, Gulf States has waived any claim to an interest in the 1973 Martin lease. Neither of these issues has been fully developed or briefed in the present case. Therefore, such issues should be considered at the trial upon remand.
Brannon also argues that none of the evidence on good faith development by Gulf States is admissible in view of our holding that such evidence could not vary the written instruments evidencing payment of rentals by Gulf States on the 1973 Martin lease. While parol evidence was not admissible to vary the written contract, it is admissible and should be heard on retrial for the sole purpose of determining whether Gulf States believed in good faith in the superiority of its 1975 lease when it drilled the three wells on the Martin lease. Bran-non contends that Gulf States should be held as a matter of law not to have been in good faith in drilling the third well because it was commenced after this suit was filed. This particular argument is overruled because Gulf States entered upon the Martin tract and began its drilling program prior to the filing of this case. The question of Gulf States’ good faith is still one of fact to be decided upon remand.
Brannon further contends in the alternative that each of the three wells should be treated separately in determining the re-coupment of costs to which Gulf States would be entitled if held again upon retrial to have been acting in good faith. However, this argument is not briefed; no cases *226are cited on the point; and like the other issues referred to above, it should be developed, briefed and decided at the new trial.
Gulf States’ motion complains of our holding that it was not a stranger to the 1973 Martin lease when it paid the rentals due thereon. It argues that no right or title ever passed to it by reason of the contract with Brannon dated February 18, 1974, or by a constructive trust resulting therefrom. We have disposed of this argument in our original opinion contrary to the views argued by Gulf States.
Accordingly, both motions for rehearing are overruled.