concurring.
I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately to emphasize that I do not read the majority opinion as saying that the condition of the Revelle marriage “had no relevance” under all circumstances. Moreover, contrary to the view expressed in Judge Prewitt’s dissent, I do not read the majority opinion as turning “on relevancy.” Had I interpreted the majority opinion in that fashion and had such alleged views been dispositive, I could not concur.
The State admits that Lisa’s memo was hearsay. In his dissent, Judge Prewitt concedes that Lisa’s memo was hearsay, but says: “We should have enough confidence in the jury system that we should not keep this type of relevant evidence out-” Although I, too, have confidence in the jury system, it should be borne in mind that rules of evidence were originally devised for jury trials. See 1 John HenRY WigmoRe, Evidence § 4 at 35, § 4b at 107-08 n. 1 (Tiller’s rev.1983). In my view, consistent adherence to the law of evidence is essential to maintaining confidence in the jury system.
Our supreme court has said that “even if relevant, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.” *435State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 110 (Mo.banc 1992). Certainly, evidence tending to establish motive is relevant. Yet, as this court has said, “motive can no more be proved by inadmissible and objected-to hearsay than any other fact.” State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d at 85 (Mo.App. S.D. 1997).
Defendant’s first point relied on charges that “[t]he trial court erred in admitting into evidence [Lisa’s memo] concerning marital disharmony between appellant and the victim because this writing was hearsay....” In developing this point, Defendant argues the following:
“The trial court’s admission of the marital note was fundamentally flawed for one reason. It admitted the evidence simply because it found the note to be relevant. At no time did the trial court analyze appellant’s claim that the marital note was inadmissible hearsay. Instead, the trial court proceeded directly to an analysis of the relevancy of this evidence Specifically, the court examined only whether the marital note was written at a time too remote to be relevant_ Despite appellant’s objections to the hearsay nature of the marital note the trial court concluded only that ‘it’s an issue for the jury ... whether or not this note has probative value at all....’ However, this conclusion ignored a foundational and a crucial issue, whether the jury should have been permitted to evaluate the marital note’s probative value at all.”
The background to this argument and the circumstances surrounding Lisa’s memo and its admission can be summarized as follows.
The morning Lisa Revelle was murdered, an investigator found the questioned memo in the basement of the Revelle home. Later, officer Michael Rogers had Lisa’s memo in his possession as he interviewed Defendant. Without disclosing that he had the memo, Rogers asked Defendant to characterize his marriage with Lisa. According to Rogers, Defendant repeatedly denied any marital problems, said his marriage was perfect, and denied that Lisa ever gave him ultimatums about divorce or separation. Rogers quoted Defendant as saying: “My life was perfect until today.” Thereon, Rogers produced Lisa’s memo and showed it to Defendant. Asked to describe Defendant’s reaction, Rogers said: “[H]is face fell, his head went down[,][h]e slumped in the chair-” Rogers testified that he asked Defendant, “ ‘Would you like me to read you this,’ and [Defendant answered] ‘No, I know what it says.’ ”
As a pre-trial matter, Defendant asked the trial court to suppress Lisa’s memo via a motion in limine on the grounds that it was “hearsay” and too “remote in time.” Initially, the trial court denied Defendant’s request to exclude Lisa’s memo. A few days later, the court reversed its position and sustained Defendant’s request to exclude the memo. However, the trial court indicated it would consider any evidence adduced on the issue of remoteness, i.e., evidence concerning when Lisa may have written the memo. During trial, specifically after jury selection but before opening arguments, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion in limine. Officer Rogers testified about his “marital status” interview with Defendant, including Defendant’s reaction when confronted with Lisa’s memo. After both the State and defense presented evidence on the “remoteness” issue, the prosecutor urged the admission of Lisa’s memo as follows:
“[MR. HULSHOF, THE PROSECUTOR]
... [T]he purpose for which we offer [Lisa’s memo] is to show the inconsistency or the deception that the defendant was attempting to put over the investigators. If there were to be an argument Well, but this was written in the hand of the decedent and therefore it’s not admissible’, we would state—
“THE COURT:—I think the only issue we have—
“MR. HULSHOF—Okay, remoteness—
“THE COURT:—is remoteness—
“MR. HULSHOF—WeU, then I would—
“THE COURT;—I’ve read the motion, and it appears to me that is the only issue that we have concerning the memo.
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“MR. HULSHOF:—I will forego then the argument about the state of mind and things of that nature.
*436“THE COURT: I don’t think that’s the issue.
“MR. HULSHOF: Judge, we feel that this is clearly the document that impeaches the defendant’s statement, and we anticipate through discovery from the defense that either cross examination of state witnesses or perhaps even direct examin[ation] of the defendant’s witnesses, the jury is going to hear testimony about the state of the marriage and how good it appeared from the outside, from the neighbor’s perspectives. We have no way to refute that in that Lisa Revelle has been murdered, and so this is evidence that directly refutes the defendant’s version, and we ask the Court to allow the state to introduce it into evidence. ...”
The trial court then reversed itself and ruled that Lisa’s memo was admissible.
Later, during the trial, Rogers told the jury about his “marital status” interview with Defendant. The State then moved for admission of Lisa’s memo. Defense counsel responded, saying: “No objection other than what’s already on the record previously, Judge.”
In my view, defense counsel timely objected that Lisa’s memo was “hearsay” and clearly reiterated that complaint in the motion for new trial. Consequently, Defendant preserved for appellate review his claim that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence. See State v. Penn, 413 S.W.2d 281, 283[5] (Mo.1967); State v. Newson, 898 S.W.2d 710, 715 (Mo.App.1995) (cases holding that objections on the grounds that questioned evidence is “hearsay” preserve the claims of error for appellate review).1
Twice in arguments before this court, the State conceded that Lisa’s memo was hearsay; accordingly, it must be regarded as presumptively inadmissible. See State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Baker, 505 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Mo.App.1974). “In order to avoid trial court error and.to enable the court to rule intelligently, the burden is on the party offering the evidence to explain the proper grounds for its admission.” Adams v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 865 S.W.2d 748, 752[7] (Mo.App.1993). “This is particularly so where the proffered evidence, as here, is normally inadmissible.” Id. “After objection, a sufficient showing that some exception qualifies the hearsay testimony is a necessary predicate to receipt of the evidence.” Jordan v. Robert Half Personnel Agencies of Kansas City, Inc., 615 S.W.2d 574, 584 (Mo.App.1981) (citing Gough v. General Box Co., 302 S.W.2d 884 (Mo.1957)).
On appeal, the State tried by various theories to fit Lisa’s memo into some hearsay exception that would qualify it as admissible. The majority opinion analyzed the State’s arguments and, in my view, correctly concluded that the State failed in all such endeavors.2
In his dissent, Judge Prewitt says that evidence about Defendant’s conduct when faced with Lisa’s memo could be seen as an acknowledgment by Defendant that he lied to investigators about the quality of his marriage and thus give rise to an inference of guilty knowledge. I agree. However, the issue is not whether evidence of Defendant’s conduct was admissible. The record reveals that evidence of Defendant’s reaction when confronted with Lisa’s memo came in without objection. The dispositive issue is the admissibility of Lisa’s memo, i.e., whether there is any hearsay exception that will qualify it as admissible. Neither State v. Stewart, 850 S.W.2d 916 (Mo.App.1993), nor State v. Al*437len, 817 S.W.2d 526 (Mo.App.1991), nor any other case of which I am aware, permits the use of hearsay evidence to show consciousness of guilt unless that evidence fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. The State’s failure to brief “consciousness of guilt” as grounds for admission of Lisa’s memo indicates that it knew the memo was not admissible under that theory.
Nothing in this record suggests that the trial court ever considered or the State ever urged that the challenged testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the victim’s statement, and therefore was not hearsay. The record reveals that no limiting instruction was requested and none was given. This is understandable because it does not appear that anyone at trial understood that Lisa’s memo was not being offered to prove the truth of its contents. Yet, Judge Garrison’s dissent seems to say that we can treat Lisa’s memo as properly admitted by considering it, not for the truth of statements therein, but as evidence offered to show Defendant’s motive. To take that approach, however, ignores the importance of a limiting instruction. When out-of-court statements of a homicide victim that inferentially implicate a defendant are admitted, the minimum requirement is a limiting instruction. United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758, 766, n. 25 (D.C.Cir.1973).
The State never explained at trial that it intended to use Lisa’s memo for a non-hearsay purpose. Thus, Defendant was effectively denied an opportunity to request a limiting instruction or argue to the jury that the memo should be given limited consideration.
The dissents make a compelling argument that, at least on the issue of motive, the memo is relevant. If Defendant is retried, Lisa’s memo may be admissible depending on how it is submitted and used. However, as incongruous as that may seem, this court deals only with the record presented to it.
Again, I concur with the majority opinion.
. I cannot perceive that this learned, experienced, and capable trial judge would not have understood that defense counsel’s objection to Lisa’s memo was two-fold: (1) That it was hearsay, and (2) that it was too remote.
. During oral argument, the State cited State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.banc 1997) as holding that objected-to hearsay otherwise inadmissible can be used to prove motive. Judge Prewitt’s dissent also cites Basile as "relevant here.” I disagree. As the dissent shows by its quote from Basile, the questioned testimony in Basile was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; consequently, it was not hearsay. For that reason alone, Basile is markedly different from this case. Moreover, the testimony at issue in Basile came in without objection. Thus, even if the Basile testimony had been hearsay, it would fall within the rule that hearsay received without objection may be considered by a jury. State v. Thomas, 440 S.W.2d 467, 470[3] (Mo.1969). In my view Basile lends no strength to the State’s position.