dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion, in deciding this matter on a different basis than presented in the trial court, concludes that in a prosecution for murdering his wife, evidence that the wife is unhappy with the marriage “had no relevance.” Outside of a confession or eyewit*438ness testimony of the offense, it is difficult to conceive of anything that could be more relevant.
The majority opinion turns on relevancy. It states: “[T]he general rule is that extrajudicial statements of a declarant-victim’s present state of mind are excepted from the hearsay ban, provided the declarant’s state of mind at the time is an issue in the case.” It then concludes that “Lisa’s state of mind ‘as to her belief in the future of the marriage’ and ‘as to her future relations with [Defendant]’ had no relevance.” The majority determined that the memo was not relevant for “state of mind or a true indication of Defendant’s motive,” but that non-hearsay evidence of marital disharmony is admissible.
Judge Shrum’s concurring opinion assumes that the memo is inadmissible hearsay, denies that the majority opinion was decided on relevancy, and yet seems to agree that the memo is relevant. Those opinions are inconsistent and can only be reconciled by ignoring the distinction between relevancy and hearsay discussed later herein. My colleague misreads the majority opinion, the record, and this dissent, as further discussed primarily in footnotes added since his initial concurring opinion was circulated.1
Certainly a happy husband in a harmonious marriage is not likely to kill his wife. An interspousal “memo” is so unusual that it indicates problems with the marriage, especially a memo with the tone of this document. Defendant knew of the memo, discussed it with his wife, and admitted the memo and what it said was a serious factor in their relationship. The memo was not timely filed here, but at my request, was later received. It is set forth marginally.2
Ironically, the evidence reflects that both the Defendant and the investigating officers recognized the relevance of the condition of the Revelle marriage. During the initial investigation on the day of Lisa Revelle’s death, an officer asked Defendant if there had been any marital problems. Defendant portrayed their marriage as “just perfect.” The investigating officer then pulled the memo out of his pocket and Defendant’s face fell, his head went down, and he slumped in his chair. He said he knew the memo’s contents. Defendant said that as a result of the memo the couple had a long talk and things had been better in the last six to eight months of their marriage. The memo was offered into evidence and Defendant’s counsel stated, “No objection other than what’s already on the record previously_” What was on the record was the contention that *439the memo Was too remote. Judge Shrum’s concurring opinion refers to Defendant’s brief as to his current objections, but does not correctly analyze the record as to the objection made before the trial judge.3
There was no discussion when offered as to the basis for admissibility of the memo. In argument during hearings on the pretrial motions, the State initially indicated that the memo was relevant because it showed that Defendant was seeking to mislead the investigators. It is clearly the law that conduct and statements of the Defendant occurring after the commission of a crime, which are relevant to show consciousness of guilt, are admissible. State v. Eighinger, 931 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Mo.App.1996). “Guilty knowledge may be inferred from false statements to police.”4 State v. Stewart, 850 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Mo.App.1993). See also State v. Allen, 817 S.W.2d 526, 528 (Mo.App.1991)(“false statements to police ... can give rise to an inference of guilty knowledge”).
Defendant’s conduct when confronted with the memo could be interpreted as an acknowledgment that he sought to mislead the investigators regarding the condition of the marriage. Neither party, in their briefs or in oral argument, addressed the memo’s admissibility on that theory, nor does the majority opinion. The latter discusses the relevancy of the memo on the issues briefed, not on just the theories before the trial court, Based on such cases as Stewart and Allen, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the memo on what was one of the State’s theories at trial.4
There was, likewise, no abuse of discretion in admitting the memo upon the theories briefed here. We should have enough confidence in the jury system that we should not keep this type of relevant evidence out on the basis that the State said it was hearsay, as it was. Numerous decisions state that a victim’s state of mind is not hearsay or is not subject to the hearsay rule, and is admissible and relevant. See, e.g., State v. Boliek, 706 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. banc 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 908, 107 S.Ct. 302, 93 L.Ed.2d 276 (1986). State v. Isaiah, 874 S.W.2d 429, 441 (Mo.App.1994); State v. Singh, 586 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Mo.App.1979).5
State v. Kelley, 953 S.W.2d 73 (Mo.App.S.D. 1997), discussed by the majority, concerned double or multiple hearsay and could have, but did not, turn on that basis. Kelley determines that some statements made to others were not relevant because the state of mind of the victim is irrelevant. Kelley may be correct because defendant apparently was not aware of the statements made by the victim. Had he been, then neither its logic nor its result was proper.6
*440Both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion by Judge Shrum manipulate or misconstrue the law and the facts here in a misguided effort to apply Kelley. The inapplicability of Kelley is logically explained in Judge Garrison’s dissent. Kelley relies, at least in part, on State v. Post, 901 S.W.2d 231 (Mo.App.1995). Post clearly indicates that the note is relevant as to motive and clarifies the difference between Kelley and this matter. Here, as Defendant was aware of the memo, it may have affected his actions. Post states, 901 S.W.2d at 236:
Under those facts the decedent’s particular state of mind that she was unhappy with her husband has no relevance. Nor does that state of mind become relevant to the issue of motive because the State provided no evidence that Defendant was aware of his wife’s intentions to obtain a divorce if indeed she did so intend.... In the absence of knowledge by Defendant of these intentions they do not have relevancy and were erroneously admitted.
The majority opinion indicates that it was the State, not the Defendant, who first injected the issue of the parties’ relationship. Defendant, however, first put the memo’s existence and content before the jury. No reference to the memo was made in the State’s opening statement. Following the State’s opening statement, Defendant’s attorney made an opening statement, mentioning the “good relationship” between the Revelles, stating that the memo was well over two- and-a-half years old, and that Defendant kept the memo to remind himself that he had to communicate with his wife. The attorney said it was found in a box of Defendant’s things, not Lisa Revelle’s.7
The majority opinion, by concluding that Defendant can complain on appeal of evidence that he first put before the jury, is contrary to the general rule that a “defendant cannot complain about matters that he himself brings into the case.” State v. Radley, 904 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Mo.App.1995).
Such a general rule was specifically applied in Bushong v. Marathon Electric Mfg. Corp., 719 S.W.2d 828 (Mo.App.1986). There, plaintiff filed a motion in limine seeking to keep out of evidence that a blood-alcohol test had been administered to plaintiff and the result of the test. The motion was denied in a pre-trial order. On the day of trial, plaintiffs counsel renewed the motion before the calling of veniremen for voir dire. The trial court again denied the motion. Thereafter, plaintiffs counsel, in opening statement, referred to the blood test and its result. This District concluded: “Plaintiff may not complain of the admission into evidence of the result of the blood test because plaintiffs counsel himself conveyed that information to the jury during his opening statement.”
In his concurring opinion, Judge Parrish seeks to distinguish Bushong, referring to the statement that a party who has introduced evidence may not complain. Judge Parrish fails to mention that the complaint in Bushong was two-fold: (1) the result of a blood test which plaintiff did not introduce into evidence but told the jury in his opening statement; and (2) evidence of plaintiffs drinking which he did introduce and which caused the court to refer to a party introducing evidence “concerning a certain fact.” It is the first contention, the result of the blood test, that caused Judge Flanigan, in writing for this District, to conclude that plaintiff could not complain because his attorney “conveyed that information to the jury during his opening statement.” Bushong states “plaintiff did not introduce into evidence the result of the blood test”.
A similar result occurred in Peters v. Henshaw, 640 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Mo.App.1982), a suit seeking damages for the wrongful death *441of plaintiffs wife. Following the denial of a motion in limine, plaintiffs counsel told the jury panel during voir dire that plaintiff had remarried. The court held in applying “the rule which has been applied for years in criminal eases,” that since a motion in limine cannot in and of itself be the basis of reversible error, plaintiff was required to await an attempt to introduce the evidence and then object, rather than bring it into the case himself.
When a spouse is charged with killing the other they would like to show, by inference or otherwise, a “good relationship,” as the Defendant here announced in his opening statement, he would and attempted to do. Should not contrary evidence be available to the jury. Amazingly, my colleagues say no.8
I see no point in lengthening this opinion by discussing the other cases cited by the majority, as a reading of them, as well as the majority’s discussion, establishes that they do not support excluding the note under these facts. Judge Garrison explains this in irrefutable reasoning in his dissenting opinion. I move to cases and authorities which are relevant here.
Certainly how the Defendant might have envisioned his wife’s state of mind is relevant, as he may have acted upon it. Trial courts have discretion in determining relevancy. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 457 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 837, 115 S.Ct. 118, 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994). “Parties generally have wide latitude in developing evidence of motive.” Id. Where the Defendant claims innocence, evidence of motive is relevant. Id. See also Boliek, 706 S.W.2d at 850 (admission of evidence that victim feared defendant was going to kill her not an abuse of discretion); State v. Ivory, 916 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Mo.App.1995)(hearsay evidence relevant as to motive); State v. Herington, 520 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Mo.App.1975)(hearsay statements relevant as they may have formed the basis for subsequent actions); People v. Jones, 293 Mich. 409, 292 N.W. 350 (1940)(letter admissible to show motive to commit assault).
When a spouse is charged with murdering a spouse, evidence of the relationship and affection or lack thereof is allowed in Missouri (and apparently all other common-law jurisdictions), including out-of-court statements which may reflect this. In discussing exceptions to the hearsay rule, VI WigmoRE, Evidence, § 1730, p. 150 (Chadbourn rev. 1976), states:
A special application is also found in actions for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, divorce, or wife murder, where the state of affections of the wife to the husband, or of the husband to the wife, becomes material. Here the declarations of the person as to her or his own state of affections are admissible under the present principle. In most instances, such expressions are chiefly useful in an indirect or circumstantial way only [citations omitted]; ... and it is said merely that declarations made at a time when there was no motive to deceive are admissible, [emphasis in original]9
Cited following the above quote are numerous decisions in Missouri and elsewhere, including those where writings of the victim were offered. Missouri has long allowed the *442evidence which the majority opinion excludes. In State v. Callaway, 154 Mo. 91, 55 S.W. 444, 450 (1900), a man was charged with the murder of his wife. The court there stated: “Anything tending to show want of affection, whether on the part of one or both of the parties, is competent on the grounds of disclosing motive_” See also Commonwealth v. Barnak, 357 Pa. 391, 54 A.2d 865, 876 (1947): “When any defendant is charged with murder, evidence of the prior relationship between him and his alleged victim is always relevant.”
In State v. Danforth, 654 S.W.2d 912 (Mo.App.1983), the defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit the capital murder of her husband. The husband was found dead prior to the charges brought against defendant. Appealing from her conviction, defendant contended that certain statements attributed to her husband were hearsay and were improperly admitted. The court stated that the evidence was offered to show the decedent’s state of mind, and was relevant as it supported testimony that defendant wanted her husband killed on a certain date “because she thought if she did not sleep with him that night he would cut her out of his will.” Id. at 921. See also Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804, 810 (8th Cir.1981)(“Under Missouri law the declarations of the decedent in a homicide case are admissible to prove the decedent’s state of mind where that is relevant.”).
In State v. O’Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 616 P.2d 1383 (1980), defendant was found guilty of manslaughter in the death of his wife. On appeal, he argued that a letter written by his wife to a friend was improperly admitted into evidence. The decedent stated in the letter that her marriage was failing and that she intended to seek a divorce, and that defendant was opposed to a divorce and their separation. The court determined that statements made by the victim were admissible under the state-of-the-mind exception to the hearsay rule, concluding that “[tjhere is no doubt that the state of the O’Daniel marriage was critical to the prosecution in proving the motive or intent issue.” Id. at 1389.
In State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342 (Mo.banc 1997), defendant was hired by Richard DeCaro to kill Elizabeth DeCaro, Richard’s wife. Two witnesses testified to statements of the victim reflecting in part on the relationship of the marriage. In rejecting the contention that this evidence was improper, at 357, the Missouri Supreme Court said:
The apparent purpose of offering the statements of Elizabeth DeCaro was not to prove the truth of her statements, but to show that the DeCaro’s marital relationship was breaking up and, further, that Elizabeth had knowledge of the insurance fraud scheme involving the van. Her attitude toward Richard and knowledge of his criminal involvement were relevant to establish Richard DeCaro’s motive to murder Elizabeth. Out of court statements offered to prove knowledge or state of mind of the declarant are not subject to a hearsay objection. [Citing cases.]
Contrary to the statement in Judge Shrum’s concurring opinion that “Basile is markedly different from this case,” because in Basile the questioned testimony “was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted,” Basile is actually very similar. In this case, one of the reasons the State indicated it offered the memo was to show Lisa’s state of mind regarding her marriage, a well-established exception to the hearsay rule. Basile directly contradicts the majority’s assertion that the memo was not admissible on the issue of motive.10
In his concurring opinion, Judge Shrum acknowledges that “the dissents makes a compelling argument ... on the issue of motive,” that “the memo is relevant.” The parties briefed this issue, and the majority opines: “[W]e hold that otherwise inadmissible hearsay cannot be admitted under the state of mind exception as direct evidence of Defendant’s state of mind or a true indication of Defendant’s motive.” When the majority opinion discusses issues briefed, how can this concurring opinion claim that the dissents, in *443discussing the same issues, go outside the record? The concurring opinion necessarily concludes that when the majority opinion discusses an issue it is proper, but when the dissents do so, they go outside the record and the issues presented. If so, the dissents are following the lead of the majority. The simple answer to this, as earlier noted, is that the parties and the majority opinion ignore the issue before the trial court: whether the memo was too remote to be presented to the jury. Its truth or relevance was never doubted. By his comments, Defendant vouched for both.
In Defendant’s brief, he acknowledges that there “is no doubt that: (1) The appellant recognized the note when Officer Rogers first showed it to him; and (2) that as a result of the note Mr. Revelle worked harder to maintain a strong relationship with his wife.” Obviously, Defendant believed the facts reflected in the memo, had a long talk with his wife regarding it, and may have acted on those facts. Defendant was admittedly aware of the memo and kept it to remind himself to communicate with his wife. He said things had gotten “better,” but apparently were not “perfect,” as he had first said. The jury could thus find that the victim’s thoughts as reflected in the memo, and as envisioned by the Defendant, continued until her death.11
Nevertheless, the majority, in their opinion, find that the memo was not relevant for “state of mind or a true indication of motive,” or apparently for any other purpose. When evidence reflects that a person steals from his employer and his neighbors, is in financial difficulty, and has life insurance paying one million dollars on the decedent, should not the jury also know that the marriage may have problems? By their opinion, the majority have established a rule contrary to most, and I believe all, reported decisions regarding the relationship of a defendant and the victim.
The majority opinion states: “In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that evidence of marital break-up or threats is admissible and is probative of a defendant’s intent, motive, or culpability where proof is by non-hearsay.” By doing so, it determines relevance based on whether the evidence is hearsay. Whether evidence is “probative” of a defendant’s motive cannot depend on it being hearsay. It depends on relevance. The majority opinion thus confuses and improperly combines two separate considerations: hearsay and relevance. “Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it.” 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 259, p. 491 (1996). “Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue.” 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 198, p. 382-83 (1996).
Relevance is not determined by whether the evidence is hearsay. State-of-the-mind evidence is admissible, notwithstanding that it is hearsay, but is an exception to' the hearsay rule. Where such evidence bears upon the relationship of the defendant and the victim it is certainly relevant.
As stated in State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 925 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1098, 115 S.Ct. 1827, 131 L.Ed.2d 748 (1995), hearsay and relevance are not the same. Parker states that an objection on hearsay does not preserve the contention that hearsay is not relevant. See also State v. Foust, 920 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Mo.App.1996)(trial court erred in excluding hearsay as irrelevant where objection was “hearsay,” not relevance).
The distinction between the rule against hearsay and relevance is discussed in Mash v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 341 S.W.2d 822, 827 (Mo.1960). The court there stated that if the hearsay rule does not apply, evidence “may or may not be received, according as it has any relevancy in the case; but if it is not received this is in no way due to the Hearsay rule.” (quoting from VI Wigmore, EVIDENCE, § 1766, p. 250). The court concluded:
Under this principle, and considering the purpose for which the statement was offered, its admissibility was governed not *444by whether it was hearsay, but by whether it had any relevancy in the case. Consequently the hearsay objection was not well taken, and it not having been objected to on the grounds of want of relevancy, we are not called upon to decide whether it was or was not relevant.
The majority opinion states that evidence of marital problems “is admissible and is probative of a defendant’s intent, motive, or culpability where proof is by non-hearsay,” but does not explain why evidence that is an exception to the hearsay rule covering the same subject has different relevancy considerations than non-hearsay evidence. Obviously, there is no explanation.
Evidence is either relevant or it is not. Whether it is hearsay may affect its admissibility but cannot change its relevancy.12
Evidence is relevant or not, irrespective of whether it is hearsay. For example: (1) “I saw Joe shoot Bill;” (2) “Bob told me he saw Joe shoot Bill.” Both are relevant, but (2) is obviously hearsay and inadmissible.
Where hearsay may be involved, as it is in this matter, the question of admissibility is a two-step process (in either order): (1) Is it hearsay or an exception to the hearsay rule? (2) Is it relevant? Whether it is relevant has no relationship to whether it is hearsay or is barred by the hearsay rule. The steps are obviously separate and independent of each other and are related only because certain evidence may be questioned by both relevance and hearsay. Relevancy is not dependent upon whether the evidence is hearsay, nor is the reverse true. Evidence can be an exception to the hearsay rule and be irrelevant but evidence cannot be, as the majority opinion concludes, irrelevant because it is hearsay.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion reaches that conclusion. Let us look at it further: (1) Suppose Lisa Revelle survived and a charge of attempted murder was brought against Defendant. She testifies as to the contents of the memo and that she gave it to Defendant and they had a detailed discussion regarding it. Obviously, there is no hearsay objection possible as she personally testifies. The contents of the document are, of course, relevant, as they pertain to the marital relationship.
Now, this situation: ■ Lisa Revelle, in a memo found after her death, strongly indicates that she is unhappy "with her marriage. This is within the state-of-the-mind exception (one of the theories the State mentioned in discussing the admissibility of the memo). No bar of the hearsay rule here. The next question is: Is it relevant? Of course, as it goes to the relationship of the marriage and Defendant’s attempt to mislead the investigating officers regarding that relationship.
The contents of the memo are either relevant or they are not. If they were relevant if Lisa survived and testified about it, then they are relevant where she did not. Under either scenario, the memo is not more relevant in one instance than the other, and in both the memo is admissible. It is hearsay where she does not take the stand, but the hearsay rule is no bar. As the authorities above-outlined establish, and as Judge Shrum’s concurring opinion also suggests, the memo’s relevance can hardly be questioned.
Any contention that the memo was used for a purpose other than the purpose received is not before us. Where Defendant contemplates that evidence may be used or is being used for improper purposes his “remedy ... lies not on appeal but in requesting a limiting instruction from the trial court.” State v. Hubbard, 659 S.W.2d 551, 557 (Mo.App.1983). See also State v. McClure, 504 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Mo.App.1974)(to prevent prejudice, a party may seek instruction limiting the extent to which, and the purpose for which, the jury may consider evidence). No such request was made here regarding the memo, nor, as Judge Shrum’s concurring opinion suggests, was Defendant ever “effectively” or otherwise denied an opportunity to do so.
*445In his concurring opinion, Judge Shram concludes that it was “understandable” why no limiting instruction was requested, “because it does not appear that anyone at trial understood that Lisa’s memo was not being offered to prove the truth of its contents.” What this concurrence fails to say is that everyone at tidal “understood” that, aside from the illegal search contention, there was but one issue as to the memo, whether it was too remote. There was no issue as to whether or not it was being offered to prove the truth of its contents. It was, however, as Judge Garrison explains in his dissent, admissible whether or not it was true. This was obviously “understood” by Defendant’s counsel, and the only issue presented in his Amended Motion in Limine was that it was “remote hearsay.” At the hearing on the motion, the State suggested that the memo was admissible to show that Defendant misled the investigators, as he acknowledged that he did, and for “state of mind.” Neither then nor when the memo was introduced did Defendant make any argument or contention contrary to either theory.
The concurring opinion by Judge Shram refers to Defendant’s Motion in Limine, quoting the motion that the memo was “hearsay.” That motion was filed and a hearing held on January 19, 1996, eighteen days before the memo was formally admitted. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court denied the motion as to the memo. No record of that hearing was filed here. Only in that motion is there unmodified reference to the memo being hearsay. Even if the initial Motion in Limine raised a proper “hearsay” objection it preserved no error when the memo was offered eighteen days later. See State v. Blackman, 875 S.W.2d 122, 143 (Mo.App.1994)(following the denial of a motion in limine, to preserve error on appeal, “defendant was required to object on the appropriate ground at the time the evidence was offered”). See also State v. Tidwell, 888 S.W.2d 736., 740 (Mo.App.1994)(following the denial of a motion to suppress, “to preserve the issue ... a specific objection” must be made when items are offered); State v. Dwyer, 847 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Mo.App.1992)(following a ruling on a motion in limine, the parties must proceed “as if no in limine ruling had been made”).
“[I]t is required that any objection to evidence be sufficiently clear and definite so that the court will understand the reason for the objection.” State v. Bartholomew, 829 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo.App.1992). “An objection which covers a broad range of situations which are not readily apparent, does not preserve error.” Id.
On January 24, 1996, Defendant filed a “First Amended Motion in Limine,” contending that the memo was “remote hearsay.” On January 31, 1996, the court held a hearing on Defendant’s Motion for Continuance and after denying the motion announced it was sustaining the Motion in Limine as to the memo and advised that before attempting to offer the memo, “the State will need to make a record outside the hearing of the jury.” That hearing occurred after the trial commenced, the day before the memo was introduced. There, the trial judge stated he had read the motion and the only issue was “remoteness.” The next day when the memo was offered Defendant’s counsel stated, “No objection other than what’s already on the record previously....” The trial court may well have construed this to cover the motion to suppress due to an illegal search of the house, or remoteness, but nothing further. For further details on Defendant’s amended motion in limine, see note 3, infra.
With all due respect to my colleagues, they are caught up in semantics as to what is hearsay and how the hearsay rule is applied, and have failed to properly analyze the law, this record, and to consider the practicalities and common sense of this matter. Four of the majority, in agreeing with Judge Shrum, believe: “If Defendant is re-tried, Lisa’s memo may be admissible depending on how it is submitted and used.” Thus, the majority reverses and remands for a new trial when at least four of them acknowledge that on retrial the evidence should be the same. Where, then, is the error?
No reason has been presented or exists indicating that disharmony in the marriage is not relevant. The jurors should know, in considering whether Defendant murdered his wife, the evidence as to the condition of the *446marriage. Contrary to the above authorities, logic, and common sense, the majority opinion concludes: “Given the facts of this case, Lisa’s state of mind ‘as to her belief in the future of the marriage’ and ‘as to her future relations with [Defendant]’ had no relevance.”
As Defendant received a fair trial, with no error in the respects briefed or otherwise, I would affirm the conviction.
. Judge Shrum's concurring opinion states that the majority opinion does not say "that the condition of the Revelle marriage 'had no. relevance' under all circumstances." I agree with that. The majority opinion concludes that the condition of the marriage “had no relevance” where Defendant was charged with killing his wife. Innumerable other circumstances could exist, but are not before us.
. Memo
To: George
From: Lisa
Maybe this is the only form you will read—like an office memo. I can’t seem to tell you anything without feeling your anger so I’ll try to write down my feelings.
I am very scared about our marriage and our family. I can’t continue living this way. I'm afraid of you—afraid of your anger and your silence! I find myself telling the kids not to bother you. I find myself tiptoeing around the house and I won’t do it any more. Life's too short for this garbage. If you can’t talk to me then find someone you can talk to.
Your indecision about your job, our home, everything right now has nothing to do with me—find out why you're stalling. I don’t want a big new home or a Mercedes or a Highland membership. I only want someone who loves me and accepts me as I am. I need someone who cares what I think and wants me to be a part of his life. What do you want?
I’ve often thought that it would be easier if you were having an affair—at least that would be something tangible I could deal with but I don't know how to deal with this. I've tried to give you time but nothing happens and you don’t seem to want it to change. You probably don’t even believe anything is wrong.
Just to live in a house together isn’t enough. I try to find out about your work but you give me one or two word replies. When did you ever ask me about my summer school classes? I want to be a part of your life and maybe you don’t care about mine but at least be honest enough to tell me!
I’m hurt and alone and the kids feel it too. I see Stan shutting down his feelings too and it makes me sad. Candice is just plain angry and I know she can feel my pain and your anger.
I will always love you but I won’t live with you like this.
.According to the record, the trial court interpreted the sole issue regarding the memo to be remoteness. That appears to be an accurate assessment. In Defendant's amended motion in limine, he states that the memo "constitutes remote hearsay” and “requests a hearing out of the jury's presence, requiring the State to prove that the evidence is not remote in time.” At such a hearing, evidence was presented by the State and Defendant. The trial court interrupted the State’s argument as to why the memo was relevant, because of misleading the investigators, stating that the only issue is "remoteness.” Hearing that, the State then announced it would forego argument about the state-of-mind "and things of that nature.” Counsel for Defendant neither corrected the court’s assumption nor made any objection or argument regarding "hearsay.” The trial court then correctly determined that the time, weight and probative value of the memo was for the juiy. When the memo was offered, Defendant’s attorney stated, "No objection other than what’s already on the record previously, judge.”
. Judge Shrum’s concurring opinion agrees that the evidence of Defendant’s reaction when confronted with the memo was relevant. As an integral part of that evidence, the memo should be admissible. The concurring opinion then concludes that "the State’s failure to brief 'consciousness of guilt’ ... indicates that it knew the memo was not admissible under that theory." The decision here cannot be considered on such an assumption. Defendant, as Appellant, had the burden to show error in the trial court. The State is not required to brief anything or even to file a brief.
. Some of the cases indicate that state of mind is not hearsay, but an examination of Wigmore hereinafter cited shows that such evidence is hearsay but is. nevertheless admissible, as not barred by the hearsay rule. Such evidence is usually offered not for the truth of the facts which the person thought but for the truth that those thoughts existed.
. However, when there is a problem in a marriage, is it not unusual to conclude that only one *440spouse knew of it? Kelley, as does the majority here, turns on relevancy. By admitting the memo may be relevant, Judge Shrum’s concurring opinion distinguishes and is inconsistent with both Kelley and the majority opinion which relies on Kelley to conclude that the memo "had no relevance.” I admire Judge Shrum’s tenacity, although misguided attempt, to support Kelley. Unfortunately to that end, he raises issues inconsistent with this record.
. The majority opinion, as initially circulated, failed to note that Defendant first mentioned the memo to the jury. Following this dissent’s circulation, the majority opinion was changed to reflect that fact.
. The concurring opinion by Judge Shrum refers to my initial reference to the jury system, ignores the authorities cited after that statement, and concludes: “consistent adherence to the law of evidence is essential to maintaining confidence in the jury system.” Yet later, contrary to the majority opinion, seems to agree that "adherence to the law of evidence" makes the memo admissible as to motive, a theory briefed by the parties and rejected by the majority opinion. Such candid admission by Judge Shrum fortifies my admiration of his integrity. Questions remain, however, of his reasoning in this matter.
. Obviously and logically, to be an "exception” to the hearsay rule, the evidence must be hearsay but admissible, irrespective of the general rule. Otherwise it would be outside the rule, not an "exception” to the rule. Judge Shrum’s concurring opinion emphasizes that because in oral arguments before this Court the State agreed that the memo was "hearsay,” it was inadmissible. The State could hardly dispute that it was hearsay. Clearly it was. What else could the statement of a deceased victim to a murder be in a trial for one accused of murdering her? The question is not whether it is hearsay, but is it admissible, as were numerous and less relevant statements of murder victims in cases herein cited.
. Basile also supports Judge Shrum’s apparent agreement with the dissents that the memo is relevant for motive.
. Remoteness of the note was for the trial court and jury. See State v. Hodge, 655 S.W.2d 738, 744 (Mo.App.1983)(conduct and statements of defendant as far back as 17 months from hired assault on ex-wife admissible in discretion of trial judge).
. The majority opinion states: “|T]he general rule is that extrajudicial statements of a declar-ant-victim’s present state of mind are excepted from the hearsay ban, provided the declarant's state of mind at the time is an issue in the case.” It then concludes that “Lisa’s state of mind 'as to her belief in the future of the marriage’ and 'as to her future relations with [Defendant]’ had no relevance.” How then can anyone say the majority opinion did not turn on relevancy?