dissenting.
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), the Supreme Court said we should approach criminal collateral estoppel “with realism and rationality.” Because the majority departs from reality to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, I must dissent.
I.
First, it must be made clear that the majority opinion never addresses the grounds for review.1 Appellee contends the Court of Appeals erred in re-affirming the holding in Burrows v. Texas Dept of Public Safety, 740 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1987, no pet.). The Court of Appeals relied on Burrows to hold collateral estoppel could not arise from an administrative proceeding. State v. Brabson, 899 S.W.2d 741, 745 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995).
When dealing with this issue, it is important to remember the applicability of collateral estoppel does not depend on the mere “label” of the proceeding. Rather, we look to determine if the proceeding was conducted in a judicial capacity. In Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), we held:
... When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose.
*191Tarver, 725 S.W.2d at 199 (citing, United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Company, 384 U.S. 394, 421-422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1559-1560, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966).). See also, State v. Groves, 837 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
Recently, in State v. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), this Court considered the issue presented in the instant ease, namely whether an administrative license revocation proceeding can have collateral es-toppel affect in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Id., 947 S.W.2d at 258. In Aguilar, a majority of the Court followed the rationale of Ashe and Tarver and held an administrative hearing could have collateral estoppel effect on a later criminal proceeding. Id., 947 S.W.2d at 259 (“Importantly, the collateral estoppel protection — given effect through the double jeopardy clause — may have application even if one of the proceedings under analysis is labeled ‘civil’ or ‘administrative.’ ”).2
Because Tarver and Aguilar clearly hold the determination of a factual issue at an administrative hearing may be used to collaterally estop the State in a subsequent criminal proceeding, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Burrows was misplaced. Consequently, the majority errs in not addressing the grounds for review and disavowing the holding in Burrows.
II.
Initially, the majority holds, “[t]he Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are not the same parties.” Ante at 496. This holding is based upon a confusion which leads the majority to intertwine criminal and civil collateral es-toppel.3 When this confusion is exposed, one can see that the majority’s holding is contradicted by a wealth of authority from this Court and the United States Supreme Court.
A.
It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court separates collateral estoppel into two distinct categories, criminal and civil. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 2007, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980). The doctrine of collateral estoppel has its roots in civil law, using the property right of the parties in determining privity. However, because criminal collateral estoppel emanates from the Double Jeopardy Clause, the focus is not on the parties but rather the sovereign against the defendant. If it were not the sovereign attempting to relitigate the issues, the roots of criminal collateral estoppel would not be in double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy provides that no sovereign can make a person “subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5. However, *192sovereigns are not barred by the Fifth amendment from seeking a conviction already tried by another sovereign. For instance, a federal conviction does not bar a state conviction, a foreign state conviction does not bar a federal conviction, and a state conviction does not bar another state’s conviction. This is the doctrine of “Dual Sovereignty.”
B.
“The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the government.” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87-89, 106 S.Ct. 433, 437, 88 L.Ed.2d 387 (1985). The same conduct can violate the laws of two distinct sovereigns and, therefore, be considered two separate offenses. The “crucial determination is whether the two entities that seek successively to prosecute a defendant for the same course of conduct can be termed separate sovereigns.” Id.
... This determination turns on whether the two entities draw their authority to punish the offender from distinct sources of power. Thus, the Court has uniformly held that the States are separate sovereigns with respect to the Federal Government because each State’s power to prosecute is derived from its own “inherent sovereignty,” not from the Federal Government ... The States are no less sovereign with respect to each other than they are with respect to the Federal Government. Their powers to undertake criminal prosecutions derive from separate and independent sources of power and authority originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment.
Id., at 88-89, 106 S.Ct. at 437-438.4 The Court further stated: “In those instances where the Court has found the dual sovereignty doctrine inapplicable, it has done so because the two prosecuting entities did not derive their powers to prosecute from independent sources of authority.” Id., at 90, 106 S.Ct. at 438.
Therefore, in the context of criminal collateral estoppel, for the majority’s logic to hold water, the Department of Public Safety (DPS) and the Dallas County District Attorney would have to be two separate sovereigns.
C.
Both the DPS and the district and county attorneys garner their prosecutorial strength from the Constitution and statutes of the State of Texas.5 Therefore, they are entities “emanating from the same sovereignty.” Heath, 474 U.S. at 90, 106 S.Ct. at 438 (1985) (citing, Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 264, 58 S.Ct. 167, 172, 82 L.Ed. 235 (1937)). As entities of the same sovereign they derive their power from the same “organic law.” Ibid.
In Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 391—392, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 1187, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970), the State of Florida attempted to prosecute an individual under State law after he had been prosecuted for the same conduct in a municipal proceeding. Florida argued the subsequent prosecution was permissible because the municipality and the State were separate sovereigns. The Court considered whether two courts within one State could place a defendant on trial for the same alleged crime. Id., at 389-391, 90 S.Ct. at 1186. The Supreme Court rejected this theory, finding the judicial power from each entity emanated from the same source.
... Political subdivisions of States — counties, cities, or whatever — never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental entities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental functions.
*193Id., at 392, 90 S.Ct. at 1187 (citing, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1388, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)). The Court has further noted “any power [the municipality] has to define and punish crimes exists only because such power has been granted by the State; the power derives from the source of [its] creation.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1085, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978)(citing Mount Pleasant v. Beck-with, 100 U.S. 514, 524, 25 L.Ed. 699).
According to the tenets of dual sovereignty, each sovereign derives its power from a different constitutional source. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194, 79 S.Ct. 666, 670, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959). Almost sixty years ago the United States Supreme Court in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940), held:
... There is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the [government] is res judicata in relit-igation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government. The crucial point is whether or not in the earlier litigation the representative of the [government] had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy.
Id., 310 U.S. at 402-403, 60 S.Ct. at 917 (citations omitted).
D.
The case law is abundantly clear, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) is not a sovereign, in and of itself. Clearly, the Department of Public Safety comes under the umbrella of the sovereign State of Texas. Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Perez, 905 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1995); City of Beverly Hills v. Guevara, 886 5.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex.App. — Waco 1994); and, Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Martin, 882 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1994). In operating as a law enforcement agency, the DPS is performing a governmental function. Ellis v. City of West University Place, 171 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1943); Cronen v. Nix, 611 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1980); and, City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 658 (Tex.1994). Therefore, the DPS represents the State of Texas in its actions and is treated as the State of Texas in its defense.
Indeed, the Texas Department of Public Safety has been established by statute as an agency of this State. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 411.002(a) (Vernon 1990). See, n. 5, supra. And with regard to lawsuits, an agency of the State is generally treated as the equivalent of the State itself. See, Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976); Texas Department of Public Safety v. Richardson, 384 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex.1964) (DPS is officer of this State); and, Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Casselman, 417 S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex.1967).6
E.
The Supreme Court held: “collateral es-toppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. Ashe requires an intimate analysis of the issue to see if the issue is the same as the defendant seeks to foreclose from future prosecution. This inquiry into the issue must be done in a practical frame work and viewed with all the circumstances of the proceeding. Ibid.
Ashe did not address the “parties argument” because that is not the issue in a criminal collateral estoppel. It is axiomatic in criminal collateral estoppel that the same party is seeking re-litigation. Taken in light of Waller, supra, it is clear the individual entities of the State do not immunize the State from criminal collateral estoppel. *194There is no doubt the Supreme Court had this in mind when they handed down Ashe and Waller on the same day. The Court went on to say: “... [a]ny test more technically restrictive, would of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings ...” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194.
Additionally, this Court recognizes criminal collateral estoppel applies to the sovereign:
... To state the distinction in more prosaic terms, the traditional bar of double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact of the crime.
Dedrick v. State, 623 S.W.2d 332, 336 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (citing United States v. Mock, 604 F.2d 341 (5th Cir.1979). Ashe mandates only two inquires in criminal collateral estop-pel:
First, what facts were necessarily determined in the first law suit? Second, has the government in a subsequent trial tried to relitigate facts necessarily established against it in the first trial?
Id., at 336. Making it abundantly clear, criminal collateral estoppel bars the reintroduction or relitigation of fact already established against the sovereign. Ibid.; see also, Ladner v. State, 780 S.W.2d 247, 251-252 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 443 — 146, 90 S.Ct. at 1194-1196) (the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits the State from relitigating issues); Ex parte Byrd, 752 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (the State is thereafter precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel); Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (collateral estoppel prevents the State from relitigating); Ex parte Mathes, 830 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (collateral estop-pel precludes the State from relitigating); Neaves v. State, 767 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.Cr. App.1989) (applying collateral estoppel only where the State litigated the issues); Padgett v. State, 717 S.W.2d 55,57 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (collateral estoppel precludes the government from relitigating issues); and, United States v. Nelson, 599 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir.1979) (collateral estoppel forbids the government from relitigating certain facts).
And, to be directly on point, we have previously held the DPS and a district or county attorney are the same sovereign. In Tharp v. State, 935 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), we considered a double jeopardy claim that the suspension of a driver’s license by the DPS was punishment which jeopardy barred a criminal DWI prosecution. We reached the merits of the argument and held there was no jeopardy bar because a driver’s license suspension does not constitute punishment. Similarly, in Voisinet v. State, 935 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.Cr.App.1996), we held the statute providing for administrative license revocation and the statute governing the offense of driving while intoxicated defined the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See also, Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (Montana Department of Revenue was the same sovereign as the criminal prosecutor for jeopardy purposes.); and, Stennett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 914 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts and the Harris County District Attorney were same sovereign for jeopardy purposes.).
Judge Womack offers a concurring opinion in disagreement with this position. Interestingly, he cites only civil cases for support. When forced to recognize that the cases discussed above hold the DPS and the prosecutor are the same sovereign, he suggests these holdings are not controlling because the word “party” is not mentioned in these opinions. Ante, at 498. What Judge Wom-ack fails to recognize is that every opinion necessarily makes many implicit holdings. For example, most opinions do not contain the word “jurisdiction.” Would Judge Wom-ack, therefore, argue that because the word “jurisdiction” was not in the opinion, the court lacked jurisdiction?7 A truer reading *195of those cases would reveal that their holdings could not have been reached had we not implicitly held the DPS and the prosecutor were the same sovereign. Had we held otherwise, we would not have addressed the issues of whether the offenses were the same, Voisinet, supra, or whether the driver’s license suspension was punishment, Tharp, supra. Because the prosecution emanated from the same sovereign, we did not need to address the issue of parties, nor for that matter, the issue of dual sovereignty.8
F.
In conclusion, it is clear the majority confuses criminal and civil collateral estoppel and in doing so either ignores or fails to grasp the holdings of the cases from both the United States Supreme Court and this Court which dictate a different holding.9
III.
Recognizing the absurdity of the not-the-same-party argument, the majority quickly abandons that position and holds the issue of probable cause was not properly before the administrative agency.
First, it is important to remember the State did not appeal the decision of the justice court. If the State believed the resolution of the probable cause issue was erroneous, the remedy was to appeal that determination. See, Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6687b, § 22(e). But, the State chose not to appeal and the majority errs in advancing the argument for the State.
Nevertheless, there is precedent from this Court which holds the probable cause issue was properly before the justice court. In Neaves v. State, 767 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989), we found the Legislature required the administrative judge to determine probable cause because it was unfair to suspend one’s driver’s license when there was never probable cause to arrest for DWI. We stated:
... We can think of no other explanation for this [probable cause] requirement but that the legislature believed it would be untenable to penalize a D.W.I. suspect who refuses to submit a specimen under circumstances that could not constitutionally justify his arrest for that offense.
Id., 767 S.W.2d at 786.
Again, in State v. Groves, 837 S.W.2d 103, we held an administrative license revocation can have a collateral estoppel effect on the subsequent criminal trial. However, we could not decide whether that particular administrative hearing had collateral estoppel effect because there was “nothing in the record to indicate that the issue of probable cause to arrest the appellee had been previously litigated (as there is nothing indicating that the justice court concluded that there was an absence of probable cause), there was no collateral estoppel bar to litigating that issue in the instant cause.” Id., at 106 (Emphasis added.).10
Additionally, as noted above, in Voisinet, supra, this Court held the two offense were the same for jeopardy purposes. To be the same offense, the elements and, therefore, the issues are properly before both the trier *196of fact in the suspension hearing and the subsequent criminal proceeding.
IV.
Finally, the majority holds the issue of probable cause is not an issue of ultimate fact. Ante at 496. The majority fails to recognize the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not limited to issues of ultimate fact but applies to evidentiary facts as well. Dedrick v. State, 623 S.W.2d 332, 336 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209, 212-213 (5th Cir.1972); Blackburn v. Cross 510 F.2d 1014, 1018-1019 (5th Cir.1975). And, probable cause to arrest is both an ultimate fact and an evidentiary fact. Probable cause is an issue of ultimate fact in a motion to suppress hearing and an evidentia-ry fact in a DWI prosecution. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23. To hold otherwise is to show a complete ignorance of our law relating to pre-trial hearings, and our search and seizure jurisprudence.
V.
The majority has taken leave of its senses in order to rule for the State. Such result-oriented jurisprudence is odious in all respects and a disservice to the people of Texas. Accordingly, I dissent.
*197APPENDIX A
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*198APPENDIX B
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*199APPENDIX C
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. Appellee’s grounds for review state:
1) Did the court of appeals err in re-affirming its holding in Burrows v. Texas Dept. Of Public Safety, 740 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1987, no pet.) That the issue preclusion component of the collateral es-toppel doctrine cannot arise from administrative hearings on license revocation proceedings based on an accused’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test?
2) Did the court of appeals err in concluding that the record from the trial court did not show appellee was arrested where there are written findings from the justice court that appellee was arrested on the date alleged in the information and a police officer testified as to when he decided to arrest appellee?
3)Under the standard that a fact-finder may accept or reject all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, did the court of appeals err in nonetheless basing its opinion in part on the perceived truthfulness of a police officer’s "uncontroverted" testimony?
The majority offers no reason for ignoring the grounds for review. The majority goes so far as to set out the first ground of review in footnote one of their opinion, but then fails to address it. Instead of reaching the grounds upon which review was granted, the majority raises several issues of its own making. This is done because the author of the lead opinion, Judge McCormick, dissented in Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), which along with State v. Aguilar, 947 S.W.2d 257 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), control the instant case. See, infra. Therefore, to avoid stare decisis, Judge McCormick avoids the true issue and creates an argument out of thin air. There is no greater testament to judicial activism than when a judge takes a case, that is clearly dictated by prior case law, and conjures up an issue that neither party has raised or argued.
The parties who appear before this Court have every right to believe their issues will be resolved in a fair and impartial manner. Making decisions in this manner is the sole source of our credibility. When a majority of this Court reaches out to resolve issues not raised by the parties, the majority acts as partisan advocates, not as impartial jurists. Anson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 203, 208 n. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1997) (BAIRD and Overstreet, JJ., dissenting).
. It is interesting to note that three of the judges who comprised the majority in Aguilar, Price, Holland and Womack, now join the lead opinion which holds the complete opposite. Ante, at 496 ("Therefore, collateral estoppel principles do not preclude the Dallas County District Attorney from litigating the issue of probable cause for appellee’s arrest at the suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution."). Indeed, Judge McCormick’s lead opinion fails to even mention the existence of Aguilar. Yet Judges Price and Holland offer no explanation for their radical change of position. And Judge Womack, who offers a concurring opinion, does not explain his change of position. Certainly the bench and bar deserve better. Aguilar was decided but eight months ago yet today it is sub siliento overruled without any explanation. This is result-oriented jurisprudence at its worst!
. The majority’s analysis is as follows:
The first question we address is whether the parties in the administrative proceeding and the criminal prosecution are the same. The party that sought to revoke appellee’s driver's license in the administrative proceeding was the Texas Department of Public Safety. See Article 67011-5, Section 2(f). The Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are not the same parties. Therefore, collateral estoppel principles do not preclude the Dallas County Attorney from litigating the issue of probable cause for appellee's arrest at the suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution.
Ante, at 496.
The holding is restated to assist the reader in this evaluation. As the reader can see, the majority's holding is devoid of any analysis or reasoning. In his concurrence, Judge Womack recognizes the sparsity of Judge McCormick’s analysis and attempts to ride to the rescue and to give the lead opinion some feeling of logic. However, Judge Womack’s opinion also fails to appreciate the difference between criminal and civil collateral estoppel.
. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.
. Government Code § 411.002(a) provides:
The Department of Public Safety of the State of Texas is an agency of the state to enforce the laws protecting the public safety and provide for the prevention and detection of crime.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 2.01 provides: "Each district attorney shall represent the State in all criminal cases.... ”
. In the instant case, it could not be more clear that the DPS and the Dallas County District Attorney both represent the State of Texas. Attached as exhibits A and B are the findings of the justice court and the information, respectively. Both documents are entitled the State of Texas vs. William Harold Brabson, III. Although the Petition for Administrative Hearing that was filed in the justice court is titled "Texas Department of Public Safety v. Brabson,” it reads: "Now comes the State of Texas, acting by and through James R. Wilson Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety_” See, Exhibit C.
. Indeed, if the majority and the concurrence are correct, why is there not some reference to the parties issue in any of our cases addressing criminal collateral estoppel? See, State v. Groves, 837 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Ex parte Mathes, 830 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Ladner v. *195State, 780 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Sorola v. State, 769 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Garcia v. State, 768 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Ex parte Byrd, 752 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); State ex rel. Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Disheroon v. State, 687 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Meeks v. State, 653 S.W.2d 6 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983); Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); and, Dedrick v. State, 623 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
.Judge Womack argues there is no such mutuality between the DPS and the local prosecutor. However, collateral estoppel does not require mutuality of parties. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329, 99 S.Ct. 645, 650, 58 L.Ed.2d 552,(1979); and, Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex.1971).
. Interestingly, if a defendant is acquitted of the underlying DWI charge, any license suspension is rescinded; in effect, a "reverse” collateral estoppel effect by the DPS, recognizing the validity of the other court’s findings. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.015.
. Judge McCormick, who voted for the opinions in Groves and Neaves, now declares them to be pure dicta. Ante at 497. Such a declaration is utter nonsense. For a judge on this Court to create issues of his own choosing and in resolving those issues reduce to dicta two opinions for which he voted is the height of intellectual dishonesty.